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ABSTRACT
This study examines the origins of the N.I.R.A. (1933) with particular 
reference to its industrial planning features. It argues that the Act's 
form was influenced by the interplay of three strategies for national 
industrial planning which were current during the early years of the 
depression and of the attempts made to implement them as public policy.
Despite widespread support for the application of systematic planning 
to the economy, there was no agreement on how it should be conducted.
Three strategies for national industrial planning commanded support: 
'voluntary associationism', developed by President Hoover; 'trade 
associationism' promoted by the business community; and 'central planning* 
favoured by left-wing intellectuals and organised labour. Of these, 
only voluntary associationism achieved the status of public policy during 
Hoover's presidency, but its shortcomings prompted supporters of rival 
approaches to attempt to influence government policy. However, attempts 
to establish a national economic council and to amend the antitrust 
laws were unsuccessful. Hoover persisted with voluntary associationism 
until the end of his term of office despite its shortcomings, which 
were illustrated by the failure of The Share-the-Work Movement in 1933.
The politics of industrial planning had become deadlocked by 1933. 
Experimentation with alternative approaches was prevented by divisions 
amongst the planners themselves: in particular, the business community 
resisted an economic council, and President Hoover opposed changes in 
the antitrust laws. Roosevelt's election and the context of crisis 
in which he assumed office revived the prospects for the various 
approaches. Elements of each were included in the administration's 
Recovery Act, although trade associationism was dominant. Of the three 
strategies only the trade association movement had gained strength as 
the depression continued, and by 1933, it was not handicapped with 
either the stigma of failure or the liability of a limited constituency 
in its support.
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INTRODUCTION
(i) Economic Planning in the Context of the Depression, 1929-1933.
"It is a singular fact," the economist, Myron W. Watkins wrote in 1933,
"that economics has popular appeal, arouses widespread interest, only
when its dominant note is tragedy .... A 'dismal science' becomes at
least a subject of lively concern."^ Watkins referred to the upsurge
of interest in economic planning in the United States which was evident
in contemporary scholarly and popular texts, the impulse for which was
provided by the economic depression.
Empirical studies have confirmed the economist's opinion. Hornell
Hart's survey of 1933 into magazine attitudes to business conditions
noted an increasing interest during the early period of the depression
in both industrial stabilisation and economic planning. This interest
peaked during 1932, the point at which the same magazines were most
2pessimistic about the prospects of a business revival. Hart's findings 
were corroborated by a more comprehensive study of journal opinion which 
appeared in Social Forces in 1934. The survey covered the period, 1923- 
1934, and focussed on the interest in economic planning as revealed by 
164 leading periodicals. It discovered that the number of articles 
incorporating the word 'planning' in their titles increased from 188 in 
1929 (the high-point of the decade) to 401 by 1932, More recently, the
1. Myron W. Watkins, 'The Literature of the Crisis', Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 47 (May, 1933); 517.
2. Hart's findings were based on entries in the Reader's Guide to 
Periodical Literature and a sampling of a selection of large and 
medium circulation journals. Hornell Hart, 'Changing Opinions 
about Business Prosperity; A Consensus of Magazine Opinion in the 
U.S., 1929-1932'. American Journal of Sociology 38 (March, 1933): 
665-686.
3. The distribution of titles on 'planning' during the early years of 
the depression are as follows: 1930 - 210; 1931 - 365; 1932 — 401; 
1933 (first six months) - 197. Evelyn C. Brooks & Lee M. Brooks,
'A Decade of "Planning" Literature', Social Forces 12 (March, 1934): 
427-430.
2historian, Peter G. Filene, has correlated the number of books on Russia 
written by American authors with political and socio-economic develop­
ments in the United States and the Soviet Union. He has found that 
more books were published on Russian topics during 1931 and 1932 than 
in any one year since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and suggests 
that the reason lies in the impatience of Americans with the continuing 
economic depression. The deepening depression stimulated consideration 
of alternative forms of economic organisation which would furnish 
stability, and during the early depression the Soviet Five-Year Plan 
attracted particular attention.^
The gravity and persistence of the depression in the United States 
was the most powerful factor which stimulated interest in economic 
planning. Unemployment was the most poignant indicator of depressed 
business conditions and increased from 1,550,000 in 1929 to its depression 
peak of 12,830,000 in 1933. As a percentage of the civilian labour force, 
this represented an increase from 3.2 to 24.9% unemployed."* But if, 
as John A. Garraty suggests, unemployment was the most "tragic" and 
Ymjust" feature of the depression, the damaging effects on the business 
system itself should not be overlooked.^ In 1933 there were 252,000 
fewer business concerns in existence than in 1929. Of these, over 
100,000 represented failures, leaving considerable liabilities which 
amounted to $928 million in 1932 alone. In 1932 the business failure
4. Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933
(Cambridge, Mass., 1967): 287.
5. Ben J. Wattenberg (ed.), The Statistical History of the United States:
From Colonial Times to the Present (New York, 1976): 135.
6. John A. Garraty, Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and
Public Policy (New York, 1978): 188.
t
rate was 154 per 10,000 enterprises, the highest since 1 8 7 8 Those 
firms which remained in operation faced a shrinking market and declining 
prices for their products. Between 1929-1932 the Federal Reserve 
Board's index of manufacturing production shows a decline of almost 
50% while for the same years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics index of
g
wholesale prices shows a decline of nearly 30%. The dismal business 
situation was not revived by new capital issues which fell from 
$ 11,592.2 million in 1929 to $1,053.7 million in 1933.9
The tangible signs of economic downturn which can be expressed in 
statistical form do not account solely for the immense impact of the 
depression upon the American consciousness. A psychological dimension 
existed also, which was associated with American expectations in the 
1920s of continued growth and the possibility of realising an 'economy 
of abundance'.1^  The bitterness of thwarted ambitions combined with 
the severity of the depression provoked a reconsideration by many 
Americans of what Theodore Rosenof refers to as "the central tradition"; 
the equation between free enterprise and political liberties and the 
concept of the United States as a capitalist democracy. 11 While 
economic planning was not necessarily in opposition to this "central 
tradition", it seemed to some to promise the stable economic growth 
which free enterprise was unable to provide.
7. Wattenberg (ed.), Statistical History, op.cit., 912-913.
8 . Ibid., 199; 667.
9. Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade: From New Era through New Deal, 
1929-1941 (New York, 1969): 440.
10. Lester V. Chandler, America's Greatest Depression, 1929-1941 
(New York, 1970): 1.
11. Theodore Rosenof, Dogma, Depression and the New Deal: The Debate 
of Political Leaders over Economic Recovery (Port Washington,
New York, 1975): 10-12~.~
4Two other facets of the depression which historians have identified
helped to foster this increasing interest in economic planning during
the early years of the depression. The first was the emergence of the
'maturity thesis' which accepted that with the passing of the frontier
and the termination of unrestricted immigration, the expansionist phase
of capitalism in the United States had ended. Stress needed now to be
placed on stable development and the nurturing of consumptive rather 
. . 12than productive capacity. A second concept to emerge from the depres­
sion was the analogy drawn by reflective Americans between the business 
slump and wartime. Both William E. Leuchtenburg and Gerald D. Nash 
have noted the parallels made in the American mind and in government 
policy between wartime and peacetime crises. During the early period 
of the depression, reference to the surmounting of the crisis of 1917- 
1918 was comforting to many Americans who sensed that their nation's 
prior experience with crisis was didactic. As American involvement 
in war had demanded rationalisation, coordination, centralisation and 
a degree of regimentation to come to terms with the logistical demands 
of the war effort, so the same qualities were required to counter the 
business depression. Planners' frequent and favourable references to 
the War Industries Board, which served as the central coordinating 
agency for the war effort, illustrates the attraction of this analogy.
Finally, the depression was an international experience and the 
trend towards planned economy was not unique to the United States. 
Professor Garraty has suggested parallels between the American and
12. Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams; Culture 
and Social Thought in the Depression Years (New York, 1973): 75. 13*
13. William E. Leuchtenburg, 'The New Deal and the Analogue of War',
in John Braeman et al. (eds.), Change and Continuity in 20th 
Century America (New York, 1966): 81-143. Gerald D. Nash, 
'Experiments in Industrial Mobilization: WIB and NRA', Mid- 
America 45 (July, 1963): 157-174.
5European responses to the depression in the 1930s based on
increasing government intervention in the economy and the
participation of organised economic groups in modes of corporatist 
14planning. Experiments with economic planning in the Soviet 
Union provided a particular stimulus for American consideration 
of planning, according to Lewis S. Feuer, through the accounts 
of visiting Americans to Russia in the late 1920s and early 
1930s.^ The impulse towards economic planning in the 1930s 
was international and mutually reinforcing between autonomous 
nation states.
(ii) Economic Planning as a Concept
Advocates of planning sought to stabilise and regularise economic 
activity by introducing purposeful management into economic 
affairs. They perceived that economic planning was in opposition 
to laissez-faire in which the impartial forces of supply and 
demand determined the quality and rate of economic development, 
and they distinguished it from the type of ad hoc regulatory 
action - such as government tariff policy - which sought to 
secure specific goals but was not integrated into an overall 
framework of economic policy.
Jan Tinbergen notes that economic planning has three principal 
characteristics. It is anticipatory in that it refers to the future;
14. John A Garraty, 'The New Deal, National Socialism, and the 
Great Depression', American Historical Review 78 
(October, 1973): 907-944. 15
15. Lesis S. Feuer, 'Travelers to the Soviet Union, 1917-1932:
The Formation of a Component of New Deal Ideology',
American Quarterly 14 (Summer, 1962): 119rl49.
6it is based on specified aims which determine the planning
process, and it requires the coordination of economic policy
to achieve these aims. Essentially, the planning process involves
the reconciliation of planning aims with forecasts of future
economic developments and where the two do not coincide, adjusting
16policy accordingly. Planning can assume diverse forms and 
modes, may be directed to particular social or economic ends, 
involve differing degrees of control of the productive apparatus 
of an economy and is flexible in as far as the central decision­
making necessary to achieve planning objectives. In this latter 
category, Tinbergen stresses the choice between a centralised or 
decentralised structure in the planning procedure. Plans may be 
formulated by individual enterprises according to guidelines 
established by a central agency, or planning may be imposed on 
individual enterprises by the central agency. The choice often 
decides the democratic or elitist nature of planning by determining
the number of participants - "outside contacts" - in the planning 
17process.
The institutions which are involved in the planning process 
may influence the mode and objectives of planning and decide its 
egalitarian/authoritarian or centralised/decentralised structure.
Since 1930 the tendency has been for government to assume increasing 
responsibility for national planning, as the historian, Otis L. Graham 
certifies in his recent definition of macro-planning:
16. Jan Tinbergen, Central Planning (New Haven, 1964): 8-10.
17. Ibid, 16-18.
7Planning assumes that modern industrial society requires public 
intervention to achieve national goals; assumes that such 
intervention must touch all social developments; must be goal- 
oriented, and effectively consolidated at the center; must be 
anticipatory rather than characterized by ad hoc solutions 
and timing dictated by crisis.
However, the historian cannot assume inevitability in the historical 
process, particularly when alternative patterns of development suggest 
themselves. In the first years of the depression there was no 
consensus amongst proponents of planning about the role of government, 
the desirability of any "consolidation at the center", and the pervasive 
effect that planning should have on the social structure.
Various approaches to economic planning were championed during 
the early phase of the depression. The planning ambitions of some 
Americans were directed exclusively, for example, at achieving 
agricultural reform or regulating the public utilities. Others sought 
to use the Federal Government's fiscal and/or monetary powers to 
achieve economic stability. A further school of planning and the 
focus of this present study, emphasised the desirability and feasibility 
of a planned industrial system, in which the production aspects of 
industry would be regulated to even cyclical fluctuations in 
business activity and to serve social ends as well as private 
profit. This approach received its most emphatic expression during 
the depression in the National Industrial Recovery Act, a keystone 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt's legislative programme in 1933.
(iii) Economic Planning and the National Industrial Recovery Act 
It has become commonplace amongst historians to locate the emergence of 
national economic planning in the United States in the New Deal of the 
1930s which expanded "social management" of economic affairs and 18
18. Otis L. Graham, Jr., Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt 
to Nixon (New York, 1976): xii-xiii.
8capitalised on Americans' readiness to experiment with planning as
"a cure for economic imbalances". At the outset of the administration
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the New Deal was closest, in the metaphorical
sense, to a "laboratory" and experimentation with economic planning to
20produce industrial recovery was merely one of its various projects.
The centrepiece of early New Deal industrial planning was the National 
Recovery Administration (N.R.A.) which was created by the enabling 
legislation signed by President Roosevelt on 16 June 1933.
As William E. Leuchtenburg has noted, the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (N.I.R.A.) was an "omnibus proposal" which was kaleidoscopic 
in its various aspects and appeal to diverse interest groups. Labour 
gained the right of collective bargaining under Section 7 of the Act, 
together with the advantages of maximum hours and minimum wages stip­
ulated by the government. Deficit spenders were appeased by the 
inclusion of an appropriation of $3.3 billion for public works expendi­
ture under Title II of the Act. Business received government author­
isation to draft code agreements exempt from the antitrust laws which 
would facilitate the stabilisation of business by permitting business­
men, organised into trade groups, to eliminate destructive competition, 
restrict production, control entry into industry and protect capital 
investments. However, the Act was something more than the pragmatic 
product of an emergent broker state which bestowed its favours to 
privileged groups. In its general purpose the Act reflected a partic­
ular ideological position about how the business structure was to be 1920
19. Idem. 'The Planning Ideal and American Reality: the 1930s', in 
Stanley M. Elkins & Eric L. McKitrick (eds.), The Hofstadter Aegis: 
A Memorial (New York, 1974): 257. Byrd L. Jones, A Plan for 
Planning in the New Deal', Social Science Quarterly 50 (December, 
1969): 525.
20. Frank Freidel, FDR: Launching the New Deal (Boston, 1973): 434-435.
21. William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. 
1932-1940. (New York, 1963): 57-58.
9reformed and how economic recovery was to be achieved. On putting his 
signature to the measure President Roosevelt suggested that it repre­
sented "a supreme effort to stabilize for all time the many factors
which make for the prosperity of the Nation, and the preservation of
22American standards". Economic planning through the code formulation 
process was central to the achievement of the Act's recovery and reform 
objectives.
The aims of the Act, in terms of broad policy, were prescribed in 
its preamble. Obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign 
commerce were to be removed; cooperative action would be promoted 
between trade groups; "unfair competitive practices" in industry would 
be eliminated; consumption would be increased by stimulating purchasing 
power; unemployment would be reduced, and relieved; standards of 
labour would be improved and natural resources would be conserved.
The principal mechanism for achieving most of these ambitious aims, 
and the measure's integral conception of economic planning was contained 
in Title I of the Act.
Section 3 of the first Title provided the basic content of the law. 
Trade or industry groups would be allowed to formulate codes of fair 
competition for their respective sectors and present them to the President 
for his approval. Certain conditions were attached to the acceptance 
of codes. They had to incorporate the labour provisions enumerated 
elsewhere in the legislation and should not permit monopolies or mono­
polistic practices under their terms. Apart from these caveats the 
Act gave business a generous flexibility to design codes which would 
ensure 'fair' practices in industry and would help to stabilise their 
sectors, although the law did not specify what the codes should contain. 2*
22. Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols., (New York, 1938-1950) 2 ) 246.
(Hereafter cited as P.P.A.).
Under Section 5, approved codes were granted exemption from the anti­
trust laws, while Section 3(b) made them legally binding once approved. 
Violations of a code would be treated as misdemeanours within the 
meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. If trade groups 
failed to assume the initiative in drawing up codes, Section 3(d) 
permitted the President to prescribe codes for recalcitrant trades or 
industries. However, most significant of all the powers granted to 
the President under the terms of the Act were contained in Section 4(b).
This section authorised him to license business enterprises if it was
23deemed necessary to make effective a code of fair competition.
Although the Act was merely a piece of enabling legislation which 
committed the President to no definite policy and was vague with reference 
to the means by which its objectives would be achieved, it was clearly 
regarded by its sponsors as a deviation from past governmental approaches 
to economic policy and a first step to committing the Federal Government 
to pervasive intervention in the economy and fostering stable economic 
growth through national planning. Roosevelt himself inferred such 
sentiments on 16 June, 1933, when he declared: "History probably will 
record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most important and
n  /
far-reaching legislation enacted by the American Congress".
The boldness of this intended re-direction of economic policy away 
from the traditional channels of competitive individualism has been of 
particular interest to historians in recent years. Scholars have sought 
to examine the Act and the Administration which it created with a view 
to understanding the sources and nature of economic planning under the 
N.R.A. Current historical scholarship is dominated by the conceptual­
isations of Ellis W. Hawley whose historical method is to isolate
23. U.S. National Recovery Administration, A Handbook of N.R.A.:
Laws, Regulations, Codes (Washington, D.cV, 1933): 9-25. 24
24. P.P.A.T op.cit, 2: 246.
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economic tendencies and establish their relationship to public policy.
In his The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (1966), Professor Hawley
described the N.R.A. as the "triumph of industrial self-government"
and the Act that created it as being heavily influenced by business
theorists who stressed the virtues of the "associational" approach to
planning and the role of private trade associations in the economic
planning process. Robert F. Himmelberg has accepted that trade
associationism was the central feature of the recovery measure in his
recent study, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration (1976),
which rigorously traces this approach to economic planning back to the
Great War. Essentially, he views the N.I.R.A. as the culmination of
a movement which waxed and waned during the 1920s according to political
circumstances, but survived to take advantage of the depression crisis
26to implement its ideas into public policy. Bernard Bellush has also
accepted the business origins of the recovery measure. He regards the
Act as a defeat for the progressives in Congress and one which allowed
the business community the broad license to advance its self-interest
. 27at the expense of the national welfare.
There is a danger in making generalisations about either the 
Recovery Act itself or its origins on the basis of the performance of 
the agency which it created. Retrospective insight is not always advan­
tageous to the historian in that it may make the historical process 
less complex and more predictable than it is in fact. Professor Hawley 
avoided this pitfall in his early work in which he recognised the 
existence of various "visions" of "the ideal business structure" that
25. Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly; A Study 
in Economic Ambivalence (Clinton, Mass., 1966): chaps.1-3.
26. Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery 
Administration: Business, Government and the Trade-Association 
Issue. 1921-1933 (Fordham, New York, 1976). 27
27. Bernard Bellush, The Failure of the N.R.A. (New York, 1975): 22-25.
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were current In the early 1930s. All of these contributed to
the making of the N.I.R.A., were reflected in the Act's
provisions, and once the Act was in operation, each struggled
to gain ascendancy over N.R.A. policy, bedevilling the agency in
the process. Even if trade associationism provided the major
thrust from the making of the N.I.R.A. to the operation of the
N.R.A., it did not constitute the sole impulse behind industrial
28planning in the early years of the depression.
Hawley's work serves as a reference for this present research
which seeks to amplify those approaches to industrial planning
which he has identified as being current during the early phase
of the depression, and to relate them to the origins of the
N.I.R.A. The study does not focus upon the underlying intellectual
basis for planning which had been developed since the turn of the
century by the related disciplines of philosophy, sociology,
psychology and economics. In particular, no attempt is made to
appraise the significance of the development of 'institutional
economics' during the 1920s and the impact of its leading exponents
such as Thorstein Veblen, Wesley C. Mitchell and John R. Commons,
29on industrial planning during the first phase of the depression. 
Rather, the study focuses upon those groups which promoted and 
popularised various strategies for national industrial planning 
during the period, 1929-1933, and attempted to implement them 
into public policy.
28. Hawley, The New Deal and Monopoly, op.cit., 35-52. See also 
Idem, 'The New Deal and Business', in John Braeman, et al., 
(eds.), The New Deal (Columbus, 1975) 1: 61. 29
29. The challenges of the 'social sciences' to conventional economic 
theory during the 1920s are discussed in Joseph Dorfman,
The Economic Mind in American Civllizatibn (New York, 1959)
4:124-164.
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The contention of the thesis Is that alternatives for industrial
planning existed during the years of the depression which coincided
with Hoover's presidency, and that the N.I.R.A. was the outcome of
American experience with, and consideration of, these planning
alternatives between 1929 and 1933. Two of these alternatives
were suggested by Professor Hawley in his early research: trade
associationism and collectivism (central planning). The third was
suggested in his recent review of Professor Himmelberg's study, where
Hawley noted that the author had omitted to discuss the contribution
of the approach to planning of Herbert Hoover to the origins of the
30N.R.A.: voluntary associationism. Like Hawley, the present writer 
assumes that the N.I.R.A. was most heavily influenced by trade 
associationism, but insists that this approach emerged out of three 
conflicting alternatives to industrial planning that were current 
during the early phase of the depression.
(iv) Three Schools of Industrial Planning, 1929-1933
The disowning of prevailing approaches to economic policy was a 
prerequisite for national industrial planning. Since the last decade 
of the nineteenth century, and particularly during the 1920s, a firm 
intellectual basis for national planning had been established with 
the development of 'institutional economics'. Economists of this 
school rejected neoclassical economics for its preoccupation with, 
and general approval of, the market system and the means by which 
it allocated resources. They were critical of its disregard for 
history and historical forces; its neglect of empirical analysis 30
30. Ellis W. Hawley, 'Antitrust on the Defensive: The American
Movement for a Cartelized Economy, 1918-1933', a review article, 
Reviews in American History 4 (December, 1976): 586.
using statistical methods, and its insensitivity to the nature 
and functions of institutions - such as corporations, trade 
associations and trade unions - within the economic system.
During the 1920s, the leading figures in this school
were Thorstein Veblen, Wesley C. Mitchell and John R. Commons.
Veblen provided a radical critique of the capitalist system by
emphasising the incompatibility of entrepreneurial profits with
expanding production and technological innovation. Mitchell was
noted for his work on business cycles and his insistence that
economics have a rigorous empirical and statistical foundation.
His researches were instrumental in making Americans aware of both
the problem of cyclical unemployment and the need for ameliorative
action by society. Commons was concerned with the role and
potential of institutions within the economy, especially with
respect to the American trade union movement. He was convinced
that institutions brought order and rationality to the economy,
but advocated a larger role for government to ensure equity and
31balance within society. In general, ’institutionalism' 
represented the emergence of a more factual, policy-oriented 
economics which was critical of competitive individualism as the 
guiding principle for economic development and which welcomed an 
enlarged role for government within the economy.
The concerns of the 'institutional economists' were shared 
by political, business, labour and reform interests during the 31
31. Dorfman, Economic Mind, op. cit. 4: 352-395.
13b
1920s, and during the early phase of the depression they formed a 
consensus in support of the proposition that purposeful direction 
of economic development through planning was vital to induce 
stability. The competitive principle became an object of criticism. 
Critics referred disparagingly to the persistence of laissez-faire. 
The phrase served an emblematic function for planners.. Few deluded 
themselves that the contemporary American economy actually was 
guided by the interplay of free market forces and unfettered 
competition. However, the phrase provided a convenient rhetorical 
target, and its use by planners represented their condemnation of 
the extent to which nineteenth century competitive ideals had 
survived in the public policy of twentieth century America.
Three schools of industrial planning emerged from this 
critique of laissez-faire: voluntary associationism, trade 
associationism and collectivism. The first was associated with 
Herbert Hoover; the second with the business community, and the 
third, with organised labour and the liberal and socialist 
intelligentsia.
To many Americans Herbert Hoover seemed to embody those 
qualities most suitable for a president of the United States 
who occupied office during a period of economic depression. In 
particular, his engineering background and the reputation he 
had acquired for using scientific skills in the solution 
of social problems boded well for his leadership during the 
economic crisis. The Boston retailer, Edward A. Filene captured 
this optimism in a complimentary letter to Hoover in 1930:
14
The engineering mind, of which yours is recognized as one of 
the best, is the type that is most necessary for the restor­
ation of prosperity, which will come back to stay only as 
'fast as the leaders of our citizenship learn to substitute 
fact-finding for opinion in trying to cure the present serious 
depression.32
Furthermore, as Secretary of Commerce between 1921 and 1928 Hoover 
had earned acclaim for his bold and vigorous championing of ’New Era’ 
economics, whereby government, in cooperation with organised, functional 
economic organisations had worked in tandem to stimulate economic growth. 
Hoover had been an advocate of the "associative state", which he regarded 
as a new synthesis between traditional ideals of individualism and self- 
help and new industrial concepts such as scientific rationalism and 
social engineering. The aims of the "associative state" were to harmonise 
social relationships, increase the general standard of living and 
improve industrial relations. These would be achieved by introducing 
purposeful management into economic affairs through the collective 
efforts of government and organised groups such as trade associations 
and labour unions. Organised into a coherent network, the private 
institutions would work for national reform, a stabilised economic 
structure and regularised growth. Government would abet the efforts 
of these organisations by making available its expertise, fact-finding 
and publicity resources. However, Hoover was sensitive of the danger 
that the "associative state" might degenerate into outright statism and 
was careful to emphasise the voluntaristic aspects of his design. The 
"associative state" involved no controls by government of the economic 
apparatus or legal compulsion of organisations. The exercise of such 
authority would compromise traditional ideals of self-help and individual 
initiative and abort the delicate synthesis between conventional and
32. Edward A. Filene to Herbert Hoover, 20 December, 1930. Presidential 
Papers: Box 89 File, Business - Correspondence. Herbert Hoover 
Library. (Hereafter cited as Pres, and H.H.L.)
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modem ideals which was contained in the concept of the "associative 
33state". As revealed in his anti-depression strategy, Hoover remained 
consistent with these ideals during his presidential period when 
'voluntary associationism' became the keystone of his recovery and 
relief policies and the basis of his ideas about industrial planning.
As the depression deepened, Hoover's policies were considered 
inadequate by members of the business community who argued for a 
different role for government than that afforded by voluntary associa­
tionism. Some employers, like the manufacturer Ernest G. Draper, 
believed that the blight of unemployment might promote a positive inter­
est in régularisation of employment through economic planning, but
contended that the Hoover approach of passing initiative for planning
34to industry was unsatisfactory. "We would be guilty of false optimism
if we assert that industry alone can cope with unemployment", he wrote in
1931. While Draper did not relish an overbearing role for government in
the economic process, he saw it as the government's duty to "release
economic imagination with the minimum of effective control". Draper's
solution was to suggest the creation of a Federal Board of Unemployment,
answerable to Congress, to which it would provide suggestions for counter- 
35employment plans. For other businessmen, such as Gerard Swope, the 
president of General Electric, and business organisations such as the 
Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, the aims
33. Ellis W. Hawley, 'Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the 
Vision of an "Associative State", 1921-1928', Journal of American 
History 61 (June, 1974): 116-120.
34. Ernest G. Draper to Daniel B. Luten, 8 May, 1931. Ernest G. Draper 
MSS: Box 1 File, 1928-1934. Library of Congress. Ernest G. Draper, 
'What Employers are Doing'. Undated speech ca 1931. Ibid., File, 
Speeches, 1929-1931. 35
35. Idem, 'Memorandum on Unemployment', 2 January, 1931; Idem,
'Economic Planning and the Small Industrial’. Undated speech, 
ca. 1931. Ibid. Ernest G. Draper to Robert F. Wagner, 21 
November, 1932. Ibid., File, 1928-1934.
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of business and employment stabilisation could be more satisfactorily 
assured through the aegis of trade associations freed from the strictures 
of the antitrust laws. Government’s role would be to relieve trade 
associations from antitrust restraints and supervise the associations 
in the public interest.
As a feature of the business structure, trade associations emerged 
during the Great War and were nurtured in the 1920s by the Department of 
Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission which encouraged their cooper­
ative activities in prescribing 'fair' practices for their industries, 
particularly through the trade practice conference procedure. Trade 
associations emphasised the virtues of the 'new competition' in which 
the individual employer perceived that his own interests and those of 
the community at large would be best served by conforming to stipulated 
practices such as price maintenance. Cooperative activity would result
in greater stability in industry, regularised employment, elimination
36of waste and improved products for the consumer.
Trade associationism received a stimulus from the struggle to 
maintain markets during the depression and the emergence of 'cutthroat 
competition', epitomised by price-wars which, according to trade assoc­
iation spokesmen, injected an undesirable instability into the business 
structure. Where trade associationism differed from voluntary assoc­
iationism was in the more structured and specific mechanisms provided 
for by the former, the legislative change necessary to make those 
associations effective and the role allowed to the Federal Government 
to supervise and regulate associational activities. At times it appeared 
to some dissenters from trade associationism that business was "begging 36
36. Charles F. Roos, NRA Economic Planning (Bloomington, 1937): 9-16.
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for socialism"; a confusion that could not have applied to voluntary
. . .  37associatiomsm.
Industrial planning through trade associations was supported by a 
broad spectrum of the business community, which is defined here as 
composed of businessmen’s organisations, individual spokesmen and pro­
fessional groups which had close connections with the business community: 
lawyers, engineers and educationalists. Of course, sentiment was not 
universally favourable to planning within the business community and 
conflict existed between 'traditionalists' who were not prepared to 
compromise private control of business and 'modernists' who were prepared 
to sacrifice traditional entrepreneurial freedoms to achieve stability 
in business operations. Myron C. Taylor, chairman of U.S. Steel, 
remained a 'traditionalist' despite his willingness to sanction volun­
tary associationism. Taylor characterised much of the vogue for planning 
as "ill-advised and destructive in character", particularly where 
"artificial" means to stabilise industry were advocated, and which 
were contrary to the 'law' of supply and demand. "It cannot be too 
strongly emphasised," Taylor asserted, "that, if any plan for the 
amelioration of our present economic difficulties does not harmonize 
with this great law, it is due to fail." Especially pernicious were 
artificial fixing of commodity prices and government regulation of 
industry. Both would eliminate the "elixir" of capitalism which con­
sisted of competition, initiative and uncertainty. Taylor's own recom­
mendations for countering the depression consisted of re-allocating 
population by encouraging a back-to-the-land movement and industrial 
retrenchment during the ‘economic downturn. "And so it seems we need 
once more, as in those quite numerous occasions in the past, to endure
37. Willis J.'Ballinger, 'Big Business Begs for Socialism', Forum 87 
(February, 1932): 97-100.
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very real hardships," he reflected. "But we may rest confident in the
thought that with each passing day we are nearing a revival of activities
38and a return to more sober and happy surroundings."
Such sentiments persuaded the historian, James W. Prothro that after
the onset of the depression, the business community remained inflexibly
attached to conservative credos of the 1920s, including the laissez-faire 
. 39ideal. Thomas C. Longin does not accept that businessmen were immune 
to other influences during the depression. However, he argues that 
business support for planning was variable and tended to be strongest 
when economic prospects were bleak and weakest when businessmen could 
perceive signs of revival. The variable intensity of business commitment 
to planning is indicative, Longin argues, of the continuing primacy 
of traditionalist ideas within the community. Undoubtedly the 
depression did not result in any wholesale transformation of business 
theory and certain spokesmen remained committed to traditional verities 
which celebrated the private control of the affairs of the individual 
enterprise. But evidence gleaned from businessmen's organisations, 
individual spokesmen and professional groups suggests a new emphasis 
in business thought in favour of cooperative planning and an acceptance 
of a limited role for government in the planning process. This new 
thrust in business thought was variable in its intensity during the 
early years of the depression due to political expediency rather than
38. Myron C. Taylor, 'The Importance of Reaffirming Our Faith in Well- 
Established Principles', an Address before the Boston Chamber of 
Commerce, Boston, Mass., 24 March, 1932. Myron C. Taylor MSS: Box
22. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. (Hereafter cited as F.D.R.L.) 
Iron Age 129 (7 January, 31 March, 1932): 1-2; 788-789.
39. James W. Prothro, The Dollar Decade: Business Ideas in the 1920s- 
(Baton Rouge, 1954): 220-221.
40. Thomas C. Longin, 'The Search for Security: American Business Thought in the 1930s', Ph.D. Thesis, University of Nebraska, 
1970: 93-100; 141-151; 314-316.
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lack of conviction. Since antitrust reform was regarded as essential 
for an effective trade associationism, businessmen mixed caution and 
boldness according to the political circumstances of the time.
One major source of the business community's interest in 
industrial planning was the fear that if business adopted a conventional 
response of retrenchment in time of depression, government would assume 
the obligation to initiate and conduct the planning process, with 
detrimental consequences to the private control of enterprise. 
Businessmen's concerns were exacerbated particularly by the existence 
of a third school of planning which advocated a larger role for the 
government in the planning process, and which was championed by the 
collectivist intelligentsia and organised labour.
The collectivist strain in the thought of reform intellectuals 
may be traced back to the late nineteenth century. It was a response 
to the increasingly complex nature of a society experiencing rapid 
industrialism with its associated social and economic problems of 
adjustment. Collectivists sought to impose order and rationality 
on the disjointed and distended society by reproducing on a national 
scale the type of functional structures which had been developed 
especially by large corporations to regulate their operations. The 
collectivist solution to national problems involved increasing central 
or governmental control over the social and economic processes, the 
use of more technical expertise in political decision-making and the 
development of functional bureaucracies. As such collectivism was 
essentially an elitist doctrine in which professionals and experts 
employed public bureaucratic institutions to regulate defined instit­
utions in the private sector in the interests of economic growth,
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social stability and efficiency.^' Collectivism was not a popular 
doctrine, for as Cushing Strout noted, this "technocratic rationalism" 
with its ideas of a mass, organised society, regulated by a professional 
elite, had no appeal to the ordinary citizen: "With a bland blindness 
to what they were proposing, [they] urged the manipulation of society 
by social 'scientists', as if individual and social values were mere
/ 9laboratory data." Such an impersonal doctrine of social development
was unable to compete with traditional American political myths based
on egalitarianism, individualism and mobility which personalised
national progress. Consequently, collectivism remained an esoteric
concept shared by intellectuals. According to James Gilbert:
"Collectivism became a loose set of ideas which explained American
A 3society to other intellectuals, if not to the nation."
The depression provided an opportunity for collectivists to lose 
their exclusiveness as interest in economic planning became widespread. 
Not only were collectivist ideas disseminated more widely through the 
proliferation of books and articles by reform intellectuals, but a 
'humanising' of collectivist thought occurred during the period as it 
became associated with the relief of mass unemployment and distress.
Of all the planning schools, collectivists were most effective in 
educating the public mind to the principles of economic planning. In
41. In the last two decades a school of organisational history has 
emerged which stresses the importance of large-scale organisations 
and bureaucratisation as determining the pattern of American 
history in the twentieth century. See Louis A. Galambos, 'The 
Emerging Organizational Synthesis in American History', Business 
History Review 44 (Autumn, 1970): 279-290.
42. Cushing Strout, 'The Twentieth-Century Enlightenment', American 
Political Science Review 49 (June, 1955): 328. 43*
43. James Gilbert, Designing the Industrial State: The Intellectual
Pursuit of Collectivism in America, 1880-1940 (Chicago, 1972): 20.
part this was because, unlike other planners, collectivists retained
no residual respect for traditional economic theory or social mores,
which enabled them to assume unequivocal, iconoclastic and dramatic
positions on economic issues. Controversy generated interest and
allowed collectivists to reach a wide audience. The labour leader,
John P. Frey, celebrated the ability of Sumner H. Slichter, the
labour economist, to make much of established economic theory look
like "a bent penny", while the engineer, Otto S. Beyer wrote admiringly
to the popular economist, Stuart Chase of his talent for "debunking 
44Wall Street". Collectivists were also conscious that they were
communicating to a wider audience than their fellow intellectuals and
abandoned academic pedantry in much of their written work in favour of
a straightforward, lucid and often vivid prose style to achieve greater
effect. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, Harold
Ickes, was later to describe Stuart Chase as "the one economist I not
only can understand but enjoy, "while the physicist, Albert Einstein,
45felt that he brought "welcome clarification" to economic subjects. 
Collectivists tended to translate the works of academic economists for 
popular consumption and they served as filters for the ideas of the 
'institutional' economists, in particular, to become established in 
the public mind. Stuart Chase’s talent as a translator was apprec­
iated by Gardiner C. Means, an economist whose partnership with 
A.A. Berle, Jr., produced significant insights into the nature 
of the industrial corporation. In response to a review by Chase of 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), Means wrote:
44. John P. Frey to Frank Brown, 6 May, 1932. John P. Frey MSS: Box 
12 File, 168. Library of Congress. Otto S. Beyer to Stuart 
Chase, 7 April, 1930. Otto S. Beyer MSS: Box 19 File, Labor 
Bureau Inc. Library of Congress. 45
45. Harold I. Ickes to Stuart Chase, 14 April 1935. Albert Einstein 
to Stuart Chase, 8 September 1937. Stuart Chase MSS: Box 1.
Library of Congress.
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"I cannot begin to tell you how much I appreciate your review ....
You have said what we have been trying to say, but you have said it
very much more lucidly, so that I wish that you had written the book 
46yourself." These qualities so prominent in Chase prompted Thurman
Arnold to comment in 1938: "There is no small town in the country
47where someone is not caught by his effective illustration."
During the early years of the depression collectivism was 
represented by individuals of diverse political viewpoints. Walter 
Lippmann, the editor of The New York Herald Tribune, and Donald 
Richberg, the general counsel for the Railway Executives* Association, 
represented the conservative fringe. They were old Roosevelt 
Progressives, and their commitment to a managed and centrally-directed 
economy would be strained eventually by New Deal pragmatism and 
welfarism.48 Some collectivists of the 1930s, such as the popular 
economists and social critics, George Soule - the editor of The New 
Republic - and Stuart Chase - the director of Labor Bureau Inc. — were, 
as R. Alan Lawson has described them, "independent liberals". While 
they supported the principles of state intervention and planning, they 
were not allied to established political parties or their programmes.48 
Other collectivists were firmly established in the political process, 
whether as a progressive Republican such as Robert M. La Follette, Jr., 
a senator from Wisconsin, or as a Socialist like Norman Thomas, 
the party's leader.
46. Gardiner C. Means to Stuart Chase, 23 January, 1933. Ibid.
47. Malcolm Cowley, 'Books that Changed our Minds', New Republic 87
<7 December, 1938): 136.
48. Charles Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl. 
Lippmann. and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925 (New York, 1967): 
298-299. Thomas E. Vadney, The Wayward Liberal: A Political 
Biography of Donald Richberg, (Lexington, 1970): 170,
R. Alan Lawson, The Failure of Independent Liberalism, 1930-1941 
(New York, 1971).
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Collectivism found support in the universities from which prominent 
academics sought to cultivate public sentiment for collectivist ideas.
Four leading spokesmen for central planning were attached to Columbia 
University, New York City: Charles A. Beard, the historian whose 
researches on the formulation of the Constitution had popularised the 
notion of economic causation in the historical process; Rexford G. 
Tugwell, an economist who was concerned with trends in the concentration 
and control of American industry and the application of economic 
planning to the agricultural sector; Harold Rugg, a progressive 
educationalist, and Leo Wolman, who had acted as director of research 
for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America before his appointment 
as professor of economics in 1931. Economists, like Wolman, whose 
specialism was industrial relations, tended to be sympathetic to the 
social control of industry. Both Sumner H. Slichter of Cornell and 
Harvard universities and Isador Lubin of Brookings Institution addressed 
themselves to the problems of controlling industry in the public interest, 
in particular, through their researches into the nature and effects of 
technological unemployment and their consideration of unemployment 
remedies. Collectivist ideas were disseminated in various ways. The 
depression created a demand for books of the diagnosis/prescription type, 
which gave collectivists, such as Stuart Chase, George Soule and Harold 
Rugg, the opportunity to popularise their ideas. Newspapers and journals 
opened their pages to collectivist opinion. 'Medium' and 'small' 
circulation magazines such as The Atlantic Monthly, Harper's Magazine, 
Forum, Current History, and Survey Graphic featured articles by the
collectivists, but The Nation and The New Republic were the most
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consistent editorial supporters of central planning. The radio 
was a further medium through which the central planners could 
propagate their ideas. For example, Chase, Charles Beard and 
Rexford Tugwell all discussed economic planning in a series of 
lectures sponsored by the National Advisory Council on Radio in 
Education during 1932. Finally, collectivists had more direct 
access to public policy-making. Soule, Chase, Sumner Slichter,
Donald Richberg and Leo Wolman were frequently invited to testify 
before congressional committees investigating economic problems. 
Collectivists were also consulted by Senator LaFollette in prepa­
ration for his bill to establish a national economic council which 
he introduced in 1931. Isador Lubin acted as La Follette's assistant 
during the subsequent hearings.
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50. The circulation figures of the periodicals cited for 1930
were as follows:
The Atlantic Monthly 133,287
Harper's Magazine 121,116
Forum 90,719
Current History 63,580
Survey Graphic 25,466
The Nation . 37,991
The New Republic 12,000
N.W. Ayer & Son's Directory, 
Newspapers and Periodicals - 1930 
(Philadelphia, 1930): 1275-1277.
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The collectivist intelligentsia of the 1930s typify Wassily 
Leontief's assertion that "more often than not, a critic of the prevail­
ing style of economic thought is also a critic of the dominant social 
and political institutions". Collectivists deplored the persistence 
of the laissez-faire tradition in public policy and wished to transform 
public institutions to correspond to changing economic circumstances.
They stressed the theme of interdependence in the modern economy and 
the need to adopt 'holistic* perspectives on economic activity through 
the creation of a central planning agency. Ideally such an agency 
would be operated by government and staffed by technical experts whose 
decisions would have mandatory force. However, collectivists were 
prepared to compromise their ideals for reasons of political expediency 
and their recommendations for a centrally-planned economy often avoided 
such an authoritarian emphasis.
Collectivist intellectuals were joined by organised labour in 
preferring central planning to the alternatives of trade associationism 
or voluntary associationism, although their motives were somewhat 
different. Like the collectivists, organised labour became progressively 
disenchanted with the Hoover approach to planning during the depression 
and remained sceptical about the sincerity of the intentions of the 
business planners. However, a restriction of options alone does not 
explain the trade union movement's advocacy of central planning. The 
historian, Ronald Radosh makes a convincing case for the development 
of a corporate ideology within the American Federation of Labor (A.F. 
of L.) from the turn of the century to the New Deal. Rather than view 
American society in terms of class and conflict between different groups, 
labour leaders viewed divisions as existing between functional economic 
groups and stressed the essential harmony of interests between them.
51. Wassily Leontief, 'The Limits of Economics', A Review Article, New
York Review of Books 19 (20 July, 1972): 30.
Their ideal was an economic congress in which all functional groups 
would be represented and in which government acted as an impartial
e omediator. Radosh's thesis offers a perspective through which to 
contextualise labour's support of central planning during the early 
phase of the depression. The development of central planning mechanisms 
which permitted democratic participation for economic groups would 
serve as a means for organised labour to be integrated into the existing 
political economy.
Planning through central direction was the third alternative for 
a planned industrial structure to be sponsored during the early years 
of the depression. Clearly, there was no fixed or static relationship 
between individuals and groups who approved of industrial planning and 
the particular approaches which they favoured. Hoover's attempts to 
implement voluntary associationism received initial support from both 
organised labour and collectivist intellectuals, while many businessmen 
remained loyal to the President's planning approach throughout his 
tenure. The business conception of the potential role of the trade 
association in industrial planning was appreciated by Hoover who 
regarded the institutions as the major vehicles for propagating indus­
trial planning programmes. Neither did he reject outright the business 
community's argument for modification of the antitrust laws to permit 
trade associations more license and authority in the planning process, 
for he spoke favourably of selective revision for particular industries. 
Organised labour and collectivist intellectuals were also receptive to 
the business community's demands, since they regarded changes in the 
antitrust laws as a prerequisite for a rationally planned industrial 
structure. As for the idea of a national economic council put forward
52. Ronald Radosh, 'The Corporate Ideology of American Labor Leaders
from Gompers to Hillman'. Studies on the Left 6 (July-August.1966): 66-86. -------------------
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by the central planners, leading business spokesmen and major business­
men's organisations endorsed the idea of a central planning agency, 
and President Hoover made brief but positive references to the utility 
of such a body. Support for particular approaches or strategies was 
essentially a matter of emphasis which emerged from a consensus on the 
need to provide for an industrial structure which was consciously planned.
(v) The Translation of Ideas into Public Policy; Industrial Planning
and the Political Process, 1929-1933
The fortunes of the three planning schools depended on a variety of 
factors and circumstances during the period. Of these, the attitude 
of the Hoover administration was undoubtedly the most crucial, but other 
considerations were also influential in determining the viability of 
these alternatives as public policy. In particular, the disposition 
of Congress and the ability of sponsors of planning approaches to command 
a broad consensus of opinion in support of their measures were decisive 
factors.
Of the three alternatives, only voluntary associationism required 
no legislative action to put into effect and was the sole approach to 
industrial planning which achieved the status of public policy during 
the Hoover administration. From the outset of the depression Hoover 
sought to harness the initiative of individual firms in a national 
counter-depression programme by creating organisations and agencies 
which would provide advice to businessmen about means of introducing 
planning practices into their operations to stabilise business and 
employment. While Hoover attempted to bring organisation and coherence 
to an overall counter-depression strategy, he waived the need for any 
legislative change or coercion to achieve his aims, fearing a growth 
of statism and its damaging effects on traditional American credos.
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Despite a general, initial enthusiasm for the Hoover strategy, 
the favourable consensus began to dissipate during 1931 as the depression 
continued and the prospects for a business revival became more remote. 
Alternative planning strategies began to be seriously considered within 
Congress and elsewhere. Hoover's critics called for a more prominent 
role for government in the planning process and legislation which would 
provide the necessary machinery for effective economic planning. During 
1931 a boom developed in favour of the establishment of a national 
economic council, which was the object of a bill introduced by Sen.
Robert M,LaFollette, Jr. of Wisconsin. The economic council idea was 
essentially a product of the vision of the central planners who had 
become impatient with Hoover's decentralised planning emphasis and who 
called for the creation of a central agency to guide or direct economic 
policy. Contemporaneously, the business community began to press for 
some modification of the antitrust laws to permit trade associations 
to stabilise their particular sectors by regulating competition.
However, by the end of Hoover's presidency neither the trade association 
nor the central planning approaches had been given legislative expression.
The failure of the business and central planners to achieve their 
legislative objectives was due to a number of factors. In the first 
place, the central planners could claim no consensus behind their 
economic council proposal. The lack of any wholehearted support from 
the business community particularly handicapped their effort. Second, 
Congress was reluctant to make fundamental changes in the nation's 
political economy. In part this was due to the attachment of some 
congressmen to traditional American concepts of competitive individ­
ualism and their caution about committing the nation to ideals which 
were ideologically alien, and in the case of central planning, novel 
and vague. Political expediency also determined congressional inaction.
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The majority of the measures to amend the antitrust laws were introduced 
in 1932, an election year, when it would have been a political liability 
for many congressmen to support controversial legislation. However, 
President Hoover's position seems to have been the most crucial. His 
reservations about both approaches made him determined not to lend the 
prestige of his office in support of measures which ran counter in spirit 
to his own conception of a proper planning strategy for America, and 
which might compromise his own programme based on voluntary associationism.
Hoover maintained faith with voluntary associationism to the end 
of his tenure as president. In the late summer of 1932, the President 
made one last effort to make the formula work to achieve recovery and 
relief goals. One of the mainstays of the Hoover administration's 
counter-depression programme was work-sharing, which was regarded not 
only as a short-term relief measure, but as a long-term solution to the 
problem of securing stable employment in a technologically progressive 
society. In August 1932, Hoover embarked on a major work-sharing drive 
which adhered to the principles of voluntary associationism in that 
the programme had no statutory basis. The disappointing achievements 
of the work-sharing initiative and the widespread criticism it received 
emphasised the failure of voluntary associationism to secure its 
counter-depression objectives. This failure was emphasised by the 
support in Congress for a bill introduced by Sen. Hugo L. Black of 
Alabama to make work-sharing mandatory.
The electoral defeat of Herbert Hoover and the advent of the 
Roosevelt administration reopened the political possibilities for the 
various industrial planning schools. Hoover's defeat removed from 
office the major opponent of the business and central planners' schemes.
He had been replaced as president by a man who had initially supported 
voluntary associationism but revealed a sympathy for other planning
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alternatives in his pre-election addresses. The political complexion 
of Congress had also changed. The Democratic sweep of 1932 had given 
Roosevelt's party substantial majorities in both Houses, and over three 
years of mounting unemployment rolls gave this secure Congress the 
determination to take vigorous action on economic issues and make 
ideological scruples take second place to the exigencies of an ailing 
economy.
It would not be historical to suggest that the industrial planning 
strategy adopted by the Roosevelt administration in the N.I.R.A. had 
been preordained by the experiences of the previous four years. However, 
in terms of the alternatives for industrial planning and their accept­
ability as public policy for the new administration, the early years 
of the depression served to clarify possibilities and limit the options 
available to a president who was committed to planning. Voluntary 
associationism had been seen to have failed through lack of authorit­
ative sanction, and although work-sharing was incorporated into the 
N.I.R.A., it was merely a part of a broader programme whose emphasis 
was quite different to that of Hoover. Collectivism, in the form of 
a national economic council was supported by a limited constituency 
and aroused resistance within the business community. However, trade 
associationism could claim a broad range of support in its favour, 
and with the removal of Hoover from office and the changing climate 
in Congress, the prospects were favourable for the translation of 
trade association ideas into public policy. In the volatile political 
and economic circumstances of the spring months of 1933, the business 
lobbies seized the opportunity to press for legislative sanction of 
trade association planning and were rewarded with the N.I.R.A.
However, the 'business commonwealth' features of the N.I.R.A. 
were not the products of the immediate circumstances of Roosevelt's
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election; neither were they pre-destined by the growth of the trade 
association movement after the Great War. They arose from a consensus 
which was formed between political, business, reform and labour groups 
during the depression about the need to transform the United States’ 
political economy, and represented one means of accomplishing this 
transformation.
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CHAPTER 1
PRELUDE TO PLANNING: THE RENOUNCEMENT OF ’LAISSEZ-FAIRE,1 1929-1933
Laissez-faire was a staple term employed in economic discourse during the 
early years of the depression. It was used by some business spokesmen, 
collectivist intellectuals, labour leaders and politicians to draw attention 
to the lack of authoritative management in the economic system by either 
private or public agencies. The phrase was applied loosely. It was 
employed as an emotive rubric for an economy which was not purposefully 
directed, rather than as a claim that the United States’ economy was 
governed by free market forces. It was widely accepted that the expanded 
role of government, particularly in the spheres of fiscal, monetary and 
social policy, and the concentration of economic power in the private sector 
which allowed oligopolistic industries to override free market forces, 
had rendered laissez-faire an anachronistic and inaccurate description of 
the sources of the American economy's dynamic. Few of those who equated 
the concept with the twentieth-century American economy were so naive 
as to relate it to the 'pure' doctrine of Adam Smith or his nineteenth- 
century successors. The theory of laissez-faire which emphasised an 
economy composed of many small, competing units in which neither producers 
nor consumers were restrained by 'artificial' public policy or private 
action, no longer described reality. Nevertheless, the flotsam of the 
doctrine lingered in political and economic thought, neither having adapted 
fully to the technological and structural changes which had occurred in 
/ the American economy since the late nineteenth century and the corres­
ponding increase of the role of government during the period. The 
challenge to the critics of laissez-faire during the early depression 
was to establish new economic concepts to supercede the old; to modernise 
economic thought and public policy to conform to economic realities.
The first stage of this process was the obliteration of outmoded concepts. 
"The battle for an individualistic laissez-faire economy, self-regulated 
by competition, is definitely lost," . George Soule recognised.
"Unless we make that fact the basis of our political and economic 
thinking, we shall be headed in the wrong direction."'
The circumstances of the depression made criticisms of laissez-faire 
particularly strident. Critics expressed an intense dissatisfaction
• •
with the value of classical economic theory in providing diagnoses and 
prescriptions for economic depression. A doctrine which demanded immed­
iate liquidation of values with the promise of natural and inevitable 
revival, offered little assurance in the face of mounting unemployment, 
declining profits and general business instability. Furthermore, the 
proposition that such slumps were an inevitable aspect of economic progres 
met with scepticism from those convinced that it was within American 
ingenuity to mitigate if not extirpate the violent fluctuations of the 
business cycle. The converse of the arbitrariness of laissez-faire was 
the purposeful allocation and distribution of resources through economic 
planning.
Rejection of laissez-faire was not limited to any specific political 
or ideological grouping. It spanned the spectrum of American constitu­
tionalism: from Herbert Hoover, President of the United States, to 
Norman Thomas, leader of the Socialist Party. Repeatedly, during his 
presidency, Hoover disassociated himself from any commitment to laissez- 
faire ideals. He subscribed to no "fatalistic view" of the business 
cycle, the President informed the American Bankers’ Association in 1930.
1. George Soule, A Planned Society (New York, 1932): 172.
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"The economic fatalist believes that these crises are inevitable and
bound to be recurrent," Hoover stated. "I would remind these pessimists
that exactly the same thing was once said of typhoid, cholera and
smallpox." Fatalism was antithetical to the spirit of modern science
2and "the genius of modern business". A planned and orderly development 
of the national economy was possible. Hoover's opponent in the presi­
dential campaign of 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt, shared this rejection 
of laissez-faire. At Oglethorpe University in 1932 Roosevelt condemned 
the "haphazardness" of American industrial development, its wastage of 
resources, duplication of productive facilities, high risk in enterprise 
and profligate consumerism. He also rejected the classical concept of 
depression as an "inherent peculiarity" of the economic system which 
must be borne stoically until prosperity returned. Sceptical of "immutable 
economic law" and confident of man's ability to control economic forces, 
Roosevelt advised that the application of foresight through "social
3planning" could promote more stable and socially-useful economic growth.
The Socialist Party candidate, Norman Thomas was similarly convinced 
that laissez-faire ideals were inappropriate to a "Machine Age".
"Physical science has given us firm foundations for our Utopias," he 
declared in 1931. The task was to adjust social principles to conform
to the maxim that "there is now no longer any external excuse for
„ „ 4 poverty .
Walter Lippmann echoed the sentiments of fellow collectivist 
intellectuals when he indicated the paradox of poverty and plenty, a
2. Address at 56th Annual Convention of American Bankers' Association 
at Cleveland, Ohio, 2 October, 1930. William Starr Myers (ed.),
The State Papers and Other Public Writings of Herbert Hoover, 2 vols. 
(New York, 1934), 1: 379. (Hereafter cited as State Papers.)
3. Address at Oglethorpe University, Atlanta, Georgia, 22 May, 1932. 
P.P.A. op. cit., 1 ; 642-643. 4*
4. Norman Thomas, America's Way Out: A Program for Democracy (New
York, 1931): 4-5.
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characteristic of a society which had solved the problem of scarcity 
without accomplishing the same for distribution. The issues of the 
presidential election of 1932, Lippmann believed, involved the 
"management of plenty" to create a "secure and ordered civilization".
A policy of laissez-faire had become "utterly impossible" and the 
nineteenth century dynamic of industrial expansion, the acquisitive 
and competitive instinct, needed to be replaced by forces "disinterested 
and cooperative" in their effect."*
The adjustment of theory and institutions to economic circumstances 
was possible since economic laws were not immutable. Donald R. Richberg, 
general counsel of the Railway Executives' Association, claimed that 
the economic system was not a "creation of Providence" but a "man-made" 
artifice which was capable of management and direction. Richberg 
believed that "a nationally planned economy is the only lâlvation of 
our present situation and the only hope for the future in the complic­
ations of modern life".** It was imperative that theory and institutions 
reconcile themselves to the revolutionary impact wrought by technological 
change upon American economic life, the American Federation of Labor's 
Executive Council contended in 1932. The immediate problem was of a 
reconciliation with collectivism; the adoption of new principles and the 
adaptation of established ones to suit current needs.^
The recognition that the laissez-faire ideal was no longer useful 
as a guide to policy penetrated into the business community. The manu­
facturer, Henry S. Dennison expressed the point with particular urgency:
5. Walter Lippmann, Interpretations, 1931-1932 (London, 1933): 4.
6. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufac­
tures. Hearings on S.5125, Federal Aid for Unemployment Relief, 
72nd Congress, Second Session, 1933: 454-455. 7
7. Report of the Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, Cincinnati, Ohio, 21 November - 
2 December, 1932 (Washington, D.C., 1932): 32.
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We must manage oursekres if we are to gain on the past. No 
laissez-faire, no unchanneled and unimpeded course of nature, 
no invisible hand will do it for us. Unless there is a 
growing social control to meet the unquestioned growing social 
complexity, most of us must believe, I think, that we can 
expect no happier fate for mankind; and many of us would risk 
the prediction of retrogression to ultimate catastrophe.®
Disregard for laissez-faire was. not limited to a fringe of
radical or 'enlightened' employers. Myron C. Taylor, chairman of U.S.
Steel, was a traditionalist in terms of his belief in competition as
"a law of nature" and his aversion to government intervention in the
economy; however, he could contradict himself in the space of three
sentences in an essay of 1932. Claiming that government planning was
contrary to a fundamental "law of nature" at one moment, he then
contended that "it has yet to be demonstrated that any government can
9adjust supply and demand as well as does free business". Taylor's 
commitment to laissez-faire was rhetorical, a veil to conceal 
anxiety about government intervention.
Spokesmen for the business community who advocated a 'liquid- 
ationist' approach to depressions invited hostile responses such as 
that received by Albert C. Wiggin, chairman of the Chase National Bank, 
from Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., chairman of a Senate subcommittee in 
1931 investigating the advisability of establishing an economic 
council. LaFollette branded Wiggin's testimony as a "counsel of despair", 
a phrase which was widely adopted by critics of laissez-faire.^ Such 
accusations were not just levelled by liberals at business spokesmen; 
they were heard within the business community itself. Business Week, 
for example, frequently chided those traditionalists among its subscribers
8. Henry S. Dennison, 'Social Self-Control', The Annals 149 (May,
1930): 1-2. Dennison's emphasis.
9. Myron C. Taylor, 'The Machine Delusion', in Samuel Crowther, (ed.),
A Basis for Stability (Boston, 1932): 50.
10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures. 
Hearings on S.6215, Establishment of a National Economic Council,
71st Congress, First Session, 1931: 372-373.
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to accept the "discipline" and "control" necessary to produce economic 
recovery.* *
Critics joined issue with the doctrine of laissez-faire on two 
levels. First, empirical research demonstrated that the structure of 
the American economy no longer conformed to that prescribed by classical 
theory. Second, the persistence of laissez-faire in economic theory 
and its influence on public policy and private practice was condemned 
as unsatisfactory in realising the problems and complexities of the 
economic system and the potential of economic and political institutions. 
Although by no means distinct or exclusive, three lines of attack by 
the critics on the effects of laissez-faire through public policy may 
be discerned. First, concern was expressed about the problems generated 
by enforced competition, particularly in those 'sick' industries in 
crucial economic sectors which suffered from overproduction and declining 
prices. Second, critics charged that the potential social force of 
technology was being dissipated and that technological progress, rather 
than benefiting the community, was jeopardising its stability through 
the creation of technological unemployment. Finally, many critics 
charged that there was insufficient current income in the hands of 
the masses to carry from the market the output of a highly productive 
industrial system. From a perspective of the early 1930s the irony 
was not only that the theory of laissez-faire no longer fitted the 
economic facts, but that where public policy and private practice attempted 
to approximate the ideal the effect was pernicious to the general public 
and damaging to the sectors concerned.
In its report published in January 1933, the President's Research 
Committee on Social Trends pointed to a cultural lag between the physical 1
11. See, for example, Business Week, 9 July, 1930: 40; 3 May, 1933:
32.
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and social sciences. "There is in our social organizations an instit­
utional inertia, and in our social philosophies a tradition of rigidity," 
the Committee asserted. "Unless there is a speeding up of social 
invention or a slowing down of mechanical invention, grave maladjustments 
are certain to result." The Committee's reasoning was that both the 
social sciences which sought to explain contemporary conditions and the 
political institutions which tried to adapt to them, had fallen behind 
the rapid changes that technological progress had wrought. The social 
sciences derived theories from descriptions of economic life, and 
political institutions were modified according to those theories. The 
problem was that rapid technological change made theories as outdated 
as the descriptions. The Columbia University economist, Rexford G. 
Tugwell noted that such obsolescent theories acquired a mystique, a 
symbolism which made them seem precious and made them more difficult 
to discard: "The protective vine makes the ruined wall seem beautiful, 
we dislike abandoning it for something different." Adherents to laissez-
faire were the devotees of a "mere slogan", Tugwell challenged, for the
13theory no longer explained economic reality.
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), Adolf A. 
Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means revealed the inconsistency of an economy
12. Recent Social Trends in the United States: Report of the President's 
Research Committee on Social Trends, 2 vols. (New York, 1933), 1: 
xxviii. The Committee was appointed in December 1929 and reported 
in January 1933. Its objective, designated by President Hoover,
was to provide data upon which prosperity might be stabilised through 
private and public action. Financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the Committee included many eminent 'progressive' social scientists 
such as Charles E. Merriam, Wesley C. Mitchell and William F. Ogburn.
13. Rexford G. Tugwell, 'The Principle of Planning and the Institution 
of Laissez-Faire', American Economic Review 22 (March, 1932):
76-78, 88. (Supp.).
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where major sectors were dominated by a few firms and a theory of
capitalism which requires that power to affect prices, wages, output
and investment be impersonally governed by the reactions of many firms.
They disclosed that of 300,000 non-financial corporations in the United
States in 1929, 200 of these controlled nearly half the corporate wealth.
Moreover, this concentration of economic power was seen to be progressing
at a striking rate. In 1909, the assets of the 200 then largest non-
financial corporations amounted to $26 billion. By 1919, they had reached
$43.7 billion, an increase of 68% in ten years. In the next ten years
they increased to $81.1 billion, an increase of 85%. The growth rate
of these 200 largest corporations, Berle and Means estimated, was nearly
three times greater than that of the others, and the wealth of the large
corporations had been increasing at a very much more rapid rate than
14the total national wealth. They had already suggested that American 
Telephone and Telegraph, if compared with the 48 United States on a 
basis of wealth, would have been the twenty-seventh State in the Union 
in 1922.^ Nor could Berle and Means envisage any immediate limit to 
this increasing trend of concentration; they predicted that, theoretic­
ally, in 360 years the 184 companies which would have survived dissolution 
would have merged into a single corporation with a life expectancy 
of 1,000 years.1** The implication of this degree of concentration was 
that competition had changed in character and in the process had made 
the competitive principles applicable to contemporary conditions very 
different from those which applied when the dominant competing units
14. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, 10th ed. (New York, 1937): 30-41.
15. Idem, 'Corporations and the Public Investor', American Economic 
Review 20 (March, 1930): 58.
16. Idem, The Modern Corporation, op.cit., 44.
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were smaller and more numerous. The principles of "duopoly" had become 
more important than those of free competition.^
Berle and Means' discoveries were corroborated by other evidence 
such as Willard L. Thorp's investigation of the merger movement1 and 
by the findings of the Committee on Recent Social Trends which noted 
that the merger movement in the 1920s had been inspired by the twin aims 
of stabilising operations and reducing costs by eliminating waste, and 
had been facilitated by the favourable financial conditions of the decade. 
It recognised the social power of large corporations such as U.S. Steel 
which employed twice the number of workers and earned double the gross 
revenue of New York City and New York State combined and perceived that 
the logic which promoted consolidations was stronger than ever in depres­
sions. Given the availability of credit, the trend would be likely to
continue, posing "formidable new problems in the private and social
19control of business".
As significant as these findings on the concentration of industry
were Berle and Means' disclosures of the diffusion of stock ownership
in United States' industry. In 1930, Means revealed that from a study
of thirty-one large corporations he had found that the number of book
. 20stockholders increased from 226,543 in 1900 to 1,419,126 in 1928.
He explored the implications of this trend in an article of 1932. It 
was apparent to Means that with the increasing dispersion of stock owner­
ship in the largest American corporations, a new condition had developed 
with regard to their control. No longer could an individual or group 
control a corporation in which shares were owned, for no matter how
17. G.C. Means, 'The Growth in the Relative Importance of the Large 
Corporation in American Life', American Economic Review 21 (March,
1931): 36-37. Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation, op.cit., 45-46.
18. Willard L. Thorp, 'The Persistence of the Merger Movement', American 
Economic Review 21 (March, 1931): 77-89, (Supp.)
19. Recent Social Trends, op.cit. 1: 238-240; 2; 1512.
20. G.C. Means, 'The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States', 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 44 (August, 1930): 563.
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many shares owned, it was sure to be an insignificant amount because of
the diffusion of stock ownership. Control now rested with management
who could use the proxy votes of the apathetic shareholders or benefit
from disinterested stockholders not voting at all. Management could
thus become self-perpetuating through the election of the board of
directors. "This separation of ownership and control involves a change
in the organization of enterprise almost as revolutionary as that which
occurred in the industrial revolution," Means asserted. Whereas the
factory system divorced control from labour in the industrial revolution,
21so the corporate system was divorcing control from ownership.
In summary, two conclusions drawn from Berle and Means' researches 
were of considerable importance to the critics of laissez-faire. The 
first was that economic areas within which production could be conducted 
on a rational coordinated basis had become limited only by the ability 
of a few individuals to administer the huge organisation of workers and 
of wealth which could be brought under their control. The second con­
clusion was that the civilisation of capitalism, its ethics, morality 
and philosophy - the "vines" to which Tugwell referred - were being 
destroyed by the practice of capitalism. "A society in which production 
is governed by blind economic forces is being replaced by one in which 
production is carried on under the ultimate control of a handful of 
individuals," Means wrote. "The economic power in the hands of the few 
persons who control a giant corporation is a tremendous force which can 
harm or benefit a multitude of'individuals, affect whole districts, shift 
the currents of trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to 
another." The organisations which the managers controlled had passed
21. idem, 'The Separation of Ownership and Control in American
Industry*, Ibid., 46 (November, 1931): 83-88; 95-97.
far beyond the realms of private enterprise and had become "social 
institutions". "A Machiavelli writing today," Berle reflected, "would 
have very little interest in princes, and every interest in the Standard 
Oil Company of Indiana. And he would be right; because the prince
22today is the president or dominating interest in a great corporation."
Reflecting on this increasing concentration of power in a few hands,
however, Berle and Means did not regard the future with any fear, for
"it is never well to try to prevent the hands of the clock from turning".
The corporate system was moving through "an age of constitutional
monarchy", they believed, guided "by an intelligence superior even to
the political entities", and which would, in turn, guide "these instrument
23to a balance which will more nearly serve the state in which we live". 
Berle's abiding faith, as Arthur Schlesinger expressed it, was that, in 
time, "the corporation would generate a conscience and a soul". More 
precisely, both Berle and Means may have derived their optimism from the 
professions of public responsibility uttered by businessmen during the 
depression, through their own equation of size with stability and public 
service and by the understanding reached by progressive business planners 
that the welfare of industry and the consumer were not incompatible but 
inextricable.
Although The Modern Corporation and Private Property had considerabl 
impact after its publication in 1932, its central findings had appeared 
much earlier in articles and had become established features of the 
broader critique of laissez-faire during the Hoover presidency. Indeed, 
it was the authors' intention that this should be so. As Gardiner Means
22. Idem. 'The Growth of the Relative Importance of the Large Corpor­
ation in American Life', op.cit., 37. Berle & Means, 'Corporations 
and the Public Investor', op.cit., 71.
23. Ibid.
24. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Kingswood, 
1958): 177. See also A.A. Berle, Jr., 'A High Road for Business', 
Scribner's Magazine 93 (June, 1933): 325.
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wrote to Stuart Chase: "It seems to me awfully important that the whole 
set of ideas which we have attempted to set forth should be absorbed 
into every day economic thinking." Complimenting Chase on his review 
of The Modern Corporation, Means expressed satisfaction that "it will 
insure a wider dissemination of the facts, and theoretical material 
which it seems to me important the community have in its mind".
The trend towards industrial concentration provoked widespread 
discussion within the business community. Spokesmen for small business 
such as J. Harvey Williams, a Buffalo tool manufacturer who was influential 
in the councils of the National Civic Federation and the National Assoc­
iation of Manufacturers, regretted the tendency but appreciated the 
advantages of scale for the control and distribution of resources. His 
antidote for the hardships incurred by indeperident proprietors during 
the depression was to emulate their corporate counterparts without com­
promising the integrity of the autonomous unit through associational 
activity. Such associational activity was considered inadequate by 
many industrial spokesmen. Trade publications for the steel and coal 
industries whose sectors were bedevilled by excess capacity encouraged 
the merger movement to enable firms to maintain a more precise control 
of output and balance supply with demand. The depression merely rein- 
forced an already established commitment to rationalisation. Others 
regarded the large corporation as a potentially beneficent force.
Wallace B. Donham, Dean of Harvard's Business School, regarded the
25. Gardiner C. Means to Stuart Chase, 23 January, 1933. Chase MSS:
Box 1.
26. J. Harvey Williams, 'Industrial Disarmament, the First Step Towards 
Economic Security', Forbes 25 (1 June, 1930): 26-28; 30.
27. See, for example, Iron Trade Review 84 (11 April, 30 May, 1929):
1004; 1455; 1470. Coal Age 34 (January 1929): 6-8; 24; 44-45.
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great corporation as an influential and progressive force in social and
economic progress and looked to the leadership of "a few hundred men in
a few hundred corporations" to take the initiative in fostering economic 
28recovery. Throughout the early phase of the depression business 
publications extolled the accomplishments of large organisations both 
in ameliorating unemployment and in planning for stabilised production.
The image of the large corporation was enhanced also by President Hoover's 
reliance on prominent corporation leaders to effect and popularise
29'economic planning' practices to overcome depressed business conditions.
Collectivist intellectuals objected not to the concentration of 
industry into large units per se, but to the fact that those who controlled 
them exercised considerable social and economic power which could be used 
in benign or malign ways to benefit or damage the national interest.
The attitude of The Nation towards consolidated enterprise was 
established before the depression occurred. The Treasury Department 
statistics for corporate income in 1927 elicited much comment from the 
journal after their publication. While these figures showed a slump 
in net corporate income and an increase in corporate deficits of companies 
with relatively small capitalisation, highly-capitalised concerns, such 
as General Motors, were seen to have made considerable profits. To one 
Nation leader in January 1929, this phenomenon of increased prosperity 
during a period of falling prices could be attributed, in large part, 
to the elimination of the inefficiencies of small-scale production.
28. Wallace B. Donham, 'Business Ethics: A General Survey', Harvard 
Business Review 7 (July, 1929): 385-394. Idem,
Business Looks at the Unforeseen (New York, 1932); 12.
29. Two particularly comprehensive and laudatory contemporary accounts 
of the 'corporate consciousness' during the early depression are 
Warren Bishop, 'How Business Fights the Wolf', Nation's Business 
20 (November, 1932): 23-25; 54-55. Russell Greenman, 'Plans that 
Shortened the Bread Lines', Ibid. 21 (October, 1933): 50; 52; 
54-56; 58. For Hoover's use of prominent business executives in 
his recovery programme, see Chapter 2.
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"if the little businessman is dying," the leader continued, "let him 
die. As consumers we cannot afford to maintain him in independent 
wastefulness." The Nation appreciated the economic benefits of 
large-scale enterprise and applauded the activities of the "vast 
organizers" who had demonstrated the economies possible from combination 
and "proved that a high standard of living can be maintained only in 
lands where monopoly is allowed to flourish". To those Brandeisians 
who bewailed such tendencies toward concentration, Heywood Broun retorted: 
"Utopian dreams of the four-hour day and five-day week assume immediacy 
only when they are translated into terms of industrial unification and 
organization .... Most of the tears which have been shed over the passing 
of the candlestick maker and the weaver and the tinsmith were not shed 
by any of the members of those arduous occupations." But there was 
one caveat concerning industrial concentration: such powerful enterprises 
should no longer be controlled to the end of purely private profit but 
to the public advantage. In the longer term The Nation envisaged sub­
stantial control of private enterprise. "The real task of a modern 
democracy," the journal editorialised, "is not to fight large-scale 
organization, but to learn to use it for the common welfare. We shall
not accomplish that without making large inroads on the present organ-
32ization of private enterprise."
The New Republic welcomed the economic dominance of the large 
corporation since it promised to facilitate planning whether performed 
by the large corporation itself or by government. Concentration and 
control had created a situation whereby "the agencies through which
30. Nation 128 (2 January, 1929): 2.
31. Ibid., 129 (3 July, 1929): 7.
32. Ibid., 130 (28 May, 1930): 614.
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general planning might be executed are already very largely in being 
and are steadily growing more powerful." American socialists regarded 
the concentration of industry as a portent of the demise of the capitalist 
system. Not only did rationalisation facilitate the transfer of economic 
power to the public sector, but the separation of ownership and control 
had removed the major barrier to public ownership - the sanctity of
Q/
private property. Rexford Tugwell reached similar conclusions. He 
contended that the separation of ownership and control served to illus­
trate the "fallacy" of profits which had been presumed to guide the 
economic system under laissez-faire. "Since profits go only to owners," 
he wrote, "control is effectively separated from its assumed motive .... 
The truth is that if industry could not run without this incentive it 
would have stopped running long ago." Tugwell noted that industry, 
persisting without the incentive of profits and concentrating into few, 
huge units, was becoming amenable to government expropriation of the 
managerial function. This government intervention into private enterprise
would only produce "small, unnoticed changes" since, in effect, all that
35would occur would be a change in management. Tugwell favoured the
concentration of economic power but insisted that concentration be
"correlated to elaboration". Only through the overarching control
exercised by a federal supervisory body could a synthesis emerge between
36economic growth and the public interest.
33. New Republic; 65 (13 May, 1931): 341.
34. Thomas, America’s Way Out, op.cit., 163-164. Harry W. Laidler,
’The New Capitalism and the Socialist', The Annals 149 (May, 1930): 
12-21. Paul Blanshard, 'A Plea for Social Control and Ownership', 
Ibid. 154 (March, 1931): 78-84.
35. Tugwell, 'The Principle of Planning', op.cit., 79; 92.
36. Rexford G. Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental 
Arts, (New York, 1933): 218.
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Donald Richberg's concern, like that of Brandeis, was that the 
great corporations posed problems of management too great for the 
individual or the small group. "The huge vertical and horizontal ’trusts' 
of the present day must have great directors to survive," he wrote.
"They require double Napoleons, who as yet have not been found." Without 
adequate expertise and direction they would flounder despite their 
present hegemony, for, as Richberg reminded his readers, "the dinosaur 
perished not from lack of power, but from lack of brain." One alternative 
to the disintegration of these "superhuman organizations" was a redist­
ribution of the control of industry, based on the public interest and on 
principles of "industrial-social engineering". The A.F. of L. Executive 
Council of 1930 agreed that the concentration of industry had made the 
responsibility resting on management "correspondingly grave", especially 
in terms of its obligations to promote workers' welfare. By 1933,
William Green, president of the A.F. of L. could equate concentrated 
economic power with "autocratic power" and regret that the great corpor­
ations had proved ineffectual in promoting revival. The public interest 
required that economic decision-making be nationalised. "There must be
planning," Green declared. "The old order has had its day and it has
 ^ j M38 failed.
The concentration of industry provided a focus for the critics of 
laissez-faire who indicated that the developing corporate economy no 
longer fitted the description of the classical ideal. Although 'old'
37. Donald R. Richberg, 'The Industrial Liberalism of Justice Brandeis', 
Columbia Law Review 31 (November, 1931): 1102. See also
Idem, 'Industrial Civilization', American Federationist 39 
iMarch, 1932): 274.
38. Report of the Proceedings of the 50th Annual Convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, Boston, Massachusetts, 6-17 October, 
1930 (Washington D.C., 1930): 47-48. Nation's Business 21 
(February, 1933): 46-47.
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Progressives and 'decentralist' intellectuals bemoaned this concentration 
of American economic life, the corporate form and the processes of concen­
tration and control were favoured by elements within the business community, 
the liberal and socialist intelligentsia and organised labour. While 
their evaluations were based on very different criteria, all welcomed 
consolidated or coordinated enterprise as a factor favourable to stabil­
ised and rational operation in industry. As a guide to public policy and 
private practice laissez-faire provided an inappropriate theoretical basis 
and both economic theory and institutional action required modification 
to conform to the new realities. This was particularly imperative since 
the laissez-faire ethic continued to exercise an influence on government 
policy, and, in turn, placed restraints on private practice. The effect 
was damaging to the interests of business and industry, labour and the 
consumer, and it prevented the American economy from achieving its full 
potential. Evidence could be gleaned from those industries blighted 
by enforced competition, from the unemployed who had been displaced by 
technological innovation and from the growing relief queues which test­
ified to a maldistribution of purchasing power in the American economy.
A major tenet in the critique of laissez-faire was that the degree 
of competition which was central to the doctrine was an evil, essentially 
'destructive', and both a cause of the depression and a factor in its 
continuance. The simple thesis that 'predatory' or excessive competition 
was a major contributing factor to the national economic crisis appealed 
to a broad spectrum of opinion which charged 'cutthroat' competition 
with responsibility for ttve widespread business failures and the price 
and wage reductions that had occurred during the depression. For collec­
tivists the consequences of excessive competition provided a case for 
social control of industry to provide stability. For businessmen,
47
'predatory' competition could be avoided most effectively through the 
trade association form, immune from the antitrust laws, which could set 
common standards for industries. For labour spokesmen, the vulnerability 
of wage rates when the competitive situation required cost reductions 
by employers stimulated an interest in economic planning by management 
or government to stabilise economic activity.
Despite the increasing concentration of industry, administered
prices and informal trade agreements, bitter competition was still
prevalent in many sectors of industry. Competition even existed in the
oligopolistic industries, but was conducted on a non-price basis - the
granting of premiums, bulk discounts and other 'free deals' to potential 
39buyers. However, the areas in which 'cutthroat' competition was most 
virulent were those such as the oil, coal, textile, lumber, clothing and 
retail industries in which excess capacity existed and where competition 
was on a price basis.^ Whereas the integrated monopolistic enterprise, 
secure in its control of the market, responded to the depression by 
reducing its supply to what could be sold at existing prices,the small 
firm, which had no similar control over its markets and faced a declining 
demand for its products, was forced to reduce its prices in order to 
secure a share of rivals' markets and hence make a reasonable profit 
and meet its overheads.
39. George Soule, Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression, 1917-1929 
(New York, 1968): 144. Leverett S. Lyon, The Economics of Free 
Pea -^8 (Washington, D.C., 1933).
40. Excess capacity was prevalent also in industries such as automobiles 
and construction but was less serious during the depression because 
of the ability of leading firms and associations to stabilise oper­
ations. See Steel 89 (2 November, 1931): 23-24; 34. New Republic 
60 (30 October, 1929): 283. Other sectors such as coal and boot 
and shoes were disadvantaged by the number of firms involved in 
their industries. The Commissioner on Labor Statistics reported
in 1931 that from 20 to 24% of the 6,057 coal mines in operation 
could produce all of the total of coal then produced if working at 
full capacity, and that 14 to 15% of the capacity in the boot and 
shoe industry could produce 95% of the total output if allowed to 
utilise its full capacity. Monthly Labor Review 32 (January, February, 
1931): 52-53; 50-52.
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Such price-cutting was prone to spiral and it was not unusual for 
producers to sell at cost of production simply to stay in business. To 
secure a strategic advantage some producers sold below their costs for 
a limited period in the hope that their competitors would bankrupt them­
selves in their attempts to follow the leader's prices. Inevitably, 
such price-wars were accompanied by low wages, 'sweated' labour, wastage 
of natural resources and the idle plant capacity of bankrupt firms.
Businessmen were particularly conscious of excessive competition. 
According to a survey conducted by the Niagara Hudson Power Co. covering 
1,500 manufacturing establishments in New York State, the most widely 
reported factor hindering business development was "undue competition" 
and price cutting.^' Small business was especially vulnerable. Repre­
sentatives of small business appeared before a Senate subcommittee chaired 
by Gerald P. Nye in 1931, investigating the amendment of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. The witnesses included spokesmen for brick 
manufacturers, steel constructors, tile manufacturers, marble dealers 
and plumbing and heating suppliers. Their testimony indicated that 
'cutthroat' competition could assume diverse forms. Although price 
competition was the principal source of complaint it occurred in various 
guises: invasion of others' sales territory; "bid peddling" or "dickering 
and peddling" between contractors and sub-contractors; price discrimin­
ation and misrepresentation. All were regarded as 'unfair' methods of 
/ ocompetition. The purpose of the witnesses was to convince the govern­
ment of the need to amend the antitrust laws to permit small concerns 
to collude through trade associations to prevent such practices. As
41. Business Week 19 November, 1930: 27-28.
42. U.S. Congress,Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary.
Hearings onS2626, S2627 and S.2628 Amendment of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and Establishment of a Federal Court, 72nd Congress, 
First Session, 1931: 65; 91; 122; 128; 216-218.
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the business journal Barronb expressed it: "It is high time for this 
country to reconsider the subject of 'competition'. Up to date its 
ideas seem to be marked by a curious ignorance of facts and their 
consequences."
'Cutthroat' competition drew The Nation's condemnation also. To 
The Nation's columnist, Heywood Broun, writing before the onset of the 
depression, it seemed that the consumer could never, in the long run, 
benefit from price-wars between competitors. "After all," he reflected, 
"price must depend ultimately upon cost of production, and too many 
cooks not only spoil the broth but make it more expensive." Although 
the "innocent bystander" may benefit in the short-term from a price-war, 
such "deadly struggles" were of short duration and "you may be sure 
that what the consumer saves during the strife he will later make up 
in an indemnity to the w i n n e r . T h e  firm which survived would have 
hegemony over its market and the ability to exploit it through inflexibly 
high prices which would prevail until new capital was attracted to the 
industry and 'cutthroat' competition resumed once more.
In the long run high prices were not the only consequence of excessive 
competition. In the very process itself, standards of quality were 
sacrificed to reduce costs to a bare minimum so that the quality of 
goods received by the consumer was often inferior.^ The wages paid 
to labour were also reduced in order that firms could reduce costs and 
sell products competitively. The New York State Industrial Commissioner,
43. BaxronV 11 (17 August, 1931): 14.
44. Nation: 129 (3 July, 1929): 7.
45. Berle and Means drew attention to the fact that competition was not 
always a stimulus for the production of quality goods. They noted 
that much of the production of integrated companies was for their 
own use in the process of making further goods. The result was 
often a product of higher quality which incidentally benefited the 
consumer. Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation, op.cit., 46.
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Frances Perkins, revealed the unsatisfactory working conditions and wage
levels in the New York garments trades where small employers did business
with a minimum of capital and survived only as a result of 'sweating*
their labour and becoming price effective in the market. Perkins detected
common features in the sweatshops: low wages, long hours and a disregard
for the comfort and safety of the workers. For many workers there was
no alternative than to seek work in a sweatshop, since the policy of the
owners was to locate in a particularly hard-pressed community, set up
business, and employ the wives and children of unemployed men. Individual
State labour laws were ineffective in dealing with the 'chiseler' in the
garments trades, since his mobility enabled him to move from one locality
to another and between states to avoid factory inspection.
The continued existence of the sweatshop operator posed manifold
dangers for New York State and for the national interest. Perkins
condemned the sweatshop not only on humanitarian grounds, but also as
an economic affliction. For New York, it meant the loss of much of its
textile business to states with looser labour laws; for the "great body
of American employers" who attempted to maintain industrial standards,
it entailed debilitating rivalry with cheap-price competitors, and for
the community it meant that purchasing power was being withheld from
those who most needed and could effectively use it. Although Perkins
did not believe that the sweatshop was entirely to blame for the
industrial depression, she did regard it as a "serious contributing
factor". The cost of a five-dollar dress was hence borne not only by
46the ultimate consumer, but by the community at large.
46. Frances Perkins, 'The Cost of a Five-Dollar Dress', Survey
Graphic 22 (February, 1933): 75-78. Idem, et al., 'Do We 
Need Minimum Wage Laws?', Forum 88 (May, 1933): 282-287.
Idem, 'Why We Need a Minimum Wage Law', Nation's Business 
21 (July, 1933): 24; 59. See also New Republic 69 (18 
November, 1931): 3.
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William Green characterised the sweatshop as "a form of industrial 
brigandry" which had resulted in industries with the lowest standards 
setting the pace to which all others were obliged to conform. Excessive 
competition had not only disorganised industry but, since it was not
I
self-sustaining, meant that "industry ceases to be legitimate producing .•
concern". Green attributed excessive competition to the unwillingness
of some managers to conform to standards necessary for industrial planning
and because the antitrust laws inhibited trade association action as an
antidote to excessive competition. Declaring that the era of uncontrolled
individualism had passed, Green welcomed the establishment of machinery
for associated action to counter the undesirable effects of 'cutthroat'
47competition.
Nowhere was this consencus in favour of economic planning more pro­
nounced than with reference to the 'sick' industries. Business and labour 
spokesmen and collectivists appreciated the problems of such industries 
as oil, coal and textiles which had suffered from excess capacity, 
intense competition and declining prices since the Great War. These 
sectors mostly closely approximated the laissez-faire ideal of competitive 
individualism and were amongst the most unstable in the American economy.
Concern for the oil industry stemmed from the considerable wastage 
of natural resources in the industry's operation from extraction to 
distribution. Oil is an industry whose geological peculiarities condition 
its economic aspects. As the economist George Ward Stocking urged, 
scientific development of oil reserves designed to secure a maximum of 
oil at a minimum of cost, would take the geological unit - the oil pool - 
as its point of departure and would endeavour to utilise it in the most 
efficient manner possible. In particular, scientific development would
47. American Federationist 40 (June,July, 1933): 568-569; 677.
harness those substances found in association with oil - gas and water - 
as expulsive agents in oil recovery. However, scientific development 
was impossible when the geological unit was divided into arbitrary 
property tracts and when, under a system of unregulated competition they 
were exploited to the full. The result of such persistent exploitation, 
Stocking lamented, was waste on a scale "to excite the admiration of the 
most profligate". Free gas had been permitted to escape unutilised into 
the atmosphere; gas pressure - the major expulsive force - had been 
dissipated recklessly and oil fields had been flooded and ruined through 
the premature encroachment of salt water. Stocking did not blame 
individuals for these wastes but rather the system which allowed compet­
itive mining of a migratory mineral was responsible. Because oil is a 
fugacious mineral, tending to move through the pores of the underground 
rock once the equilibrium of the pool has been disturbed by drilling, 
without regard to property lines on the surface, under a competitive 
system .once capacity was called into being the operator was compelled 
to utilise it to the full. Having relatively large fixed costs and 
facing 'cutthroat* competition, the oil operators were obliged to produce 
regardless of the price of oil. Should an individual operator choose 
to curtail or cease production in anticipation of a higher future price 
for the product, it would benefit a competitor on an adjoining tract 
who would reduce the fugitive mineral to his possession. "These wastes," 
Stocking declared, "inevitably flow from the competitive mining of a 
migratory mineral which recognizes no property lines and transgresses 
the principle of ownership. They are the product of a system of exploit- 
ation based on the principle of robbery."
48. George Ward Stocking, 'Stabilization of the Oil Industry: Its
Economic and Legal Aspects', American Economic Review 23 (March, 
1933): 55-57. Leverett S. Lyon et al., Government and Economic 
Life, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1940), 2: 994-996. Eugene W. Rostow, 
A National Policy for the Oil Industry (New Haven, 1948): 16-18.
E.P. Salisbury, 'Overproduction in the Oil Industry', in Scoville 
Hamlin (ed.), The Menace of Overproduction: Its Cause, Extent and 
Cure, (London, 1930): 18-19.
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In addition to these inherent problems in extraction which made 
for overproduction, the industry was affected by excess capacity and an 
inadequate demand for its products. Overproduction of the raw material 
naturally led to surplus refining capacity and marketing and distributing 
facilities and they, in turn, exacerbated competition in the industry. 
Independent refiners pressured producers on price and volume due to their 
inability to compete, except on price, with the patent-protected high 
octane grades of corporate competitors. The chain was completed by 
independent wholesalers and retailers who demanded price concessions 
from refiners since they could not compete otherwise but on price with 
the 'branded' gasoline of integrated competitors. Hence at every process 
in the chain from extraction to distribution there was competition for 
gallonage between the major companies and the independents, and this
AOcompetition was based on price. A further problem faced by the industry 
was that demand for its major product, gasoline, was not elastic enough 
to keep pace with the increased production of oil and the increasing 
percentage yield of gasoline from crude oil. The most dramatic manifest­
ation of overproduction and inadequate demand during the depression was 
the outbreak of price wars in the retail sector involving not only majors 
against independents, but between leading companies such as Standard,
Dutch Shell and Gulf. 50 *
Stocking believed that this precarious situation had first become 
apparent during 1927 when accumulating stocks had so weakened the oil 
price structure that it could not withstand the shock of the Oklahoma
49. Stocking, 'Stabilization of the Oil Industry', op.cit., 57-58. 
Independent producers accounted for over 40% of total crude output. 
See Ruth W. Ayres, 'The Petroleum Industry', in George B. Galloway 
et al., Industrial Planning under Codes (New York, 1935): 189-193.
50. Lawrence M. Hughes, 'Your Gasoline Tank', Nation 132 (18 February,
1931): 178-180. Sidney A. Swensrud, 'Distribution Problems of
the Oil Industry', Parts 1 and 2. Harvard Business Review 9 
(July, 1931): 389-399; Ibid., 10 (October, 1931): 78-84.
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Greater Seminole fields strike and the resultant substantial output.^'
By 1929, the industry had reached a crisis with production of crude 
petroleum reaching 1,007,323,000 barrels, a new record high and an 
increase of 105,849,000 barrels (12%) over 1928. The year, remarked 
the Bureau of Mines, was "the first billion barrel year for the United 
States". Overproduction and competition were intensified in 1931 when 
rich new fields began to be exploited in eastern Texas and increased 
quantities of cheap foreign fuel were imported into the United States.
In response to the oil industry's chronic problems, exacerbated 
by the depression, a broad consensus developed on the desirability of 
planning to prevent overproduction and falling prices. Such an accord 
had been developing since the turn of the century,as oil operators became 
concerned about declining profits and liberals grew anxious about conserv­
ing a precious natural resource. Since the State of Oklahoma fixed the 
minimum price of crude oil in 1907 to counter the effects of overproduction 
in the Glenn Pool fields, both had looked to government for assistance 
with the industry's problems. This trend was furthered by the positive
and beneficial relationship developed between oil operators and the
53Fuel Administration during World War I.
Industry's initial response to the crisis of the late 1920s was 
to exhort producers to reduce output voluntarily, through the industry's 
trade association, the American Petroleum Institute and the Federal Oil 
Conservation Board. The industry also turned to the states and action 
was taken individually and collectively at State level to effect production 
curtailment. Both Oklahoma (1927) and Texas (1930) enacted compulsory
51. George Ward Stocking, 'Chaos in the Oil Industry', Nation 136 
(7 June, 1933): 634.
52. G.R. Hopkins and A.B. Coons, 'Petroleum in 1929', in Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Resources, 1929 (Washington, DC, 
1931), Part 2: 421. 53*
53. Gerald D. Nash, United States Oil Policy, 1890-1964 (Norman, 1968):
16-17; 22-44.
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proration statutes with the support of the major operators, and in 1931 
nine oil-producing states organised an Oil States Advisory Committee to 
coordinate curtailment activities. However, support for proration was 
strongest in the large integrated concerns and weakest among the indepen­
dents who believed that they would be unduly disadvantaged by production 
restrictions. Consequently, 'hot oil' continued to be produced even in 
those states where proration laws were in effect and in both Oklahoma 
and Texas martial law was declared to 'shut down' capacity.
Sentiment emerged for a modification of the antitrust laws to 
allow cooperation between firms to prevent overproduction and President 
Hoover was expected to champion the cause. However, after initial high 
hopes for the Hoover administration's stance on the oil issue collectivists 
and operators were subsequently disabused by the President's course.
Despite the President's recognition of the problems faced by natural 
resource industries during the depression and his sympathy for selective
revision of the antitrust statutes, he remained unwilling to lead the 
. 56revision movement.
By 1933 considerable sentiment existed for regulation of the oil 
industry, the first steps having been taken by the industry itself when 
it attempted to effect a voluntary proration programme. Its failure 
convinced many collectivists and operators alike that only the Federal 
Government possessed the necessary authority to solve the industry's 
problems. Labour spokesmen were particularly concerned about the mounting 
unemployment in the oil industry and those allied to it. One estimate
54. Ibid., 110-127. Elmer Davis, 'Can Business Manage Itself?',
Harper's 162 (March, 1931): 391. Avis D. Carlson, 'Drowning in 
Oil*, Ibid., 163 (October, 1931): 608-617. Keith L. Bryant, Jr., 
Alfalfa Bill Murray (Norman, 1968): 198-200; 243-244.
55. The Nation was initially optimistic about President Hoover's conserv- 
ationist intentions. See Nation 128 (27 March, 1929): 359. 56*
56. President Hoover's attitude to antitrust revision is discussed in
Chapter 6.
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in 1931 put unemployment due to the problems of the industry at 382,000,
with a cost to wage earners in salaries of $1,974,000 per day.^ For
many businessmen, collectivists and labour spokesmen alike, a policy of
laissez-faire was regarded as grossly inappropriate for the circumstances
in which the oil industry found itself.
A similar situation to that in oil existed in cotton textiles.
The cotton textile industry suffered from over-expansion during the
Great War, and while overall spindle capacity decreased in the 1920s
overproduction remained a feature of the industry due to excess capacity
stimulated by low investment requirements to enter the industry and the
practice, especially in the South, of extending operating man-hours.
Overproduction was particularly serious since the market for cotton
textiles was threatened by the availability of substitutes such as paper
and rayon, and during the depression demand was further affected by the
slump in consumers' incomes. As a result overproduction provoked a
parallel trend in the industry - declining profits. In 1926, a generally
good business year, more cotton textile corporations reported deficits
than those reporting profits, and in 1929, the; peak year of corporate
profits, the industry earned less than it had during the recession of
1920-1921. The depression exacerbated this tendency, large net losses
being recorded between 1930 and 1932 and in 1932, according to income
58tax returns, 75% of operators sustained losses.
As in the oil industry, initiative in textiles was taken by the 
industry's trade association, the Cotton Textile Institute, which spon­
sored programmes to curtail production by voluntary limitation of working
57. T.F. Hunter to Representative Guinn Williams n.d. Reprinted in 
Congressional Record 74, 71st Congress, Third Session, 1931: 
5300-5301. 58
58. Julius Backman and M.R. Gainsbrugh, Profits and Losses in Textiles: 
Cotton Financing Since the War (New York, 1936): 195-200. George 
A. Sloan, 'The Cotton Textile Industry under the N.R.A.', in 
Galloway, 'Industrial Planning', op.cit., 118-120. Edmund P. 
Learned, 'The Cotton Textile Situation*, Harvard Business Review
14 (Autumn, 1935): 30-32.
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hours in all textile mills. However, as in oil, despite support for its
endeavours, the Institute’s policies were bedevilled by 'non-conformers'
who believed that competition rather than stabilisation better served
their own interests. The failure of voluntarism inspired 'advanced'
elements in the industry to seek government authority to make curtailment
schemes binding. Throughout 1932 and during the last months of the
Hoover administration, the C.T.I. conducted negotiations with the
Department of Commerce and with the President himself to urge the
establishment of a national board; this would investigate conditions
in depressed industries and through trade associations, freed from the
strictures of the antitrust laws, apply measures involving "economic
59planning" and cooperative action to master overproduction.
The problems of the bituminous coal industry attracted considerable 
attention during the early phase of the depression. Demand for coal 
during the Great War had overextended the industry, and subsequent 
markets were inadequate to sustain it profitably at its 1918 capacity. 
During the 1920s the industry suffered from a declining demand for its 
product and an increase in production. The rivalry of energy substitutes 
such as petroleum, natural gas and hydro-electric power, together with 
improvements in the utilisation of coal by industry were instrumental 
in reducing demand. At the same time, although capacity was reduced in 
the industry as the market declined, mechanisation increased productivity 
by an estimated 25% and the industry remained overdeveloped. The result 
was 'cutthroat' competition wherein operators attempted to utilise their 
full capacity and drove down the price of bituminous coal in the process.
59. Louis Galambos, Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a 
National Trade Association (Baltimore, 1966): 157-190. Sloan,
'The Cotton Textile Industry', op.cit., 117. Milton Handler (ed.), 
The Federal Antitrust Laws: A Symposium (Chicago, J932): 76-90.
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The depression exacerbated existing problems. While production of soft 
coal experienced a 42% decline between 1929 and the depression low-point 
of 1932, and the producer received 26% less in average value per ton, 
the number of mines in operation declined by only 10%. Such persistence 
on the part of the owners and operators can be explained, in part, by 
their ability to reduce costs by lowering wage levels. Although total 
employment declined by only 8% during these three years, wages and time 
worked declined more significantly. On average, mine workers received 
in 1932 only 54% of the wage level in 1929 and worked for 34% fewer days. 
At the same time, operators were able to reduce fixed costs by retarding 
mechanisation. In 1932, 35% less coal was mechanically extracted, cleaned 
and loaded than it had been in 1929.*^
There were strident arguments for the adoption of planning in the 
bituminous coal industry: to balance production with demand, increase 
prices, rationalise the industry and increase productivity, allow workers 
a fair day's pay for a fair day's work and to preserve an exhaustible 
natural resource. Broad agreement was reached between unions and some 
operators on the need to plan, and modification of the antitrust laws 
to permit cooperation between independent units was considered indis­
pensable in this respect. However, although legislation was introduced 
to permit cooperative activity, the aims of the planners in the coal 
industry were thwarted by disagreements as to the nature of planning 
and where cotitrol of the planning process should be ultimately located.
60. Sydney A. Hale, 'The Bituminous Coal Mining Industry', in George B. 
Galloway et al.. Industrial Planning Under Codes (New York, 1933): 
162-165. C. E. Bockus, 'The Cost of Overproduction in the Bituminous 
Mining Industry', in Scoville Hamlin (ed.), The Menace of Over­
production: Its Cause, Extent and Cure (London 1930): 2-11. Waldo E. 
Fisher and Charles M. James, Minimum Price-Fixing in the Bituminous 
Coal Industry (Princeton, 1955): 5-13. Ethelbert Stewart, 'Extent 
of Overdevelopment in the Bituminous Coal Industry', Monthly Labor 
Review 32 (February, 1931): 50-51. Wattenberg (ed.), Statistical 
History, op.cit., 170; 589; 591.
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The movement towards private and public regulation of such chronic­
ally depressed industries as dl, textiles and coal gained a broad-based 
support due to the forceful arguments that could be mustered in its 
favour. The undesirability of dislocation and disorganisation in such 
major industries was obvious to all since the ramifications for the 
overall economy were grave. Although competition provided purchasers 
with cheaper prices, rather than stimulate business activity, it acted 
in reverse, for erratic price structures inhibited industries and domestic 
consumers from purchasing. For the operator, successful restriction of 
production would eliminate much excess capacity and stabilise prices at 
a higher plateau than prevailing levels. The plight of labour in these 
depressed sectors evoked both a humanitarian concern and an economic one.
As 'cutthroat' competition forced employers to lower wage rates to reduce 
costs, anxiety was expressed about the welfare of the worker and the 
effect of the reduced purchasing power of these consumers on general 
economic activity. Two of these industries - coal and textiles - were 
specifically mentioned in the A.F. of L.'s Executive Council Report of 
November, 1929 as conspicuous for "lack of management" and "badly 
balanced production and irregular employment".^ Further support for 
regulation came from those allied industries and communities dependent 
upon these depressed industries. A broad range of interests was adversely 
affected by the fortunes of these industries, from the construction and 
steel industries and the railroads at one extreme, to community merchants, 
farmers who supplied cotton to textile factories, and landowners dependent 
upon payments by oil companies,for the lease of their lands, on the other. 
Conservationists, too, could support the extension of regulation to the 61
61. Report of the Proceedings of the 49th Annual Convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 7-18 
October, 1929 (Washington DC, 1929); 37-3§.
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natural resource industries since it would encourage the application of 
scientific practices and a more effective utilisation of valuable and 
finite national assets. Finally, disorganisation in these sectors 
offended collectivists' belief in man's capacity to control his environ­
ment in the best national interest and to instill order and efficiency 
into industry. Whether such regulation should be accompanied by a 
strong government interest or whether control by the industry itself 
was contemplated, the example of the 'sick' industries testified to 
the inadequacy of laissez-faire as a governing principle for industrial 
development.
Technological change was a contributor factor to the problems of 
'sick' industries since it increased productivity in sectors where 
demand was already inadequate. Another implication which was widely 
discussed during the early years of the depression was its effect on 
employment. The phenomenon of technological unemployment provided 
further ammunition for those critics of laissez-faire who claimed that 
it was an unsound theoretical basis for an industrially—  advanced society.
The subject began to attract widespread attention in the 1920s 
when improvements in technical efficiency displaced workers from 
industry. After the onset of the depression awareness of technolog­
ical unemployment was deepened with the publication of studies of specific 
situations in which workers were displaced by machines and by the sens­
ational and sophistic revelations of the Technocrats during the last 
months of Hoover's office. The issue evoked much interest amongst 62*
62. Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker,
1920-1933 (Baltimore, 1966): 60-62. Joseph Dorfman, The Economic
Mind in American Civilization, 5 vols. (New York, 1969), 5: 604.
61
economists, and in the journal press especially, since there was disagree­
ment as to whether machinery threatened to replace workers permanently 
or whether technological unemployment was merely a temporary phenomenon.^ 
Whichever, most agreed that the hardships endured by those affected by 
technological progress should be cushioned in the process of adjustment 
and that some form of planning was essential to safeguard the workers' 
interests.
Generally, there were three schools of thought on the significance 
of technological unemployment. The first contended that unemployment 
was not necessarily the corollary of technical progress. While hardship 
did accompany adjustment, technological advances eventuated in lower 
prices to the consumer and enlarged demand, which resulted in re-employment 
for those made redundant by technology. As such, there was no real cause 
for concern.^ At the other extreme, the economist, Alvin H. Hansen saw 
no reason why labour displaced by machinery should not remain permanently 
unemployed. Hansen claimed that technological gains would not be trans­
lated into an increased demand. The aggregate purchasing power would 
remain the same but would rest in fewer hands, and the demand from this
sector would increase only to a level for which the machine process
65could produce without re-employing workers. A third school accepted.
63. For a survey of the contemporary state of economic thought on 
technological unemployment and an intended response to the Techno­
crats in itself, see Leo Wolman, 'Machinery and Unemployment', 
Nation 136 (22 February, 1933): 202-204.
64. Myron C. Taylor, 'An Address at Colgate University, Hamilton, New 
York, Special Convocation, 12 April, 1929'. Taylor MSS: Box 22. 
F.D.R.L. Commercial and Financial Chronicle 130 (19 April, 1930): 
2649-2651. Fabian Franklin, 'The Specter of Overproduction', 
Forum 84 (December, 1930): 367-370. 65*
65. Alvin H. Hansen, 'Institutional Frictions and Technological 
Unemployment', Quarterly Journal of Economics 45 (August, 1931): 
686-687. Idem, 'The Theory of Technological Progress and the 
Dislocation of Employment', American Economic Review 22 (March,
1932): 25-31, (Supp.) Hansen was a business cycle theorist. 
Despite his pessimism about technological unemployment he had 
reservations about government intervention to remedy the problem.
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the view that ultimately displaced workers would be reabsorbed into 
industry, since technological development not only increased effective 
demand by reducing prices but also created new enterprises which would 
absorb labour. However, emphasis was placed on the problems of adjust­
ment for the displaced worker and the need to cushion the effects of 
technological unemployment. As Dexter S. Kimball, Dean of Engineering 
at Cornell, expressed it: "We need not be troubled ... as to the final 
results of such metamorphoses. It is the immediate results of such 
changes that are now engaging the attention of the thoughtful man."^ 
Similarly, the economist Paul H. Douglas, while optimistic of displaced 
labour’s ultimate re-absorption into industry, believed that more 
attention should be paid to the process of readjustment for the displaced
worker: to "those temporary frictions which the economist blithely 
.. 67ignores .
Available evidence emphasised the problems involved in readjustment 
and the number of workers obliged to undergo the process. David Weintraub 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research estimated that between 1920 
and 1931 over three million wage earners in manufacturing, coal mining, 
and railroads had been displaced by technological improvements, an average 
of about a quarter of a million a year. While these workers were even­
tually reabsorbed, Weintraub calculated that the average period of 
unemployment was nine months, corroborating Isador Lubin's previous 
findings of 1929. Clague and Coupers' studies of employees made 
redundant by the U.S. Rubber Company in 1929 confirmed the extensive
66. Dexter S. Kimball, 'Social Effects of Mass Production’, in Charles 
F. Roos (ed.), Stabilization of Employment (Bloomington, 1933): 62. 
Kimball's emphasis. 678*
67. Paul H. Douglas, 'Technological Unemployment', American Federationist 
37 (August, 1930): 923-950. Douglas was a specialist in labour 
economics at the University of Chicago and an active social reformer.
68. David Weintraub, 'The Displacement of Workers through Increases in
Efficiency and their Absorption by Industry, 1920-1931', Journal 
of the American Statistical Association 27 (December, 1932): 399. 
Isador Lubin, The Absorption of the Unemployed by American Industry, 
(Washington, D.C, 1929).
hiatus between dismissal and reemployment, although their researches
suggested a more conservative average of between four and five months.
They also discovered that the majority of workers reemployed failed
to secure jobs paying wages equal to those of their last employment;
rather they were forced to accept decreases averaging between thirty
69and forty percent. Elizabeth Faulkner Baker recorded another dis­
location associated with technological change which, while not resulting 
necessarily in unemployment, introduced friction into industry. From 
studies of the effects of technical change in New York's commercial 
printing industry, Baker concluded that despite installation of new 
equipment, demand for labour had not slackened. However, improved 
technique resulted in a qualitative change in the nature of skills 
demanded of employees and problems of readjustment in this instance 
involved a surfeit of unskilled and semi-skilled labour in a situation 
where skilled labour was required as the industry changed from hand-fed 
to machine-fed presses.^
One particular facet of technological unemployment which aroused 
concern was that the older workers bore a disproportionate burden of 
this type of unemployment. Writing in 1929, Stuart Chase remarked on 
the increasing difficulty experienced by men over forty years in retain­
ing their jobs and finding new ones. 'Old-age' unemployment, he wrote, 
"is something new, a cancer which has fastened upon the industrial order 
almost without our knowing it". Chase noted that the phenomenon was 
to be explained, in part, by the.adoption of group insurance schemes 
in industry and a reluctance on the part of employers to pay the higher
69. Ewan Clague and W.J. Couper, 'The Readjustment of Workers Displaced 
by Plant Shutdowns', Quarterly Journal of Economics 45 (February, 
1931): 326-336. 70
70. Elizabeth Faulkner Baker, Displacement of Men by Machines: Effects 
of Technological Change in Commercial Printing (New York, 1933): 
38-39; 80; 182.
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premiums required for older participants. 71 But of greater significance 
was technological innovation which was reducing industry's labour 
requirements and making the labour of the older worker particularly 
dispensable. "Invention is eliminating labor at an unprecedented rate," 
Chase reflected, "and it is the man over forty who is being hit the 
hardest."7^
Evidence for discrimination against older workers in industry was
provided by studies such as those of Clague and Couper, and by Robert
J. Myers' study of redundancy in the Chicago cloth industry. Myers
concluded that younger men changed jobs fewer times, lost less time
before securing re-employment, had relatively more increases and fewer
decreases in earnings. Men over thirty-nine were disadvantaged in each 
73respect. Reports from the states indicated that industry was adopting
a conscious and deliberate age bar to hiring. A survey by the Maryland
Commissioner of Labor and Statistics disclosed that employers of over
30% of the workers covered in the project had definite age limits and
a survey by the California Department of Industrial Relations revealed
that while only 1 1% of the replies were affirmative, they represented
7439% of the workers covered.
71. Stuart Chase, 'Laid Off at Forty', Harper's 149 (August, 1929): 
340-344.
72. Idem. Men and Machines (London, 1929): 212.
73. Robert J. Myers, 'Occupational Readjustment of Displaced Skilled 
Workmen', Journal of Political Economy 37 (August, 1929): 487-489.
74. Monthly Labor Review 32 (February, 1931): 30-39. State of 
California Department of Industrial Relations, Middle-Aged and 
Older Workers in California (San Francisco, 1930): 14-40. See 
also an industrial employment supervisor's defence of maximum 
hiring age limits in Millicent Pond, 'Maximum Hiring Age Limit 
in Industry', American Labor Legislation Review 19 (December,
1929): 351-354.
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For Sumner H. Slichter it was regrettable that the costs of tech­
nological change fell upon the community at large rather than upon those 
who encouraged and would ultimately benefit from it - the owners and 
managers. In effect the nation was subsidising technological change 
in industry, and as a result "the cost of change tends to be excessive". 
Slichter was adamant that wage earners be protected from industrial 
changes unfavourable to them.^ Stuart Chase regarded technological 
unemployment as one manifestation of a developing economy which was 
unable to provide security of employment for its workers.^ Chase was 
sceptical that technologically displaced workers could continue to be 
reabsorbed by industry and services (the "blotting-paper trades") since 
change was ongoing and displacing workers to a point beyond the capacity 
of the distribution system and ’new' industries to absorb them. "I am 
seriously afraid that accelerating unemployment is here," Chase reflected 
and "that the park bench is destined to grow l o n g e r . I n  such circum­
stances there was a need for planning to anticipate and control the 
effects of technological unemployment.
Organised labour had a vested interest in the subject. In 1930 
The American Federationist deplored the fact that technological unemploy­
ment remained an unsolved problem and urged that it should be a national
priority "to install technical progress so that labor will not fear 
70science". William Green recognised both the problem and society's 
"obligation" to those displaced at the A.F. of L.'s Toronto convention 
of 1929 and at Boston in 1930 the Executive Council demanded that
75. Sumner H. Slichter, 'Lines of Action, Adaptation and Control', 
American Economic Review 22 (March, 1932): 41-42, (Supp.).
76. Stuart Chase, 'The Nemesis of American Business', Harper*s 161 
(July, 1930): 136.
77. Idem,' " 'The Iron Bouncer', in Morse A. Cartwright (ed.),
Unemployment and Adult Education: A Symposium on Certain Problems 
of Re-Education arising from 'Permanent Lay-Off' (New York, 1931): 
15. Idem, Men and Machines, op.cit., 215.
78. American Federationist 37 (May, 1930): 530.
President Hoover arrange a special study of technological unemployment
and related problems. In 1932, Green expressed concern that industry
would effect more technical improvements once revival got underway and
obsolescent machinery was replaced. He predicted that 55% of the
unemployed would be unable to recover their jobs. For Green a crossroads
had been reached where the social aims of technological progress needed
to be defined. "Shall this technical progress create the misery and
waste of unémployment," he asked, "or shall it bring higher standards
80of living and the opportunities of leisure with income to all?"
The Hoover administration accepted the existence of technological
unemployment and attempted to gauge its extent through surveys conducted
81by the Department of Commerce. Hoover recognised that technological
and managerial efficiency was "shifting men in industry with a speed
we have never hitherto known" and that the subject of technological
82unemployment was one of "profound importance". Despite the fact that 
Hoover understood that labour-saving devices had displaced more than 
two million workers during the 1920s he saw no reason for alarm and was 
confident that "the problem is not at all insurmountable in the long run". 
The President expected that the economic system would "revolve" to 
enable displaced workers to be reabsorbed by new industries. These new
79. Proceedings, 49th Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1929, op.cit., 7-8; 
35-37; 41; 94-98; 256-257. Proceedings, 50th Annual Convention,
A.F. of L., 1930, op.cit., 63; 89-91.
80. American Federationist 39 (October, 1932): 1099.
81. Robert P. Lamont to John P. Frey, 27 March, 1930. Frey MSS Box 9, 
File 131.
82. Address before Chamber of Commerce, 1 May, 1930. State Papers, 
op.cit., 1 : 295.
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industries, the products of American innovation which had initially 
displaced workers, would not only reabsorb ingenuity's victims, but would 
increase the general standard of living in the process. Such optimism 
did not make Hoover sanguine for he appreciated the transitional diffi­
culties for the displaced worker. "There is a period of readjustment 
in each case of new discovery and industry has need of a larger under- 
standing of the facts." By 1932 the problem had become more urgent.
In his 'Labor Speech' at Cleveland on 15 October, he admitted that new 
industries and services had failed to take up the slack of employment 
caused by the adoption of labour-saving machinery in the established 
sectors. Embarking on his 'Share-the-Work' drive, the President felt 
that hours limitation was the most efficacious remedy. The report 
of the Committee on Recent Social Trends confirmed this attitude. "At
best, the problem of technological unemployment promises to remain grave
85in the years to come."
Technological unemployment as an issue received considerable 
publicity and excited public attention,after the publication of a series 
of three articles on Technocracy by Wayne W. Parrish which appeared in 
Alfred E. Smith's The New Outlook between November 1932 and January 1933. 
Parrish outlined Technocracy's claims that mechanical energy was dis­
placing labour manpower at such a rate that by 1934, over twenty million 
workers would be unemployed in the United States. These claims were 
accompanied by dramatic supporting statistical evidence which revealed 
enormous increases in the productivity of labour using technology and 
the prediction that future developments would eliminate increasing
83. Address at the 50th Annual Convention of the A.F. of L., Boston, 
Mass., 6 October, 1930, Ibid., 393.
84. Ibid., 2: 394.
85. Recent Social Trends, op.cit., 1 : xxviii.
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numbers of workers from industry. Claims such as the one that one
hundred men in fully mechanised plants could produce the total national
brick output evoked much controversy and were shown to be demonstrably 
87false. By the end of January 1933, the Columbia-based organisation 
led by Howard Scott had been thoroughly discredited, much of its evidence 
having been found false or fatuous. Nevertheless, commentators in 
liberal, business and labour quarters saw merit in the movement for 
bringing the issue of technological unemployment to the public's 
attention.
George Soule, otherwise critical of Technocracy, regarded its 
principal contribution as gaining publicity for the problems and potential 
of technology. In this sense, the organisation served a positive function 
for it acted as an agent of social change. "The Technocrats like most 
advocates of economic planning, are helping to change people's ideas 
so that they will be more ready to support new political forms and
88powers. They serve a function in the large complex of social change."
VVvv
Writing for The Nation, Archibald MacLeish hoped that rejection of 
Technocracy's evidence and its leadership would not lead to "the neglect 
of issues we cannot afford to neglect"; and after Technocracy split
86. Wayne W. Parrish, 'What is Technocracy?', New Outlook 161 (November, 
1932): 13-18. Idem, 'Technocracy's Question', Ibid~  161 (December, 
1932): 13-16; 18. Idem, 'Technocracy's Challenge', Ibid., 161 
(January, 1933): 13-16; 18.
87. The most effective critic of Technocracy's claims was John H. Van 
Devanter, editor of Iron Age. His refutations of the movement's 
data were used by other critics. See Iron Age 130 (1, 22 December, 
1932): 849-850; 960-963; 16 (ad.); 131 (26 January, 1933): 159-161; 
10 (ad.). For other criticisms of Technocracy, see J. George 
Frederick (ed.), For and Against Technocracy: A Symposium (New 
York, 1933): 31-757 Simeon Strunsky, 'A Challenge to Technocracy', 
New York Times Magazine, 8 January, 1933.
88. George Soule, 'Technocracy: Good Medicine or a Bedtime Story?',
New Republic 73 (28 December, 1932): 180.
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into rival groups at the end of January, The Nation considered the schism
unfortunate since it would be construed as proof of the weakness of
Technocracy's theories and the inaccuracy of its findings. Stuart
Chase, while unimpressed with Technocracy's statistical evidence, was
committed to the movement's general thesis about the advance of the
machine and the displacement of labour. "The trend I cannot doubt,"
Chase asserted, "even though certain details may be erroneous or
incomplete." In The Survey Graphic, Leon Whipple congratulated
Technocracy's critics on the thoroughness of their research into the
accuracy of the movement's claims but regretted that they had generally
91failed to point out the value of the ideas underlying them. Harlow S. 
Person of the Taylor Society grieved the sensationalism of Technocracy, 
fearing that it would blind Americans to its fundamental ideas. He 
continued:
In a few weeks it has focussed public attention on the significance 
of technological change. It has made us face, at least for a 
moment, the changing status of human labor, the possibilities 
implicit for all of us in the vast power resources of our Machine 
Age. It has wrested our attention from individual problems and 
plunged us into both fear and hope for our common future.*
Speaking for labour, William Green recognised the validity of the
criticism levelled at the movement but contended that its intrinsic
shortcomings were less significant than its location of "a crucial
93problem in our social progress", For Spencer Miller, Jr., secretary
89. Archibald MacLeish, 'Machines and the Future', Nation 136 (8 February, 
, 1933): 140. Ibid., 136 (1 February, 1933): 105.
90. Stuart Chase, Technocracy: An Interpretation (New York, 1933): 16.
91. Leon Whipple, 'Rockets do Light No-Man's Land', Survey Graphic 22 
(March, 1933); 176-177.
92. Harlow S. Person and Beulah Amidon, 'Economics Make the Front Page', 
Ibid., 158.
93. American Federationist 40 (February, 1933): 123.
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of the Workers' Education Bureau of America, Technocracy's thesis was
"so sweeping and overwhelming" that it was impossible to ignore.^
Neither was the movement devoid of sympathy from industry. Henry I.
Harriman, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, actually used
Technocracy's data in a speech in December 1932, to illustrate his theme
of the increased productivity of American industry and its economic and
social effects. Coal Age decried the "brimstone publicity" received
by the organisation and regretted that "what should be a valuable research
study suffers from premature and sensational exploitation".^ Textile
World suggested that the depression should have taught Americans an
important lesson: that their machine civilisation needed to be planned
and directed into channels of social usefulness. As such it could applaud
97the Technocrats for drawing public attention to the problems involved.
L.W.W. Morrow, editor of Electrical World claimed that Technocracy's
revelations deserved an official investigation which would begin with
ascertaining facts rather than devising theory. Even Iron Age, the
most vociferous of the organisation's critics could concede that however
flawed were Technocracy's claims, they did present a challenge to
99industry to respond to the problems that had been emphasised.
94. Proceedings. 52nd Annual Convention, A.F, of L., 1932, op.cit., 182.
95. Henry I. Harriman, 'Sound Business Policies Essential to Security': 
an Address delivered at the 26th Annual Convention of the Association 
of Life Insurance Presidents in New York City, 9 December, 1932.
Henry I. Harriman File: Chamber Library.
96. Coal Age 38 (January, 1933): 2.
97. Textile World 83 (January, 1933): 37.
98. Electrical World 100.(14 January, 1933): 60-62.
99. Iron Age 130 (22 December, 1932): 951. See also Steel 91 (5 December, 
1932): 18.
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Like the Technocrats, few commentators wished to retard technological 
progress to avoid unemployment stemming from it, although few would have 
endorsed Technocracy’s prescription of central, unified control of the 
economy. Collectivist intellectuals, businessmen and labour spokesmen 
joined in stressing the social potential of technological progress.
Edward A. Filene contended that technological progress was a 
prime agent for human betterment in both material and aesthetic senses.
It would furnish the individual with increased earning and buying power 
and provide him with the leisure to strengthen.both "soul" and "spirit" 
through educational opportunities and involvement in cultural pursuits. 
However, Filene understood that until employers accepted that the future 
of industry and business was irrevocably intertwined with the economic 
welfare of those they employed and who consumed their products, social 
progress would be limited. By the end of 1932, Filene had come to 
endorse the thirty-hour week with a guaranteed minimum wage as a response 
to cyclical and technological unemployment.^^ Stuart Chase could agree 
with Filene about the potential of technology. "By and large," he wrote, "we 
stand to gain more than we lose by the emergence of the technical arts and 
the economic specialization which they have created."1^ * Industry had 
the potential to create a vast quantity of goods and services, produced 
efficiently and at low cost. These gains could be passed on to the 
consumer who, in turn, would be liberated from his present material 
preoccupations through the very abundance of goods created. Technological
100. Edward A. Filene, 'Mass Production Makes a Better World', Atlantic 
Monthly 143 (May, 1929): 626-627. Idem, 'The New Capitalism', ThlT 
Annals 149 (May, 1930): 6-9. Idem, Successful Living in this 
Machine Age (New York, 1932). New York Times, 1 January, 1933.
101. Stuart Chase, 'Prometheus Enchained', in The Nemesis of American 
Business and Other Essays (New York, 193lT: 102.
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unemployment was bound to occur, but if technological progress was
controlled and allowance made for displaced victims, it should not
cause concern. The "logical, sensible and only final answer" was to
shorten working hours. Instead of making some men redundant, the
available work should be 'spread' without loss of earning power. The
whole nation would then share in technological advances: the worker in
a steady job with fewer hours; the owner gaining more reliable markets
and profits due to undiminished purchasing power. Rexford G. Tugwell
expressed the same concern that concentration on the unemployment
aspects of technological progress would obscure the social gains
possible. Tugwell urged Americans to accept "the obsolescence of
occupations" as desirable. Once this acceptance had become universal
then unemployment would become "another sort of problem, to be met in
very different ways". A more positive approach to unemployment could
be made, Tugwell argued, with the accent on how to fully utilise leisure
time. "It is man's destiny," he reflected, "to perform those functions
103which machines can never do - the thinking and contriving ones."
The A.F. of L. was not hostile to mechanisation. As John P. Frey
admitted to the English trade unionist W.A. Appleton, labour had benefitted
104from technological change during the 1920s through higher real wages.
This faith in a harmony between labour's interests and technology 
was asserted by William Green in September 1930, in a speech at a 
Labor Day State Fair at Syracuse, New York, where he claimed that
102. Idem. 'The Nemesis of American Business', op.cit., 130. Chase's 
recommendations for the amelioration of technological unemployment 
also included public works, raising the minimum hiring age limit 
of workers, dismissal compensation and unemployment insurance.
103. Rexford G. Tugwell, 'The Theory of Occupational Obsolescence', 
Political Science Quarterly 46 (June, 1931): 171-181; 227. See 
also Idem. 'Occupational Obsolescence'» in Cartwright (ed.), 
Unemployment and Adult Education, op.cit., 20-22.
. John P. Frey to W.A. Appleton, 10 January, 1930. Frey MSS: Box 1 
File 5.
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recovery could be generated through "the application of scientific
production and sales methods" in tandem with systematic long-term
• 105planning.
Glenn Frank, president of the University of Wisconsin, summed up 
the prevailing attitude towards technology and its effects in Thunder 
and Dawn (1932). Economic maladjustments had accompanied technological 
progress, but the fault for this lay not in mechanical progress itself.
The problem lay in the inability of political and industrial leadership 
to comprehend the implications of technological change for the economy 
as a whole:
The machine order has not failed us. It is the economic order 
that has gone awry. The maniac may slash his throat with a 
razor without indicting the razor as a useful shaving tool for 
sane men. 106
Legislative recommendations were made in 1932 by Representative David J. 
Lewis (Maryland) and Senator Hugo L. Black (Alabama) to share available 
employment between all workers. While the bills were primarily motivated 
by the unemployment caused by the business depression, both asserted 
their relevance to the problem of technological unemployment. Lewis 
introduced a bill to legalise workers' right to work and to share avail­
able employment on 11 January, 1932.^  In testimony before the Committee 
on Ways and Means, he declared that advances in technology accounted 
for a large proportion of current unemployment and that while progress 
was desirable it should not abridge "fundamental rights". Sharing avail­
able work would protect workers' right to work and cushion the effects 
of technological change.1®**
105. Commercial and Financial Chronicle 131 (6 September, 1930): 1480.
106. Glenn Frank, Thunder and Dawn (New York, 1932): 364-365.
107. H.RJ448.
108. US.Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means. Hearings on 
H.R.7448, Legalizing Worker's Right to Work and to Share of Available 
Employment, 72nd Congress, First Session, 1932: 1-2.
Black also regarded his thirty-hour week bill, introduced on 21
. 109December, 1932 as an antidote to technological unemployment. Black
was convinced that advances in technology had created a situation in 
which the thirty-hour week was adequate to fulfil the demands of American 
domestic and foreign commerce. Rather than have the owners derive 
exclusive benefit from technological change, the worker should profit 
also through shorter hours. There was no reasonable argument for long 
hours. Black dismissed as a "fallacy" the opinion that human wants were 
insatiable and stressed that leisure was a desired alternative. Also, 
technological advances accomplished in the context of long working hours 
threatened to add to technological unemployment. Black dismissed as 
"sophistry" the thesis that machines created new wants and absorbed 
displaced labour. The alternative to increasing technological unemploy­
ment was increased leisure, which he considered to be a beneficial end 
in itself: "I look upon reasonable leisure as a blessing, not a curse.""
The shorter working week was only one of several approaches proposed 
to counter technological unemployment. Advocates of the dismissal compen­
sation wage argued that redundancy benefits would cushion readjustment 
for the displaced worker and facilitate reemployment.'" Unemployment 
insurance had its champions amongst labour leaders not inhibited by the 
movement's traditional voluntarism and in 'enlightened' business leaders 
such as Gerard Swope and the fifteen companies that the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company discovered in 1931 had initiated unemployment
109. S.5267.
110. Congressional Record 76, 72nd Congress, Second Session: 4305; Ibid., 
77, 73rd Congress, First Session: 1127; 1183; 1191; 1444. 1
111. Everett D. Hawkins, 'The Dismissal Compensation Movement', The 
Annals 165 (January, 1933): 24-30. Sumner H. Slichter, 'Pharaoh 
Dreams Again', Atlantic Monthly 148 (August, 1931): 248-252.
Business Week, 30 September, 1931: 15-16.
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benefit schemes. The engineer, David Cushman Coyle contended that
the answer to technological unemployment was a vigorous programme of
public works, sponsored by the Federal Government to create employment
113in the service sector. Sumner Slichter suggested the creation of 
a federal labour board which would observe and forecast the effects of 
technical change in industry, devise plans to facilitate adjustment and 
recommend them to industries concerned.
In all the proposals, awareness of the need to control the effects 
of technological change revealed a widespread dissatisfaction with 
economic laws which were indifferent to the plight of displaced labour. 
As Sumner Slichter wrote:
For two centuries now, we have permitted the Juggernaut of 
industrial revolution to run wild .... Is it not high time 
that we recognise that change is bound to occur too rapidly 
and to produce misery and degradation unless it is controlled 
and intelligently directed and unless men are assisted to 
adjust themselves to their environment? Is it not high time 
that we recognise that change is now occurring on such a vast 
scale that we can no longer simply permit it to happen regard­
less of the consequences which it produces.
An issue frequently associated with technological unemployment, 
and which provided a further avenue of criticism of laissez-faire, was 
the maldistribution of income which was believed to have occurred in 
the 1920s and had been a significant contributory factor to the causes 
of the economic depression. As expounded by its principal popularisers, 
William Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings, the underconsumptionist 
analysis of the depression argued that one of the major causes of the 
depression had been the businessman's propensity throughout the 1920s
112. Sidney Hillman, 'Unemployment Reserves', Atlantic Monthly 148 
(November, 1931): 661-669. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 
Unemployment Insurance: A Summary of Some Existing Governmental 
and Private Plans (New York, 1931): 62-81.
113. David Cushman Coyle, 'New Aspects of the Distribution Problem', 
The Annals 165 (January, 1933): 109-115.
114. Slichter, 'Lines of Action, Adaptation and Control', op.cit., 48.
115. Ibid., 53-54.
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to transmute his lower costs into super-normal profits, instead of
into lower prices and higher money wages. The result of this was the
concentration of purchasing power in the hands of few people. Instead
of this purchasing power being realised in increased real income to
general consumers, it was recklessly re-invested in ventures such as
pyramiding holding companies, unnecessary capacity in industry and
investments abroad. The consequences were a hyper-active stock market,
excess capacity in industry and a decline of effective purchasing 
116power.
This underconsumptionist analysis appealed to collectivists, 
labour and some businessmen. Each could claim that to secure revival 
and to lay the foundations for long-term industrial stability, industry 
had to recognise the mutuality of interests with those of labour and 
consumers. The crux of the idea was that current income in the hands 
of the masses was insufficient to carry from the market the potential 
output of industry, and that economic stability could be achieved 
through a larger distribution of income to the working population.
Throughout the Hoover period organised labour remained convinced 
that underconsumption was a principal cause of the depression and a 
major reason for its continuance. Responding to the argument that over­
production had caused the depression, The American Federationist stressed 
that industry's difficulties stemmed from inadequate markets caused by 
income shortage, rather than from any product surplus. The kernel of 
the problem was that the incomes of 80% of consumers who were wage 
earners had failed to keep pace with increases in industrial productivity.
116. W.T. Foster and Waddill Catchings, 'In the Day of Adversity', 
Atlantic Monthly 148 (July, 1931): 101-106.
117. American Federationist 37 (July, 1930): 789; 38 (January, 1931):
18; 39 (August, 1932): 803.
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John Frey credited an "economically unsound" distribution of wealth with 
responsibility for the depression and appreciated the need for a "material 
advance in the real wage" to prevent protracted dislocation. Frey 
expressed concern that American businessmen would adopt a "European wages" 
approach to business conditions, and asserted that: "Businessmen are 
little different from other human beings when it comes to following the
119bell weather. A movement to reduce wages could easily become a contagion."
By 1931, Matthew Woll, vice-president of the A.F. of L., believed that
Frey's fears had been realised. Industrialists and businessmen had
resorted to wage reductions as a reflex response to economic depression,
a policy which was not only morally unscrupulous but unsound in terms
of inspiring revival. Too many employers "still believe that Adam Smith
is alive and that his philosophy has virtues," Woll contended. William
Green was less restrained in 1932. Industry's actions had been "stupid",
"indefensible" and "short-sighted" in initiating a policy which "has not
121only borne heavily upon labor, but ... has destroyed its own market."
Collectivists subscribed also to the underconsumptionist thesis
of the causes of the depression. George Soule contended that during
the period 1923 - 1928, industrial productivity had increased at a rate
four times greater than real wages. Increased profits and dividends
had contributed to overinvestment and speculative activity on Wall Street
122which had led to the economic depression inaugurated in 1929. Accord­
ing to Stuart Chase the essence of the problem lay in the absence of
118. John P. Frey to W.A. Appleton, 10 January, 1930; 30 December, 1930.
Frey MSS: Box 1, File 5.
119. John P. Frey to Theodore M. Knappen, 11 August, 1930. Ibid.,
Box 12, File 164.
120. Matthew Woll, 'The Economic Policy Proposed by American Labor',
The Annals 154 (March, 1931): 85.
121. Proceedings, 52nd Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1932, op.cit. 6.
122. George Soule, 'The Maintenance of Wages', Papers & Proceedings 
of the Academy of Political Science 14 (No.4, 1931): 548-550.
Collectivists• lOOinstitutions to maintain the economy "in balance".
understood the necessity for controls over wages and prices, but doubted
that industrialists and businessmen could be relied upon to voluntarily
effect such control given their disappointing performance in the 1920s.
"We have too easily assumed," Rexford Tugwell suggested, "that the power
124to make profits implies wisdom in the disposal of them." George
Soule demanded a "deliberate" control of wages and prices by which he
precluded announcements of "good intentions in respect to high wages
by our Henry Fords." Even if sincere, individual actions would be
ineffective, would result in disparities throughout industry and were
not likely to assist employees in ailing sectors such as coal where
falling prices inhibited employers from increasing wages. Soule despaired
of "attempting to effectuate any intelligent wage policy in a competitive,
unplanned, and lopsided economic order". The complexities involved were
too great for a successful policy to be achieved. Stuart Chase had
some confidence that an inflationary programme could stimulate revival,
central to which would be a "bold program" of public works. To this
end, in 1932 Chase demanded that the government initiate a $5 billion
programme. However, he believed that pump-priming was not the ultimate
solution for industrial instability. Only "a trenchant program of
126economic planning" could provide a basis for permanent stability.
The underconsumption theory met no little resistance from exponents 
of classical economics. "More puerile nonsense than this would be hard 
to imagine," Myron Watkins reneged, and he felt obliged to apologise
123. Stuart Chase, The Promise of Power (New York, 1933): 25.
124. Tugwell, 'The Principle of Planning', op.cit., 200.
125. George Soule, 'After Revival, What?', Harpers 166 (December,
1932): 99.
126. Stuart Chase, 'The Case for Inflation', Ibid., 165 (July, 1932): 
207-208.
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to the readers of The Quarterly Journal of Economics for taking up
valuable space with a refutation. That there could be an inherent
tendency towards disequilibrium in capitalism was "simply absurd".
The joint product of industry in any period, he argued, was the same
as the aggregate income of the community during that period. Income
which was saved was by no means dormant for savings allowed further
investment which constituted in itself a demand for a corresponding
127part of current production.
Tugwell could demur that the principal function of savings in the
American economy had been in fueling speculation and causing excess
128capacity in industry. Stuart Chase argued that promoters were
ignorant of the utility of savings: "A new device, an improvement of
an old device, a happy advertising slogan, a new technical method of
manufacturing, a rumour of great profits being made by those already in
the field, a patent, a selling contract secured in advance" - all
offered "the chance for rushing in where angels fear to tread."
Savings had been used wastefully by industry with unfavourable effects
on the environment, on the economy, and with scant regard for the
purchasing power of the consumers of industry's products. The process
had been "all very human", Chase remarked, "and profoundly in accord
129with the American tradition".
Understandably, businessmen were less likely to subscribe to 
the underconsumptionist thesis. However, as Barron's noted in 1930, 
industrial leaders of "the more progressive type" were disavowing the 
traditional liquidationist response to economic depressions. The 
voluntary agreement of leading industrial executives to uphold wages
127. Watkins, 'The Literature of the Crisis', op.cit., 523.
128. Tugwell, 'The Theory of Occupational Obsolescence', op.cit., 197-200.
129. Stuart Chase, 'The Enemy of Prosperity; Overproduction: What shall 
we do about it?', Harper's 161 (November, 1930): 643.
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made during the White House conference of November 1929, testified to
the more 'progressive' view which was making itself felt within the
130business community. This new attitude was reflected in an editorial
in the columns of Railway Age of December 1932:
That the problem of rapidly increasing production has been 
so largely solved is a promise, not a menace. The menace 
is in the fact that so little progress has been or is being 
made in solving the great problem of so balancing the pur­
chasing power of all classes of producers as to enable 
each of them to buy continuously the products of the others.
The argument that business should no longer extract the most favourable 
advantage that the supply of and demand for labour offered in the form 
of low wages, and that it should refrain from eking short-term advantages 
out of the consumer, constituted a further thrust against the doctrine 
of laissez-faire during the Hoover period. Both President Hoover and 
his successor subscribed to this position. Hoover's exhortations to 
businessmen to uphold wages and maintain employment, despite adverse 
business conditions, and Roosevelt's sponsorship of a minimum wage law 
during his two terms as State Governor were ideologically disparate 
responses to the problem of maintaining purchasing power, but shared 
a common rejection of the liquidationist approach to economic depression. 
The distinction, however, was symptomatic of the broader schism that 
developed between the critics of laissez-faire when attention was trans­
ferred from castigating an outmoded doctrine to prescribing its successor.
The critique of laissez-faire proceeded from both theoretical and 
practical premises. Its components were not individually exclusive, 
but rather served as a loose patchwork which provided a frame of reference 
for those committed to economic and social planning. Adherents were to 
be found in the collectivist intelligentsia, organised labour, the
130. Barron's 10 (12 May, 1930): 14.
131. Railway Age 93 (24 December, 1932): 937.
business community and politics. Of course, all these groups did not 
subscribe equally to each tenet of the general critique and there was 
broad disagreement as to how perceived deficiencies should be remedied 
through planning. Nevertheless, their combined efforts provided a 
cogent diagnosis of contemporary economic problems, and while agreement 
as to the nature of the problems did not presuppose any common identif­
ication with particular solutions, they did indicate the general 
direction in which management and control needed to be introduced into 
American economic life.
Collectivists sanctioned each element of the critique, the destruc­
tiveness of excessive competition, the serious plight of the chronically 
depressed industries, the problems posed by technological progress for 
employment, and the inequitable distribution of income which had been a 
major factor in precipitating the depression. These economic flaws served 
to constrain the social potential of technology and had resulted in 
economic progress being uneven, particularly jeopardising the welfare 
of the working population during downswings of the business cycle. 
Collectivists perceived the necessity for even and controlled development 
through economic management in order to ensure that technological change 
should serve the national interest most effectively. While collectivists 
welcomed the consolidation of industry as a stabilising force in business, 
they were sceptical that businessmen themselves had the necessary incen­
tives to exercise satisfactory control. Berle and Means' revelations 
as to the separation of ownership and control in industry justified 
increasing intervention by government in economic life. Since the 
principal ethic of laissez-faire no longer corresponded to reality, 
there seemed no moral objections to government expropriation of the 
managerial function. An economy whose major sectors were composed of 
large units, whose operations were directed by government through
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compulsion or cooperative partnership, promised an economy of abundance 
whose benefits would be widely distributed.
Labour was vitally interested in most elements of the critique. 
Excessive competition and the problems of 'sick' industries served to 
reduce workers' wage rates as costs were cut by firms to maintain their 
competitive positions. Technological unemployment posed a direct threat 
to the working man and the prospect of its acceleration, once revival 
got underway, was a source of anxiety for organised labour. Naturally, 
the labour movement accepted the underconsumptionist thesis of the cause 
of the depression and the argument that recovery could be achieved by 
increasing the purchasing power of wage earners. As organised labour's 
commitment to 'voluntarism' weakened during the depression, the A.F. of L. 
looked increasingly to government as the champion of the interests of 
the wage-earner and as an agency which would induce stability into the 
operations of industry.
The business critique of laissez-faire - aside from the very actions 
of merging companies which were abetting the trend away from it - was 
more selective. Generally, spokesmen concentrated upon the problems 
of excessive competition and those of the 'sick' industries which needed 
to be controlled in order to balance production and consumption. The 
successful securing of this balance would automatically solve other 
problems. Unlike the collectivists and organised labour, businessmen 
rejected resort to government as a controlling agency, claiming that 
business itself had the resources - through trade associations - to 
instigate planning and induce stability into the operations of industry.
Nevertheless, the role of government was crucial for the implemen­
tation of economic planning, since legislative change was regarded by 
many to be a prerequisite of industrial stabilisation. 'Planners' were
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optimistic at the outset of Herbert Hoover's presidency that they would 
have his support in realising their goals. However, while Hoover appre­
ciated the consequences of an economy governed by the principles of 
individualism and competition, he remained unconvinced that traditional 
ideals had lost either their vitality or utility. While Hoover recog­
nised the need for planning in the economic process, he was adamant that 
it should be conducted within the parameters of traditional American 
ideals. Although he accepted the shortcomings of laissez-faire in 
practice, he retained a strong admiration for its ethical values. This 
respect decisively influenced his approach to planning and placed him 
in opposition to the ideas of collectivist intellectuals, organised 
labour and the business community. Only with the accession of the 
more pragmatic Roosevelt in 1933 did government become prepared to 
disown the ethical idealism of laissez-faire. By then, three distinct 
approaches to industrial planning had emerged and the New Deal's options 
were determined, in large part, by the experience of each during the
Hoover years.
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CHAPTER 2
THE HOOVER APPROACH TO PLANNING: VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONISM
Herbert Hoover's planning vision was distinctive. While other 'planners' 
accepted or welcomed a transformation of national ideals to conform to 
the imperatives of technological progress and the need for economic manage­
ment, Hoover developed a synthesis between national credos and the direction 
of economic growth. The values which Hoover sought to conserve were 
localism, individualism, voluntary cooperation and economic competition.
He perceived that these were at risk in a modern, complex and technologic­
ally advanced economy which generated pressures to allocate and distri­
bute resources through central direction. Threats to traditional values 
were identified in the engrossment of private and public power or a 
combination of the two. Hoover understood that the need for economic 
stability, the control of natural resources and markets had promoted 
oligopoly in private industry. This trend had been accompanied by an 
increase in the functions of government to protect the public interest 
against these developing accretions of private power. Separately or in 
combination these tendencies jeopardised traditional values with central­
isation, bureaucracy, cartelism and statism.
Herbert Hoover did, however, recognise the economic circumstances 
that had brought forth these trends and which invited further central­
isation of economic decision-making. Yet he remained convinced that 
economic stabilisation was possible through management and planning 
without private or public centralisation or the disruption of national 
ideals. Hoover's alternative was voluntary associationism. Through 
voluntary associationism a reconciliation was possible between traditional 
ideals and the management of a complex economic structure.
The associations in which Hoover set so much store were trade 
associations, businessmen's organisations, agricultural cooperatives
and labour unions. Enlightened self-interest would encourage the 
individual to participate in organisational activities. Organisations 
would assume responsibility for the well-being of particular sectors 
and would cooperate with each other to ensure stable progress for the 
economy as a whole. Through planning they would eliminate waste, 
standardise commodities, conserve natural resources and promote scien­
tific management and in turn, increase efficiency, reduce costs and 
increase the consuming public's purchasing power.*
Utilisation of expertise and access to information were essential 
to facilitate associational planning. As both Secretary of Commerce 
and President, in both 'New Era' and 'Great Depression', Hoover retained 
a technocrat's conviction that impartial expertise in government could 
supply the advice and information that functional economic organisations 
could apply to their particular sectors and translate for their member­
ships. His reorganisation and expansion of the functions of the Department 
of Commerce during the 1920s, the appointment of numerous investigative 
economic commissions and organisation of 250 conferences were means of 
collecting appropriate information, and through aggressive publicity, 
of disseminating it nationwide, particularly to associations. Hoover's 
confidence that mastery of the economic system depended upon securing 
greater knowledge rather than experimenting with economic theory remained 
constant during his presidency. This was epitomised by his appointment 
of the Committee on Recent Social Trends. After the stock market crash 1
1. This characterisation of the ideology of Herbert Hoover draws on the 
following sources: Ellis W. Hawley essay in J. Joseph Huthmacher 
and Warren I. Susman (eds.), Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of 
American Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1973): 3-33. Ellis W. Hawley, 
'Herbert Hoover and American Corporatism, 1929-1933', in Martin L. 
Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (eds.), The Hoover Presidency: A 
Reappraisal (Albany, 1974): 101-119Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: 
Forgotten Progressive (Boston, 1975).
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Hoover remained convinced that self-interest would prompt businessmen 
to act upon government information as to economic conditions and accept 
its advice on ameliorative and recovery procedures.
Mutuality was also essential for efficacious planning. Government 
should not only supply the informational inputs that associations them­
selves could not provide but also encourage a sense of mutual interest 
between the various associations. As Secretary of Commerce and as 
President, Hoover sought to convince both employers and labour of the 
importance of a mutuality of interests in technological progress. For 
one it involved acceptance of the trade union and collective bargaining, 
for the other technological change and the principle that a rising 
standard of living must be linked to productivity gains. As Hoover 
stressed before the American Federation of Labor's annual convention 
in 1930 at Boston: "It is a practice of cooperation for an advantage 
that is not only mutual but universal." Labour gained from increased 
technical efficiency through higher wages and shorter hours, employers 
benefited from a wider market, and the consumer through reduced prices. 
"Indeed, mass production must be accompanied by mass consumption through 
increased standards of living."^
Emphasis upon economic stability and growth by means of strong 
independent groups with the assistance of government does not mean that
2. David Burner and Thomas R. West, *A Technocrat's Morality: Con­
servatism and Hoover the Engineer', in Elkins and McKitrick (eds.), 
The Hofstadter Aegis, op.cit., 235-236. Barry D. Karl, 'Presidential 
Planning and Social Science Research: Mr Hoover's Experts', 
Perspectives in American History 3 (1969): 347-409. Craig Lloyd, 
Aggressive Introvert: A Study of Herbert Hoover and Public Relations 
Management, 1912-1932 (Columbus, 1972).
3. Robert H. Zieger, The Republicans and Labor, 1919-1929 (Lexington, 
1969).
4. Address at American Federation of Labor Convention, Boston, 
6 October, 1930. State Papers, op.cit., 1: 392.
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Herbert Hoover was a corporatist.5 67 Hoover distinguished between 
government encouragement and government initiative. For Hoover the 
latter implied the bureaucratisation of American life, the stultifying 
of individual initiative and the deprivation of the central dynamic from 
the national economy. Defending his presidential policies in a radio 
address of 1932, Hoover stressed his care to avoid foisting great 
bureaucracies upon the American people "which only deaden and do not 
heal".** Equally, he was not prepared to allow self-government in 
industry to degenerate into cartelisation, with the protection of 
privileged firms and associations which sought to control prices, 
production, resources and markets. Cooperation should not be allowed 
to be transmuted into collusion and from there, to concentration. 
Cooperation and competition needed to co-exist, and, as such, voluntary 
associationism attempted to reconcile opposites.^
In his inaugural address of 4 March, 1929, Hoover reiterated his 
commitment to voluntary associationism. During the 1920s, Americans had 
discovered "a new found capacity for cooperation" to advance the public 
welfare, a process which had occurred largely outside formal government 
and its agencies. This development gave Hoover satisfaction not only 
in terms of results - "great progress in the advancement of service, in 
stability, in regularity of employment and in the correction of its own 
abuses" - but in terms of the maintenance of national ideals of cooperative
5. For characterisations of Herbert Hoover as a corporatist, see 
Murray N. Rothbard, 'The Hoover Myth', Studies on the Left 6 
(July-August, 1966): 70-84. Idem, 'Herbert Hoover and the 
Myth of Laissez-Faire', in Ronald Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard 
(eds.) A New History of Leviathan (New York, 1972): 111-145.
For a contrary opinion, see the review by William A. Williams,
'What This Country Needs...', in New York Review of Books 15
(5 November, 1970): 7-11.
6. Radio Address, 7 October, 1932. State Papers, op.cit., 2: 325.
7. Robert F. Himmelberg stresses Hoover's commitment to competition, 
particularly in terms of his determination to enforce the antitrust 
laws. See the Himmelberg essay in Huthmacher and Susman, Herbert 
Hoover and the Crisis op.cit., 59-85.
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individualism and decentralised decision-making. Government’s role had
been to assist and encourage these trends rather than to compel them
by imposing restraints upon the business community. The past decade had
witnessed "an advance toward the highest conception of self-government".
However, while Hoover condoned the trend towards business self-government
he warned that the public interest would be protected only so long as
business manifested respect for the law and he interpreted his election
as a mandate for "the continued regulation of business to prevent domination
in the community". Business self-government should not become an excuse
for cartelisation and monopolisation at the expense of the community at
large. While cooperation should be encouraged, it should not be achieved
oat the expense of the competitive process.
The onset of economic depression after October 1929, reinforced 
Hoover's commitment to voluntary associationism. Throughout his presidency 
he reiterated his faith in voluntary cooperation, continuously apprising 
Americans of its basic tenets and their virtues.
Hoover envisaged that the dynamic for a successful counter-depression 
programme would emerge from the "great associations" representative of 
business, industry, labour and agriculture. These would operate down 
from the national to local levels, and disseminate pertinent economic 
information which would provide a sound basis for "wise planning" by 
individual firms and whole industries. The aim of such activity was 
to increase awareness of methods to ameliorate unemployment and promote 
business upturn. Hoover subscribed to the belief that enlightened self- 
interest would encourage individuals to act upon information and advice 
and thus obviate any form of coercion. Government's role would remain 
consistent with "the very bones of our economic system" in that inter­
vention would be largely restricted to securing and supplying detailed
8 . Inaugural, 4 March, 1929. State Papers, op.cit., 1: 6-7; 11.
information and issuing advice. The role of government would be 
supportive. "I have never believed that our form of government could 
satisfactorily solve economic problems by direct action," Hoover asserted 
in 1930.^  Government could be more effective by instigating associa- 
tional activity. Hoover clarified this point before the American Bankers’ 
Association:
Without intrusion the Government can sometimes give leadership 
and serve to bring together divergent elements and secure 
cooperation in development of ideas, measures and institutions.
That is a reinforcement of our individualism. It does not 
cripple the initiative and enterprise of our people by the 
substitution of government.^
In his second and third annual messages to Congress Hoover stressed
the futility of sole reliance upon legislative action or executive
pronouncement as cures for economic depression. "Economic wounds must
be healed by the action of the cells of the economic body - the producers
and consumers themselves," he stated in 1930. "Recovery can be expedited
12and its effects mitigated by cooperative action." In such a scheme 
the most appropriate role for government was to "encourage" such voluntary 
cooperation. Hoover outlined the alternative in his address at King's 
Mountain Battlefield in October 1930, when he referred to the "incar­
nation of tyranny" through the creation of a federal bureaucracy, and
13the threat to local self-help posed by federal intervention.
He was adamant that his approach was neither cautious nor conser­
vative. In a campaign radio address of 7 October, 1932, he characterised 
it as "innovatory" while remaining in accordance with American values.
9. Address at Annual Dinner of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1 May, 1930. 
Ibid., 296.
10. Address, American Bankers' Association. Ibid., 382.
11. Ibid.
12. Second Annual Message to Congress, 2 December, 1930. Ibid., 431.
Third Annual Message to Congress, 8 December, 1931. Ibid., 2: 44-45. 13
13. Address at King's Mountain Battlefield, 7 October, 1930. Ibid.,
1: 399-400.
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"We must not lose faith in the ability of democracy to be master of its 
own house without burning it down," Hoover declared.^ Hoover's fear 
about the economic depression was that the cure could be worse than the 
disease.
Hoover's immediate response to the stock market crash was to evoke 
the same policy which, as Secretary of Commerce, he had implemented during 
the recession of 1920-1921. He had then been the instigator of the 
Unemployment Conference of 1921 which was designed to organise "areas of 
cooperation" to counter the recession. Under his direction an Economic 
Advisory Committee composed of businessmen, labour spokesmen and economists 
considered the extent of unemployment, emergency recommendations and 
possible reforms to even out fluctuations in the business cycle. Once 
the Advisory Committee had completed its report, Hoover assembled a 
larger conference. The delegates were chosen primarily according to 
geographical and professional criteria in order to make an impact on 
the public consciousness and mobilise support for the experts' recommen­
dations. These included the placing of principal responsibility for 
relief and recovery upon local governments; urging industry to employ 
workers through work-sharing programmes, the enlargement of inventories 
and maintenance and repair work, and recommendations for increased public 
works expenditure by all levels of government. After the conference 
dispersed an office was established in Washington under Colonel Arthur 
Woods to coordinate anti-recession programmes and publicise the meeting's 
recommendations.^ Hoover resorted to similar expedients during his 
tenure as President, using the familiar devices of expertise, information 
and publicity to inspire voluntary cooperation.
14. Radio address, 7 October, 1932. Ibid., 2; 325.
15. Carolyn Grin, 'The Unemployment Conference of 1921: An Experiment 
in National Cooperative Planning', Mid-America 55 (April, 1973): 
83-107.
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After 24 October, 1929, Hoover was preoccupied with preventing the
liquidation of share values from having adverse effects on business
activity. His response was a mixture of fiscal, monetary and industrial
coordination initiatives. Federal expenditure on public works was
increased, taxation reduced, credit eased through Federal Reserve policies
and during late November, a series of conferences were held to initiate
"the coordination of business and governmental agencies in concerted
action for continued business progress".^ Hoover regarded his programme
as an interrelated entity. The lowering of the rediscount rate and
reductions in taxation would ease liquidity and stimulate a "large scale
resumption of the construction industries" recently denied access to
capital which had been destined for the security market. Revival would
be accompanied and supplemented by expanded expenditure in the public
sector. To give effect to these counter-cyclical measures the "most
important step in business stabilization," Hoover informed Julius Barnes,
was the establishment of an organisation "to secure coordinated and
progressive action" between the private and public sectors. The President
invited the Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to
suggest names of prominent leaders in the business community to liaise
with the government in creating such an organisation.^
Between 19 and 27 November, numerous conferences assembled at the
White House, constituting, according to The New York Times "the largest
gathering of noted heads of industry and other corporations in Washington
since the resources of the nation were marshalled for participation in 
18the World War". Separate conferences were hosted for representatives
16. State Papers, op.cit., 1: 133-134.
17. Herbert Hoover to Julius Barnes, 15 November, 1929. President’s 
Personal File (hereafter cited as P.P.F.), Box 10, File, Business, 
H.H.L. 18
18. New York Times, 21 November, 1929.
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of the railroads, Federal Reserve system, industry, business and finance,
labour, construction, agriculture and the public utilities. The outcome
of the industry conferences was that the conferees pledged to employ their
resources to pre-empt a business recession by maintaining wage-rates,
19stabilising employment and increasing construction activity.
The purpose of Hoover's initiative was to act immediately to prevent
the slide in stock values from affecting the "fundamental" business
sectors. It was accomplished according to Hoover's diagnosis of the
depression, within the limits of his ideology and using techniques long
familiar to the President. The summoning of the conferences reflected
Hoover's view, expressed on 25 October, that despite stock market turbulence
"the fundamental business of the country ... is on a sound and prosperous
basis" and that by pre-emptive action, the effects of the Crash could be
20cushioned for the economy as a whole. Hoover's ideology demanded that
this be achieved through voluntary cooperation with the dynamic emerging
from the private sector, but with support from government. The principle
of mutuality was evident in the representative nature of the conferences
and the reciprocal concessions that Hoover secured from the various
groups. In return for the employers' pledges to uphold wage rates, William
Green for the A.F. of L., advised labour not "to aggravate the situation"
by demanding wage increases until the repercussions of the events of
21October had dissipated. The conferences also conformed to Hoover's 
assessment of the value of expert advice and aggressive publicity as 
educational devices.
19. Commercial & Financial Chronicle 129 (23, 30 November, 1929): 3261— 
3265; 3415-3419.
20. State Papers, op.cit., 1: 133.
21. Commercial & Financial Chronicle 129 (30 November, 1929): 3417.
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On 3 December, 1930, Hoover explained his actions in his first annual 
message to Congress. Previous experience suggested that precipitous 
declines in stock market values provoked pessimism amongst businessmen, 
investors and consumers alike, with the result that new investment was 
delayed, wages were cut and redundancies spread, thereby intensifying 
economic depression. To avoid this the government had instituted "system­
atic, voluntary measures of cooperation" with business institutions and 
with State and municipal governments to prevent such a backlash. Hoover 
was confident of the prospects for his programme's success. "Due to the 
enlarged sense of cooperation and responsibility which has grown in the
business world during the past few years the response has been remarkable
22and satisfactory."
The White House conferences were not intended by Hoover to serve 
merely as publicity vehicles, although they were fully utilised by the 
administration in that respect. Neither were they isolated, unsupported 
gestures. In his letter of 15 November to Julius Barnes, Hoover mentioned 
the need for organisation, and at the business conference of 21 November, 
invited Barnes to establish an executive committee from the assembled 
group of leaders and from national trade associations. The committee 
would endeavour to mobilise industry in support of the President's 
programme and the White House conference recommendations. The small 
executive committee selected by Barnes included the type of expertise 
and prestige in the business community which would command maximum publicity 
and national respect. Chaired by Barnes, the committee included Walter S.
22. State Papers, op.cit., 1: 145-146. Given the alacrity with which 
Hoover acted, the lack of precedents for action, and the fact that 
the conferences were intended as more than propaganda material, 
characterisations of them as ritualistic "scout meetings" or "no­
business" meetings are distorted by retrospective insight. See 
Jonathan N. Leonard, Three Years Down (Rahway, 1939): 91-105.
J.K. Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (‘London, 1966): 157-160.
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Gifford (American Telephone and Telegraph), Thomas W. Lamont (J.P. Morgan 
and Co.)» Silas Strawn (Montgomery Ward), Myron C. Taylor (U.S. Steel), 
Walter C. Teagle (Standard Oil) and Owen D. Young (General Electric).
The composition of the committee serves to exemplify the Hoover formula 
to activate voluntary cooperation.
The Barnes committee formed the nucleus of the National Business 
Survey Conference which was formally inaugurated at a meeting of 400 
business and trade association executives at the Chamber of Commerce 
headquarters on 5 December, 1929. The assembly was addressed by Hoover, 
Secretary of Commerce Robert P. Lamont, Assistant Secretary Julius Klein 
and received 150 reports from trade associations endorsing the organisation. 
In his keynote address, Hoover stressed his determination to stabilise 
business conditions through a three-point programme which consisted of 
the extension of credit, the mutual pledges of management and labour to 
maintain existing wage rates and avoid disruptive bargaining activity, 
and the "voluntary organization of industry" to provide a "great balance 
wheel of stability". Organisation was the key to preventing economic 
conditions from deteriorating, and Hoover advised delegates of the advan­
tages of a central committee which would popularise the need for the 
extension and organisation of work at the levels of firm, association and 
industry. The initiative in this scheme would be directly in the hands 
of the businessmen themselves. "It is a request from the Government that 
you cooperate in prudent measures to solve a national problem," Hoover
stated. "A great responsibility and a great opportunity rest upon
23business and economic organization of the country."
As with other Hoover conferences, the 5 December meeting dramatised 
and publicised proposals favoured by Herbert Hoover himself. The principal
23. State Papers, op.cit., 1: 181-183.
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suggestions developed at the Chamber conference stemmed immediately from 
the more exclusive White House conference of 21 November and to the earlier 
Unemployment Conference of 1921. In effect the National Business Survey 
Conference was launched with its conferees rubber-stamping Hoover’s anti­
depression programmes. Delegates agreed that "prudent" public and private 
construction was desirable under the stimulus of trade associations and 
chambers of commerce in cooperation with the Department of Commerce. The 
Business Conference would also encourage the acceleration.of repairs, 
replacements and improvements in industry and in the home and would 
publicise the virtues of normal purchasing and the facing of advance 
orders, thus promoting cooperation between wholesale and retail trade 
associations and sales forces.
In the aftermath of the conference, on 20 December, Barnes appointed 
a larger conference committee of some 170 representatives of trade assoc­
iations. The role of the committee was to furnish reports to the private 
sector of developing trends in industry and encourage cooperation to
implement the various stabilisation measures suggested at the 5 December
2 Aconference. In a letter to Barnes of 7 December, Hoover expressed his
concern that the work should commence promptly. The "general situation"
continued to deteriorate with three million unemployed and Hoover urged
Barnes to circularise the Conference's membership, stressing the need for
25a "concerted effort" behind the agreed programme over the winter months.
The National Business Survey Conference was an avowedly temporary 
agency to promote the stabilisation of business and employment through 
voluntary cooperation. Functioning principally through national trade
24. Calendar: Meeting of Executive Committee, National Business Survey 
Conference, 23 January, 1930, Washington, D.C. Pres., Box 96 File, 
Chamber of Commerce - National Business Survey Conference, H.H.L. 25*
25. Herbert Hoover to Julius Barnes, 7 December, 1929. Ibid., Box 337
File, Unemployment - P.E.C.E.
associations, the Conference had no powers to compel adherence to its 
programme but rather sought to persuade employers of the advisability 
of collective self-help in planning their operations to assist economic 
stabilisation. The Conference issued pamphlets, circulars, leaflets 
and Conference Bulletins on business conditions and stabilisation recommen­
dations and had use of the Chamber of Commerce's Week's Work as a vehicle 
for Conference publicity. Furthermore, Barnes periodically compiled a 
pamphlet entitled The Business Situation, published by the Chamber, which 
went through seven issues between March and December 1930. The pamphlet
was based on the Hooverian assumption that access to information would
^Y;1*r Ainspire business confidence. Conference publications had a circularisation
of between 6,500 and 50,000 and particular efforts were made to reach small
manufacturers through specific communications recommending adoption of
26stabilisation proposals.
The initiative taken by Hoover in calling the White House conferences
and in establishing the Survey Conference was greeted with approval by
business, liberal and labour spokesmen. In April 1930, the Chamber of
Commerce adopted a resolution commending the "vision and leadership" of
the President "in his timely initiation of this movement", and Julius Barnes
could claim "practical results" for the programme of the Survey Conference,
and urge "continued effort". The Chamber's organ, Nation's Business,
detected a new spirit of cooperation between business and government and
reflected that the Survey Conference had given American business "a sense
28of national unity which it had never had before". Forbes regarded Hoover' 
action as "the boldest economic experiment ever undertaken on so grand a
26. Julius Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 29 January, 1930. Ibid.,•Box 95 File, 
Chamber of Commerce. Calendar, op.cit. The seven issues of The 
Business Situation may be found in Pres. Box 96 File, Chamber of 
Commerce - National Business Survey, H.H.L. Julius H. Barnes, 'The 
President's Conference Means Business', Forbes 25 (15 January 1930): 21
27. Julius Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 30 April, 1930. Pres. Box 92 File, 
President's Business Conference, H.H.L. 28
28. Nation's Business 18 (January, February, 1930): 9; 11.
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scale in peace time" and suggested wishfully that the President had
unleashed "forces of revolutionary power" in an organisation which would
evolve into an enduring Economic Council and serve as a coordinating
29agency between business and government in economic management.
The Magazine of Wall Street perceived similar presidential intentions. 
Columnist, Theodore M. Knappen, interpreted Hoover's summoning of the 
White House conferences as the emergence of a new activist attitude 
towards business reverses which would become institutionalised on a 
permanent basis in the formation of the Survey Conference. Equally 
praiseworthy was the President's entrusting the business community with 
the command of so momentous an organisation and his preference for govern­
ment cooperation over governmental coercion. The organisation was "the
30negation of bureaucracy, a splendid adventure in economic democracy".
The liberal journal press was also hopeful that Hoover had made the
first tentative steps towards creating a permanent economic planning
organisation. The Nation welcomed his prompt initiative of November and
suggested that it would be an injustice to the President to regard his
action "as a mere gesture from a badly scared politician to bolster a
shaky stock market". The direction in which Hoover seemed to be moving
31was towards the creation of a "Supreme Council of National Economy".
The New Republic characterised the calling of the November conferences 29301
as "a courageous act" untypical of his Republican predecessors and "a 
positive assertion of leadership in a time of crisis". The establishment 
of the Survey Conference augured the creation of an "Economic General 
Staff" which would collate and correlate economic statistics and trends
29. Merryle S. Rukeyser, 'What Hoover's Action will Mean to Business', 
Forbes 24 (15 December, 1929): 18-29; 40-42.
30. Theodore M. Knappen, 'Business Rallies to the Standard of Permanent 
Prosperity', Magazine of Wall Street, 14 December, 1929: 263~265; 
308-310.
31. The Nation 129 (27 November, 1929): 611.
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and recommend measures to ensure stability and equilibrium in the economy
through forward planning. The journal believed that such an "ordered
economic world" must come and hoped that Herbert Hoover would be its 
32founding father.
William Green's agreement with Hoover's demands of labour at the White
House conferences drew sharp criticism from the more radical spokesmen in
the labour movement such as A.J. Muste of the Conference for Progressive
Labor Action. Muste described the labour president's action as "a hideous
betrayal of trust" in abandoning independent policy and following the lead
of big business. Yet as late as October 1930, the Executive Council of
the A.F. of L. could express satisfaction at President Hoover's "constructive
achievement" in persuading employers to repudiate wage reductions and in
stimulating "a growing sense of responsibility on the part of management
for the workers on their pay rolls".^ John P. Frey, Secretary Treasurer
of the Metal Trades Department of the A.F. of L., welcomed Hoover's "firm
and immediate interest in the situation" in December 1929, and was gratified
that the conferences had had much to do with preventing wholesale reductions
in wages. Although Frey was later to become disenchanted with Hoover's
programme, he could still write in 1931 that, in retrospect, the President's
early initiatives represented "the one outstanding, constructive act" of
35his tenure since the stock market slide.
From the outset both liberals and labour retained a degree of scepticism 
about the prospects for Hoover's programme and their criticisms increased
32. The New Republic 61 (27 November, 11 December, 1929): 6; 555.
33. Commercial and Financial Chronicle 129 (30 November, 1929): 3417.
34. Proceedings, 50th Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1930, op.cit., 59.
35. John P. Frey to W.A. Appleton, 2 December, 1929. Frey MSS; Box 1 
File 5. John P. Frey to Fritz Kummer, 3 February, 1930, 29 October, 
1931. Ibid., Box 11 File 160.
during 1930 as their fears appeared to be confirmed. Yet during the 
first few months of the 'Hoover experiment' they could entertain optimism 
about the President's attempt to mitigate the business cycle and both the 
short and long-term implications of his strategy. The popular magazine 
Collier's summed up the prevailing enthusiasm for Hoover's intervention, 
in its editorial columns:
Hoover has not abolished the business cycle of prosperity and 
depression. The cycle exists but the mountains are not so high 
and the valleys are not so deep.... This is a natural procedure.
It is in line with our scientific development, which is man's 
effort to understand and to control natural forces .... Never 
before in any country has a more intelligent effort been made 
to stabilize business and to assure prosperity. On the foundation 
of work actually done we can look hopefully to the future. '
Throughout 1930 Hoover continued to emphasise the utility of his 
approach until other programmes began to supplement and supercede the 
White House agreements and the National Business Survey Conference. 
Addressing the Chamber of Commerce in May, he characterised his policies 
as innovatory and evaluated the "joint undertaking" as having succeeded 
to a "remarkable degree". "On the occasion of this great storm," Hoover 
asserted, "we have for the first time attempted a great economic experiment 
possibly one of the greatest of our history." Before the A.F. of L. 
Convention in October, he stressed the "astonishing degree" of cooperation 
between business, labour and government and the "growing sense of respons­
ibility and ... willingness to bend private interests to the general good". 
So rewarding had the programme proved in ameliorating unemployment that 
Hoover suggested to the American Bankers Convention of October 1930, that 
an "amplified plan" should be considered in the future. Other members 
of his administration also continued to boost the Hoover programme.
Writing in July 1930, Secretary of Commerce Lamont defended the White 
House Conference agreements as generally successful in maintaining wage
36. The progressive disenchantment of labour and collectivists with 
Hoover's programme is examined in Chapter 4.
37. Colliers 85 (25 January, 1930): 66.
36
38. State Papers, op.cit.,1: 289;379; 391-392.
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levels and continuing construction programmes. In September, Secretary 
of Labor James J. Davis wrote approvingly of Hoover's "mighty effort at <■ 
stability" which had prevented more severe dislocation, "in due time this 
application of wisdom and effort must bring a return to normal conditions," 
Davis prophesied.^
When the National Business Survey Conference terminated its work on
6 May, 1931, Herbert Hoover's first experiment with voluntary associationism
41during the depression ended. The absence of any sustained recovery and 
the establishment of a government agency whose functions overlapped made 
the work of the Survey Conference largely superfluous. The organisation 
represented Hoover's conviction that through the dissemination of facts 
and advice from some central, expert agency, channelled through represen­
tative functional associations, business could exercise self-regulation 
and stabilise economic conditions. Rather than retrench, businesses would 
plan their operations to contribute to economic recovery. However, the 
absence of markets provoked a cautious outlook within the business community 
which was not conducive to any generation of recovery through Hoover's 
strategy. In July 1931, Barron's complained of a "buyer's strike" which 
bedevilled wage maintenance and new construction proposals and in October, 
U.S. Steel cut wage rates by 10% to be followed by other major concerns.^ 
Still Hoover did not desert voluntary associationism. Rather the 
doctrine was transmogrified in that government assumed the role of coord­
inator for the associational activities which had been initially placed 
in the hands of businessmen themselves.
39. Robert P. Lamont, 'The White House Conferences', The Journal of 
Business, 3 July, 1930: 269-271.
40. Commercial & Financial Chronicle 131 (6 September, 1930): 1481.
41. Julius H. Barnes to Robert P. Lamont, 8 May, 1931. Record Group 40, 
General Records of the Department of Commerce, (Hereafter cited as 
E.GA0). File 92001/2 National Archives.
42. Barronfe 11 (20 July, 1931): 14. For a succinct summary of the record 
of industry in maintaining wage rates and promoting construction, see 
Albert U. Romasco, The Poverty of Abundance: Hoover, the Nation, the 
Depression (New York, 1968): 51-65.
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On 17 October, 1930, the President established an Emergency Committee
for Employment (P.E.C.E.). Hoover regarded its formation as an extension
of the arrangements made at the White House conferences of 1929. Federal
authority would be used to meet the unemployment problem during the coming
winter, with particular emphasis on encouraging cooperation with «State and
local employment agencies, creating employment through public works and
developing stabilisation methods with industry. P.E.C.E. would "stimulate
more intensive cooperation throughout the country" and serve to enhance
the sense of voluntary organisation and community service in the nation- 
43at-large. Colonel Arthur Woods, a member of the Conference of Unemployment 
in 1921 was appointed chairman of the organisation.
P.E.C.E. was guided by Hooverian principles: that government's role 
should be restricted to supplementing the principal self-help efforts at 
local and State level and that the dissemination of information and advice 
through aggressive publicity would provide the basis for successful stabil­
isation initiatives. P.E.C.E. had no mandatory powers and did not generally
44sponsor or initiate stabilisation schemes. The organisation acted as 
a clearing house for schemes in operation in the private sector, and its 
aim was to publicise these as widely as possible to inspire voluntary 
cooperation.
Although the Committee was an emergency agency, according to Chairman 
Woods, its work had long-term implications. For while the immediate 
priority was the amelioration of unemployment during the present crisis, 
the effort would inspire a long-term commitment to "keeping the ratio of
43. Press Statements, 17 October, 1930; 24 October, 1930; Second Annual 
Message to Congress, 2 December, 1930. State Papers, op.cit., 1:
401-402; 405; 431.
44. It did not have the finances or the research staff to perform such a 
function. Committee Member, E.P. Hayes estimated that throughout its 
duration (October 1930-August 1931) the organisation was provided with 
only $257,000 by the Department of Commerce with which to meet general 
expenses, salaries and printing. At the outset the Committee had an 
executive staff of thirty. E.P. Hayes, Activities of the President's 
Emergency Committee for Employment, 1930-1931 (Concord, N.H., 1936): 3-5.
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unemployed in permanent check". This dual purpose of P.E.C.E. was 
outlined in an undated memorandum, circulated within the organisation.
The objectives of the agency were to be twofold. First, it would "promote 
an effective nation-wide effort to deal with the present unemployment" 
and second, would assist in the development of plans and policies "that 
will make for stabilization of employment and greater effectiveness in 
dealing with unemployment in the future". These aims would be achieved 
by encouraging action in the private and public sectors, fostering cooper­
ation in local, State and national programmes and achieving coordination 
between various stabilisation activities.^ Depressions should no longer 
be regarded as "'Acts of God'", Colonel Woods asserted, but rather as "an 
intolerable curse on our social and economic system" . ^  It was P.E.C.E.'s 
view that such recurrent slumps could certainly be mitigated and perhaps, 
be prevented through the cooperative efforts of both private and public 
sectors in their individual spheres, encouraged and coordinated by a 
central organisation. In this respect P.E.C.E. found itself in "the center
of innumerable industrial laboratories, all working, each in its way, to
48diagnose and treat this.... industrial disease".
Although P.E.C.E. regarded as one of its functions the formulation 
of policies for private and public agencies, the organisation devised few 
novel programmes. It either borrowed from the suggestions of the Unemploy­
ment Conference of 1921 or relied upon the inventiveness of the private 
sector. Essentially the role of the agency became that of broadcaster
45. Arthur Woods, 'Industry Must Find Permanent Cure for Unemployment', 
Forbes 27 (1 February, 1931): 15.
46. 'The President's Emergency Committee for Employment: Organization, 
Personnel and Policies', undated memorandum. Record Group 73,
Records of the President's Organization on Unemployment Relief 
(hereafter cited as R.G. 73), Series 3, Central Files of P.E.C.E.: 
General Organization. National Archives.
47. New York Times, 27 January, 1931.
45
48. Quoted in Hayes, P.E.C.E. op.cit., 11.
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and publicist of ideas generated elsewhere. These ideas were collated 
and disseminated by eight divisions within the organisation and by seven 
advisers who assumed responsibility for particular geographical regions
A Qand encouraged the organisation of action committees at local level.
Publicity was central to the P.E.C.E. effort, and one division was 
concerned exclusively with this aspect. Like the National Business Survey 
Conference, P.E.C.E. issued pamphlets and leaflets under its own auspices 
or through the Department of Commerce which publicised the broad range of 
relief and stabilisation devices available to industries and communities 
and stressed the part that the individual homeowner could play in relieving 
distress. Through provision of information the Committee encouraged a 
diverse range of activities, from the acceleration of private and public 
construction and the maximisation of efficiency in local relief disburse­
ment to the provision of home gardens for the unemployed and the creation 
of employment opportunities through spruce-up and renovation work for 
home owners.
A major drive was directed towards encouraging industry to effect 
stabilisation proposals. In November and December, 1930, the Committee 
circularised industrialists for information on methods in use to counter 
depressed economic conditions. The replies formed the basis of P.E.C.E.'s 
publicity campaign to persuade other firms to follow suit.^
Information was elicited from a "well-diversified" list of large and 
small corporations, established in over five hundred localities and employ­
ing in 1929 over 750,000 men. The responses indicated that "spreading"
49. For a survey of the P.E.C.E. organisation, see Ibid., 1-18.
50. For analyses of the various private programmes, see J. Douglas 
Brown, ’The Manufacturers and the Unemployed', Current History 34 
(July, 1931): 517-520. Roger S. Makepeace, 'Stabilizing Factory 
Employment', Harvard Business Review 10 (January, 1932): 241-256,
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the available work was the most widely utilised method of ameliorating 
unemployment; 82% of companies indicating a commitment to this policy. 
Various methods of sharing work were discovered, the most common being 
the shortened work-day and week. One-third of companies had initiated 
repair and maintenance programmes to maintain payrolls while 37% has 
instituted direct relief plans for their employees either unilaterally 
or in cooperation with local agencies. The commencement of new construc­
tion, manufacture for stock and the extension of loans to employees were 
the other stabilisation methods found to be in use, being practised by 
12, 20 and 14% respectively of the respondents."*'
52Companies frequently used these nethods in combination. The 
American Multigraph Co. claimed to have increased its payroll from 425 
on 1 January, 1930, to 460 at the end of the year by means of diversifying 
its product and reducing working hours. The American Rolling Mill Co. 
employed four devices to ameliorate conditions for its employees: the 
provision of "fill-in" work, rotation of jobs between slack and busy 
departments, the payment of "retirement allowances" and cooperation with 
established community relief agencies, through which the company channelled 
$75,000 a year. Both the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad and the 
Chicago and North Western Railway Co. reported work-sharing schemes in 
operation, supplemented in the former case by the provision of food 
supplied for unemployed workers, and in the latter by acceleration of 
repair work and provision of supplies and medical attention to laid-off 
employees. Both the Bethlehem Steel Co. and Commonwealth and Edison Co.
51. U.S., P.E.C.E., A Survey of Unemployment Relief in Industry 
(Washington, D.C., January, 1931).
52. It was not general P.E.C.E. practice to specify the programmes of 
individual companies. The organisation claimed that this was done 
to avoid inflated claims in the replies of individual concerns and 
to observe industrialists' wishes that no false impressions should 
be created of industry's ability to meet the unemployment problem.
A perusal of industrialists' replies in the P.E.C.E. records, 
however, makes it clear that they were equally concerned to avoid 
any binding commitments or being inundated with relief demands from 
past employees.
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claimed to have established work-sharing schemes, Bethlehem reporting that 
90% of its work force had been retained intact as a result. Both companies 
supplemented work-sharing by other practices: the steel concern by provid­
ing credit to employees in need; the electrical company through job
„ 53rotation.
P.E.C.E. research provided the material for its general and specific 
literature on stabilisation and relief programmes to combat the effects of 
business depression.^ The printed media was complemented by the use of 
radio as a vehicle for disseminating information on industrial stabilisation. 
Leading industrialists were invited to deliver brief radio addresses out­
lining their companies’ contributions to employee welfare. Gerard Swope, 
president of General Electric, discussed his company’s broad programme 
of unemployment insurance and employment stabilisation; Cyrus McCormick, 
vice-president of International Harvester Co. surveyed the benefits of 
loans to employees; Henry S. Dennison, president of Dennison Manufacturing 
Co. and Morris E. Leeds, president of Leeds and Northrup Co. urged that 
reserves be accumulated during profitable years as a contingency for future 
unemployment; Walter C. Teagle, president of Standard Oil Co., New Jersey, 
and Myron C. Taylor, chairman of U.S. Steel Co., outlined their companies' 
records of employment stabilisation, particularly through work-sharing; 
William G. Stuber, president of Eastman Kodak Co., emphasised the value 
of ameliorating seasonal fluctuations in employment, while Col. William 
Cooper Procter, chairman of the Board of Procter and Gamble Co., considered 
approaches by which industry could "guarantee" employment for workers.
53. T.H. White to J. Douglas Brown, 10 December, 1930. Charles R. Hook
to J. Douglas Brown, 12 December, 1930. F.E. Williamson to J. Douglas 
Brown, 9 January, 1931. W.M. Walliser to J. Douglas Brown, 8 December, 
1930. J.M. Larkin to J. Douglas Brown, 9 December, 1930. Homer E. 
Niesz to J. Douglas Brown, ,11 December, 1930. R.G.73 Series 19,
Records of the Industrial Division: Industrial Radio Series.
54. See U.S. P.E.C.E., Outline of Industrial Policies and Practices in
Time of Reduced Operation and Employment (Washington, D.C., February, 
1931) and U.S. P.E.C.E., Loans as an Unemployment Relief Measure 
(Washington, D.C., February, 1931). — — — — —
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P.E.C.E. also recruited Lawrence A. Downs, president of the Illinois 
Central System, to discuss the role of the railroads in combatting 
unemployment and the A.F. of L.'s president, William Green, to present 
the trade union v i ew po i n t . T h e  selection of prestigious individuals 
conformed to the Hooverian formula of how best to promote ideas through 
publicity.
P.E.C.E. was preoccupied with exploiting the most useful channels 
through which ideas could be converted into action. In the summer of 1931, 
the Committee focussed its attention on a medium which was integral to 
Hoover's concept of voluntary associationism: the trade association.
Not only could the associations provide a mechanism for the dissemination 
of stabilisation proposals for their members, but they had the organis­
ational structures to effect industry-wide planning.
From its inception P.E.C.E. had made use of trade associations to 
convey information on stabilisation programmes to their memberships. For 
example, their cooperation was sought during the Committee's work-sharing 
drive of March 1931. Then over two hundred associations were circularised 
with pamphlet literature and were requested to establish committees to 
formulate work-sharing plans with their member firms. According to
W.J. Barrett, about half of the associations followed up on P.E.C.E.'s 
• 56suggestion.
During the early summer of 1931, P.E.C.E. decided upon a strategy 
whereby stabilisation programmes would be sponsored by trade associations.
The programme would be inaugurated by a well-publicised joint conference 
of trade association representatives and P.E.C.E. and government personnel. 
Edward Eyre Hunt, secretary to P.E.C.E., appears to have been the source 
of the conference venture. On 27 May, Hunt wrote to Secretary Lamont
55. The addresses were published in collective form in U.S. P.E.C.E., 
Unemployment: Industry Seeks a Solution - A Series of Radio Addresses 
^Washington, D.C., February, 1931).
56. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 157-158.
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of the benefits of holding a small national conference on employment and 
business stabilisation, on the lines of the President's Unemployment 
Conference of 1921, to coincide with and reinforce any future improvement 
in the business situation. Hunt speculated that the conference might be 
most useful in the autumn if business conditions warranted. ^  However, 
on 9 June, the machinery was already being set in motion for the holding 
of a national trade association conference in July. After consultations 
with Fred C. Croxton, vice-chairman of P.E.C.E., William J. Barrett, trade 
association liaison officer, informed the leading association executive, 
Roscoe C. Edlund of the Association of American Soap and Glycerine 
Producers, that his Committee was contemplating "an aggressive program" 
of industrial stabilisation using trade associations to provide the major 
thrust. P.E.C.E.'s aim was to make more widespread the isolated stabilis­
ation practices of individual firms and associations. A conference of 
executives would "bring together the best thoughts in the development of
a program for the rapid dissemination to trade associations of how they
58could best set up their operations".
P.E.C.E. officials had numerous reasons for sponsoring such a 
programme. Outwardly the organisation professed - as Barrett did to 
Edlund - that it wished to use associations as the most "direct" and 
"effective" way of implementing stabilisation programmes. However, two 
other considerations would seem to have been decisive in P.E.C.E.'s 
initiative as revealed by Hunt in his letter to Robert Lamont. In the 
first place, Hunt noted that a vogue for economic planning was "in the
57. E.E. Hunt to Secretary Lamont, 27 May, 1931. R.G73 Series 1, 
Chronological Files of Edward E. Hunt.
58. William J. Barrett to Roscoe C. Edlund, 9 June, 1931. Ibid., Series 
12, Office Files of Erving P. Hayes: Secretary.
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air" and warned of the "great danger of foolish measures next winter" when 
undesirable programmes such as "compulsory stabilization plans" and schemes 
for unemployment insurance might be enacted by Congress. As an alternative, 
Hunt believed that a conference on business and employment, accompanied by 
"aggressive management" would deflect much of this radical sentiment. The 
conference would "give a decided impulse to the long-time stabilization 
program," Hunt contended. "It could give an impulse to sound and practical 
business planning, instead of letting the very word 'planning' be appro­
priated by the Reds and Pinks." In the second place, Hunt feared that 
P.E.C.E. was languishing and required a strategy to ensure its continued 
usefulness. The agency "cannot do more than mark time," Hunt advised 
Lamont, "it may even go down hill, unless a new impulse is given to it 
from outside."
Neither Hunt nor Barrett envisaged that the conference would consider 
any 'radical' approaches to planning of the type being discussed currently 
by liberal, labour and business groups. Strictly adhering to Hooverian 
principles, Hunt asserted that the strength of any conference would be in 
"restating" the problem of stabilisation "in a purely factual setting". 
Voluntary initiative, guided by accurate and available information rather 
than coercion and government direction was the very touchstone of Herbert 
Hoover's approach to planning. Barrett explained at length P.E.C.E.'s 
attitudes towards planning by trade associations. They would provide the 
information on which members would base their stabilisation programmes. 
Information on orders received, production, shipments, inventories and 
profits would assist the individual operator in planning his operations 
to avoid overproduction and price-cutting. From such beginnings it was 
"but a step" to greater cooperative activity in the form of cooperative 
research, cost accounting, purchasing and selling. Through access to 
"the best advice on management practices" industries would be in a superior
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position to forecast and plan operations on a more regularised basis, 
eliminate seasonal variations in employment, provide for unemployment 
reserves and shorter working hours.
The meeting was scheduled for 15 July, 1931. Fred C. Croxton sent 
invitations to "a few key men" in the trade association movement "to 
discuss the place of the trade association in the current handling of the
59employment problem and in long range planning for industry and business".
At least two executives felt that P.E.C.E.'s initiative might inaugurate 
long-term planning through trade associations. Leslie C. Smith, president 
of the American Trade Association Executives, reflected that the feeling 
of many leading executives was that "the study of stabilization of industry 
is one which may very helpfully be made a matter of permanent endeavor".
A.P. Haake, Managing Director of the National Association of Furniture 
Manufacturers Inc., was convinced that a long-term programme should be 
set in motion to prevent or mitigate the extremes of the business cycle.
"I am frank to say to you that in my judgment the situation, especially 
from a long time point of view, calls for adequate government of industry, 
if not by the government then by industry itself," Haake asserted. "But 
there must be government1"^
The programme for the conference was discussed at a dinner meeting on 
1 July, 1931, attended by Edlund, Barrett, Philip P. Gott, Manager of the 
Trade Association Department of the Chamber of Commerce, and other repre­
sentatives of the government and trade associations. The meeting was 
agreed that the most critical problem facing industry was destructive 
competition, and that this was a matter which the trade association 
movement had the power within itself to correct without resort to government
59. Open letter from Fred C. Croxton, 3 July, 1931. R.G, 73 Series 7,
Office Files of Fred Croxton: Trade Association Executives Meeting.
60. Leslie C. Smith to Fred C. Croxton, 11 July, 1931. A.P. Haake to 
Fred C. Croxton, 11 July, 1931. Ibid.
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action. The purpose of the conference would be to inspire interest in 
"a definite plan on the part of business management", the basis of which 
would be stabilisation of operations through the advice and guidance of 
trade associations.^^
Secretary Lamont and P.E.C.E. officials confirmed this commitment 
to a long-term perspective of trade association planning in their intro­
ductory conference remarks. W.J. Barrett drew the distinction between 
"creative" and "corrective" work by P.E.C.E., the former representing the 
organisation's efforts to create immediate employment, while the latter 
represented its commitment to advancing stabilised business and employment 
conditions in the long-term. The "corrective" aspect was emphasised by 
Fred Croxton who appealed to executives to consider how ameliorative 
measures resorted to in the present emergency could be incorporated into 
long-term planning programmes. Robert P. Lamont claimed that only trade 
associations could effect the type of advanced planning which would avoid 
the recurrence of similar depressions:
The individual can't do it; it has to be done by groups of 
industry. The Federal Government can't do it and if it is not 
done by trade association activities I don't know how it can 
be done. It is up to the trade association to see what it can 
do.
Lamont was even prepared to hold out the bait of antitrust law revision to 
stimulate trade association action. "Maybe it is going to be difficult 
without some change in our laws and if that is necessary changes can be 
brought about," Lamont promised. But before that point, he was confident 
that "a great deal can be done if members of the industry are advised to 
the facts''.^
61. Trade Association Plan; Memorandum before dinner meeting, 1 July, 
1931. Ibid.
62. Report of Trade Association Executives' Meeting, 15 July, 1931.
Ibid.
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In the aftermath of the meeting Croxton circularised trade association 
executives requesting their cooperation in encouraging the adoption of 
emergency programmes by their members both to provide work and to establish 
the type of informational services which would be requisite to long-term 
planning by individual operators. Croxton concluded with a veiled threat 
if the trade associations failed to rise to their responsibilities. "If 
such activities toward greater continuity of operation and income should 
become the accepted policy of industry and commerce," he counselled, "there 
would be little necessity for discussion of other methods for control out- 
side the scope of these groups."
P.E.C.E. continued to support the efforts of trade associations, such 
as the Cotton Textile Institute, whose programmes the organisation approved.^ 
However, P.E.C.E.'s great effort to educate trade associations in economic 
planning according to the principles of voluntary associâtionism was 
handicapped by economic circumstances which induced a pessimism amongst 
businessmen and association executives and a scepticism about the indus­
try's capacity to stabilise unless legislative change removed the threat 
of prosecution under the antitrust laws. While P.E.C.E. urged the dissem­
ination of facts as a basis for voluntary planning, business leaders,such 
as Gerard Swope, and organisations, such as the Chamber of Commerce, 
contended that goodwill and access to statistics were not enough, in 
themselves, to promote business stability. Revision of the antitrust 
laws was regarded as a prerequisite to planning. 'Cutthroat' competition 
was unlikely to be checked without the type of collusion between firms 
over output and prices which was prohibited by the antitrust laws.
63. Open letter from Fred C. Croxton, 18 July, 1931. Pres. Box 92 File, 
Business - Stabilization Plans, H.H.L.
64. George A. Sloan to Fred C.Croxton, 10, 31 July, 1931. Fred C.
Croxton to George A. Sloan, 7 August, 1931. R .G. 73 Series 7, Office 
Files of Fred Croxton: Cotton Textile Institute.
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Ironically, a section of business opinion - represented by Swope - was 
becoming increasingly favourable to the type of control that Croxton 
threatened and the trade associations which P.E.C.E. sought to woo were 
reticent to implement planning proposals without antitrust law revision.
William Barrett had grasped the essence of the problem even before 
the P.E.C.E. trade association strategy was fully developed. On 22 May, 
1931, he wrote to Kendall K. Hoyt of the Industrial Division that the 
basic difficulty in the adoption of stabilisation programmes by industry 
was that "the industrial companies are troubled with declining surpluses". 
Executives, pressured by boards of directors to pare costs and increase 
profits were "loath to commit themselves to any policy". Even the most 
"enlightened companies" to which P.E.C.E. naturally turned to champion 
stabilisation activity were resorting to dismissals.
P.E.C.E. was superceded by the President's Organization on Unemploy­
ment Relief (P.O.U.R.) established by President Hoover on 19 August, 1931. 
The machinery of P.E.C.E. was incorporated into the new organisation, its 
role being to study employment problems. Walter S. Gifford, president of 
American Telephone and Telegraph Co., became director of the new programme,
replacing P.E.C.E.'s acting Chairman, Fred C. Croxton who had headed the
66organisation since the resignation of Arthur Woods in April 1931. 
Effectively, P.O.U.R. remained in operation for' ten months. In his message 
to Congress of 5 July, 1932, Hoover noted that Congress had omitted to 
make any appropriation for the continuance of P.O.U.R. and unsuccessfully 
requested a modest $120,000 for the next fiscal year.^
65. William J. Barrett to Kendall K. Hoyt, 22 May, 1931. R.G. 73 Series 
19, Records of the Industrial Division: Barrett, W.J.
66. Press Statement: Establishment of P.O.U.R., 19 August, 1931. State 
Papers, op.cit., 1: 609-610.
67. Ibid., 2: 220-221.
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P.O.U.R. marked no break with its predecessor's commitment to voluntary 
associationism. Although a new structure emerged, greater business exper­
tise was employed, and the organisation's publicity approaches were sharp­
ened, like P.E.C.E. it continued to view its role as that of coordinator, 
assisting the primary efforts at State and local levels and amongst private 
organisations. Gifford outlined the functions of his organisation before 
a Senate committee in January 1932. "The job simplified down" to four 
principles: the raising of private and public funds for relief; the 
administration of relief; the provision of work through industrial pro­
grammes such as work-sharing and the investigation of the possibilities
68of increasing employment through public works programmes.
Hoover's sponsorship of economic planning through voluntary associa­
tionism at the national level was paralleled at State level by Franklin 
D. Roosevelt in New York. On 30 March, 1930, Governor Roosevelt announced 
the appointment of a Commission on Unemployment Problems, New York being 
the first State to appoint an organisation to coordinate, on a State-wide 
basis, constructive efforts to stabilise business and reduce unemployment. 
Roosevelt's announcement resounded with phrases compatible with Herbert 
Hoover's planning concepts. The Governor warned that the index of factory 
employment in the State had fallen by 9% since October 1929, and that 
"bread lines are increasing in our great cities". To avoid even greater 
distress in the winter of 1930-1931, Roosevelt advised the immediate 
consideration of "plans" with which to counteract the depression. "The 
situation is serious and the time has come for us to face this unpleasant 
fact dispassionately and constructively," Roosevelt affirmed, "as a 
scientist faces a test tube of deadly germs, intending first to understand
68. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on the Committee of Manufactures, 
Hearings onS.174 and S262, Unemployment Relief, 72nd Congress, 1st 
Session, 1931-1932: 310.
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the nature, the cause and the effect, and finally the method of overcoming 
and the techniques of preventing its ravages." While concerted action 
by local governments, business organisations and industry would do much 
to remedy existing conditions, any initiatives should be taken "in full 
knowledge of the actual facts" and "without hysteria or exaggeration".
The brief of Roosevelt's Commission was to enquire into the causes
of the depression, and through the collection of information on existing
private stabilisation projects, both within the State and elsewhere,
publicise the means already developed by business to regularisS production
and employment. Roosevelt stressed that his purpose was to launch a
long-term programme for the stabilisation of industry and employment
which would be based "on authentic American business experience and
arising out of and adapted to their own local industrial problem".
The cooperation of the business community was central to this endeavour.
Roosevelt praised those industrialists who had the foresight to plan
for such emergencies and characterised their efforts as "an interesting
and vigorous chapter of the story of American inventiveness, courage
and leadership". The Commission would use as models the progressive
schemes of enlightened employers and Roosevelt trusted that, informed
of the facts and the available planning alternatives, "good will and
69sound business judgment" would secure their widespread adoption.
Roosevelt followed the work of the Commission closely, using its 
ex-officio member, the Industrial Commissioner, Frances Perkins, to keep 
him informed of its progress. . When the final report was published in 
June, 1931, Perkins remembered that Roosevelt had been "greatly impressed"
69. Commercial & Financial Chronicle 130 (5 April, 1930): 2330-2331.
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with at least some of the individual plans discovered by the Commission 
to be in operation in American industry.^
The Bureau of Statistics and Information of New York State confirmed 
that the Commission had canvassed 1,900 firms representing one-third of 
all factory workers in New York State, and that responses were gleaned 
from 598 concerns. In large part the Commission based its report on the 
replies of those 292 concerns which reported having plans in operation 
to stabilise forces or operations. In other words, only 15% of all the 
factories surveyed furnished information on plans.^ Similar to the studies 
of P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R., the Commission's sampling was limited and its 
recommendations were drawn from examples provided by an unrepresentative 
minority of business concerns. However, unlike the Hoover organisations, 
the New York Commission on Unemployment made no attempt to buttress 
business confidence by conjuring a favourable survey of business conditions 
through its researches. The Commission was more concerned with providing 
models for emulation in a period of economic crisis.
Among the methods in operation in industry to induce stabilisation, 
the Commission discovered that part-time working was the most popular. 
Although practised by 157 New York establishments in the survey, the best 
known example cited was the programme of the cereal manufacturers, Kelloggs
70. Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York, 1964): 101; 103.
The commission's report is divided into two parts. Part One discusses 
the causes of the depression, gives a general outline of schemes in 
operation to induce stabilisation of production and employment and 
concludes with a list of recommendations for the State government. 
Part Two examines methods of stabilisation in operation in greater 
detail on a firm-by-firm basis. The Commission's original - 
"preliminary" - report was completed in November 1930 and was revised 
in June 1931 to accommodate new developments. Part I: Stabilized 
Employment. Report to Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt^ Governor of 
The State of New York submitted by the Governor's Commission on 
Unemployment for the State of New York. Part II: Report of the 
Governor's Commission on Unemployment Problems for the State of New 
York. Illustrations of ways of stabilizing operations and plans of 
Unemployment Compensation, November 1930, revised to 30 June, 1931. 
(Second Printing: Albany, June 1931)
71. Bureau of Statistics and Information, New York State, Industrial 
Bulletin: No. 9 (Albany, June 1930): 251-252.
at Battle Creek, Michigan. The company had added 430 employees to its 
payroll through a reduction of the working-day from eight hours to six, 
and.the introduction of a four rather than three-shift system, while 
increasing wage rates to give workers the same overall purchasing power 
as in 1928. Other major stabilisation programmes discovered included 
manufacturing for stock in times when demand was low, stimulating consumer 
demand during 'off seasons', rigid sales forecasting and forward planning 
to enable production to be scheduled to allow employment to be evenly 
distributed throughout the year despite fluctuations in sales, and the 
development of sideline or 'filler' products to employ workers during 
slack seasons. Other methods that the Commission considered to constitute 
conscious efforts to stabilise production and employment included temporary 
transfer of employees to other tasks in the factory; stimulation of 
advanced orders and superior sales efforts; standardisation of production 
and reduced prices to stimulate demand. Frequently the use of these 
methods, singularly or in combination, proved successful for employer 
and employee alike. The Eastman-Kodak plant at Rochester, New York, 
for instance, boasted a virtually unchanged payroll between 1929 and 
1931.72
In her testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate's Committee 
on Manufactures in 1931,Frances Perkins emphasised the importance of the 
New York Commission's studies. While she acknowledged the small percentage 
of firms returning positive replies she regarded them, and the efforts 
to attain stabilisation which lay behind them, as significant. The sample 
"may seem small to you," she remarked, "but inasmuch as the stabilization 
of industry has been talked of but very recently, it is a comforting 
percentage." Perkins could even applaud stabilisation projects which
72. Stabilized Employment, op.cit., 7-40.
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did not include "major planning" and were "not worthy of much attention", 
since, at least such examples reflected "a conscious effort to do something". 
While the results were not significant in totals, Perkins insisted that 
their quality was conspicuous "in that there are a number of plants which 
have managed, through careful analysis of both their market and production 
plans, to go through these years of depression with a minimum of laying
70off". The ones that had succeeded formed "a striking picture".
Perkins kept Roosevelt informed of the Commission's work but was not 
the sole source of information for the Governor, since he personally main­
tained contacts with individual members such as Ernest Draper and its 
Chairman, Henry Bruere. Writing to Bruere in November 1930, Roosevelt 
displayed his familiarity with stabilisation schemes and the firms employ­
ing them in a discussion of loans-to-employees plans. Roosevelt understood 
that two major methods of loan plans were in operation. First, those 
operated by individual companies which were premised on the assumption 
that unemployment would be temporary and that their employees would soon 
return to work and pay off the loan. Second, those devised by "industrial 
communities" such as Rochester, which could rally sufficient resources 
to underwrite large credit sums to be advanced by the community banks.
The Governor also understood the limitations of such schemes: that only 
large, sound companies could afford to sponsor such loan programmes and 
that loans could be made only to "thoroughly responsible people who have 
a good record of work and enough' pride to repay the loan, but too much 
pride to ask for charity". At. best, Roosevelt believed, loans could 
"take care of the large percentage of cases of men and women, chiefly 
heads of families, who are regular workers, and this would eliminate at 
least a portion of the general problem".^
73. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit.,
139-140. 74*
74. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry Bruere, 21 November, 1930. Records
of the Office of the Governor (hereafter cited as R.O.G.) Roll 177 
(microfilm reference) F.D.R.L.
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Roosevelt also corresponded with Bruere about the New York Commission 
instigating at local level some long-term measures for industrial stabilis­
ation. He appreciated that unemployment had assumed nationwide proportions 
and required national solutions, particularly with a view to "the equili­
bration of production and consumption". This should not inhibit positive 
responses by states pending national action and Roosevelt believed that 
his Commission had an important role to serve in promoting business 
stabilisation ideas throughout New York State. Roosevelt envisaged that 
the work of the Commission would be coordinated with that of the State 
Advisory Council on Employment Problems,^ so that a coherent and rational 
attack could be made on the unemployment problem. To this end, he 
recommended to Bruere a three-point programme. First, local committees 
should be permanently established in the chief industrial centres of New 
York State; second, the Commission should secure the cooperation of local 
public officials to work with the committees and third, in the interest
of unified State action, these committees should be coordinated with
76the State Advisory Council.
Not only was Roosevelt sufficiently involved in the work of the 
Commission that he could discourse with some degree of expertise with 
its chairman on an exiguous aspect of industrial stabilisation, but he was also 
confident enough of the value of the Commission's work to recommend that 
it be incorporated into a rationalised and concentrated effort to alleviate 
unemployment in New York State. Indeed, Roosevelt congratulated Bruere 
for the "distinctive service" his Commission was performing and the
75. A body appointed by Industrial Commissioner Perkins in June 1929, 
to advise her on methods of improving the state employment service 
and more effectively organise the State's labour market. The 
Council was given legal status in 1930. 76
76. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry Bruere, 8 October, 1930. R.O.G.
Roll 177. F.D.R.L.
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"significant contribution" it was making in providing solutions to the 
unemployment problem. ^
The Commission's report emphasised the positive measures that business
had undertaken to stabilise production and employment and the potential
of business to improve the present situation of its own volition. The
Commission admitted that "great progress is being made by American industry
to overcome wide fluctuation in employment" and regarded this as auspicious
of industry making "a very large contribution to the solution of the
78recurring problem of acute unemployment". Frances Perkins was impressed 
by industry's achievements and sensed "a real disposition" amongst manu­
facturers to stabilise their industries as a matter of public duty.
"There are a great number of manufacturers," Perkins believed, "who 
recognise that the demand for security and stability is a demand on
industry, and they can employ their brains and their understanding of
79life in such way as to plan for it."
The preliminary report made eight specific suggestions from its 
survey of business. One called for the establishment of an official body 
to study the unemployment problem; another for an improved State Employ­
ment Service and a third for a State Planning Board to frame a long-term 
public works programme. The remainder were recommendations stemming from 
the Commission's observations of businesses' efforts to stabilise. The 
Commission urged the widespread adoption of unemployment insurance plans 
by industry, the use of work-sharing schemes, the introduction of dismissal 
wages and the establishment of local committees to promote the movement 
for régularisation. Its first and fullest recommendation was a plea for 789*
77. Ibid.
78. Stabilized Employment, op.cit., 5.
79. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 140.
See also Frances Perkins, 'Helping Industry to Help Itself', Harper’s
Magazine 161 (October, 1930); 624.
industrialists to practise "well-tested methods of regularization" with
the cooperation of trade associations, chambers of commerce and the State.
Frances Perkins believed that the New York Commission reports marked 
a turning point in Roosevelt's economic thought. They convinced him of 
the need for public unemployment insurance, either through national legis­
lation or interstate compact, and convinced him too of the need for more 
fundamental action to correct imbalances in the economy which made unemploy­
ment benefits necessary. "He felt," Perkins recollected, "that people ...
would have to think, plan, and experiment to overcome this hazard to our
81industrial society."
The nature of planning that Roosevelt encouraged as Governor before 
1932 was of the voluntary associational variety whose most renowned 
exponent was Herbert Hoover. Both Henry Bruere and Frances Perkins recog­
nised a kinship between their planning work and the sentiments of the 
President when they endorsed Hoover's statement in his address before
the Chamber of Commerce of May 1930, that wise planning based upon accurate
82data could even out the business cycle. For its part P.E.C.E. utilised 
the work of the Roosevelt Commission and used New York State stabilisation 
programmes in its publicity releases. Arthur Woods requested 250 copies 
of the Commission's "excellent" report for distribution to each national 
trade association and "key persons" in industry. We "know that the report 
will have wide influence," Frances Perkins was informed. Particular 
schemes covered by the Commission's report also attracted further enquiries 
from P.E.C.E. such as Rochester Unemployment Benefit Plan, announced in
80. Stabilized Employment, op.cit., 21.
81. Frances Perkins, Roosevelt, op.cit., 107.
82. Henry Bruere and Frances Perkins to Herbert Hoover, 2 May, 1930.
P.P.F. Box 41 File, Congratulatory Correspondence - U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Address. H.H.L. 83
83. Arthur Woods to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 February, 1931. J. Douglas 
Brown to Frances Perkins, 14 February, 1931. R.G.73 Series 19, Records 
of the Industrial Divisions Miscellaneous, November 1930 - April 1931.
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February 1931, in which fourteen employers of 28,000 workers agreed to 
pool their resources to set up unemployment reserves for their employees. 
Writing to Marion B. Folsom, assistant treasurer of Eastman-Kodak,
J. Douglas Brown congratulated the Rochester employers in contriving 
"the outstanding event in the field of employment stabilization this 
winter" and expressed P.E.C.E.'s concern to "direct as much attention 
to it as possible".^
The distinction between Hoover and Roosevelt in their commitment 
to economic planning was that of the ideologue and the pragmatist. In 
April 1932, Roosevelt considered restructuring the State's economic 
programmes to include proposals which were "progressive, new and fearless, 
without being radical". "Conventional remedies have been honorably tried 
both by State, municipalities and private charity," Roosevelt wrote.
85"They have been well carried out but have proved insufficient. What next?" 
Hoover, on the other hand, remained intransigent, remaining wedded throughout 
his tenure to the principles of voluntary associationism. Through the 
White House conferences, the National Business Survey Conference, P.E.C.E. 
and P.O.U.R., he repeated the same experiments, using the same formulae, 
hoping for different results. In the autumn of 1932 he made one last 
effort in a movement which concentrated on one planning goal: 'Share-the- 
Work'. By then Hoover's planning strategy had been shorn of its scope 
and vision, for the 1932 initiative was little more than a relief programme.
A visionary in terms of his advocacy of economic planning during the 
1920s, Hoover's intransigence made him appear increasingly conservative 
to those who 'discovered' economic planning during the depression or who
84. J. Douglas Brown to M.B. Folsom, 19 February, 1931. Ibid.
85 'Memorandum for "GTC"' f 13 April, 1932. R.O.G. Roll 177. F.D.R.L.
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resented the constraints which Hoover imposed. Liberals and labour welcomed 
more positive, central direction than the President was prepared to provide. 
Businessmen - Hoover's natural allies - became increasingly receptive to 
legislative change which would permit trade associations the freedom to 
determine output and prices in their sectors and surmount the imbalance 
between production and consumption. While Hoover hoped to the end that 
enlightened self-interest would inspire voluntary cooperation without 
compromising the values and virtues of individualism and competition, 
many of his critics charged that economic conditions were so grave that 
individuals needed to be coerced to act wisely. To Hoover the very concept 
was anathema. Consequently, the visionary became idiosyncratic at the 
end of a four-year period in which interest in economic planning, which 
Herbert Hoover had long espoused, became widespread.
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CHAPTER 3
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND PLANNING; TRADE ASSOCIATION!SM
"Never before has 'capitalism' felt so self-conscious of itself as a system 
or so sincerely questioned itself," wrote the business publicist, J. George 
Frederick in 1932. "Instead of blaming the weather, God or the Democratic 
party, as so often before, the crisis has stimulated genuine analysis, 
and as a result we have had the serious and intelligent formulation not 
only of 'slump remedies' but broadscale economic planning based on a 
certain degree of fundamental changes in our economic system."^ Against 
Frederick's roseate perspective of the business community and its progressive 
vanguard, may be placed the more sober and neutral verdict of the Federal 
Government's National Planning Board in 1934 that "in modern times, business 
has been the stronghold of economic planning and the 'center of diffusion' 
from which that practice has spread". The Board referred primarily to 
planning by the individual firm, but recognised that elements of uncertainty 
had forced businessmen to accept that planning needed to be conducted more 
broadly to erase "hazards" beyond the individual firm's control - even to 
the extent of requesting government aid in the planning process. The 
tendency impressed the sceptical journalist, John T. Flynn, who discerned
a sentiment amongst progressive businessmen to establish "The New Capitalism"
/
3in which private gain would become subordinated to public service. As 
business propagandist, government agency and muckraker recognised, the 
depression had stimulated businessmen to consider broadening the scope 
and nature of economic planning.
1. J. George Frederick, Readings in Economic Planning (New York, 1932): 
141-144; 293-294.
2. National Planning Board, Final Report: 1933-1934 (Washington, D.C.,
1934): 21-22.
3. John T. Flynn, 'The New Capitalism', Collierh 91 (18 March, 1933): 12.
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Although businessmen and industrialists responded positively to 
President Hoover's overtures for their support in 1929 and 1930, by 1931 
the doctrine of voluntary associationism appeared to many to offer few 
prospects for business stabilisation and economic revival. Voluntary 
associationism was flawed in two respects. First, its planning proposals 
were too limited in scope to have any decisive effect on business 
conditions. Assuming that the major contributing factor to the depression 
was excessive competition, many business spokesmen regarded some control 
of prices and output and zoning of markets on an industry-wide basis as 
a prerequisite for stabilisation. The Hoover approach, however, limited 
its focus largely on the individual firm and its policies to those that 
would stabilise employment, rather than production. Second, voluntary 
associationism depended upon informal agreement and lacked any authorit­
ative institutional mechanisms to put programmes into effect. Business 
spokesmen believed that trade associations were an appropriate mechanism 
for effecting industry-wide planning. Trade associationism conformed to 
the Hoover approach in the sense that initiative was retained by the 
business community in implementing economic planning. It diverged from 
voluntary associationism in its implications of legislative change to 
achieve its ends. Some advocates of trade associationism even conceded 
government supervision in return for a liberal definition of the organis­
ation's legal functions. Herbert Hoover equated such proposals with an 
offensive cartelism.
The persistence of the depression was undoubtedly the principal 
factor in stimulating the interest of the business community in planning. 
However, other considerations were also apparent. A humanitarian concern 
for the plight of labour motivated some progressive employers, such as the 
food packer, Ernest Draper. Draper called for "an American plan" to
provide short-term relief and even out fluctuations in the business cycle. 
"Rugged individualism is not rugged enough to save the unemployed worker 
from complete annihilation when forces of depression grip the nation as 
they now do," he reflected in 1931.^ In the same year, Steel recognised 
the importance of two other related influences. The journal noted that 
the depression had instilled a new sense of responsibility for the welfare 
of the community and the worker within business leadership. Only a minor­
ity of executives - "adherents to the old school of industrial tyranny" - 
continued to shirk their responsibilities and in doing so, gave industry 
as a whole "a 'black eye' in the public mind" and risked stimulating 
"congressional attacks on big business".’’ In effect, Steel identified 
two of industry's major preoccupations since the Progressive era which 
were re-emphasised during the early depression years: the public image 
of business and the fear of government intervention in the affairs of 
industry.^ Business sponsorship of economic planning was at one-and-the- 
same time a means of rehabilitating the depression-tarnished business 
image, pre-empting overt federal regulation, fulfilling community oblig­
ations and providing an economic framework conducive to revival and 
stabilisation.
Sensitivity about the public image of business and anxiety about 
excessive government intervention developed in parallel and spanned the 
period from the 'New Era' of the late 1920s to the enactment of the 
N.I.R.A. in June 1933. Both concerns found emphasis in the trade assoc­
iation lawyer, Benjamin A. Javits' Make Everybody Rich: Industry's New
4. Ernest G. Draper to Dr. John H. Finley, 30 July, 1931. Draper MSS:
Box 1 File, 1928-1934.
5. Steel 88 (5 February, 1931): 4.
6. Morrell Heald, The Social Responsibilities of Business: Company and
Community, 1900-1960 (Cleveland, 197ti): 20-174. Allan R. Raucher,
Public Relations and Business, 1900-1929 (Baltimore, 1968).
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Goal (1929), a work published in the expiring days of prosperity and 
embodying 'New Era' optimism to its fullest degree. Javits sought to 
persuade business leaders to translate the technological progress of 
the decade into social gains, by raising the spectre of government 
intervention if industry failed to act. "If the movement to 'make 
everybody rich' is not soon attempted by organized industrial intelligence, 
it will soon be attempted by organized political ignorance," Javits 
advanced.^ The onset of the depression made the business community more 
conscious of the importance of maintaining its prestige. Business Week 
was prompted to chide critics of government for failing to lead by example. 
"Business should find no alibi in government, nor government in business," 
the journal declared. Sympathetic voices in education exhorted business­
men to rise to the crisis. Wallace B. Donham urged them to broaden their 
perspectives from the individual company to the welfare of industries 
and the community as a whole: "Such attention to these problems by our 
industrial leaders is essential to the continuance of our present civil- 
ization." Glenn Frank challenged that the alternative to "revolutionary 
politics" lay in the businessman adopting the idealism of the reformer 
and becoming the sponsor of change. "Sound economic statesmanship 
suggests that the soap box be taken indoors, that it be set up in the 
directors' room and that it be henceforth occupied by the industrial 
administrator," Frank reflected.*^1 7890
7. Benjamin A. Javits, Make Everybody Rich: Industry's New Goal (New 
York, 1929): x; 36; 125; 275.
8. Business Week, 11 March, 1931: 56.
9. Donham, Business Looks at the Unforeseen, op.cit., 12.
10. Frank, Thunder and Dawn, op.cit., 382-383.
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Fear of alternatives served to inspire the formulation of individual 
programmes to ameliorate the effects of the depression on labour. Both. 
Marion Folsom of Eastman Kodak and the tool manufacturer, James W. Hook, 
recommended that industry assume the initiative in championing unemploy­
ment insurance to pre-empt government action in this field. "We believe 
that the responsibility for establishing unemployment reserves rests 
with industry," Folsom wrote in 1931, "and if industry does not accept 
this responsibility, it will have to face legislation - possibly unsound 
legislation."^ Hook contended that the alternative to privately-initiated 
schemes was the establishment of a federal 'dole' based on the English 
model with its arbitrary and inequitable charges on employers. "Let 
industry solve its own problems," he advised, "if necessary under regulatory
laws that will make all units of industry accept the principle uniformly.
12But let industry do the job."
The sponsorship of planning by the business community to pre-empt 
government encroachment on the functions of private enterprise was a 
leading theme of business organisations, individual spokesmen and trade 
periodicals throughout the early depression. In the summer of 1931, the 
National Civic Federation noted with concern the growing conviction that 
the alternative to inaction in the private sector was government interven­
tion, and urged business . to consider its own measures of guidance to
mark out "a greater goal for industry than it has ever known - the proper
13service to a nation of human beings". Government intervention threatened 
to stultify entrepreneurial initiative and involve political 'log-rolling',
11. Marion B. Folsom, 'The Rochester Unemployment Benefit Plan', Papers 
and Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science 14 
(no.4, 1931): 22.
12. James W. Hook, 'Industry's Obligation to the Unemployed', Mechanical 
Engineering 53 (October, 1931): 712. 13*
13. National Civic Federation, 'A Manifesto on Planning', in Charles A.
Beard (ed.), America Faces the Future (Cambridge, Mass., 1932): 35.
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Paul Mazur of Lehman Brothers believed. "In order to avoid the inevit­
ability of the imposition of government regulation," Mazur wrote, "it 
is an urgent necessity for industry to take energetic remedial and 
regulating steps on its own initiative."^ Owen D. Young, chairman of 
General Electric, located three courses open to business: it could 
continue complacent in a "system of intensified individualism"; accept 
responsibility to formulate and execute programmes to promote recovery 
and stabilisation, or acquiesce in government exercising the initiative.
The last alternative was as undesirable as the first since government 
would use the power of taxation rigorously to achieve desired ends and 
"this carries only a political and not an economic check on such expen­
ditures". ^  Gerard Swope placed the onus on business to organise industry, 
coordinate production and consumption and stabilise employment. "Even if 
industry falls short of an ideal accomplishment, there is no doubt in my 
mind," Swope advised, "that more progress will be made and it will be 
better done and cost less than if the government, either State or Federal, 
endeavors to do it."^
In the early months of 1933 much of industry had become reconciled 
to a degree of federal intervention as a necessary sacrifice to prevent 
more wholesale government interference. Steel greeted Roosevelt's 
inauguration with expressions of penitence, regretting that "bitter 
experience has demonstrated the folly of much of our 1929 thinking" and 
demanding new standards from businessmen in terms of a "purification of 
the motives of men and a higher regard for the quality of integrity".^
14. Paul M. Mazur, New Ways to Prosperity; The Crisis and Some Ways Out 
(New York, 1931): 133-134.
15. New York Times, 17 September, 1931.
16. Gerard Swope, 'Stabilization of Industry', Papers and Proceedings 
of the American Academy of Political Science 14 (no.4, 1931): 112. 17
17. Steel 92 (6 March, 1933): 18.
129
The response of industrial spokesmen to the new administration's industrial
recovery programme was to accept a limited extent of government intervention
into industry's activities and seize the opportunity for 'self-government'
18through trade associations to preclude a larger governmental role. As 
Francis E. Neagle, counsel for the National Electrical Manufacturers' 
Association expressed it:
The theory of the bill is to allow industry to govern itself. If 
industry fails to govern itself, then government will not fail.
If we do not regulate our own industry, government will regulate 
it for us. The two are not going to fail. If one fails, the 
other acts.^
Educationalists were particularly concerned about the public image
of business since it reflected upon those institutions which provided
specialist services for business education. Further, the economic crisis
and the retarded 'natural' revival presented business educationalists with
an opportunity to call for a re-evaluation of business ideals, in which
business management faculties would play a leading role. Professional
prestige was a major motivating factor in the espousal of planning by
. . 20spokesmen of the universities.
Harvard's Wallace B. Donham advocated planning with the proviso that 
it would result in no radical or revolutionary change in the social struc­
ture and that control of economic forces could be made compatible with 
the maintenance of private enterprise and the retention of individual 
opportunity. While Donham was reluctant to abandon qualities which he 
considered indispensable to economic progress and a high standard of
18. William H. Wilson, 'How the Chamber of Commerce viewed the National 
Recovery Administration: A Re-Examination', Mid-America 44 (April, 
1962): 96-97.
19. New York Times, 24 May, 1933.
20. Donham, 'Business Ethics', op.cit., 385”394. Idem, 'The Failure of 
Business Leadership and the Responsibility of the Universities', 
Harvard Business Review 11 (July, 1933): 418-435.
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living, he recognised that individualism had failed to provide security to 
such a degree that it was presently reacting upon itself and withholding 
opportunities for individual initiative. Moreover, not only the risk- 
takers suffered from the economic depression, but also those millions of 
workers who had sought no opportunity except the security of continuous 
employment. The object of planning for Donham became the reconciliation 
of individualism with stability and security. Further drift and continued 
insecurity might jeopardise the capitalist system and its potentialities, 
and as such, Donham could not condone reliance on "happy accidents" to 
promote revival. "This is not time for panaceas or patent cure-alls," 
he wrote. "Neither is it a time to wait for miracles." Stability and 
security would be attained only through the substitution of intelligence 
for chance in meeting present emergency conditions and future 
developments.
The businessman was central to Donham's planning ideas. While he 
accused businessmen of "overspecialization" and called for the adoption 
of broader perspectives on economic problems by business leaders, he was 
confident that the ability and incentive existed for their successful 
sponsorship of planning. However, Donham advised that business would 
be unable to shoulder the entire responsibility for planning and that 
government had a significant function to perform. What Donham envisaged 
was a dichotomised form of planning with business and government sovereign 
in their respective spheres. Functions would be strictly demarcated. 
Distinguishing between "business" and "social" problems, Donham recommended 
that business should concern itself with the technical aspects of the 
economy to ensure continued employment and prosperity, while government 
should plan on the premise that in times of economic recession, when
21. Idem, 'Twenty Year Plans: As Related to the Temporary Emergency',
Mechanical Engineering 55 (January, 1932): 9-10. Idem, 'The Attack
on Depressions', Harvard Business Review 11 (October, 1932): 47-48.
Idem. Business Looks at the Unforeseen, op.cit., 3-4; 16.
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business was unable to provide necessary security, it would furnish
employment through public works programmes. Government was to take the
ultimate responsibility for giving security, but not for instigating
economic progress. "Business is primarily responsible for efficient
plants and for efficient current production," Donham remarked. "Govern-
22ment is responsible for public works." There was no irony for Donham 
in his suggestion that government make plans in a 'planned economy' to 
meet unemployment in times of depression, for he believed that slumps 
were inevitable and that no amount of planning could prevent them while 
maintaining the goal of a high standard of living.
Glenn Frank shared Donham's convictions that the business community 
should initiate planning and that education had a vital role to play in
23propagating a wholesome sense of social responsibility in young executives.
He feared that the economic crisis had placed in jeopardy western democracy 
and held that the West was confronted with the stark alternatives of 
"social control by design or social suicide by default". While Frank 
rejected any compromise of private rights, he contended that to avoid 
social convulsion, industry must necessarily shed "the still regnant 
philosophy it inherited from Adam Smith". A "new capitalism" was required, 
based on planning and pioneered by enlightened business leaders. Frank 
had scant respect for "the inherited patter and patterns of politico- 
social liberalism", and doubted that a complex technical civilisation 
could be served adequately by the type of political leadership that 
democracy habitually provided where leaders were indistinguishable from
22. Idem, 'Can American Business Meet the Present Emergency?', Harvard 
Business Review 9 (April, 1931): 265-266. Idem, Business Adrift 
(London, 1931): 128; 135; 137-139; 144. Idem, Business Looks at 
the Unforeseen, op.cit., 65. 23
23. Frank, Thunder and Dawn, op.cit., 220-225.
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their electorates. The need was for the "first-class man" with the "first- 
class mind" to assume the initiative in humanising the industrial order 
and creating a "mass-conscious" industrialism and he was confident that 
such potential leadership resided in industry. An enlightened business 
leadership would appreciate that reform was a policy of enlightened self- 
interest: "The best insurance policy for capitalism, but the best business 
policy for capitalists." It would realise that industry's self-interest 
lay in facilitating distribution through higher wages, shorter hours and 
lower prices, understanding that consumer prosperity represented the 
surest guarantee of industrial profits. It would also erase the anomaly 
of the general planlessness in America's social development with the 
meticulous planning that had been applied to the development of individual 
enterprises. The leadership would appreciate that in a complex techno­
logical era, laissez-faire was "suicidal" and some measure of planning 
"imperative".2^
Representatives of the legal profession also favoured the initiation
of planning by the business community and were principally concerned with
25the mechanisms through which this could be achieved. Lawyers were dis­
satisfied with the functioning of the antitrust laws, particularly with 
the inherent uncertainties faced by businessmen in compliance, the 
stringent penalties of criminal prosecution and the wisdom of allowing 
legal reasoning to determine what were essentially economic matters. 
Judicial license made for uncertainty amongst businessmen as to their 
status within the antitrust statutes. Lawyers preferred to expand the
24. Ibid., 40; 94; 139; 182-184; 330-339; 376-386. Idem, 'Business 
and Politics in the American Future', The Annals 149 (May, 1930): 
173-182. Idem. 'Notes on the Renewal of America', The Annals 162 
(July, 1932): 160. 25
25. The close connection between the legal professional elite and the 
business community before the New Deal is discussed in Jerold S. 
Auerbach, 'Lawyers and Social Change in the Depression Decade', in 
Braeman et al., (eds), The New Deal, op.cit., 1: 133-142.
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powers of the Federal Trade Commission to advise and liaise with business 
and establish more explicit and lenient rules of conduct. Particularly 
they were concerned to legitimise the status of the trade association as 
an instrument conducive to business stability and planning.
Three trade association lawyers were especially prominent in the 
discussion of antitrust questions during the Hoover years: Gilbert H. 
Montague, David L. Podell, and Benjamin A. Javits. Of the three, Montague 
was the most cautious in advocating change. He regretted the uncertainty 
that existed in the administration of the laws, especially in terms of 
conflicts between the F.T.C. and the Supreme Court, and the Court's 
"hairline" decisions on practices such as price-fixing. However, he was 
reluctant to endorse legislative amendment publicly, satisfying himself 
that much uncertainty could be removed short of legislative change. A 
great deal could be accomplished through the provision of more complete 
information by the F.T.C. as to its criteria of acceptable business 
practices and through trade associations themselves, which should accept
responsibility for educating and informing their members on government
, . 26 policy.
. Podell was explicit in advocating amendment, castigating the laws 
for their contribution to the economic depression. While they had succeeded 
in guaranteeing freedom of opportunity, they had also imposed grave 
disabilities on industry in the form of excess capacity, overproduction 
and 'cutthroat' competition and continued to inhibit industry from 
adopting positive responses to the depression through collective action.
"The .effect of our Anti-Trust laws has been to paralyze the one center 
of cooperative and enlightened planning in industry," Podell asserted 
with reference to trade associations. He opposed outright repeal as
26. Gilbert H. Montague, 'Better Administration of the Antitrust Laws',
The Annals 165 (January, 1933): 85-92. Handler (ed.), The Federal 
Antitrust Laws, op.cit., 55-61.
134
threatening to the small businessman and favoured amendment to achieve the 
necessary balance between preserving the benefits of competition and reduc­
ing its disadvantages. This could be achieved through the licensing of 
trade associations and by giving to government powers of regulation over 
their programmes. By granting immunity from criminal and treble damage 
penalties and removing uncertainties of interpretation of the laws, 
industry would be provided with a climate favourable to cooperative action 
and planning. "It would liberate over a million merchants in this country," 
Podell wrote, "and afford them the opportunity to attend meetings, openly 
exchange their views, study their ills, discuss remedies, adopt lines of
cooperative action, enter upon plans and programs which in the main would
27be entirely in harmony with the spirit of our Anti-trust laws."
Benjamin A. Javits was prolific in his efforts to secure amendment
of the antitrust laws, through published works, radio addresses, political
connections and in cooperation with business organisations such as the
28N.A.M. and the Committee for the Nation. Before the Crash, Javits had
outlined his position on antitrust changes. The need was not to repeal
the laws, but amend them so as to exempt "any combination in restraint
of trade which shall be in the public interest". Having little confidence
in the courts to adequately define "in the public interest", Javits
suggested the extension of the powers and personnel of the F.T.C. to
enable it to rule upon economic practices as they arose, rather than
29laying down general rules for divergent activities.
27. David L. Podell, 'Our Anti-Trust Laws and the Economic Situation', 
American Bar Association Journal 17 (April, 1931): 254-260. New 
York Times, 7 February, 193K Handler (ed.), The Federal Antitrust 
Laws, op.cit., 68-73.
28. Javits' influence extended beyond the Hoover administration. During 
May, 1933, he worked closely with business organisations to ensure 
that Roosevelt's industrial recovery bill incorporated features 
advantageous to the business community. John H. Fahey to Daniel C. 
Roper, 23 May, 1933. R.G. 40, File 94649. 29
29. Javits, Make Everybody Rich, op.cit., 237-238. Javits' emphasis.
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Javits maintained his "new view of business" during the early
depression, urging a contract between the business community and society
in which "business should be given the opportunity to set itself up in
a true sense as a 'public utility'". Given that businessmen had realised
that profits and the general welfare were synonymous, the public should
allow them to undertake the cooperation necessary for revival, relieved
of the restraints of the antitrust laws. In return, the public could
demand of business that "there shall be no unemployment, no poverty, no
economic degradation". The means of actuating business responsibility
for the general welfare was through trade associations and their general
codes of ethics which would proscribe methods of 'unfair' competition
. 3 1which damaged public and business interests alike.
The essence of Javits' position was that modern economic society 
could achieve stability and full employment only through cooperation.
He considered not only cooperation between firms in industry to effect 
economic recovery, but also cooperation between industry and government 
to ensure future stability, and even economic cooperation between nation­
states as a means of achieving international stability. In the first 
instance, Javits called for closer cooperation between government and 
business and a shift away from the tendency of government to act as 
"a callous prison warden who oppresses his charges". Taking his cue 
from the contemporaneous Technocracy movement, Javits ventured a "science 
of government that is found directly on industrial and economic facts", 
which he referred to as "poli-tees". "Poli-tecs" required the 
de-politicization of economic decision-making and the recognition that
30. Idem. Business and the Public Interest: Trade Associations, the 
Anti-Trust Laws and Industrial Planning (New York, 1932): 1-32. 31
31. Ibid., 191-258.
industrial experience and expertise were important qualifications for 
decision-makers. Economic decision-making should no longer be determined 
by criteria of political expediency but by technological imperatives, 
and responsibility for government policy should be entrusted to "industrial 
statesmen" such as Owen D. Young or Robert P. Lamont. The ascendancy 
of the "industrial statesman" would represent an acceptance of the need 
for specialisation in "political economics". Only the "industrial states­
man" understood the need for coordination and integration of economic 
activity and the requirement that government foster these trends. At 
present, politics acted as a restraining influence, as attested to by 
the failure of Hoover's business conferences. Javits believed that 
business leaders had failed to commit themselves to "long-range planning ... 
because it was understood that the members of congress were not in favor 
of placing direct power to deal with the problems of the depression in 
the hands of the businessmen and labor leaders assembled". "Poli-tecs", 
however, would segregate economic decision-making from other functions 
of government and develop "an industrial state within the political state". 
This would involve the formation of a "new order" in which industry would 
be organised in representative units such as trade associations, trade 
unions, agricultural and professional organisations under the aegis of 
a national economic board, which would "plan and control our economic 
life".32
Throughout the Hoover presidency the legal profession, and partic­
ularly its organisation, the American Bar Association, performed a leading
32. Idem, 'The New Social Science - Poli-tecs': Radio broadcast over 
WEAF and Red Network, 29 September, 1932. Idem, 'International 
Poli-tecs': Radio broadcast over WEAF and Red Network, 9 January,
1933. Nicholas Murray Butler MSS: Javits File. Columbia University. 
Idem, Business and the Public Interest, op.cit., 35; 163; 190.
Idem. 'The Anti-Trust Laws', The Annals 149 (May, 1930): 128-129.
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role in the business community’s efforts to facilitate industrial planning
by repeatedly endorsing antitrust revision and formulating amendments
33for congressional consideration. While lawyers were more concerned 
with the mechanisms through which planning would be effected, engineers 
discussed planning and its desirability in the abstract, particularly 
emphasising the role of the engineer in a planned society. To some 
extent, engineers' interest in planning after 1929 can be explained by 
a need that many felt to justify their profession and its accomplishments 
of the 1920s in the light of the economic depression. Engineers contended 
that the cause of the economic dislocation lay not in the machine - in 
the technological advances of the 1920s - but in man and his failure to 
comprehend the economic and social implications of technological progress. 
Planning became the means of reconciling the national interest to techno­
logical progress and at the same time served to apply 'engineering 
principles' to economic science.
The installation of an engineer as President of the United States 
in 1929 stimulated the engineering fraternity to discuss its social 
responsibility. Writing in March, American Institute of Electrical
33. The efforts of the legal profession to secure antitrust revision 
are discussed in Chap. 6. 34
34. Edwin T. Layton has made a convincing case for regarding engineers 
as representatives of the business community than as autonomous 
professionals. In the 1920s, although individuals joined engineer­
ing societies to enhance their professional status, attachment to 
business was more pronounced than independent professionalism. 
Engineers tended to share the values of business and there are 
clear reasons why this should be so. The engineers' pattern of 
career development often involved promotion from technical consul­
tant to administrator and business manager; loyalty requirements 
of the business firm limited the development of any professional, 
independent allegiance among engineers; business subsidised engin­
eers and their societies and the lower middle-class, small-town 
W.A.S.P. origins of many engineers, together with the business 
influence encountered in their education, made them naturally 
sympathetic to business ideals. Edwin T. Layton, Jr., The Revolt
of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American Engineering 
Profession (Cleveland, 1971): 1-19.
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Engineers' president, R.F. Schuchardt declared that engineering advances
of the 1920s had placed on the engineer "an obligation of leadership
in the affairs of his nation and of the world - a new leadership, but
35one in which his trained analytic mind should well serve him".
Engineers should enter public life not only to advance the place of 
engineering within the broader commercial and financial perspective, but 
also, as he wrote later, to use his skills in the search for solutions 
to social problems. As such, the elevation of Hoover to the presidency 
was indicative of the nation's appreciation of "the keen need of the 
time for the engineering approach to important problems of state". The 
engineer must "stand at or near the helm if this civilization is to 
survive". For Dexter S. Kimball, Dean of the College of Engineering, 
Cornell University, engineers had solved the problem of production and 
it was left to politics to solve the problem of distribution. The diffi­
culty was that politicians were still elected "on the basis of expediency 
and not upon the basis of knowledge", but, with an implied reference
to Hoover's election, Kimball stated that "even here we may look for 
37progress". Mechanical engineer, Ralph E. Flanders encapsulated these
sentiments in his assertion that the waning of the 1920s presented the
moment for engineering expertise to be realised for the general social
38welfare - "for effective benevolence".
35. Journalcf the American Institute of Electrical Engineers 48 (March, 
1929): 177.
36. Ibid., 48 (August 1929): 614.
37. Mechanical Engineering 51 (September, 1929): 652. Kimball's 
emphasis.
38. Ralph E. Flanders, 'Engineering and Human Values', Ibid., 649-652.
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With the onset of the depression the exhortations of engineering 
spokesmen to their profession to assume a more active role in public life 
became more urgent and were accompanied by efforts to disassociate the 
practical accomplishments of engineers from the causes of the depression. 
Ralph Flanders, vice-president of the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers (A.S.M.E.) in 1930, defended the past achievements of engineering 
as conducive to the general national interest and capable of significant 
social potential. "The engineer’s efforts have resulted in harm to no 
one," Flanders claimed, "at least some slight benefit to every one, and 
the possibility - for the first time - of plenty for all." The problem 
lay in the distribution sector. The production surpluses realised by 
the engineer had not been translated into enhanced levels of mass consump­
tion or greater leisure. Hence responsibility lay elsewhere: with business,
39government or the stock exchange. Engineers such as Walter N. Polokov 
and Elliott D. Smith resented that technological and distributive unemploy­
ment had become confused in the public mind and that the engineering 
profession had received abuse as a consequence. The depression was not 
a result of advances in engineering, but rather the failure of society 
to keep abreast of technological progress. "It is slender comfort to
find oneself ahead of the crowd," wrote Smith, "when it exposes one to 
. ¡ I  40taunts, not praise.
Rather than technological progress, culpability for the depression 
lay with political and business leadership and the science of economics 
which had failed to adapt to the implications of technological advances.
39. Idem, 'The Work and Influence of the Engineer', Mechanical 
Engineering 52 (September, 1930): 827-830.
40. Walter N. Polokov, 'Power as a Factor in Economic Readjustments',
The Annals 165 (January, 1933): 31-37. Elliott D. Smith,
'Engineers Encounter Human Nature', Mechanical Engineering 53 
(January, 1931): 1-2.
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To remedy this situation it was essential that politics accommodated individuals 
who understood the dynamics of technological progress and its potential , and who could 
bring to economic decision-making the qualities of scientific precision 
associated with the engineering profession. The "social engineer" or 
the "engineer-statesman" would bring with him a novel approach to the 
solution of economic problems: planning. As the engineer had been a 
devotee of planning on the micro-scale, its implementation on the macro­
scale would rectify the lag between the social sciences and technological 
change. As Elliott Smith expressed it:
The engineer in launching new technological processes in an old 
world is not merely putting new wine into old bottles. He is 
putting high voltage into old wiring. It is an important part 
of the task of engineering to see that the wiring is made adequate 
to the new load. *
According to Flanders, traditional economic concepts and leadership were 
no longer adequate to translate the potential of technological progress 
into social gains. The science of economics had little practical value 
for the solution of pressing problems. "Its present role is that of 
disinterested observer, post-mortem investigator, analyst of current 
phenomena," Flanders contended. "Seldom indeed does it offer us the 
information and the instruction in basic principles which would enable 
us to control our economic problems instead of fluttering anxiously about 
them." A more "complete science of economics" was needed, with an emphasis 
upon practical applicability.^ A similar reorientation of political 
leadership was necessary also, which involved the disowning of the inexpert 
politician who assumed responsibility for economic decisions. Flanders 
was disillusioned with the current state of politics. The response of 
Congress to the depression had been "completely ineffectual" and
41. Ibid., 4.
42. Ralph E. Flanders, 'Engineering, Economics and the Problem of Social 
Well-Being: The Engineer's View', Ibid., 53 (February, 1931): 100.
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characterised by "thoughtful flippancy". It had disintegrated "in 
fruitless internal wrangles and in quarrels with the President over 
questions of authority". If the economy was to be controlled, the 
initiative would have to come from elsewhere.
Engineers' leaders responded to this 'vacuum' in leadership by 
sponsoring the idea of the engineer as public servant. Stressing the 
need to balance scientific knowledge and social intelligence, electrical 
engineer, William E. Wickenden called for a new "social orientation" 
amongst engineers, while A.S.M.E. president, Roy V. Wright suggested that
the nation needed "militant engineers" to assist in solving contemporary
. 44 . . .economic problems. Frank B. Jewett, vice-president of American Telephone
and Telegraph believed that the engineer had a crucial role to play in 
economic decision-making since "he is the only man who in general has 
that full understanding of the facts of science as applied to the affairs 
of every-day life which is necessary for a proper operation of the new 
controls . Engineering college president, Harvey N. Davis castigated 
engineers for not having prepared emergency plans to counter the depression
through public works expenditure and advised the preparation of plans to
, 46meet the next emergency.
Engineers contributed to the debate on economic recovery with various 
suggestions. Some individuals, like Edward Bennett, composed specific
43. Idem., Taming Our Machines; The Attainment of Human Values in a 
Mechanized Society (New York, 1931): 162-163. Idem, Senator from 
Vermont (Boston, 1961): 136.
44. William E. Wickenden, 'The Engineer in a Changing Society', Electrical 
Engineering 51 (July, 1932): 470-471. Roy V. Wright, 'The Engineer 
Militant', Mechanical Engineering 55 (January, 1932): 22. See also 
Alfred D. FIinn, 'Leadership in Economic Progress', Civil Engineering 
2 (April, 1932): 242-244.
45. Frank. B. Jewett, 'Problems Confronting the Engineering Profession', 
Mechanical Engineering 54 (April, 1932): 245.
46. Harvey N. Davis, 'An Appeal for Constructive Thinking', Ibid., 54 
(October, 1932): 687.
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plans, while others made more general suggestions. Ralph Flanders 
favoured the establishment of an "authoritative body" to investigate 
economic conditions, consider proposals to stimulate revival and make 
recommendations to individual economic sectors through their represen­
tative institutions or organisations. Particularly, an economic council
would investigate the feasibility of public works expenditure as a means
48of stimulating business activity. Walter Polokov regarded it as 
"increasingly obvious" that planning would be introduced into economic 
activity and favoured its implementation by any agency. However, he 
understood that the transformation from individualism to planning was 
likely to be conducted by industry for reasons of political and economic 
expediency - "an easy step for small feet". Engineers' organisations 
were active in sponsoring studies of economic problems. In 1932 the 
Engineering Foundation's study of the industrial system described the 
'new frontier' as an industrial one and called for "a new fundamental 
philosophy" whereby the wants of the masses would be s a tisfied.The  
American Engineering Council, taking its cue from a suggestion by Colonel 
Arthur Woods of P.E.C.E., embarked upon its own investigation into the
4 7
47. Edward Bennett, A Plan for the Restoration of Employment: Arguments 
for the Enactment of an Emergency Employment Act, Making Equal Grants 
of Purchasing Power to All Citizens (Madison, 1933).
48. Flanders, Taming Our Machines, op.cit., 157-159. Hearings, Establish­
ment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 243-244. Ralph E. 
Flanders, 'The Economics of Machine Production', Mechanical Engineering 
54 (September, 1932): 612.
49. Walter N. Polokov, 'A Bag of Tricks Won't Do!', Factory and Industrial 
Management 85 (February, 1933): 26.
50. Alfred D. Flinn to John P. Frey, 15 April, 1932. The Engineering 
Foundation, 'Study of Industrial System: Informal Notes for Use of 
Planning Committee', Frey MS: Box 14 File 197.
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causes of and possible remedies for the depression."** The Council's 
Committee on the Relationship of Consumption, Production and Distribution 
issued two progress reports in January 1932 and January 1933. The 
Committee emphasised a mal-distribution of income as fundamental to the 
causes of the depression and stressed the role that public works expen­
diture could play in promoting revival. Resort to a "master-plan" on 
the lines of the W.I.B. or the Russian experiment was rejected as appro­
priate only to either a wartime situation or an economy reconciled to 
a low standard of living. However, the Committee was favourable to the 
role that trade associations could assume in sponsoring recovery through 
planning. As it concluded in its first report: "Arbitrary control of 
modern industry and commerce in all their ramifications, complexities
and details, clearly is beyond the power of human beings; influences
52now at hand must continue to govern its details."
The advent of the Technocracy movement in the late autumn of 1932 
was of considerable interest to engineers because of the movement's close 
association with the engineering profession through the bogus claims 
of leader, Howard Scott and the bona fide credentials of Walter 
Rautenstrauch and Bassett Jones. While engineers were quick to dis­
associate themselves from the extravagant claims made by the Technocrats 
for the potential of technology and the movement's prediction of the 
imminent collapse of capitalism, the Technocrats' emphasis on the need
for economic planning and the utility of the engineering viewpoint in
53economic decision-making found favour amongst some engineers.
51. American Engineering Council, Executive Committee Minutes, 17 October, 
1930. Pres. Box 58 File, American Engineering Council, H.H.L. The 
American Engineering Council continued a correspondence with P.O.U.R. 
See R& 73 Series 13, General Records: American Engineering Council. 
Mechanical Engineering 53 (January, 1930): 76-77.
52. Electrical Engineering 51 (June, 1932): 373-379. Ibid., 52 (May,
1933): 293-303.
53. The papers of John M. Carmody reveal the sensitivity of engineers such 
as Carmody himself, to the publicity value of the Technocracy movement 
for engineers' organisations.
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During the Hoover years, economic planning evoked considerable 
interest amongst engineers. Their motives seem to have been diverse: 
to salvage a professional reputation jeopardised by the collapse of the 
'New Era', to promote the engineer as a social leader and apply engin­
eering principles to the regulation of economic activity, or to commit 
government to greater public works expenditures through planning and 
thereby supply more work for engineers. While engineers could present 
for consideration no blueprint to restore prosperity, their spokesmen 
did endorse planning in general terms and contributed to the developing 
sentiment within the business community. In terms of tangible and 
practicable proposals, however, the most significant emanated not from 
groups affiliated with business but from businessmen themselves and their 
organisations. In 1931, an engineering educational journal published 
the results of a survey conducted by Ohio State University of one hundred 
leading businessmen who were asked whether or not they approved of national 
planning. Of the sample surveyed, only seven replied in the negative.^ 
Albeit a crude gauge of opinion, the engineers' survey suggests a signif­
icant interest in planning amongst businessmen and a climate in which the 
proposals for planning devised by businessmen and their organisations 
would receive serious consideration.
Generally, business planners couched their proposals in the rhetoric 
of 'welfare capitalism' and in terms of furthering, the 'national' rather 
than the 'business' interest. The planners accepted that business must 
take responsibility for the national welfare in a positive rather than 
an incidental fashion; according to the spokesman, they afforded govern­
ment a greater or lesser regulatory role; they proposed pension and
54. C.A. Norman, 'Industrial Fundamentals', Journal of Engineering 
Education 22 (March, 1932): 539.
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insurance schemes; accepted the need for a minimum wage and,most signif­
icant in terms of 'traditional' business ideals, they disavowed laissez- 
faire by severely censuring the rampant speculation of the 1920s and 
advocating the 'balancing' of production and consumption.
Central to these proposals was some modification of the antitrust 
statutes, for it was reasoned that if business was to serve social ends and 
secure benefits for the nation as a whole, it should be allowed to combine 
under the aegis of trade associations. These associations would determine 
production quotas, 'fair' prices, the pooling of resources and technical 
expertise, and institute the uniform standards essential for any reform 
of labour's conditions of work and remuneration. The balancing of produc­
tion and consumption and the elimination of 'cutthroat' competition 
would promote fairer wages and prices and contribute to industrial 
stability.
No other plan of any description received so much attention and 
elicited such comment as did the 'Swope Plan'. The boldness of the 
proposal impressed both The New York Times and Collier's, which reflected 
on the significance of a scheme which would have been construed as dangerously 
"radical" and "socialistic" in the recent American past."*“* The plan 
had both its critics and partisans. The editors of The Washington Post 
questioned Swope's construction of 'the public interest' and feared the 
development of a vast government bureaucracy if his proposal was adopted. 
Norman Thomas described the plan as "a sickening mixture of platitudes 
and blah" which constituted a drift towards "an American version of 
Fascism". On the other hand, Columbia University president, Nicholas 
Murray Butler could "rejoice" at the appearance of a specific and 
inspiring proposal after such widespread discussion of the issues involved,
55. New York Times, 18 October, 1931. Collier's 88 (24 October, 1931):
54. Ibid., 88 (7 November, 1931): 58.
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and Forum magazine was so impressed with the insurance facets of Swope's 
plan that the management proposed to test these aspects on its own 
e m p loyees .The frequency with which Swope was invited to appear before 
congressional committees attests to the political interest that his plan 
aroused and the proposal served as a basis for at least one legislative 
measure to stabilise employment - Rep. David J. Lewis's bill of 1932.^
The plan's author was the progressive president of General Electric. 
Swope's liberal credentials were established before the Great War and 
were confirmed in the 1920s with the enlightened industrial relations 
policies he promoted at G.E. Swope was a proponent of 'welfare capit­
alism'. During the decade he introduced schemes for employee participation 
in company decision-making through works councils, to give workers the 
opportunity to purchase company stock, to improve the quality of adult 
education by subsidising the Union College, Schenectady, and in 1925 he 
proposed an unemployment insurance scheme in which employer and employee 
contributed jointly. Swope also participated in national efforts to 
minimise waste in industry, was instrumental in the creation of a trade 
association for the electrical industry in 1926 - the National Electrical
Manufacturers' Association - and encouraged contacts between his own
59works' councils and the American Federation of Labor.
56. Washington Post, 20 September, 1931. New York Times, 5 October, 
1931. Nicholas Murray Butler to Gerard Swope, 17 September, 1931. 
Butler MSS: Swope, Mr. and Mrs. Gerard File. Forum 86 (November, 
1931): 257. George F. Havell, 'Unemployment Insurance: A Plan
in Actual Operation', Ibid., 87 (April, 1932): 220-221.
57. Hearings, Legalizing Worker's Right to Work, op.cit., 10.
58. David Loth, Swope of G.E. (New York, 1958): chaps. 9-12.
59. Gerard Swope Special MS: 62; 70; 79; 85-89. Oral History Related 
Papers, Columbia University.
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Swope maintained close contact with national political leaders 
during the depression and cooperated with the efforts of government 
agencies to promote recovery. He had at least two conferences with 
President Hoover, in March and April, 1930, and kept the President 
informed of measures adopted by G.E. to stabilise production and amel­
iorate underemployment.***^ Swope had a "great admiration" for Hoover, 
but as an engineer and Secretary of Commerce rather than as chief 
executive where his political ineptitude was a distinct liability.
"I thought he was a fine example of the best type of public servant," 
Swope recounted, "but as President and dealing with Congress ... was 
not at all congenial to his taste."**^ Furthermore, Hoover's programme 
for inducing recovery was limited. The programme that emerged from the 
White House conferences of 1929 had accomplished "much work of a con­
structive nature". However, by October 1930, Swope judged that Hoover's 
efforts were inadequate and in conference with the President, urged him 
to prepare for the coming winter by sponsoring a comprehensive public 
works programme to relieve unemployment. In a memorandum to Hoover of
0
2 October, 1930, which Swope believed in retrospect to anticipate the 
New Deal's Public Works Administration, he advised the President to call 
a special session of Congress which would be asked to approve a billion- 
dollar bond issue to be sold through a patriotic campaign on the lines of 
the Liberty Bond issues of the Great War. The proceedings from the bonds 
sale would be offered to localities which agreed to match federal funds 
and projects would be undertaken such as school, housing, hospital and 
road construction.**^
60. Gerard Swope to Herbert Hoover, 20 June, 1930. Pres. Box 334 File, 
Unemployment Correspondence, H.H.L. Gerard Swope to Herbert Hoover, 
10 December, 1930. Ibid., Box 335 File, Unemployment Correspondence.
61. Swope Special MS: 101.
62. Gerard Swope to Herbert Hoover, 2 October, 1930. Pres. Box 335 File, 
Unemployment Correspondence, H.H.L.
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Swope also cooperated with P.E.C.E., not only as a public speaker 
but in giving the organisation's ideas practical application at G.E. In 
April 1931,the company introduced the 'work-sharing' principle, reducing 
the working week from six days of forty-eight hours to five days of forty 
hours, and in October, proposed to selectively guarantee a certain minimum 
of employment for a six month period, employees not receiving less than 
the equivalent of one-half their average weekly earnings for full time. 
Actually, Swope was "very thankful" when the guarantee period expired for 
"this was too ambitious a plan for any company to undertake". G.E.'s 
most publicised initiative during the depression was the introduction of 
unemployment insurance in 1930. Initially rejected by company employees 
in 1925, Swope's proposals were adopted by a majority of over 90% of the 
work-force in 1930. The insurance programme, funded by equal contributions 
from employer and employee, remained in operation until 1936 when the 
Federal Unemployment Insurance programme went into effect. During its 
operational period over $7 million was collected, some $4 million of which 
was paid out in benefits and $1 million utilised as loans to employees.^
63. Swope Special MS: 106-107; 122; 132-134. However, journalist,
M.D. Pillars insinuated that General Electric was not the model 
company behind its public facade. He charged that the company 
made provision for employees' holiday pay by making deductions
in wages throughout the rest of the year. However, when the vaca­
tion period arrived some department heads demanded that their 
workers take a shorter vacation or risk dismissal. In this way, 
the company could achieve 'free time' from its work-force. M.D. 
Pillars to Hugo L. Black, 21 April, 1933. Hugo L. Black MSS: Box 
159 Library of Congress.
64. Swope Special MS: 85; 106. Extract from 'The Works News', 20 June, 
1930, in Ibid., 102-105. Gerard Swope, 'Management Cooperation 
with Workers for Economic Welfare', The Annals 154 (March, 1931): 
131-137. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Unemployment 
Insurance, Hearings on S. Res. 483, Unemployment Insurance, 72nd 
Congress First Session, 1931: 25-51. Gerard Swope, Employment: 
Assurance and Insurance', in Charles F. Roos (ed.), Stabilization 
of Employment (Bloomington, 1933): 117-129.
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Swope's accomplishments brought him to the notice of New York State 
Governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt. State Industrial Commissioner, Frances 
Perkins described G.E. unemployment policies as "industrial statesmanship 
of the highest order" and welcomed Swope's cooperation with the State's 
Stabilization Committee in publicising his ideas to other New York 
employers.^ Roosevelt invited Swope to head the State's Temporary 
Emergency Relief Administration, but commitments to his company obliged 
Swope to decline. Nevertheless, Swope remained in contact with Roosevelt, 
conferring with him after March 1933 and assisting in the development of
f if ithe administration's industrial recovery bill.
Swope's involvement in public affairs became most pronounced in 1931 
when he revealed his plan for the stabilisation of business and employment. 
The inspiration came to Swope early in the year while vacationing in 
Arizona and mulling over "plans that had been going through my mind for 
some time". During the summer of 1931 Swope systematised his ideas by 
incorporating aspects in his various speeches and seeking the opinion of 
respected associates as to the feasibility of the plan. He worked most 
closely with Owen D. Young on the proposal, although he consulted both 
Felix Frankfurter and Newton D. Baker. Frankfurter regarded the plan 
as a "public service" which would serve as a focus for discussion but 
suggested that its constitutional implications required extensive consider- 
ation. Baker felt that the proposal was "too radical". Despite these 
reservations, Swope decided to make the plan public in September 1931.
65. New York Times, 21 June, 19 July, 1930.
66. Swope Special MS: 128-129; 142-144.
67. Ibid., 123. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, 
op.cit., 300. New York Times, 7 May, 12 June, 1931. Gerard Swope
to Felix Frankfurter, 17 June, 11 September, 1931. Felix Frankfurter 
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Box 106 File 002219, Library of Congress.
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Swope formally launched his plan in an address at the annual dinner 
of the National Electrical Manufacturers' Association on 16 September,
1931. The plan, described by The New York Times as a "new constitution 
for industry", contained three major objectives: the stabilisation of 
production' and consumption, the minimising of unemployment and the 
solution of the problem of security for the worker.
The securing of the first two objectives were interrelated and 
reflected Swope's sensitivity to 'cutthroat' competition, its pernicious 
effects upon industry and his commitment to the 'underconsumptionist' 
theory of the causes of the depression. By resolving the problems of 
'balance' and 'unfair' competition, industry would stabilise and employment 
would be ensured automatically. Under Swope's scheme trade associations 
would be instrumental in attaining these goals by achieving "parity" 
between domestic corporations conducting domestic business. All companies 
engaged in interstate commerce and employing a work-force of over fifty 
would be eligible to join a trade association which would outline trade 
practices, business ethics, methods of standard accounting and cost 
practice and collect and distribute information on the volume of production, 
inventories of merchandise on hand, standardisation of products and 
stabilisation of prices. The associations would also deal with "all 
matters which may arise from time to time relating to the growth and 
development of industry and commerce in order to promote stabilization 
of employment and give the best service to the public". Membership in 
the trade associations would be mandatory after a three year period 
following the plan's adoption.
The stabilisation of industry through trade associations was one 
feature of attaining a balance between production and consumption. To 
achieve this balance at a high level, the problem of employee security 
had to be surmounted. As Swope expressed it:
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Consumption is by the mass of the population, not the few and 
the great mass of the population is made up of wage earners and 
their dependents. That they may be able to buy and satisfy 
their needs they must have not only adequate incomes, but must 
be sufficiently assured of the future to feel that they are safe 
in spending their money. The psychology of fear must be removed ...
To accomplish this goal, Swope borrowed the General Electric model and 
recommended in his plan the mutual participation of employers and employees 
in the establishment of life and disability pension and unemployment 
insurance schemes in each branch of industry. To preserve industrial 
"parity" these plans would be conducted on a national basis and supervised 
by trade associations in each sector. Contributions would be made on an 
equal basis - dollar for dollar - and the scheme's administration would 
be shared jointly by management and workers.
However, the most "revolutionary feature" of the Swope Plan, as The 
New York Times termed it, was Swope's proposal for the establishment of 
a federal supervisory body, which would be, in effect a quid pro quo for 
the modification of the antitrust statutes and the government's permission 
for trade associations to act openly. Suggesting that an appropriate 
agency might be the Federal Trade Commission or a bureau of the Department 
of Commerce, Swope proposed that the rules and practices of trade assoc­
iations would be submitted to it for scrutiny, and the agency would then 
test their soundness as a "social principle". Further safeguarding of 
the public interest would be assured by provision for the trade associations 
to file with the federal supervisory body regular financial statements 
prepared uniformly by the associations' administrative boards.
Swope's principal concern in making this substantial concession to 
governmental authority in the economic sphere was to allow industry to 
introduce a programme of economic reform which would forestall any future 
legislation of graver consequences to the "fundamental structure of American
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business". The alternatives to industry assuming the initiative were that 
either the states would introduce regulatory legislation, lacking in uni­
formity and "imposing varying burdens" upon industry, or the Federal Govern­
ment might decide to provide for employee security through use of its 
taxation power which "has no economic restraints". To reporters Swope
compared his plan to a marriage: "For the sake of its benefits it is
68necessary to surrender certain individual rights."
Seconding Swope's proposals, Owen D. Young contended that the plan 
was a frank recognition of the magnitude of the economic crisis and an 
appreciation of the need for positive and innovatory responses.^ Economic 
planning on a firm-by-firm basis had proved inadequate to achieve stability 
and it was necessary that individual efforts be coordinated for them to 
be successful. "We can retain in this country unorganised individual 
planning and operation, but, if we do," Young asserted, "its action will 
necessarily at times be chaotic, and we shall, as a result, pay the 
economic penalty of that disorder, such as we are paying now." Young 
expressed no fears about the extent of government regulation provided 
by the plan. Federal regulation was essential since the authority of 
control needed to be co-extensive with the industrial units to be con­
trolled and to achieve a stable prosperity through economic planning, 
the business community would have to sacrifice a measure of individual
68. Commercial and Financial Chronicle 133 (19 September, 1931): 1819— 
1821. New York Times, 17 September, 1931. Chicago Daily Tribune,
20 September, 1931.
69. There was some speculation that the announcement of the Swope Plan 
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freedom: "Like other things in this world, it demands its price."
Referring to his affiliations with the Democratic Party and the business
community, Young challenged his audience to consider these sentiments
that ran contrary to the tenets of states-rights and individualism. "If
this be treason," he declared, "make the most of it."^
Business Week heralded Swope's speech as "an act of true business
statesmanship" and endorsed his recommendations as indispensable to any
long-term programme of reconstruction and stabilisation. The journal •
stressed that the plan might have a short-term significance also, through
restoring confidence if it was endorsed by other industrialists.^'
Forbes welcomed the proposal as an antidote to the dangerous "delusion"
that inaction would assist recovery. "The palpable truth is that some
sort of action will be taken by somebody," the journal advised. "More
bluntly, if industry remains idle and indifferent, steps will be taken
72by the politicians."
In fact, the plan's reception within the business community was 
mixed, generating as much controversy as it did interest. Unreserved 
enthusiasm was accompanied by unrestrained scepticism; cautious approval 
was paralleled by reservations about certain features of the plan. Coal 
Age captured this ambivalence in its editorial column. The journal paid 
tribute to Swope's "vision" and "sincerity" and described the plan as 
being "in refreshing contrast to the Polyanna generalities cascading 
from the lips of too many spokesmen seeking to explain how the world may 
get rid of the debris of the wreck of 'the new era' and restore security 
to a nerve-shattered mankind." However, the editors recognised that the
70. Commercial and Financial Chronicle 133 (19 September, 1931): 1819.
71. Business Week, 23, 30 September, 1931: 15; 44.
72. Forbes 28 (1 October, 1 December, 1931): 10; 11.
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criteria that some would consider as strengths, others would identify as
weaknesses. The plan, because it was so specific, would provoke contro-
73versial discussion.
The Swope Plan prompted some industrial leaders to devise similar 
plans for their own industries and only the day after Swope delivered 
his address to the electrical manufacturers, Gen. W.W. Atterbury, president 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, presented a hastily-drawn plan for the 
stabilisation of business and employment in the railroad industry.^
This was followed by a plan composed by the National Retail Goods Assoc­
iation on 19 September, which expressed "high praise" for the Swope 
proposals. The retailers’ plan called for closer coordination of trade 
associations, under the auspices of one central body, to foster the 
development of mutual consultation and planning, the utilisation of more 
scientific marketing and production procedures and the increased use of 
specifications and standards of merchandise.^ Later, on 28 October, 
the American Institute of Steel Construction, after asserting that present 
business conditions had "created in most of us a firm belief in the exis­
tence of hell," proposed a plan, modeled on Swope's, which involved the 
adoption of more comprehensive codes of trade practices and agreements.
"We are reaping the results of our bad practices," the Institute explained. 
The industry was "headed for destruction" unless it adopted protective 
measures against 'unfair' competition and other damaging trade practices.^ 
Considerable support for the Swope proposals was evident also in the 
proceedings of the National Conference on the Relation of Law and Business, 73456
73. Coal Age 36 (October, 1931): 543.
74. New York Times, 18 September, 1931.
75. Ibid., 20 September, 1931.
76. Ibid., 29 October, 1931. J. George Frederick (ed.), The Swope Plan, 
(New York, 1931): 104-116.
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held in New York during October. Industrialists, The New York Times 
reported, presented "with utmost frankness" their analyses of the operation 
of the antitrust laws and suggested how production might be coordinated 
with consumption, fair prices maintained for both producer and consumer, 
and how adequate wages for workers might be assured. Various industrial­
ists echoed Swope's sentiments. Walker D. Hines, president of the Cotton 
Textile Institute, assured that indstry did not wish to remove any 
prohibition against combinations "really" in restraint of trade, but 
that "arrangements to bring production in balance with demand [should] 
not be obstructed through a misconception of the law and of the Supreme 
Court decisions". One way to avoid such a "misconception", Cornelius F. 
Kelley, president of the Anaconda Copper Co. suggested, was to supercede 
the Sherman law by vesting in the Department of Commerce the authority 
"to protect business and the public".^
These favourable reactions were paralleled by more critical responses. 
Spokesmen for the business-affiliate groups were sceptical about the 
feasibility of the Swope Plan and stressed its dangerous implications for 
the business community. Educationalist, Wallace B. Donham entertained 
two objections to the proposal. In the first place, he believed that the 
planning mechanisms Swope provided were not comprehensive enough and ignored 
a 'holistic' approach by concentrating on the narrow, industry-perspective 
of the trade association rather than the broader planning scope of a 
national economic council. Second, Donham feared that Swope's concessions 
to federal supervision would result in an escalating government involvement 
in the planning process and the development of a powerful federal 
bureaucracy. Trade association lawyers, Montague and Javits were 78
77. New York Times, 27 October, 1931.
78. Donham, Business Looks at the Unforeseen, op.cit., 176-183.
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uncomfortable with certain of the plan's features. Compulsory membership 
of trade associations was objectionable, governmental "control" was undesir­
able and the plan's price-fixing aspects would be clearly illegal without 
a time-consuming constitutional amendment. On the other hand, engineer, 
Ralph Flanders suggested that the plan did not go far enough in delegating 
government with the responsibility for conducting economic planning.
Although he praised the plan as "finely conceived and intelligent and
humanitarian in purpose", Flanders warned that business should not promise
80results which were beyond its capability to achieve.
Generally, three principal objections to the plan were voiced by 
business spokesmen: that it would begin a trend toward the "socialization" 
of business; that it would compromise independent decision-making in 
private enterprise and that industry was not well-enough experienced with 
the trade association form for it to be an effective agent of stabilisation. 
Steel and Textile World gave qualified endorsement to the plan for both 
perceived dangerous aspects of it. The textile journal feared that the 
plan amounted practically to the "delivery of the control of business into 
the hands of the government". Furthermore, it might abet an undesirable 
trend towards monopoly. Steel suggested that the plan required further 
study to ascertain whether it contained any "elements of danger" and 
proferred that "it is unwise for anyone to put the stamp of full approval 
on the plan at this early date". On first reading, the journal expressed 
concern about its "paternalistic" emphasis, the role provided for govern-
81ment and the threat that this posed to individual initiative and motivation. 79801
79. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit.,
546-547. Javits, Business and the Public Interest, op.cit., 60-61. 
Frederick (ed.), The Swope Plan, op.cit. , 147-150.
80. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 249.
81. Textile World 80 (3 October, 1931): 19; 22-23; 29. Steel 89 (24 
September, T$31): 26.
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In congressional testimony, individual operators added the further objec­
tion that trade associations were of limited value in inducing stabilis­
ation. Neither James A. Farrell, president of U.S. Steel, nor textile 
operator, Henry P. Kendall were confident of their potential. Experience 
in both industries had demonstrated the limited value of trade associations 
in promoting successful cooperation. Printers* Ink claimed that the 
electrical industry was exceptional in its experience with the trade 
association form and felt that few other industries were equally practiced 
to implement the Swope Plan in their sectors and "sweep aside petty 
competitive jealousies". John E. Edgerton, president of the National 
Association of Manufacturers (N.A.M.), while taking his "hat off" to 
Swope for "the courage of his able initiative", challenged that the plan 
was too selective in application. By restricting its operation to employers 
of fifty or more workers, Swope had ignored the great majority of employers 
with work-forces of less than fifty, and hence, the plan did not cover 
the bulk of wage-earners. "Any plan," Edgerton commented, "which does 
not embrace in its application and directly benefit all of the people 
who are employed in America, will not be a thoroughly sound and saving 
plan. " 82 34 *
It is understandable that Swope's proposal should have been met with 
both criticism and scepticism within the business community, for it was 
the first plan by a representative of industry during the depression to 
receive prominent national publicity. Not only did the Swope Plan mark
82. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 
344-345; 405.
83. Printers' Ink 157 (1 October, 1931): 53-54.
84. New York Times, 20 September, 1933. Frederick (ed.). The Swope Plan,
op.cit., 49-53. In a later amendment to his plan Swope incorporated 
revisions which met some of these criticisms. See Gerard Swope, 
'Stabilization of Industry', op.cit., 103-112.
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a modification of the traditional business theory of individualism by 
accepting industrial coordination and government regulation, but by 
avoiding generalities and concentrating on specific suggestions Swope 
invited criticism. Nevertheless, even the critics were prepared to 
approve Swope's general purpose, in terms of his espousal of economic 
planning. Their principal objections were directed at precise details 
of the plan. Textile World regarded the proposal as significant because 
of the lack of alternatives and suggested that it become the basis of 
experiment in one industry. Printers' Ink, while sceptical of the immed­
iate value of the trade association approach, felt the mechanism had long­
term potential and that the Swope Plan offered "a lighthouse to guide 
business off the rocks of recurrent depressions". John Edgerton was 
confident that Swope had pointed toward "the general direction" in which 
business must evolve to escape "more serious consequences of social 
discontent". The tone of the proposal was more meaningful and pertinent 
than its substance and the N.A.M. president suggested that "if industrial 
employers will get the spirit of this proposal they will work out such 
changes in its substance as will make it adaptable to the requirements 
of the general situation". Finally, Steel advised that "the general scope 
of the proposal is so directly in line with what is needed to stabilize 
business and its possibilities are so alluring that it should be given 
the widest possible scrutiny and thoughtful consideration". In sum, 
while spokesmen for the business community were uneasy about certain 
features of Swope's plan, many accepted its significance as a necessary
compromise between stand-pat individualism and extensive government
86regulation of industry.
85, Textile World 80 (3 October, 1931): 19. Printers' Ink 157 (1 October, 
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The Chamber of Commerce, through its president, Silas H. Strawn,
regarded the Swope Plan as "an excellent one". "In fact," Strawn remarked,
"it is entirely along the lines of one which the United States Chamber
87of Commerce has been working on." This latter plan was finally reported 
out of the Chamber's Committee on the Continuity of Business and Employment 
in October 1931, and in December was submitted to the organisation's 
membership, in the form of a referendum, to determine whether it should 
be adopted as official policy.
The problems of stabilising business and employment were broached 
by spokesmen during the Chamber's first conference of the depression 
held in April and May 1930. President William Butterworth stressed the 
theme of "industrial development from within" whereby the individual firm 
could contribute to stabilisation, by levelling off "peaks and valleys" 
in sales, production and employment through forward planning. Chairman, 
Julius H. Barnes stressed the social benefits of an "intelligent and 
devoted direction of industry" and alluded to "a new sense of respons­
ibility" amongst some executives to provide employee security against
88the vagaries of the business cycle. In terms of industrial stabilisation 
and planning the focus of the 1930 Convention was on the contribution 
of the individual firm, a posture which conformed to the current emphasis 
of Hoover's doctrine of voluntary associationism, and which reflected 
the Chamber's cooperation with the President's recovery programme. During 
1931, the Chamber's attitude, however, to planning became more distinct, 
with the emphasis on the virtues of co-ordinated action. Barnes had 
become convinced that while independent planning was "fruitful of results", 
it was limited in scope and that cooperative action would be more effective. 
For a later president, Henry I. Harriman, independent planning had been
87. Ibid., 18 September, 1931.
88. Chamber of Commerce, Minutes, 18th Annual Meeting, April-May 1930:
42; 57-58. Chamber of Commerce Library.
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valuable in ameliorating unemployment, but was too confined to achieve 
more substantial goals. "Group planning and national planning of business 
and industry is essential for our continued prosperity," Harriman wrote 
in 1932.89
Planning was desirable to attain a flexible 'balance' between produc­
tion and consumption. Spokesmen for the Chamber isolated the causes of 
the depression in the imbalances between the two which had occurred in 
the 1920s. The availability of credit for investment together with the 
increased productivity wrought by mechanisation in industry had resulted 
in levels of manufacturing output which available markets were unable to 
absorb. Accordingly, production either had to be adjusted downward to 
avoid excess production, competition and declining prices, or consumption 
needed to be stimulated to secure the same 'balance'. President Silas H. 
Strawn (1931-1932) was a proponent of the former approach, contending that 
the interests of industry no longer coincided with the view that "the 
consumer is entitled to buy cheaply and to exhaust his whims and fancies 
by possessing the new and novel things which invention may create". The 
more liberal approach was embodied by Harriman. Asked by a congressional 
committee why millions of American families were unable to approach an 
acceptable standard of living even before the depression, Harriman replied 
that the general inadequacy of the system of distribution, and particularly, 
low wages were culpable. Whichever approach was given emphasis, adjust­
ment through planning was considered vital, and the Chamber endorsed
89. Julius H. Barnes, 'Business Looks at Unemployment', Atlantic Monthly 
148 (August 1931): 244-245. Henry I. Harriman, The Road to Business 
Stability (Washington, D.C., 1932): 5; 9. 90*
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cooperative activity through trade associations to secure the necessary
'balance'. Reform of the antitrust laws was essential in this respect,
for as Harriman explained: "By tying the hands of business they prevent
the achievement of collective purposes detrimental to the public interest,
but they just as effectively prevent the achievement of purposes of
91advantage to the public."
Chamber spokesmen were firmly united in opposition to overt government
intervention in the affairs of industry. Julius Barnes believed that
"economics and politics do not mix" and while he could condone a "voluntary
alliance" for expressed purposes, feared a "forcible union which would
make for the peace of mind of neither". Industry must remain master in
its own house. Similarly, Henry Harriman disassociated his planning vision
from "governmental planning groups with their bureaucratic tendencies or
planning boards with their authority to enforce the will of the planning
organization". Rather he favoured "planning groups" organised in each
trade and industry which were appointed, maintained and supported by business
and reliant on the wisdom of their recommendations for their enforcement.
92Harriman shared "the feeling that conservative planning should be had".
The deterioration of economic conditions prompted the Chamber’s Board 
of Directors in February 1931 to authorise the appointment of a special 
Committee on Continuity of Business and Employment. The Committee's 
brief was to investigate the feasibility of employment stabilisation, 
employment assurance and unemployment insurance and establish contact with 
industries concerned with these issues. The Committee's authority was
91. Harriman, The Road to Business Stability, op.cit., 8. See also Barnes, 
'Business Looks at Unemployment, op.cit., 9. Strawn, 'Should our Anti- 
Trust Laws be Amended?', op.cit., 1-10. 92
92. Julius H. Barnes, 'Government and Business', Harvard Business Review
10 (July, 1932): 412-413; 419. Harriman, The Road to Business Stability, 
op.cit., 9. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, 
op.crt., 164. Robert Smith, 'How Business Builds Its Platform',
Nation*s Business 19 (June, 1931): 28.
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confirmed at the Chamber's annual meeting in May. According to the Committee's 
chairman, Harriman, the working group developed from "a very strong belief 
on the part of the Chamber of Commerce that out of the present business 
depression there should grow good as well as evil, and that we should 
learn the lessons of depression, and that we should attempt to set up 
certain fundamental principles, which, if not avoiding future depressions, 
would at least mitigate the depths of the swings and the height of the 
swings that preceded the depths". Julius Barnes described the Committee's 
function as "a first step in marshalling the forces of business" and a 
supplement to the efforts of individual firms to stabilise business con­
ditions. • The Committee met seven or eight times, cooperating with trade 
association representatives and polling some two hundred of them for 
views and suggestions. Its report was finalised in October, and submitted
to the Chamber directors. In November its recommendations were forwarded
93to the membership for approval in the form of a referendum.
The Report was devoted to three considerations: the causes of the 
depression; long-term programmes which could prevent a recurrence and 
short-term expedients to be immediately applied to ameliorate prevailing 
conditions. As to the first, the Committee considered that the Great War 
had been the catalyst for economic maladjustment, principally in the 
agricultural sector which had acted as a drag upon the economy during 
the 1920s and continued to do so. Speculation in securities was a 
contributory factor, not only in the sense of unrealistic stock values 
but because rising stocks had encouraged the extension of banking credit
93. Chamber of Commerce, Press Release, 9 February, 1931. R.G. 73 Series 
26, Records of the Publicity Section: Industry. New York Times,
9 February, 2 April, 2 May, 6 August, 3, 4, 5 October, 1931.
Nation's Business 19 (November, 1931): 56; 58. Hearings, Establish­
ment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 161-162. Chamber 
of Commerce, Referendum No. 58: On the Report of the Special 
Committee on Continuity of Business and Employment (Washington,
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to industry which had resulted in overproduction. The Committee was careful 
to exculpate technological developments in industry, minimising the influ­
ence of technological unemployment and advancing that technological develop­
ments had secured an improved standard of living before 1929. In large 
part, the Committee's depression diagnosis conformed to its contention 
that remedies could only be found in collective industrial action. The 
economic crisis was the result of a failure to regulate the complex inter­
relationships of a modern economy, and any attempt to stabilise business 
conditions would involve the adoption of broad perspectives.
In its short and long-term recommendations, the Committee stressed 
coordinated action. Much could be accomplished immediately by coordinated 
business action on the lines of the Rochester experiment as well as in the 
individual plant. The Committee endorsed methods of ameliorating unemploy­
ment advocated by P.E.C.E. such as work-sharing and non-productive employment 
and suggested that local chambers should take the initiative in emulating 
the Rochester experiment by establishing employment centres on urban and 
regional bases. Outside the area of private initiative, the national 
government should "proceed conservatively" with needed public works and 
its example should be followed on State and local levels.
The Committee's report did not restrict itself to boosting government 
efforts at employment stabilisation. According to Silas Strawn, the 
Committee was determined to broaden the scope of individual stabilisation 
projects presently being carried out in industry, and the Committee's 
"long-time measures" reflected its commitment to remedial action through 
business initiative and organisation. The Committee recognised that to 
attain a 'balance' between production and consumption, a scrupulous regard 
for traditional business freedoms would have to be waived, but that the 
gravity of the depression warranted disregard for established credos.
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"A freedom of action which might have been justified in the relatively 
simple life of the last century cannot be tolerated today," the Committee 
stated, "because the unwise action of one individual may adversely affect 
the lives of thousands. We have left the period of extreme individualism 
and are living in a period in which national economy must be recognized 
as the controlling factor."
A mature industrial vision demanded that the 'tooth and claw' struggle 
for markets be transcended by cooperation and the division of markets upon 
an equitable basis. To achieve this the Report recommended that the anti­
trust laws be amended to allow advance approval by a government agency 
for contracts between business organisations otherwise in restraint of 
trade and which would confer immunity from criminal prosecution. Trade 
associations would be instrumental in effecting these agreements and would 
be central to planning. "Business prosperity and employment will be best 
maintained by an intelligently planned business structure which affords 
a fair opportunity to make a reasonable profit through productive 
activities," the Report contended. Business planning through trade 
associations would be supplemented by the establishment of a national 
economic council, advisory in nature, adequately financed and staffed by 
men of the highest ability and character and representing all constituencies 
of industry. By recommending the establishment of a central council, the 
Committee recognised that "planning by individual concerns, even by whole 
industries, may not suffice to remedy such a severe lack of adjustment 
between production and consumption as we are experiencing". The council 
would deliberate on such economic problems which exceeded industrial lines 
and trade association competence: production requirements to meet a reason­
able national standard of living, the need to balance production and con­
sumption for the economy as a whole, levels of wages, foreign trade and 
agricultural policy.
165
The Report also addressed itself to the problem of providing workers'
security. Impressed by the "thoughtful" and "far-reaching" proposals of
Gerard Swope in this direction, the Chamber Report matched the Swope Plan
for sickness, accident, old age and unemployment insurance and declared
94for shorter hours in industry. Addressing the American Economic Assoc­
iation on the Chamber's Report, Henry Harriman contended that it was a 
recognition of "the duty which business owes to the community to help in 
bringing about normal and stable conditions". It was also an assumption 
of responsibility by business to mitigate the suffering and distress
caused by unemployment and to afford workers maximum security of employment
95with equitable remuneration.
It is difficult to quantify the general business commitment to the
programme of any 'spokesman' organisation such as the Chamber since business
leadership may not represent accurately the general sentiments of its
rank-and-file. However, the Report of the Committee on Continuity of
Business and Employment affords an opportunity to determine the degree
to which leadership and grass-roots concurred on policy. The Committee's
Report was submitted to the Chamber's membership in the form of a referendum,
the precise results of which were communicated by Silas Strawn to President
96Hoover and Secretary of Commerce Lamont on 18 December, 1931.
The referendum was conducted in two parts. Individual and associate 
members expressed their opinions to their regional organisations and those 
organisations then forwarded the results to the Chamber's national head­
quarters in Washington, D.C. Final results were expressed in the form of
94. Ibid., 4; 6; 8; 10; 12; 16; 18; 20; 24-26; 27-41. New York Times,
28 June, 1931.
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affiliate organisation's responses, rather than the total individual 
membership polled. For the Committee's Report to become Chamber policy, 
in whole or in part, the vote on a specific issue needed to constitute 
at least one-third of the total voting strength and of this, two-thirds 
had to be affirmative and representative of at least twenty states. Each 
affiliate possessed one vote and one additional for each two hundred members 
over the number of twenty-five. No affiliate was entitled to more than 
ten votes.
Ten proposals were incorporated in the referendum, pursuant to the 
recommendations of the Committee. The first three were related to anti­
trust law amendment, two referred to the establishment of a national 
economic council and the role of trade associations, and the remainder 
applied to individual firm planning and the provision of workers' security. 
In the event, each proposal received the requisite two-thirds endorsement 
for their adoption as official policy by the Chamber.
The highest individual vote recorded was on the resolution to modify 
the antitrust laws to permit agreements which would 'balance' production 
and consumption. Here the response was 89% in favour. A second proposal 
providing for government supervision of these agreements "in the public 
interest" was welcomed less but still received a substantial majority of 
77% favourable. The third proposal, providing for sanction of agreements 
by a government authority received a 90% assent.
The establishment of a national economic council was endorsed by 
81% of the Chamber's voting membership and 90% confirmed that trade 
associations should act as "economic councils" within their industrial 
spheres. The P.E.C.E. approach to the amelioration of unemployment on 
an individual and local basis was endorsed by overwhelming majorities of 
95% and hostility to intervention by the Federal Government to provide 
unemployment relief is evident in the 93% vote favouring continued
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commitment by private agencies supplemented by State and local govern­
ments. As for the establishment of unemployment reserves by industry, 
more preferred the voluntary, individual approach than the uniform and 
more compulsory alternative through trade associations. However, the 
difference was insubstantial, being 81% and 77% respectively in favour.
Certain generalisations are possible from the referendum evidence. 
First, the data reveals considerable support for proposals associated with 
P.E.C.E. and a willingness to extend them. Second, majorities were more 
emphatic when the proposals avoided government regulation as a precondition 
for implementation, and this concern about government intervention was 
explicitly demonstrated in the response to federal relief commitments. 
Further confirmation of this tendency is provided by the fact that although 
a broad consensus was evident in the sentiment for antitrust modification 
and while 90% favoured confirmation and sanction by a government authority 
of trade practices, fewer - 77% - favoured ongoing regulation of such 
agreements by the same agency. As such, it might appear that the results 
of the referendum mark no departure from traditional business demands for 
antitrust law relaxation and signify a renewed vote of confidence in 
Hoover's 'voluntarism'. The relative lack of enthusiasm for the establish­
ment of unemployment reserves may also add weight to an argument that 
Chamber members' commitment to such 'advanced' positions was less than 
wholehearted.
However, the significance of the referendum would seem to lie in the 
fact that over 75% of the polled membership supported the establishment of 
unemployment reserves, even if uniformly applied through trade associations 
and were reconciled to government supervision in return for antitrust 
relaxation. Furthermore, 81% were favourable to a national economic 
council and more, 90%, could endorse planning, on an industry-by-industry 
basis through trade associations. It would thus seem that the commitment
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of the membership of the largest representative business organisation to 
planning, 'social responsibility' and an acceptance of government regulation 
was not limited to progressive spokesmen such as Henry Harriman.
The affirmative vote committed the Chamber to the Committee's 
proposals. As President Harriman expressed the organisation's policy 
in 1932:
The Chamber approaches the question of the responsibilities of 
business itself in the establishment and maintenance of a more 
stable economic balance. It will promote business and industrial 
planning through trade associations and commercial organizations 
so as to mitigate the effects of unemployment and to prevent in 
the future, so fer as possible, the spectacle of millions without
work.
Ralph Flanders described the Swope Plan and Chamber Report as "epoch- 
making" in their implications for economic planning. They demonstrated 
that broadscale planning was capable of realisation and suggested that 
"the impossible may yet be possible". Business commitment to planning 
during the early years of the depression was inspired by the critical 
state of the economy, a sympathy for labour, anxiety about flagging business 
prestige and the possibility of overt government intervention in the 
economy. Business initiation of broadscale economic planning received 
impetus from constituent groups of the business community such as educa­
tionalists, lawyers and engineers but was given its most emphatic expression 
by Gerard Swope and the Chamber's Committee of 1931. The Chamber's refer­
endum, albeit an imperfect gauge of business opinion, suggests an appreciable 
depth of sentiment for economic planning within the community. Inevitably, 
businessmen differed in their conceptions of the nature and function of 
planning and the acceptability of government involvement in the planning
97. Henry I. Harriman, Our Job for the Year Ahead: A program of action 
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as approved by its 
officers and Board of Directors (Washington, D.C., 1932). 98
98. Ralph E. Flanders, 'Limitations and Possibilities of Economic 
Planning', The Annals 162 (July, 1932): 30.
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process. Nevertheless, by 1931 businessmen had become sceptical about 
the value of 'voluntary associationism' and had begun to consider economic 
planning in different perspectives. As for the mechanisms through which 
planning would be implemented, business organisations and affiliate groups 
still condoned planning on the basis of the individual firm and sympathy 
existed for a centralised approach through the establishment of an advisory 
national economic council. However, the method favoured by Swope and 
central to the Chamber's platform of 1931-1932 was planning through the 
aegis of trade associations, relieved of the restrictions of the antitrust 
laws. By the end of 1931 this approach had become pivotal to business's 
economic demands of government. The reasons for this preference are clear. 
Not only was antitrust revision a long-standing demand, but during the 
depression it could appeal to large producers who desired clarification 
of the laws' intent towards mergers, independent producers who wished for 
themselves the same advantages possessed by their more integrated counter­
parts, and 'sick' or disadvantaged industries which regarded coordination 
as a means of instilling stability into their stricken sectors. Moreover, 
this approach promised a measure of 'business self-government' and would 
pre-empt overt government intervention if business failed to take action 
itself to promote revival.
During the early phase of the depression a 'business position' was 
established on the modification of the antitrust laws, which had the influ­
ential support of businessmen's organisations and affiliate groups. Aside 
from the national Chamber, the American Bar Association, the National Associ­
ation of Manufacturers and the National Civic Federation all supported clarif 
ication and their efforts were supplemented by those of individual spokesmen 
and industries. By 1932 the business position had a consistency and its 
proponents had the respectability and prestige which would wield influence
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in the halls of Congress. Although the business community considered and 
participated in other forms of planning, whether on the basis of the 
individual firm or through a central council, by 1932 the trade association 
approach to planning would be in the ascendancy and business lobbies would 
seek to facilitate its implementation through congressional modification
of the antitrust laws.
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CHAPTER 4 PLANNING THROUGH CENTRAL DIRECTION: THE APPROACH OF 
ORGANISED LABOUR AND THE INTELLECTUALS
The paradox of poverty and plenty and the resolution of that anomaly 
provided the framework in which collectivist intellectuaLsand organised 
labour considered the economic crisis of the early depression. Both 
appreciated that the paradox of mass unemployment and distress in the 
world's most technologically-advanced state was not exclusively a 
product of the depression which had merely distorted existing imbalances. 
The scruples of a society committed to laissez-faire doctrines had not 
permitted technological advances to be utilised for socially-desirable 
ends. The principal concern of the United States, as Walter Lippmann 
saw it, was the "management of plenty" to secure stable economic growth 
and an equitable distribution of the wealth generated by the economy.
Such an effort would require "experimentation" in applied economics and 
a transformation of attitudes towards established economic, political 
and social principles. Lippmann could not ensure that any adjustments 
would be easily accomplished but the "pressure of events" dictated such 
a reorientation of American values and institutions.*
'Management' could assume various forms and by 1931 collectivists 
and labour had become disillusioned with President Hoover's attempts 
to stabilise the American economy and regarded trade associationism 
with scepticism. Planning through a central agency which involved a 
prominent role for government appealed to the preconceptions of the 
collectivists and accorded with organised labour's departure from 
'voluntarism' during the early years of the depression. Central planning 
recognised the interdependence of economic sectors and the need to 
coordinate their activities. Interdependence was "the warp of our
1. Lippmann, Interpretations, op.cit., 4.
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economic and social fabrics", according to the A.F. of L. Executive 
Council. Business was an organism whose parts were so "intricately 
interrelated" that the consequences of dislocation in one area were 
automatically transmitted throughout the whole structure. The depression 
revealed the extent to which Americans had not appreciated the importance 
of interdependence and had exposed the "intolerable shortcomings" of 
existing institutions and practices. Although the machinery existed 
for national economic planning it would not be effective without the 
addition of "the spirit and method of coordination and authority to 
administer the policies". A central agency would control such factors 
as investment, competition, prices and wages according to their overall 
influence and impose judicious standards throughout the economy. The 
role of government was essential since monetary and fiscal policy needed 
to be harnessed to industrial planning to give it maximum effect. 
Collectivists and labour spokesmen carefully considered the alternative 
methods of planning employed by President Hoover and advocated by the 
business community. However, by 1931 these had lost their credibility 
and a number of more radical planning programmes began to emerge which 
adopted a ’holistic' perspective on the economy.
Like other Americans, collectivists were slow to realise that the 
Stock Market crash was the trigger of a severe depression. Neither 
The New Republic nor The Nation sensed any connection and their responses 
to the decline of stock values was initially sanguine. Not until March 
1930 did the former concede that the United States was experiencing 
"a genuine industrial depression". Because they minimised the signif­
icance of the Crash, the liberal periodicals were the more disposed to
2. Proceedings. 50th Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1930, op.cit., 47.
Proceedings. 52nd Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1932, op.cit.,
32-35.
3. New Republic 62 (5 March, 1930): 58.
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President Hoover's attempts to prevent the slide in stock values from 
influencing business activity. However, when the seriousness of the 
situation became apparent during 1930 they grew impatient with presi­
dential policies.
Hoover aroused the expectations of collectivists after his calling 
of the White House conferences in November 1929. The President appeared 
as a proponent of central planning whose conference summons was a prelude 
to the establishment of a permanent national economic council. However, 
even at their most eulogistic, collectivists' enthusiasm was tempered 
by an awareness of the President's sympathies for, and reliance upon 
the business community which would influence any organisation created.
The Nation advised that there were too few "progressive concerns" to 
accomplish business stabilisation, while The New Republic doubted that 
business alone could generate the necessary discipline amongst its 
members to maintain wages, endorse agreements on production, eliminate 
excessive competition and conserve natural resources. Nevertheless, 
Hoover's sentiments would dictate a "distinctly subordinate" role for 
politics in any planning agency created. He would defer to the fears 
of business about encroachment on its prerogatives by government, labour 
or impartial experts. The President's approach represented a "modernized 
Republicanism" which sought a compromise between individualism and 
collectivism but stopped well short of any "flexible and pervasive 
government control". However limited and unsatisfactory in itself, 
Hoover's initiative was welcome and crucial to the future of economic 
planning in the United States. "The historical role of Mr. Hoover is 
apparently to try the experiment of seeing what business can do when 
given the steering wheel," The New Republic editorialised. "Mr. Hoover 
insists that there should be a steering wheel, but he will also let 
business do the driving." Whether or not the experiment was successful
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it would indicate the direction in which planning was to evolve. Its
success would ensure that the business community remained the principal
initiatory agency in planning, as Hoover contemplated; its failure
would bring the Federal Government to the forefront, which collectivists
4preferred and suspected to be inevitable.
This ambivalent attitude to Hoover continued during the early 
months of 1930, but most optimism had dissipated by late June. In March, 
the philosopher John Dewey suggested that the business conferences had 
been symptomatic of "our national habit of planlessness ... of locking the 
barn-door after the horse has been stolen". Dewey questioned whether the 
President’s action represented merely a gesture to maintain public 
confidence in the government's effectiveness or constituted "the 
beginning of a real application of the engineering mind to social life in
gits economic phase". As late as May, The New Republic remained optimistic
about Hoover's intentions and welcomed the President's speech before the
Chamber of Commerce in which he proposed the establishment of a national
organisation to recommend measures for industrial stabilisation.
Hoover's announcement had introduced an unprecedented realism into
presidential statements on economic policy. "Whatever one's disagreement
in detail, the fact that a President has made such a speech is something
6of great significance in our history," the journal contended. A month 
later, however, in reviewing the extent to which Hoover's sentiments 
had been implemented as government policy, the journal admitted that 
its early optimism had been ill-founded. Subsequent executive inaction
4. Nation 129 (4 December, 1929): 651-652. New Republic 61 (11 December,
1929) : 56.
5. John Dewey, 'Capitalistic or Public Socialism?', Ibid., 62 (5 March,
1930) : 66.
6. Ibid., 62 (14 May, 1930): 340.
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suggested that the conference initiative was "not only a gesture, but 
a gesture which represented little reality".^ By the end of 1930, 
the Hoover approach to planning no longer commanded the respect of 
the collectivists.
Rexford Tugwell believed that the President's response to the 
depression was limited by a dogmatic adherence to a fixed set of ideas 
to which he had long subscribed. In particular, four ideas were dominant: 
that the economic system should be a composite of privately-owned and 
independently-operated business units; this independence should be 
encouraged as a keystone of the national character and economic progress; 
the businessman was the agent of national prosperity through competition 
and risk-taking and when government intervened in the economy it should 
do so to protect the businessman and competition from "monopolistic 
domination". Tugwell ridiculed the portrayal of Hoover as the 'Great 
Engineer' since an emotional obsession with principles rather than a 
dispassionate regard for statistics and facts governed his depression 
policies. The President rejected potentially successful alternative 
policies if they did not conform to his values. "That his economics 
is theological in form and origin there can be little question," Tugxrell 
reflected. Hoover's intentions towards planning would be compromised 
by his alertness to the threat from "competing ideas", especially those 
emanating from the Soviet Union. This inflexibility was particularly 
unfortunate given the shallowness of the 'confidence thesis' on which 
the President based much of his policy. Even if optimistic presidential 
proclamations did manage to result in resumed production, Tugwell 
doubted that the demand would exist to consume the enlarged output
7. Ibid., 63 (25 June, 13 August, 1930): 138; 354-356.
8. Rexford G. Tugwell, 'An Engineer and the Price System: Mr. Hoover's 
Economic Policy', Manuscript, 1932. Tugwell MSS: Box 1.
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at profitable prices. A more comprehensive approach was necessary
which paid as much attention to consumers' purchasing power as it did
gto entrepreneurs' expectations.
Stuart Chase characterised Hoover's 'business confidence' approach 
as a "marvellous demonstration of misapplied psychology". Optimistic 
pronouncements were futile without tangible action against the physical 
causes of the depression. In fact, the Hoover approach was counter­
productive since repeated and unrealised prophecies of revival bread 
demoralisation and sapped the morale of the public and the business 
community. Hoover had demonstrated that a fundamental shift away from
4
the "petrified forests of rugged individualism" was necessary. The 
economy would be revived only by "authentic surgery" which included 
collectivist planning, Increased government intervention, more social 
control of economic activity and restrictions upon the freedom of 
private enterprise. 9 10 12 The Hoover conferences had been only an "amiable 
gesture" in this respect.^
According to George Soule, the President's inflexibility did not
permit the "thoroughgoing reorganization" necessary to promote revival and
stable economic growth. The need was for advance planning and the exercise
of control over areas responsible for the economic dislocation. As an
alternative to the President's patchwork solutions, Soule recommended the
coordination of credit, investment, wages, prices, production and consumption
12within a general framework which would achieve socially-desirable goals.
The socialist, Lewis Corey suggested that Hoover’s programme had
9. Rexford G. Tugwell, A.T. Cutler & G.S. Mitchell, 'Flaws in the 
Hoover Economic Plan', Current History 35 (January, 1932): 531.
10. Stuart Chase, A New Deal, op.cit., 139; 150-154.
11. Idem, "A Ten Year Plan for America", Harper's 163 (June, 1931): 9.
12. George Soule, 'Which Way Out?', Forum 88 (March, 1933): 148; 151.
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not even begun to travel in this direction. The Hoover conferences 
amounted to an "organized evasion" of problems. "Business and politics 
indulged in an orgy of optimism and evasion - no action," Corey 
asserted.
In 1931, Matthew Josephson summed up the disenchantment of collec­
tivists for Hoover. Hopes had been raised by the White House conferences 
of 1929 which, although devoid of official governmental powers, had 
impressed observers that their role "seemed mightier than that of any 
legislative body previously assembled". However, the conferences had 
been barren of accomplishment due to the limitations of the participants' 
economic perspectives:
They were the products of an economic system which bore within 
itself the germs of its own blight. When sickness and disease 
fell upon them, they became simple aborigines who tried to expel 
the evil spirits by the beating of tom-toms, by incantations, 
dances, prayers. They would not relinquish their cult; they 
knew only the terms of the past.
The problem with the pledges made at the conferences to cooperate to 
preserve wage scales, maintain production and increase expenditures 
on improvements, was that there were no guarantees because "rugged 
individualism" would permit none. As a result Hoover's strategy had 
no real effect on economic conditions, was chimerical in terms of its 
significance for planning and served only to disarm the nation in the 
face of danger.^
The growth of disillusionment with Hoover was paralleled by a 
growing impatience with the efforts of industrialists to induce recovery. 
This developing disrespect for the industrial leadership corresponded 
with the President's loss of prestige for their reputations were
intertwined through their joint endeavours in the business conference 
movement.
13. Lewis Corey, 'Bigger and Better Panics', in Samuel D. Schmalhausen 
(ed.), Behold America (New York, 1931): 642. 14
14. Matthew Josephson, 'The New Era, Its Rise and Fall: II - Pink Pills 
for Panic', New Republic 69 (18 November, 1931): 10-14. Josephson 
was a historian whose The Robber Barons (1934) was stridently 
critical of late nineteenth century American: entrepreneurs.
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Collectivist opinion was by no means hostile to industrialists 
before the onset of the depression. In July 1929, Heywood Broun 
reflected that the concentration of industry had facilitated economies 
of scale which promised to increase Americans' standard of living and 
gave credit to corporate leaders such as John D. Rockefeller for making 
this possible. Broun called for "a close alliance and understanding 
between big business and men of a radical turn of mind" to ensure that 
the advantages of large-scale industry were universally enjoyed,'^
However, the failure of the business community to rise to the challenge 
of the depression deprived it of any esteem it had commanded amongst 
collectivists.
In November 1930, The New Republic announced its loss of confidence 
in the industrial leadership and its disappointment that business had 
not addressed itself with any conviction to depression problems.
Business leadership was "bankrupt" and "even more poverty-stricken" 
than political leadership in terms of its appreciation of the changes 
necessary to control the economy in the interest of the general welfare. 
Indeed, negative business demands determined the government's own 
response to the depression. "In the midst of one of the worst depressions 
the world has ever known, its main concern is that nothing may be done 
to 'upset' conditions, or to 'destroy' confidence," the journal charged.1^
Rexford Tugwell was sceptical about the sincerity of businessmen 
who espoused planning. They were concerned to find a safe refuge 
in a period of insecurity and thought exclusively in terms of planning 
for production rather than for consumption. It would be "unnatural 
for American businesses, which live by adventures in competition, to
15. Nation 129 C3 July, 1929); 7.
16. New Republic 65 . (19 November, 1930); 5,
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abdicate their privileges voluntarily," Tugwell suggested.^ Neither
was Tugwell impressed with the upsurge of interest in planning among
engineers. The engineer had traditionally a greater influence than
the economist and more opportunity to implement his ideas into policy,
18yet had failed to capitalise on these favourable circumstances.
In 1933, Donald Richberg advised that industrial and financial 
leaders had "disqualified themselves as competent advisors to the 
Congress" by their failure to halt the destructive course of the 
depression. Recent experience demonstrated that the only effective 
remedies would require legislation to compel vital industries to oper­
ate as institutions of public service and "to prevent greedy and ignorant 
men from gambling with the natural and human resources of the Nation". 
Richberg did not envisage the destruction of capitalism and its sub­
stitution by state socialism but regarded any change as a stage in the 
evolution of capitalism. "But no sound legislative remedy of permanent 
value," he claimed, " can be based on an effort to preserve unchanged
our present economic system and to preserve unreformed the present
19forces in control of that system."
Collectivist criticism of business during the Hoover presidency 
was seldom dogmatic or picayune and , when programmes emerged from 
individuals or organisations within the business community, they were 
assessed reasonably and frequently welcomed as contributions to the 
debate on economic recovery and long-term reform. Examples of this
17. Tugwell, 'The Principles of Planning and the Institution of 
Laissez-Faire', op. cit., 83. Idem, 'Responsibility and Economic 
Distress': Broadcast for the National Advisory Council on Radio
in Education, N.B.C., 30 January, 1932. Tugwell MSS: Box 1.
18. Rexford G. Tugwell to Henry Goddard Leach, 11 September, 1930. 
Ibid. 19
19. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Hearings on S. Res. 
315, Investigation of Economic Problems, 72nd Congress, Second 
Session, 1933: 643.
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open-mindedness can be found in the responses of collectivists to the 
report of the New York State Commission on Stabilization of Industry 
for the Prevention of Unemployment, the appointment of the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce's Committee on Continuity of Business and Employment and 
the Swope Plan.
The report of the New York committee received the qualified endorse­
ment of collectivists. The New Republic characterised the efforts of 
individual firms to stabilise their operations as "praiseworthy" and 
which "should serve as a model for all who can follow them". However, 
the Committee's stress on action that could be taken by individual 
employers to induce stabilisation was regarded as generally unsatisfactory. 
In the first place, all employers were not in a position to exercise 
a similar degree of control as some of the larger, successful firms 
cited by the Committee and second, stabilisation schemes in themselves,
even if widely adopted, would do little to mitigate the depression and
20reduce unemployment. The Nation believed that the Committee's research 
represented "one of the most important things that can be done", but 
had reservations about the approach to planning which the Committee's 
report endorsed. A Columbia University Professor, Harold Rugg, also 
minimised the significance of individual stabilisation measures, 
describing them as "temporary make-shifts" and "very limited contributions 
to fundamental social reconstruction". Collectivists regarded the 
piecemeal, voluntary approach to planning as unsatisfactory because it 
depended on the goodwill of the individual operator and as such, would 
be limited in effect. National coordination was necessary and of the 
type which allowed government a prominent role with the authority to 
compel firms to stabilise their employment and operations.
20. New Republic 62 (30 April, 1930); 283.
21. Nation 131 (10 September, 1930); 262.
22. Harold Rugg, The Great Technology; Social Chaos and the Public 
Mind (New York, 1933); 169.
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The New Republic described the appointment of the Chamber's 
Committee in 1931 as a significant indication of the increasing interest 
in planning among businessmen. While the Committee's report might not 
have any immediate importance it was likely to have a long-term signif­
icance for planning. "We fear that it will be puny in comparison with 
the need, though perhaps important as a first, timid step," the journal 
reflected. The Nation suspected that businessmen were becoming con­
cerned that if they did not initiate plans, the government would intro-
24duce compulsory programmes if depressed economic conditions continued. 
However, Virgil Jordan's attendance at the Chamber's annual convention 
at Atlantic City inspired him with little confidence that the organis­
ation was capable of making any positive recommendations, He described 
the proceedings as "silly", "empty", "useless", "uncertain" and 
"insincere" and claimed that the Chamber had failed its own rank and 
file and the general public. "Never before did so many of its supporters 
on the scene sense so surely the bankruptcy of its ideas, imagination 
and capacity for action and count so accurately the consequences,"
Jordan wrote. "When they went home they knew that nothing had happened 
or been said, and that they were in for whatever was coming." Sen. 
Robert M. LaFollette was also critical of the Atlantic City proceedings.
A "defeatist attitude" was prevalent and business leaders appeared to
26be unwilling to accept responsibility for the depression.
23. New Republic 66 (15 April, 1931): 218.
24. Nation 132 (13 May, 1931): 520.
25. Virgil Jordan, 'Business Leadership Passes the Buck: At the United 
States Chamber of Commerce Meeting', New Republic 67 (20 May,
1931): 7. Jordan was chief economist of the McGraw-Hill publications. 26
26. New York Times, 3 May, 1931.
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The Swope Plan received a more favourable reception from collec­
tivists than any other scheme which emerged from a business source.
The Nation described Swope's proposal as "the only real plan so far 
put forward by any responsible 'captain of industry"' and commended 
the consideration it showed to labour. While the plan was radical in 
appearance, it was conservative in intention. It was a recognition 
that the capitalist system was in jeopardy and sought to preserve that 
system by means of drastic reorganisation. The Nation withheld whole­
hearted endorsement because it questioned whether the public interest 
would be served best through trade association planning which limited 
production and stabilised prices. The New Republic was particularly 
impressed with the unemployment insurance features of the plan but was 
dubious of its approach to industrial stabilisation. It doubted that 
price stabilisation through trade associations could contribute to 
minimising unemployment since experience demonstrated that oligopolistic 
industries such as railroads, public utilities and steel were unable 
to stabilise employment despite their ability to stabilise prices. 
Furthermore, this type of planning which sought to limit industrial 
output to the existing demand at stable prices would be "planning for 
stagnation" and would perpetuate unemployment and poverty. Rather than 
stabilise by contraction, national economic planning should aim to enhance 
the general standard of living, and to achieve this, The New Republic 
preferred to establish a national planning agency which would make 27
27. Nation 133 (30 September, 1931): 520.
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stimulation of purchasing power the crux of a general production plan
28rather than allow private industry to fix prices.
Walter Lippmann regarded the Swope Plan as a practicable synthesis
of central control and individual initiative. It served to illustrate
"the irreducible minimum of surrender required to inaugurate a stable
and socially responsible industrial order on the foundation of capitalism
and political democracy". Both Lippmann and Stuart Chase recommended
that the plan be first tested in the electrical industry as a "laboratory
29experiment" for the rest of industry to observe.
Liberals’ disenchantment with business never approached the 
Socialists' rejection of capitalist planning. Capitalism could not 
promote planning effectively according to Norman Thomas and Paul 
Blanshard because the desire for profits perpetuated a skewed distri­
bution of purchasing power and since operators were unable to cooperate 
and coordinate their efforts. "The deficiency of most of our leading 
business men is that they suggest incidental remedies that always go 
back to the good will of the individual employer," Blanshard claimed.
When businessmen advocated planning they had an inadequate awareness of 
its implications and little sincerity of intent. Socialists were 
more damning of the Swope Plan than liberals. Mauritz Hallgren suggested 
that the inevitable outcome would be an "economic dictatorship" of the
28. New Republic 68 (23 September, 14 October, 11 November, 1931): 137; 
220-221; 338-339. The restrictionist aspect of business planning 
was also emphasised by Rexford Tugwell, A. Ford Hinrichs and George 
Soule. See Tugwell, 'The Principle of Planning and the Institution 
of Laissez-Faire', op.cit., 83-84. A.F, Hinrichs, 'Russia's 
Challenge to America', Atlantic Monthly 148 (July 1931): 111-112. 
Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit.,
102-103.
29. Lippmann, Interpretations, op.cit., 40. New York Times, 29 
September, 1931. 30*
30. Paul Blanshard, 'Plea for Social Control and Ownership', The Annals 
154 (March 1931): 81. Idem, 'Socialist and Capitalist Planning',
Ibid., 162 (July 1932):lRr. Norman Thomas, As I See It, (New York,»32) 
84-85; 89-90. Idem. 'Capitalism Will Not Plan', New Republic 67
(12 August, 1931): 338.
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strongest firms which dominated the trade associations, while Norman 
Thomas compared the proposal with Italian fascism, Thomas dismissed 
the plan as irrelevant to the immediate unemployment situation and the 
issue of a planned economy since trade associations did not cover the 
functions of banks and stock markets which needed to be regulated in 
any genuinely planned society. Furthermore, Thomas parted company with 
the liberals in disparaging the unemployment insurance features of the 
proposal. The contributory features would place too heavy a burden on 
the workers for it to be satisfactory. Thomas contended that the Swope 
Plan would have undesirable consequences. It was a means, he believed 
"for putting the power of government behind the formation of strong 
capitalist syndicates which will seek to control the government which 
regulates them and, failing that, will fight it".^
The same estrangement from the Hoover approach and loss of con- 
fidence in business planning was evident in the ranks of organised 
labour. At the beginning of 1930, labour spokesmen were confident 
that Hoover's initiative of November 1929 would inspire businessmen 
to ameliorate unemployment and promote revival through planning, How­
ever, after repeated exhortations for business to act, their attitude 
became gradually more despondent. As trade unionists' expectations of 
business waned, they became increasingly receptive to government inter­
vention in the economy to instigate planning on a national basis.
The A.F. of L.'s official political non-partisanship did not permit 
explicit criticism of President Hoover. However, John P. Frey revealed 
in his private correspondence a disappointment with presidential
31. Mauritz Hallgren, Seeds of Revolt: A Study of American Life and 
the Thought of the American People during the Depression (New York, 
1933): 293-294. New York Times, 5, 27 October, 1931. 32
32. Norman Thomas, 'A Socialist Looks at the Swope Plan', Nation 133 
(7 October, 1931): 357-359.
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policies. Although the White House conferences had a "far-reaching 
influence" on businessmen’s conduct during the first few months of 
the depression, the outlook had become bleak by the summer of 1930.
Not only had the anticipated economic revival failed to materialise 
during spring, but by autumn businessmen began to resort to wage reduc­
tions in contravention of their pledges. At the end of Hoover's term 
Frey was thoroughly disabused with the President's policies. "The 
reconstruction efforts made by President Hoover and his advisors are 
seemingly economically fatal," he reflected. The Conference for 
Progressive Labor Action, a revolutionary organisation founded by 
A.J. Muste was less restrained in its condemnations of Hoover's policy. 
Chairman, J.B.S. Hardman described the meetings of 1929 as "a huge
3 Apublicity stunt" which encouraged complacency amongst businessmen.
It was the business community rather than President Hoover which 
bore the brunt of labour's criticisms during the early depression.
In the spring of 1930, The American Federationist . called on business­
men to prevent "panic" lay offs and wage cuts through "intelligent 
planning" and William Green applauded the actions of employers who 
formulated stabilisation programmes which sought to maintain labour's 
purchasing power. Their widespread adoption would be instrumental in 
promoting recovery and ameliorating unemployment. "Upon industrial 
management rests responsibility for initiating practical steps," Green 
declared. Some sympathy persisted for business's stabilisation
efforts at the A.F. of L.'s annual convention on October. The pledges
33. John P. Frey to W.A, Appleton, 23 June, 30 December, 1930;
3 January, 1933. Frey MSS; Box 1 Files 5-6.
34. New York Times, 24 January, 1930.
35. American Federationist 37 (February, May 1930)t 150-151; 530-531.
186
made at the White House conferences had been "a constructive achieve­
ment" and many employers had kept faith with their agreements although
36the tendency was not universal.
However, as the year progressed organised labour became increasingly 
disheartened by the record of industry in promoting stabilisation. In 
August, Green noted that few firms had adopted stabilisation schemes 
and that coordinated planning of whole industries was practically 
unknown. Industry had failed to perceive its self-interest in stabilis­
ation projects. "We have made comparatively little headway with stab- 
ilization of production," Green reflected in October. The labour 
economist, Paul H. Douglas questioned whether the majority of businessmen 
were willing or able to surmount the difficulties inherent in stabilis­
ation. According to Douglas, the bulk of the business community did 
not possess the "fine intelligence and social imagination" of an Owen 
D. Young. The American Federationist began to
appreciate that the isolated actions of individual firms were unsatis­
factory and that a more comprehensive approach to planning was necessary
which regulated the interrelationships between firms and their industries.
39The depression required "associated action" to promote recovery. "The 
problem of sustained prosperity can not be worked out by single plants,"
36. Proceedings, 50th Annual Convention, A.F. of L,, 1930, "op .icit,, 59. 
See also William Green, ’Why Work So Long? A Plea for Security of 
Employment and Stabilization of Business', Forbes 26 (1 October,
1930): 17; 20.
37. American Federationist 37 (August, October 1930): 914; 1195-1196.
38. American Labor Legislation Review 20 (September 1930): 273-281.
39. American Federationist 37 (September, 1930): 1046.
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the journal advised in 1931, "but there must be organized planning for 
the whole i n d u s t r y . E v e n  when it considered the achievements of 
the progressive corporation, Eastman-Kodak, its praise was limited to 
the "community planning" of the Rochester experiment in which Eastman 
participated.^'
Throughout 1931, the emphasis of The American Federationist1s 
remarks about planning was that the Federal Government should assume 
responsibility by establising a national agency. "We need more economic 
government to cure the ills of business," Green editorially declared. 
Despite the efficiency of managers in individual plants, they were incap­
able of overcoming the economic maladjustments which involved inter­
relationships within the economy. The need was for national economic 
policies on a national scale. Trade associationism was unsatisfactory 
as a vehicle for national planning. As the Federation's Executive 
Council reported to the convention of 1932: "While trade associations 
and large corporate organizations may be competent for their distinctive
jurisdictions, they are but part of the national structure which they
A 3influence and which in turn conditions their opportunities." Also, 
by 1932, labour spokesmen were unwilling to support an approach to 
planning associated exclusively with the business community. "The 
damned foolishness or stupidity of our captains of industry and finance 
is becoming more evident every day," John Frey contended.^ William
40. Ibid., 38 (January 1931): 18. See also Ibid., 38 (March 1931):
276.
41. Ibid., 37 (December 1930): 1462.
42. Ibid., 38 (April, May, July, September 1931): 403-404; 531-532;
804; 1053.
43. Proceedings, 52nd Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1932, op.cit., 35.
44. John P. Frey to William T. Foster, 5 August, 1932. Frey MSS: 
Box 9 File 128.
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Green castigated management for failing "miserably" during the depression. 
While employers remained unreceptive to new ideas the working class had 
begun to think in "more advanced terms" which involved the acceptance 
of the type of national planning which would effectively substitute 
"the unscientific and uneconomic methods now being pursued by industrial 
management".^
Labour's disillusionment with business was reflected in its lukewarm 
reception of the proposals of Gerard Swope and the Chamber of Commerce. 
William Green advised that the Swope Plan be given "careful consider­
ation" and the Labor Bureau Inc. distinguished it from "the usual 
employers' buncombe". However, the scheme had numerous shortcomings. 
Adequate labour participation was not allowed for in the administration
of the Plan and industrial stabilisation would be achieved by production
/ . 46limitation rather than through increased consumption. John Frey added 
that the plan's emulation of the European cartel system was objection­
able and doubted that business would wisely administer unemployment 
insurance programmes. ^  The Chamber's reputation was low within the 
ranks of organised labour. The American Federationist believed that 
the progressive rhetoric of Chamber spokesmen was hollow, and that 
their sentiments would not be given substance and be converted by 
business into practicable proposals.^ For William Green, both pro­
grammes were flawed by their reliance on trade associationism to regular­
ise production and consumption, since factors existed outside of industry
45. 'Labor's Appeal for Economic and Legislative Relief': Petition 
signed by William Green and Frank Norrison. Reprinted in 
Congressional Record 75, 72nd Congress, First Session, 1932: 3636.
46. American Federationist 38 (October, 1931): 1182-1183. Facts for 
Workers 9 (October 1931): 1-2.
47. John P. Frey to W.A. Draper, 12 March, 1932. Frey MSS:Box 8 
File 120.
48. American Federationist 38 (June 1931): 674.
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which the associations could not control. Throughout the last year 
of Hoover's office organised labour continued to insist on the failure 
of business leadership and the need for government to sponsor planning 
through the creation of a national agency.
Rexford Tugwell reflected the sentiments of collectivists and 
trade unionists when he wrote in 1932 that "what has been offered by 
the administration and by business leaders ... will not be of the 
slightest assistance; in fact their policies rather handicap recovery".^ 
This lack of confidence in the established sources of national leadership 
prompted collectivists and organised labour to formulate alternative 
economic plans. The year, 1931, appears as a critical juncture in the 
development of the central planners' attitudes to the Hoover adminis­
tration and the business elite. Coincidentally, during the same year 
interest in the Soviet Union reached a peak since the Bolshevik Revol­
ution as indicated by the number of books published and written by 
American authors.^
The Soviet experiments in economic planning inspired the American
central planners. Lenin's implementation of the New Economic Policy
in 1921, predicated on a mixed economy, aroused initial interest.
Information on Soviet developments were relayed to the United States
by American technicians employed in Russian industry and visiting 
53delegations. As Russian planning became more centripetal with the 
introduction of the first Soviet Five-Year Plan by Stalin in 1928,
49. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 
601-602.
50. American Federationist 39 (July, October 1932): 729-731; 1101-1102. 
Ibid., 40 (January 1933): 16-17.
i
51. Rexford G. Tugwell, 'Discourse in Depression': Preliminary Report 
for the Rockefeller Foundation. Manuscript, 1932. Tugwell MSS:
Box 2.
52. Filene, The Soviet Experiment, op.cit., 287.
53. Feuer, 'Travelers to the Soviet Union', op.cit., 119-149.
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American interest was quickened. The experience of the depression in 
the United States and the inability of established leadership to effect 
revival made the central planners envious of the purposefulness of Soviet 
planning, its disregard for tradition and willingness to experiment. 
Central planners discovered that they shared common concerns with the 
Soviets. There was a mutual respect for the economic and social potential 
of technology and a determination to secure maximum benefits from mass 
production. Both appreciated the virtues of efficiency, standardisation 
and the elimination of waste in industry. Moreover, they shared a common 
reverence for information and statistics upon which to base planned 
economic activity, and a respect for expertise and experimentation in 
the planning process.
Stuart Chase admired the Soviets' efforts to manage the Russian 
economy for social ends. "This experiment is going to be the acid test 
of whether human brains are capable of directing a mechanical civilization 
for the benefit of the whole people," he contended in 1930.^ Chase 
visited Russia as a member of a trade union delegation in 1927 and was 
impressed with the purpose of Russian planning. While Russia had only 
retrieved industrial and agricultural production levels of 1913 at poor 
levels of quality, Chase was confident that the situation would improve 
after the adoption of the Five-Year Plan. Much of his optimism stemmed 
from the rigorous intolerance of waste in Russian industry as expressed 
in the absence of competition and standardisation of production. Chase 
also praised the use of national statistics in the planning process, 
which in volume and detail surpassed those of any other nation.
54. Stuart Chase et al., 'Symposium: "Dark Days Ahead: A Dialogue on
the Bankruptcy of Business Leadership"', Forum 84 (October 1930):
206.
55. James G. McDonald, Stuart Chase and Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, Soviet 
Russia after Ten Years (New York, 1927): 17.
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Russian planning also had an idealistic basis. Chase celebrated the 
expansion of industrial production without the incentive of private 
profit. He ascribed this phenomenon to the mutual involvement and 
participation in decision-making by management and workers through the 
'workers' councils', the close identification of workers with socialised 
means of production, and a "burning zeal" to make the experiment success­
ful. Such motivation was contrary to the canons of laissez-faire and 
the accepted rules of industrial behaviour. "Human nature is a more 
complicated thing than as comprehended in the doctrines of the Manchester 
school," Chase observed.Rexford Tugwell also recognised the idealism 
of Russian planning. "The Russians," Tugwell noted, "have been sustained
by an almost religious faith, which has made discipline a kind of
57joyous sacrifice for a great cause." A similar sense of purpose could 
be transposed in the United States once the economy ceased to administer 
its rewards to privileged groups. Tugwell anticipated "a great outpour­
ing of energy as soon as we shall have removed the dead hand of compet­
itive enterprise that stifles public impulses and finds use only for
58the less effective and less beneficial impulses of men". Undoubtedly, 
much of the appeal of Russian planning lay in the contrast in morale 
between the two cultures; between purposefulness and optimism on the 
one hand, and aimlessness and pessimism on the other.
In the words of Stuart Chase, Russia was "a great laboratory, a 
great experiment station in which we can finally measure the utility
56. Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn, Rexford G. Tugwell et al., Soviet Russia 
in the Second Decade: a Joint Survey by the Technical Staff of the 
First American Trade Union Delegation (London, 1928): 48-50.
57. Rexford G. Tugwell to J.R. Brackett, 11 April, 1931. Tugwell MSS: 
Box 1.
58. Tugwell, 'The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Laissez- 
Faire' , op.cit., 85-86.
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to mankind of a collectivist form of industry". The Soviet Union's 
experiments in economic policy provided models for American observation, 
adaptation and application. George Soule advised against "slavish 
imitation" of the Russian examples because of the dissimilarity of 
economic conditions, but hoped that Americans would be stimulated to 
consider experimentation with planning. Developments in Russia did not 
present the United States with any choice between capitalism and communism, 
but between "adaptation to industrialism and decay".^
Soule's qualifications are significant in that few central planners 
wished to duplicate the Russian experiment in its entirety. Americans 
could not contemplate any form of planning which involved the sacrifice 
of fundamental civil liberties. Also they were aware that the two 
nations were at different stages of economic development and that 
Russian planning methods and objectives were both unnecessary and inap­
propriate for the United States. Rather Soviet planning acted as a 
timely, inspirational force and served as an operative model from which 
the United States could benefit from observation and selective adapt­
ation. To bestow planning with a legitimacy central planners tended 
not to appeal to the inspiring, but ideologically alien Soviet experience, 
but to the American precedent of central planning, the War Industries 
Board. Planners could even claim that the W.I.B. was a forerunner of 
the Gosplan, for as Stuart Chase said of the latter: "It is our own 
War Industries Board carried three or four steps into the future."^
Commenting on the ideological basis upon which arguments about the 
separation of business and government were phrased, Oswald Garrison
59. McDonald et al., Soviet Russia after Ten Years, op.cit., 18.
60. George Soule, 'Will the Five Year Plan Succeed?', New Republic 65
(3 December, 1930): 64. Soule, A Planned Society, op.cit., 211-214.
61. McDonald et al., Soviet Russia after Ten Years, op.cit., 17.
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Villard made the point that when war came and government took increasing 
control of the economy "nobody declared that this was socialistic or 
communistic. It was just necessary". It had been also highly success­
ful. To eliminate waste in industry, the W.I.B. had insisted upon 
standardisation in manufactures and had eliminated style competition 
in many lines. To simplify the enforcement of its rules throughout 
the nation, it had dealt with businessmen through their trade associations. 
This narrowed destructive price competition, but to ensure that industry 
would not fix prices of strategic raw materials at too high levels, 
the Federal Government had regulated prices. In addition, all antitrust 
suits had been suspended during the war and large corporations frequently
received favourable consideration in the dispensation of war contracts
63because of their ability to make large and rapid deliveries. The 
imperatives of the moment demanded that the shibboleths of 'rugged 
individualism' be disregarded and practices were condoned which would 
have been greeted with apprehension in peacetime.
The Board embodied many long-term aims of the planners and exem­
plified the potential of industry to reach greater levels of productivity. 
Donald Richberg argued that the economic emergency made it imperative 
that planning on the lines of the W.I.B. be resuscitated. Contemptuous 
of the "kindergarten arguments" of those who would have the depression 
run its 'natural course', Richberg urged "a civil mobilization under 
civil authority to organize our resources for national defense against 
the destructiveness of present, uncontrolled economic forces". His 
allusion to the parallels between the economic and wartime emergencies
62. Nation 131 (3 September, 1930): 237.
63. Soule, Prosperity Decade, op.cit., 12-63. Randall B. Kester,
'The War Industries Board: A Study in Industrial Mobilization', 
American Political Science Review 34 (August 1940): 655-684.
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was not made merely for effect since Richberg discerned a precedent 
in the wartime emergency which sanctioned recourse to planning in the 
depression. "Frankly," Richberg contended, "I can not differentiate
between § great economic crisis such as we are facing ... and the menace
* ..64of war.
The War Industries Board served as a model for a number of economic 
plans in the early years of the depression. They represented a conviction 
that the reinstatement of a similar institution and the application of 
central direction to economic activity would promote recovery and presage 
long-term reform. Three plans proposed during 1931 and 1932 were indebted 
to the W.I.B. George Soule outlined the substance of his proposals for 
central planning in two articles for The New Republic in March 1931, and 
developed them in his A Planned Society (1932). Stuart Chase revealed 
his blueprint for a 'Peace Industries Board' in an article of June 1931, 
which appeared in Harper* s magazine. He elaborated his ideas in A New 
Deal (1932)♦ Historian, Charles A. Beard's proposal for a centrally- 
planned economy illustrates the vogue for 'plans' during the period. 
Although a serious effort, Beard's plan was commissioned by Forum 
magazine and appeared in its issue of July 1931.
George Soule sought sanction for central planning in the American 
wartime experience. "It is a nonsense to say that there is any physical 
impossibility of doing for peace purposes the sort of thing we actually 
did for war purposes," Soule challenged. "There may be obstructions 
in our institutions, habits and desires, but not in our equipment, 
skill and intelligence." A central planning agency would seek to 
secure short and long-term objectives. Most immediately, it would 
make proposals for effecting economic recovery and in the long-run
64. Hearings, Federal Aid for Unemployment Relief, op.cit., 454-455.
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would pursue numerous worthwhile goals such as urban renewal, conserv­
ation and raising the standard of living of lower income groups.^ 
Without any central authority to plan American economic development, 
Americans would remain vulnerable to the swings of the business cycle 
and would be deprived of the social benefits of technological progress. 
Soule characterised the business system as a "body without a brain". 
Continuing his analogy, he maintained: "We have magnificent muscles 
in our great industrial plants, efficient arteries in our railroads 
and highways, sensitive nerves in our lines of communication. But we 
have only a trace of gray matter in our economic c r a n i u m . T h e  
installation of a central planning mechanism would permit an otherwise 
efficient economic system to function effectively. Central planning 
did not require any radical change in either the economic or social 
orders. Planning and capitalism could be complementary, since planning
provided the guidance to enable the capitalist system to function more
. 67successfully.
Soule urged the establishment of two principal planning agencies: 
an Economic General Staff and a National Industrial Council. The 
General Staff would be a permanent body, authorised by act of Congress 
or executive order and composed of professionally-qualified experts.
It would function as a "correlating and thinking agency", collating 
and interpreting statistical information on economic trends, forecasting 
developments and devising appropriate policy. In its work it would 
cooperate with existing government agencies and would create new ones 
as the need arose. The National Industrial Council was conceived of
-s.
65. Soule, A Planned Society, op.cit., 187; 262-263.
66. Idem. 'Are Depressions Avoidable?', Ibid., 65 (11 February, 1931): 
343-344.
67. Idem. 'Are We Going to Have a Revolution?', Harper's 165 (August
1932): 277-286. Idem, A Planned Society , op.cit., 98-124.
as a larger, delegate body consisting of representatives of industry, 
labour, government and other interest groups. The Council would be 
the "connecting link between thinking and action", receiving information 
and recommendations from the General Staff and being responsible for 
formulating policy on the basis of the Staff's recommendations or 
otherwise. Soule vested the Council with no authority to command, and 
was content for it to be an extra-constitutional body with no formal 
legislative powers. Its effectiveness would depend upon its ability 
to influence government, business and other constituencies of the 
reasonableness of its proposals.
It would seem that Soule's endorsement of the 'advisory approach'
was tactical. He admitted that he was not convinced that such planning
organisations would be effective, but stressed that they did serve as
an initiative from which more viable planning methods might emerge. As
it was, "they might not be capable of doing much good, but they could
not do much harm". Undoubtedly Soule's priority was to present a
national planning proposal which would have a realistic chance of
implementation. He was prepared to compromise his own convictions
69to secure the foundations for national planning.
Soule defined three principal objectives for his planning agencies: 
the restoration and maintenance of purchasing power; the balancing of 
production and consumption, and the stabilisation of industry and 
employment. These considerations dictated that the logical point of 
departure for planning was those sectors such as bituminous coal and 
textiles which were inefficient, highly competitive and where the lowest 
wages and marginal occupations prevailed. To induce stabilisation
68. Idem, 'National Planning: The Problem of Creating a Brain for our 
Economy', New Republic 66 (4 March,1931): 62-63. In 1932 Soule 
expanded his design to allow for planning in individual industries 
conducted through trade associations, thus completing a pyramidal 
structure. Idem. A Planned Society, op.cit., 251-252.
69. Idem. 'National Planning', op.cit.,62. Idem. 'Hard-Boiled 
Radicalism', New Republic 65 (21 January, 1931): 265.
Soule recommended that combinations of firms be permitted, but with 
the qualifications that they would be liable to federal regulation and 
that consolidation took place "on the basis of engineering, rather than 
of merely financial design". A target should be set to provide labour 
with an adequate and minimum standard of living and a five-day, forty- 
hour week. This would necessitate doubling the national income and 
increasing industrial productivity, a problem to be considered by the 
planning agencies. Soule suggested the creation of three boards to 
serve as administrative arms. The first would institute geographic 
planning and resource development. The second would organise the labour 
market by administering employment exchanges and unemployment insurance, 
introducing job retraining schemes and compiling accurate statistics 
on the extent of unemployment and available employment opportunities.
The third would regulate investment and credit, direct investment towards 
socially-essential production, prevent excess capacity and relate credit 
to the budget and production plans of industry.^
From these modest beginnings, Soule believed that a more compre­
hensive, incisive and mandatory approach to planning might evolve. 
However, it was vital that a beginning be made and that collectivists 
should not stand on principle if it threatened to sabotage the attainment 
of an ultimately desirable objective, albeit flawed in its conception 
stage. As Soule wrote in 1932:
Social planning is not a hard-and-fast, completely predetermined 
scheme. It is a method, a technique, a way of attacking 
problems. It develops in practice. It must be learned, and 
like other disciplines of education, it can be learned only by 
doing.71
Stuart Chase adopted the same pragmatic and flexible approach in 
his attitudes to planning. Never doctrinaire in his views, Chase was
70. Idem, 'What Planning Might Do: Goals and Methods for an Economic 
brain', Ibid., 66 (11 March, 1931): 88-91.
71. Idem, A Planned Society, op.cit., 230.
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less concerned about how planning was to be achieved but that it be 
achieved as soon as possible. At one moment he could express sympathy 
with a revolutionary movement of engineers and "wayfaring men", yet 
at the next, announce that he was not interested who controlled "the
72wild horses" of industry, as long as they were effectively controlled. 
Chase's flexibility is evident in his two plans of 1931 and 1932, which 
contained the seeds of technocratic socialism, but were intended to be 
compatible with the existing capitalist structure.
To justify his programmes Chase appealed to the precedent of the 
War Industries Board. The W.I.B. had temporarily transformed the 
economic system into an intelligent mechanism for the production and 
distribution of goods and services according to the needs of the armed 
forces and the homefront. By promoting a unity of purpose between 
diverse social groups and boldly overriding "encrusted traditions and 
petty rights", war-planning succeeded not only in satisfying the material 
demands of the war-effort but in raising the standard of living for 
the American population as a whole, and despite the withdrawal of 25% 
of the work force for active service. The peacetime reinstitution of 
such an organisation was desirable, and in 1931, Chase proposed the 
establishment of a 'Peace Industries Board' for this purpose. Like 
the W.I.B. the national agency would propose no immediate threat to 
traditional American credos of private enterprise. Individualism and 
central direction would be reconciled by allowing the agency no direct, 
coercive powers, avoiding nationalisation of industries and not inter- 
fering with industrial profits. Chase's Board would be composed of
72. Stuart Chase, 'Prometheus Enchained', in Idem, The Nemesis of 
American Business, op.cit., 99. Idem, 'Harnessing the Wild Horses 
of Industry', Atlantic Monthly 147 pune, 1931): 784.
73. Idem, 'A Ten Year Plan for America', op.cit., 24. Ifflem, A New 
Deal', op.cit., 84; 151.
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representatives of government, business and "engineers", a balance 
which would ensure inclusion of both social vision and expertise and 
would be popularly acceptable. The Board would draft a ten-year plan 
for America and supervise it once accepted. It would cooperate with, 
or absorb, existing government agencies and establish working relation­
ships with representative business and labour organisations.^
The Board would have two principal objectives. First, the direc­
tion of new investment into socially desirable channels and second, 
the more equitable distribution of national income to maintain purchas­
ing power. To secure the first, Chase preferred to follow the W.I.B.'s 
precedent by refusing credit for unwarranted investment. However, he 
understood that it might provoke an unfavourable political reaction 
and that the broadcasting of information on investment opportunities 
for voluntary consideration would be more expedient. Much could be 
accomplished by the Board through enforcing its will "by argument, 
conference, the showing of facts" and only in the last resort, using 
more direct methods of compulsion. Ultimately, however, if the need 
arose the Board could use the government's powers of taxation or its 
influence in vital industries - such as communications - to ensure 
compliance to its recommendations. In certain strategic sectors the 
Board's authority would be enhanced by making major industries subject 
to "supervision". While Chase failed to clarify the nature of super­
vision in his article of 1931, he intimated in 1932 that industries 
which had matured beyond efficient private operation, such as railroads 
and the natural resource industries, should become independent state 
trusts. As such the national Board could determine the nature and 
extent of investment in these industries and use the industries them­
selves as levers to induce conformity for its investment recommendations
74. Idem, 'A Ten Year Plan for America', op.cit., 3; 7-8.
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elsewhere in industry. Chase envisaged a role for trade associations 
also in implementing the Board's investment policies and favoured a 
liberalisation of the antitrust laws to enable industries to coordinate 
their activities. The government would also become a major initiator 
of investment in its own right through the promotion of public works 
programmes. Not only would it fulfil the need for investment in areas 
where the private sector was either unwilling or unable to commit itself, 
but public works would take up the slack of technological unemployment 
and mitigate cyclical unemployment.^
Chase's second objective, the more equitable distribution of the 
national income, would be furthered by the Board's recommendations to 
industry that wage scales be improved and working hours decreased and 
its advice to Congress that taxation policy be made more progressive.
Chase was sympathetic also to the enactment of a minimum wage, unemploy­
ment insurance and the provision of efficient labour exchanges to 
facilitate re-employment.^
In A New Deal, Chase reiterated his proposals while giving his 
national agency a new title - the National Planning Board - and recommend­
ing that it be supplemented by Regional Boards composed of experts from 
the professions. Again he emphasised that his programme marked no 
absolute break with American traditions and described it as "drastic 
and progressive revision of the economic structure avoiding an utter 
break with the past". Control was aimed at strategic points only, and 
would be exercised "over landmarks with which we are really familiar".
This would entail a minimum of governmental interference and bureaucracy
75. Ibid., 5-8. Idem, A New Deal, op.cit., 220-229.
76. Ibid., 202-211; 229-232. Idem, 'A Ten Year Plan for America'
op.cit., 9-10.
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since no general price or wage fixing, profits limitation or restriction 
of consumer choice was intended.^
Charles Beard insisted that adherence to tradition was dangerous. 
Although laissez-faire had become an obsolescent doctrine during the 
late nineteenth century, its persistence in political thought and socio­
economic policy had contributed to the unrestrained competition and 
maldistribution of income which had precipitated the depression. Beard
was convinced that "orderly procedure" through national planning was
78essential to maintain consistent and impressive economic growth.
In his Forum plan, Beard provided for the creation of a National 
Economic Council composed of representatives from the major industries, 
distribution, agriculture and labour. The function of the Council would 
be to formulate an economic programme, including the necessary constit­
utional changes, which would be submitted to popular referendum for 
public approval. The Council would be responsible for the plan's 
operation once adopted. It would be assisted by a Board of Strategy 
and Planning whose divisions would survey and predict the resource 
and productive capability available #to industry and allocate production 
quotas to industries according to pre-determined criteria - whether the 
ultimate objective be maximum output, more leisure or higher wages.
The Bureau of Standards would work in tandem with the Board to eliminate 
duplication in industry.
Beard envisaged that, while remaining privately-owned, all highly- 
concentrated industries would be declared by the N.E.C. to be "national 
public service enterprises 'affected with public interest' and subject
77. Idem, A New Deal, op.cit., 173; 236-237.
78. Charles A. Beard, 'The Myth of Rugged Individualism', Harperh 164 
(December 1931): 13-22. Idem, Issues of Domestic Policy: Govern­
ment Series Lecture No.8 delivered 24 May, N.B.C. (Chicago, 1932): 
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to the principles of prudent investment and fair returns". Once these 
industries had been placed on a public utilities basis, each industry 
would be organised into a syndicate and sub-divided into Corporations.
At the Syndicate level the operations of the Corporations would be 
rationalised through the suspension of the antitrust laws, while at the 
Council level the operations of the various Syndicates would be inte­
grated. Production quotas, operating standards and efficiency tests 
would be dispensed by the Council and Syndicates while competitive 
principles would be encouraged through the granting of bonuses as a 
reward for achievement. Beard's Council would not concern itself with 
the so-called "quality goods" industries which would continue in private 
hands. But Beard forecast that with the decline of the "plutocracy" 
the production of articles for the "demi-monde" would fall off in any 
case. Beard also contemplated the control of agriculture and inter­
national marketing by the N.E.C. and its sponsorship of a massive urban
79renewal programme to provide work for the unemployed.
Beard went to great lengths to claim legitimacy for his plan 
within the American experience, although contemporaries believed that 
it was inspired by the Italian corporatist model. He prefaced his 
programme with the warning that if planning was to be anything more 
than "another transitory fad" or "an idle fantasy", it needed to be 
thoroughly grounded in American practice. Beard cited elements of 
planning which already existed in private corporations and in national, 
State and local governments. Fragments of national planning were 
already scattered throughout the economy, merely awaiting "the touch
79. Idem, 'A Five Year Plan for America', Forum 86 (July 1931): 5-10.
80. Hallgren, Seeds of Revolt, op.cit., 289. However, Beard denied 
that he was influenced by Italian corporatism. See: Charles A. 
Beard, 'Government by Technologists', New Republic 63 (18 June, 
1930): 120.
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of engineering genius to extend them and tie them into a consistent 
organization for efficient functioning on the national stage". Planning 
merely conformed to the imperatives of technological change. Centri­
petal in operation, technology was rational and planful through "inner 
necessity". Systematisation and unification were inherent in its very 
processes, and consequently, technology contributed to the concentration 
of productive activities. As such, the area of economic life controlled
by planning would inevitably widen and the only issue became, under
81what institutional auspices?
Beard, with the other central planners, appealed to the "titanic 
effort" of the War Industries Board to lend his programme legitimacy. 
This solicitude for American tradition and alacrity to justify planning 
within it, was a marked feature of the proposals of the collectivists. 
Frequently, the moderation of the plans veiled a more radical intent. 
Soule and Chase, for example, were convinced that once implemented, 
planning would assume a momentum of its own and develop towards greater 
centralisation and stricter control. However, the nature of the 
programmes devised reflected their author's concern to present feasible 
and practicable schemes which might be considered acceptable by impor­
tant pressure groups.
The National Progressive Conference approved national planning 
in its report published in The New Republic in January 1932, and 
entitled 'Long Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry'.
The report defended nationwide planning against the industry-wide 
alternative favoured by the business community, but disassociated 
itself from Soviet economic planning because of its objectionable 
political aspects. National planning was essential to achieve
81. Idem, 'A Five Year Plan for America', op.cit., 1-2.
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"regularized" economic growth, increase the standard of living of the 
poorly paid, ensure a balance within the economic system and coordinate 
the activities of government agencies with industrial planning. The 
Conference proposed the establishment of a National Economic Board 
appointed by the President on the advice of national organisations and 
composed of experts in fields such as economics, labour relations, 
scientific management and agriculture. Its functions would be to 
assemble a nationwide statistical survey, scrutinise economic plans 
and recommend to Congress any new legislation which was required. It 
was given the authority also to initiate "organizing councils" through­
out industry which would establish permanent organisations, represen­
tative of all interests involved and which would apply the Board’s 
recommendations to their particular industries. The Progressive Confer­
ence denied that its proposals were radical, since they attempted to 
reconcile collective planning with the existing capitalist system.
The Board would have no power to command, the emphasis of the programme 
being on "voluntary action". However, national planning would develop 
through experimentation and the Conference expected that "measures 
will change and develop with experience". Like the individuals who 
proposed planning schemes, the Progressive Conference was conscious
of the need to take preliminary, modest steps to inaugurate a collectivist 
82economy.
The American Federation of Labor declared for national planning 
during its convention of 1930, when the Executive Council formulated 
an unemployment programme for the consideration of Congress. The plan 
called for the assembling of reliable statistics on employment, the
82. J.M. Clark,et al., 'Long-Range Planning for the Regularization
of Industry', New Republic 69 (13 January, 1932): 1-23, (Supp.).
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creation of a national system of public employment exchanges, implemen­
tation of a shorter working week, greater emphasis on public works 
programmes, government investigations of technological unemployment, 
régularisation of industrial production and relief, and provision for 
vocational training and retraining. 'Point Two' of its programme 
recognised the desirability of the efforts by individual companies to 
regularise production and incomes for employees, but contended that 
individual initiatives should be supplemented with "team work by the 
whole industry and team work between industries". To accomplish this, 
the Council urged that comprehensive planning be instigated through 
the creation of a national advisory council, representative of all 
producing and consumer groups. The council would investigate means 
of maintaining economic equilibrium, consider the institutions necessary 
to fulfil this purpose and secure the cooperation of private and govern­
mental agencies to coordinate efforts to promote recovery and ameliorate
-, 83unemployment.
By the end of 1931, the case for central planning had received 
copious publicity through the efforts of collectivists in the labour 
movement and the 'left-of-centre' intelligentsia. However, despite 
the groundswell favourable to central planning it was ironical that 
individual efforts were not given collective expression. Advocates 
did not pool their resources behind a common programme, which diminished 
the effectiveness of the central planners as a pressure group. This 
reluctance to coalesce was due, in part, to the diffuse character of 
the advocates of central planning and the financial resources available 
to publish individual plans. There was also a rift between academic 
economists who advocated central planning and 'popularisera' of the
83. Proceedings, 50th Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1930, op.cit., 
"39-64.------
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idea. For example, Rexford Tugwell was disapproving of the popular
economics of Stuart Chase. In 1930, he declined an offer from The
Saturday Review to appraise Chase’s Prosperity; Fact or Myth since he
did not regard it highly and preferred not to jeopardise his friendship
with the author.®^ Collectivists differed in their definitions of the
nature and purpose of economic planning. Socialists, in particular,
were stridently critical of the liberal collectivists' proposals which
they disparagingly characterised as props for an ailing capitalist
system. The inability of organised labour and the diverse collectivist
intelligentsia to unite in common purpose was regarded by journalist,
William Harlan Hale, as a serious shortcoming in the case for central
planning. Writing in 1933, Hale reflected that nothing tangible had
been achieved by the central planners and that their failure to create
a viable third political party, because of various political allegiances,
was the source of their failure. The central planners remained intell-
86igent 'progressives’, eminently readable, but without concrete effect.
The case for central planning was further compromised by the 
limited support of academic economists. Paul T. Homan was struck by 
the lack of consensus amongst well-qualified economists as to the 
desirability of industrial concentration and felt that if the subject 
became the focus of political discussion, the divided counsels of
84. Rexford G. Tugwell to Henry S. Canby, 22 January, 1930. Tugwell 
MSS: Box 2.
85. See, for example, Hallgren, Seeds of Revolt, op.cit., 287-291; 
294-299. Lewis Corey, 'National Economic Planning and the 
Liberals', Modern Quarterly 6 (Autumn-Winter 1932); 28-41.
86. William Harlan Hale, 'From right to left through Redeemer-Land', 
Vanity Fair 40 (May 1933): 19.
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economists would result in "a state of sad mental confusion" amongst 
87the legislators. Indeed, economists such as Frank Fetter and Myron
Watkins contended that an economy of competitive individualism was
more beneficial to the consumer and general industrial progress, than
any economic planning which involved the repeal of the antitrust laws.
Laissez-faire had been much maligned and if competition had been a
'natural person', Fetter remarked, "she or he could sue and recover
damages for malicious slander". Fetter's position evoked much
sympathy amongst economists as underlined by the creation of 'The
Economists' Committee on Anti-Trust Law Policy' of which Fetter himself
was a founder. The Committee produced a petition to be presented to
the Democratic and Republican party conventions of 1932, which demanded
that the parties add an antitrust plank to their platforms reaffirming
"the essential principle of fair competition in all lines of industry".
One hundred and sixty-seven leading economists sympathised with the
89Committee's proposals and signed the petition. Many established 
economists did not feel constrained to address themselves to the 
problem of industrial control and focussed on facilitating international 
trade and manipulating the currency as methods of extricating the 
United States from the depression. Fetter's own programme, endorsed 
by twenty economists and outlined in a letter to President-elect 
Roosevelt stressed the settlement of war debts, lowering of tariff
87. Paul T. Homan, 'Industrial Combination as Surveyed in Recent 
Literature', Quarterly Journal of Economics 44 (February 1930):
359.
88. Frank A. Fetter, 'The Truth About Competition', The Annals 165 
(January 1933): 93. Myron W. Watkins, 'The Sherman Act: Its 
Design and Its Effect', Quarterly Journal of Economics 43 
(November 1928): 1-43.
89. 'Communications', Petition by Fetter, et al., American Economic 
Review 22 (September 1932): 465-469.
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barriers and maintenance of the gold standard as a basis for economic 
90recovery.
Economists' reviews of specific proposals could be scathingly 
critical. Respected academics such as Paul Homan, Frank H. Knight and 
Frank W. Taussig all commented on the shallowness of the plans they 
reviewed. In appraising Chase's A New Deal, Homan recognised the 
author's compromise with his principles for after spending most of 
the book "making the capitalistic system look foolish", the rest was 
devoted to shoring it up by way of controls. While Chase looked forward 
ultimately to a collectivist organisation, Homan reflected that he did 
not dwell upon how it would effectively function or how the transition 
from free enterprise would be managed. Chase was so confused that 
the reason he avoided such crucial issues was that "they appear to 
be beyond the range of his intellectual competence". Homan felt no 
less strongly about George Soule's A Planned Society which was "pecul­
iarly unspoiled by analysis" and omitted such crucial problems for a
. 91 .planned economy as control of prices. Frank Knight believed that 
Soule's work was distinguished as a work of literature rather than 
an economics text. Of the author's use of economic analysis, Knight
92jibed, "the familiar gallicism tells the story - 'it does not exist'". 
Homan directed similar criticism at the Beard Plan. While recognising 
the frankness of the author in not temporising with a "system half- 
competitive" as the others, but opting for a thorough-going monopolistic 
organisation of industry, nowhere did Beard assess the relative merits
90. New York Times, 3 January, 1933.
91. Paul T. Homan, 'Economic Planning: The Proposals and the 
Literature’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 47 (November 1932): 
117-118. 92
92. Frank H. Knight, 'A Review of A Planned Society by George Soule', 
Journal of Political Economy 41 (June 1933): 421-423.
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of competition and monopoly or indicate the mechanisms which planning
93would employ to fix prices and allocate resources. Professor
Taussig, the specialist in international trade, gave the Beard Plan
94short shrift, dismissing it as "hopelessly impractical".
Divergence of opinion amongst economists over planning could arouse 
rancour as occurred between Frank Knight and Rexford Tugwell. Knight, 
although professedly sympathetic to the economics of control was 
disturbed by what he perceived as a growing vogue for planning amongst 
economists. His disquiet, as he made clear in an article of 1932, was 
provoked by evidence that economists were beginning to pander to public 
demands and the exigencies of successful publication figures by sacri­
ficing truth and objectivity to the popular clamour for "exposure and 
denunciation", "clarion calls to action" and "'wonders' of some kind". 
This development threatened the integrity of economics as a social 
science since it transformed its practitioners from objective researchers
into propagators and blurred occupational lines between the economist,
95journalist and politician.
Although Knight's article in the Journal of Political Economy was 
a critical analysis of the work of Sumner Slichter, Knight made unfav­
ourable reference to Tugwell's address before the American Economic 
Association in December 1931. Knight clearly regarded Tugwell as one 
of the major heretics responsible for the new trend and claimed that 
the address eschewed enquiry into fact and truth and was openly propa­
gandist in intent. "A little high-grade utopian-reformist soap-boxing, 
should provide excellent - let us say - 'messianic relief' from the 9345
93. Homan, 'Economic Planning: The Proposals and the Literature', 
op.cit., 118-119.
94. Forum 86 (August 1931): xvii.
95. Frank H. Knight, 'The Newer Economics and the Control of Economic 
Activity', Journal of Political Economy 40 (August 1932): 442-447.
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nerve strain of the solemn stodginess of a meeting of a learned
society," Knight scoffed. As a solution to social problems, however,
the address was distinctly unhelpful. "In that regard," Knight chided,
"it is equivalent to any other 'if-ing', from nursery rhymes about
96turnips and watches to the greatest inspiration in poetry." These 
caustic remarks began a short but acrimonious correspondence between 
the two protagonists, although only one side is available for historical 
comment.
On receiving a note from Tugwell which Knight took as "a natural 
impulse to hit back" the Chicago professor sought to explain himself 
more clearly. The literature on planning, he insisted, insulted the 
convictions of many reformers like himself that through objective 
research and rigorous analysis, economics could prove a powerful engine 
behind their cause. As it was, the vogue for planning "has about 
destroyed the religion I have lived by through the years," Knight 
contended, " the faith that utterance which tries to say something will 
tend in the famous long-run to win out over that which tries to sound 
interesting and important." Knight felt "irritation, bitterness, 
mounting to anger" as he read the exhortations of the planners and 
claimed to have been justifiably provoked by the eloquent pleas "to 
join a glorious crusade - the concrete nature and purpose of which is 
to begin to be discussed after everybody has joined up!" While Knight 
admitted that the arousing of public interest did serve an important 
function, the problem was that it monopolised the discussion on planning 
to the detriment of any analytical, problem-solving approach. "Social 
discussion does require the two sorts of attack," Knight advised, "and 
it _is important ... to keep the relations between the two in some sort 
of order." Overall, however, Knight believed that the moment was not
96. Ibid., 475.
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propitious for planning, given that social and economic statistics
in America were not developed, refined or full enough to merit it.
Referring to their personal disagreement, Knight admitted deriving 
no pleasure from Tugwell's address. The oration challenged his funda­
mental confidence in economics as a discipline with accepted methodologies 
and standards. "I am fighting my best," he wrote, "not to give up that 
there is no distinction between sense and nonsense in economics other 
than the test of what sells in the changing whims of intellectual and 
literary fashion." Equally important were the ramifications of this 
growing schism in the economics fraternity between propagandists and 
empiricists, for if "two professors of economics cannot talk understand­
ably, what chance is there for 'society* to reach the utmost minimum
98of like-mindedness requisite for any integrated organization?"
Undoubtedly, the central planners' proposals did lack the necessary
precision and detail. While they clearly favoured a planned economy
with "control from the top", the nature of that control, the way it
would be achieved and the objectives for which it was intended were
left vaguely defined. The sponsors of particular plans admitted as
much when they defended their proposals as "targets" and catalysts
99for further discussion. Rexford Tugwell, who never proposed a spec­
ific plan, regretted that most so-called 'planners' were not entitled 
to the "contemporary familiarity" with which they employed "loaded 
phrases whose content is altogether unexplored". National planning 
could only assume reality when "serious study begins to replace 
enthusiasm", and to this end, Tugwell enquired of George Soule whether
97. Knight's emphasis.
98. Frank H. Knight to Rexford G. Tugwell, 23, 26 September, 3 October, 
1932. Tugwell MSS: Box 2. 9
99. Beard, 'A Five-Year Plan for America', op.cit., 4. Chase, 'A Ten- 
Year Plan for America', op.cit., 1.
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The New Republic was prepared to finance an investigation into the 
feasibility of applying planning approaches to the existing economic 
and governmental structure. "It is perfectly evident," Tugwell wrote, 
"that more careful and elaborate orientation is a necessary preliminary 
to any attempt at expansion or redirection."**^ Soule himself recog­
nised in retrospect a basis for the collectivists’ interest in national 
planning:
Brand-newness was good, since all we had known seemed to do us 
little service, and anyway we were sick of talking about the 
familiar. Change was good, since we didn't like what we had. 
Inevitability of change was particularly good, since it appeared 
to mean that we did not have to worry about effectuating the 
change. 1
The sociologist, Eduard Lindeman believed that the word ’planning' had
been degraded through misuse and had become "a mere symbol", while
Wesley C. Mitchell, chairman of the Hoover committee on Recent Social
Trends felt that the collectivists' appeals were premature. "The best
which any group of economic planners can do with the data now at hand,
bulky but inadequate, is to lay plans for making plans," he advised.
"To work out schemes which could be taken seriously as a guide to
production and distribution would require the long collaboration of
102thousands of experts from thousands of places."
One other factor militated against the realisation of the national 
planners' aspirations - the attitude of the business community. 
Businessmen's reactions were important because of a fundamental paradox 
which belay the collectivists' position. Although many favoured 
ultimately the socialisation of the means of production and the direc­
tion of the economy through public agencies, their willingness to make
100. Tugwell, 'The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Laissez- 
Faire' , op.cit., 76. Rexford G. Tugwell to J.R. Brackett, 11 
April, 1931. Rexford G. Tugwell to George Soule, 22 October,
1932. Tugwell MSS: Boxes 1 and 2.
101. George Soule, The Coming American Revolution (London, 1934): 192.
102. Eduard C. Lindeman, 'Planning: Orderly Method for Social Change',
The Annals 162 (July 1932): 18. Recent Social Trends, op.cit.,1:xxxi.
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a short-term compromise with private interests made them reliant on 
the goodwill of the business community which was crucial to any central 
planning proposal which involved voluntary action. This support was 
not forthcoming at the Senate Committee on Manufactures hearing on the 
establishment of a national economic council in late 1931. Deprived 
of this influential support, the boom for nationwide, central planning 
was to dissipate as the less controversial alternative of trade assoc- 
iationism captured legislators’ attention during 1932.
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CHAPTER 5: THE MOVEMENT TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL,
1931-1932: CENTRAL PLANNING AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSENSUS
Writing in April 1931 of the increased interest in the establishment of
an economic council in the United States, Lewis L. Lorwin, an economist
attached to Brookings Institution, reflected that "within six months it
has pushed its way out of a vague subconscious into the open forum of
public discussion and legislative consideration".* Lorwin himself
had been a proponent of the creation of a central coordinating agency
during the 1920s and had used the American Economic Association's annual
conference at Chicago in 1928 as a platform to urge economists to promote 
2the idea. At Chicago, Lorwin predicted that within five to ten years
national planning would be one of the "topics of the day", but by 1931
he recognised that his earlier prediction had been pessimistic and that
the issue was already attracting excited concern. Lorwin attributed
this to four factors: first, the ongoing concern about'sick' industries
which were unable to stabilise their operations unilaterally; second,
the anxiety about technological unemployment and the likely continuance
of this trend; third, the stock market crisis of 1929, and the subsequent
depression which gave national planning "its longest push" by providing
Americans with "a rude awakening from an economic trance", and finally,
organised labour's support for a national economic council at its
3convention of 1930.
Lorwin's enthusiasm at the prospects for the establishment of an 
economic council stemmed from the introduction of a bill by Sen.
1. Lewis L. Lorwin, 'A Federal Economic Council: Concrete Suggestions 
for a Program of Economic Planning', New Republic 66 (29 April,
1931): 294.
2. Paul H. Douglas, et al., 'Discussion: "The Russian Economic Sit­
uation'", American Economic Review 19 (March 1929): 120-122 (Supp.)
3. Lewis L. Lorwin, 'France-Germany Have Economic Councils', Journal 
of Electrical Workers and Operators, January 1931: 10.
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Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., on 20 February, 1931, to achieve that
4purpose. The measure was referred to the Senate Committee on Manu­
factures, a subcommittee of which, chaired by LaFollette, held hearings 
on the bill 'daring'' October and December of the same year. The bill 
sought to create a National Economic Council composed of fifteen unsal­
aried members serving for four-year terms, sponsored by business, labour 
and agricultural organisations, appointed by the President and confirmed 
by Senate. The Council's duties would be to analyse economic trends, 
identify problem areas and formulate stabilisation measures. It would 
make its information and advice available to any private economic 
organisations which wished to use the Council's expertise, and deliver 
annual reports to the President and Congress with recommendations for 
necessary legislation or other action. The Council would have no 
mandatory powers other than the authority to summon witnesses to give 
testimony. "It is based on the theory that through cooperation, through 
the exercise of influence, some check upon unsound economic trends 
might be achieved," LaFollette explained.^
The establishment of a national economic council was one aspect 
of LaFollette'¿legislative programme to counter the depression which 
included federal unemployment insurance, increased public works expen­
diture, unemployment relief disbursed by the Federal Government and a
4. S.6215. Senator LaFollette's bill’.was not unique but received the 
most publicity and.made the most^rogress. In the First Session
of the 71st Congress, Reps. Louis Ludlow (Indiana), Thomas R. Amlie 
(Wisconsin) and Seymour H. Person (Michigan) introduced bills to 
establish an economic council or an industrial commission.
H.R.5317, H.R.8933, H.R.9315.
5. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 
599.
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shorter working week. He was convinced of the need for Congress to 
assume the initiative given the absence of effective leadership from 
either the President or the business community. The administration 
lacked the will to act. ''Timidity" had marked the course of Hoover's 
presidency "at a time when heroic courage and a bold frankness were 
necessary". Neither had the business community asserted effective 
leadership. Its response to the depression of production curtailment, 
redundancies and wage reductions, had only served to exacerbate the 
situation.^ In the circumstances "emergency measures" were justified 
to conserve past social gains and protect future prospects. Central to 
a progressively increasing standard of living was the creation of a 
Council which would guide national economic development. The organis­
ation would help to mitigate the fluctuations of the business cycle 
through its advice about those destructive economic trends responsible 
for booms and slumps. Had a Council been in existence during the 1920s, 
LaFollette believed that it would have detected overexpansion of 
industrial plant, stock speculation and maldistribution of income, and 
warned of the likelihood of an imminent depression.^ "The Federal 
Government may be unable to prevent depressions," LaFollette admitted.
"But when a depression is obviously approaching it is the duty of those
8in authority at Washington to put up the storm signals." Like other 
collectivists, LaFollette was an experimentalist who offered no perfect 
blueprint for national planning. His bill was vague, and even evasive.
6. Press Release, ’Remarks of Robert M. LaFollette in Opening Round 
Table Discussion of Unemployment and Industrial Stabilization' - 
National Progressive Conference, 12 March, 1931. LaFollette Family 
MSS: Series C, Box 431 File, Progressive Conference, Remarks.
Rob'éfC LaFollette, Jr., 'The President and Unemployment', Nation 
133 (15 July, 1931): 62.
7. Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., 'Progressive Statemanship in America',
Speech at St. Louis, 13 November, 1931. LaFollette Family MSS: 
Series C, Box 555 File, Progressive Statesmanship. ^
8 . Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., 'National Radio Forum Address', 14 March, 
1932. I b i d F i l e ,  Speech Drafts, 1930-1932.
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The role of the Federal Government in the Council was left undefined
and the means by which the organisation would promote stabilisation
remained unclear. It seems that suasion through expertise was the
means by which LaFollette envisaged the Council would exercise influence.
The central body would relay its information and advice to private and
public agencies for them to act upon.
There was extensive preliminary preparation on behalf of the bill.
LaFollette used the National Progressive Conference of March 1931,of
which he was a sponsor, to develop his ideas. Although chairman of the
Conference's subcommittee on public works, he involved himself in the
discussions of the subcommittee on Planning for Stabilized Industry
in the company of Stuart Chase, J.M. Clark, Lewis Lorwin, Basil Manly,
Sumner Slichter, Edwin S. Smith, J. Russell Smith, George Soule and
gLeo Wolman. LaFollette sought the advice of Conference members as
to the timing and character of the hearings on his economic council
bill and invited several to testify before the Manufactures subcommittee.
Witnesses were carefully orchestrated beforehand through the offices
of Catholic 'progressive' Dr. John Ryan, who acted as intermediary
for LaFollette.^ Although headline space in the press was dominated
by the visit to the United States of the French Prime Minister, Pierre
9. 'Outline of Report agreed upon at meeting of subcommittee on Planning 
for Stabilized Industry.1., 5 June, 1931. Ibid., Box 431 File,
Committee Correspondence. Bruce Bliven to George W. Norris, 6 
January, 1932. Norris HSSzBox 69 File 12, A-I. The National Pro­
gressive Conference of 11—12 March, 1931, was summoned by the 
'progressive' Republican bloc in Senate including LaFollette 
(Wisconsin), George W. Norris (Nebraska), Edward P. Costigan 
(Colorado), Bronson Cutting (New Mexico) and Burton K. Wheeler 
(Montana). Its purpose was to bring together 'progressive' econ­
omists, labour leaders and businessmen to formulate an alternative, 
remedial legislative programme for short-term economic recovery
and long-term industrial stabilisation. A committee on Stabilized 
Industry was established which met throughout 1931 and published 
its eventual report in the New Republic in January 1932.
10. Robert M. LaFollette to Stuart Chase, Sidney Hillman, George Soule, 
Lee Wolman, 15 April, 1931. LaFollette Family MSS: Series C, Box 
431 File, Committee Correspondence. Paul Wetfink to Robert M. 
LaFollette, Jr., 9, 13, 15 October, 1931. Ibid., Box 9 File, S-W, 
1931.
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Laval, and by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the LaFollette
committee investigations generated considerable interest. Isador
Lubin, LaFollette's assistant during the hearings, was gratified that
over 2,000 copies of the hearings were distributed within two months
and that the printing of several thousand more vase justified.^'
Outwardly, it would appear that LaFollette's bill had a fair chance
of passage. In the first place, it was confessedly moderate, avoiding
any implication of control over economic activity by the proposed
Council. Second, the bill took as its model the planning precedents
of two democratic nations, Germany and France,which established councils
in 1920 and 1925 respectively, rather than the ideologically-alien
practices of the Soviet Union. If other democracies could champion
the idea of a central economic agency without sacrificing economic
liberty for regimentation and private rights for public purpose, there
seemed no reason why the United States should not follow their example.
Finally, the bill's sponsors were confident that their measure would
draw on a broad spectrum of influential support - amongst organised
labour, the collectivist intelligentsia and the business community.
The Executive Council of the A.F. of L. included recommendations
for the establishment of an economic council in its annual reports to
12the organisation's three conventions between 1930 and 1932. In the 
summer of 1931, Federation vice-president, Matthew Uoll called for an 
"American Industrial Congress", representative of all organised economic 
groups which would consider "a warm blooded ten year plan based on 
democratic realism", and a permanent institutional structure to give
11. Isador Lubin to Dr. Lawrence H. Seltzer, 23 April, 1932. Isador 
Lubin MSS; Box 6 File, Personal Correspondence 1924-1933, F.D.R.L. 12*
12. Proceedings, 52nd Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1930, op.cit., 61.
Proceedings, 53rd Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1931, op.cit.,
81-82. Proceedings, 54th Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1932,
op.cit., 33-34.
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the plan effect. Labour's particular interest in national planning 
lay in the expectation that a planning agency would recognise the 
mutuality of interests between business and labour and promote mutually 
beneficial programmes. 'Advanced' spokesmen, such as Sidney Hillman, 
who had deserted the 'voluntarism' of Samuel Gompers, looked forward
even to the regulation of working hours and wages under a national
i • 14planning agency.
The testimony of union representatives at the LaFollette hearings 
was generally favourable to the establishment of a national economic 
council. William Green regarded it as "a necessary step that should 
be taken as quickly as possible", while John L. Lewis found himself 
"in complete accord" with the objects of the legislation. Lewis 
believed that the council would be of "inestimable value" in providing 
objective analysis of economic problems and in formulating constructive 
programmes for both the private and public sectors.^ Labour spokesmen 
stressed the need for vigorous leadership to overcome depressed business 
conditions and criticised the business elite for failing to respond 
effectively to economic challenges. "No leadership has come from 
industry, finance, or from any other source to which we have a right 
to look," Hillman charged, and the labour leader could see no prospect 
of any vigorous leadership emerging until definite responsibility for 
action was assigned. Industry's failure made it incumbent upon govern­
ment to assume responsibility in initiating the planning process.*^
13. Matthew Well, 'Press Release' nd. Pres. Box 92 File, Business - 
Stabilization Plans June-July, 1931. H.H.L.
14. Hillman, 'Unemployment Reserves', op.cit., 668-669.
15. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 
607; 624. 16
16. Ibid., 435.
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Trade unionists expressed scant confidence in the trade association
approach to planning. Not only was any approach to planning exclusively
associated with the business community suspect in the view of labour,
but the particular approach was flawed by its lack of comprehensiveness.
William Green, while in favour of revision of the antitrust laws,
felt that industry could not regularise production and employment on
its own initiative because of the existence of factors which affected
the economic situation and were outside of industry's immediate control.
Labour leaders stressed the theme of interdependence between industries
that would negate effective planning by individual industries. "The
real problem confronting us affects all industries," Hillman asserted,
17"and it is not within the power of any industry to right itself."
The LaFollette approach to planning had one further virtue for 
labour spokesmen: it permitted democratic participation in the planning 
process. The proposed economic council would permit a voice in deter­
mining economic policy to organised labour and other groups currently 
excluded from participation in the decision-making process. "The 
great need in this country is not so much the control of group interests 
over other group interests," David M. Robertson, the president of the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, contended, "but the need 
is that every group of interests may know the relation of other group 
interests to its interest and be able to point out the dangers and 
injustices of policies of far-reaching effect which are promoted only 
to advance the selfish interests of one group." The alternative to 
democratic planning was the vesting of greater authority in already 
privileged groups which had not used their power for either the public 
welfare or their own long-term interests since the onset of the depression.
17. Ibid., 435: 601.
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At worst, according to Sidney Hillman, any organisation of a national
economic council based on other than democratic principles would lead
„ , . 18 to fascism.
Central planning was crucial to the economic reforms demanded by
the collectivist intelligentsia. Collectivists were dissatisfied with
the Hoover administration's cautious anti-depression programme and
sceptical of the proposals advanced by the business planners which relied
on trade associationism. As LaFollette understood, they omitted control
of important economic forces such as government fiscal, monetary and
foreign trade policy which had a direct effect upon economic activity
19but which lay outside the control of industry itself. Frances
Perkins endorsed this viewpoint in her testimony before the Manufactures
subcommittee. Discrete planning by independent units of production had
been unsuccessful in promoting revival since individual efforts were
continually bedevilled by extraneous factors: so futile.had industry's
efforts been that "one is almost tempted to make the flippant remark
20that the Government could not do it any worse".
If the proposals of the business planners were implemented, the 
result would be detrimental to the public interest since it would be 
tantamount to 'planning for stagnation'. Collectivists believed that 
in their attempt to stabilise conditions, trade associations would limit
9
output to the existing market at the existing price and would perpetuate
21poverty and unemployment. A more satisfactory alternative was to 
promote the general welfare by enhancing the standard of living through
18. Ibid., 434; 438.
19. Ibid., 393.
2°. Ibid., 140-141.
21. Testimony of George Soule, Ibid., 462. See also New Republic 68 
(11 November, 1931): 338-339.
planning. As such, planning must be not only national'in scope, but
should consider aspects which went beyond or against the material
interests of industrial stabilisation in order to advance the goals
of security and leisure for the working man. Only a national economic
council would have this breadth of vision and purpose to successfully
effectuate planning for socially-desirable ends, and accordingly, The
New Republic suggested that LaFollette's measure "overshadows in
22ultimate importance anything else which Congress may do".
As for the functions of a national council, collectivists advanced 
deliberately moderate suggestions appropriate for a representative body 
with advisory powers. George Soule felt that it could begin by making 
regional studies of income level and industrial activity, locating 
'problem* sectors and where necessary, considering schemes to rehabil­
itate such industries and the incomes of communities dependent upon 
them. Appropriate recommendations would be drafted for legislative 
consideration. The council would also endeavour to influence industrial 
production and investment. In consultation with major industries the 
council would formulate a long-term expansionist production programme 
with the objective of enlarging mass purchasing power while new invest­
ment would be regulated, not by fiat, but through recommendation and 
the publication of information on investment desirability and poten­
tiality in specific sectors. Finally, the council would consider ways 
by which economic and social needs could be harmonised through govern­
ment public works projects and housing programmes - "ways of meeting 
the fundamental demands of the population which were not being met 
under the ordinary stimulation of competitive business for profit,"
22. Ibid., 68 (16 December, 1931): 121.
223
Soule reflected. Although the council's most valuable work would be 
of a long-term nature, it had an importance in the short-run since the 
mere existence of a central planning body composed of prestigious 
individuals would inspire confidence in businessmen, investors and
2 Aconsumers alike even before specific programmes had been formulated.
Collectivists denied any radical intentions in their advocacy of 
central planning and emphasised the advisory and representative features 
provided for in the LaFollette proposal. However, for many collectivists 
the establishment of an advisory council was a preliminary stage which 
would be superceded by a mode of planning more public and mandatory 
in application, in which the Federal Government provided the directing 
force. Rexford Tugwell was not convinced of the utility of the advisory 
council provided for in the LaFollette bill. "An advisory council might 
guess, but it could not plan," Tugwell felt, "and the difference between 
guessing and planning is the difference between laissez-faire and social 
control." Without control, the council would be unable to eliminate uncer­
tainty and be incapable of making both accurate predictions and the 
plans to fulfil them. Furthermore, Tugwell feared that the council 
would be hampered by favouritism and interest-group manipulation until 
it "will not dare call its soul its own, nor speak its mind in any 
emergency". Nevertheless, he regarded even the establishment of an 
emasculated and ineffective agency as a significant step which would 
serve as a focus for further progression and which would have consequences 
contrary to the expectations of sponsors of the council idea within the 
business community. "In spite of its innocuous nature, the day on which
23. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 
461-462. 24*
24. Guy Greer, 'A General Staff for Business: What it Could Do to
Prevent Depressions', Outlook and Independent 156 (31 December,
1930): 718.
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it comes into existence will be a dangerous one for business, just as 
the founding day of the League of Nations was a dangerous one for 
nationalism," Tugwell suggested. "There may be a long and lingering 
death, but it must be regarded as inevitable." Planning had an inex­
orable logic in which the ascendancy of government at the expense of
private property rights would be the ultimate conclusion from such an
25inauspicious beginning.
Others echoed Tugwell's sentiments about the LaFollette proposal. 
Stuart Chase described it as a practical beneficial "opening wedge" 
for planning and prophesied that "its provisions will be modified as 
evolution forces it .... The important thing is to begin." Leo 
Wolman regarded the question of who was to establish the Council as 
being academic since any organisation created would eventually come 
under the aegis of the government. Government assistance would lead 
to regulation as business requested governmental sanctions to secure 
compliance in its programmes and ultimately, while Wolman did not 
envisage government control of industry, the Federal Government would 
become an initiating agency in its own right in the planning process. 
George Soule was ambivalent about the degree of government intervention 
in national planning. While he recommended the creation of a Council 
with no administrative powers at the outset, Soule hoped that the nature 
of its advice to Congress would increase government's involvement in
25. Tugwell, 'The Principle of Planning and the Institution of 
Laissez-Faire', op.cit., 84-92. Idem, Discourse in Depression, 
op.cit.
26. Stuart Chase, The Campaign and Economic Planning! A Radio Address 
delivered on 10 May, 1932, over N.B.C. (Chicago, 1932): 6-7; 10. 
Idem, A New Deal, op.cit., 220. 27
27. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 
293-294.
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the economy, particularly in 'problem' sectors such as coal where
28nationalisation was appropriate.
Collectivists accepted what they considered to be an unsatisfactory 
planning measure in the expectation that, with time, the economic council 
would more nearly conform to their own ideas of national planning. The 
inability of an advisory council to plan effectively would thrust the 
Federal Government into a more prominent role within it and as public 
participation increased so would the elements of coercion that were 
absent in LaFollette's voluntary measure. Businessmen were not blind 
to such possible consequences arising from the establishment of a national 
economic council and it was this fear of eventual government domination 
of the agency that prevented wholehearted business support for LaFollette's 
measure. Without an enthusiastic business consensus behind the bill, 
it had little chance of enactment.
The movement to establish a national economic council or commission 
was supported by various elements of the business community whether as 
individuals, formal organisations or ad hoc groupings. The crux of 
their position was that an advisory council, sponsored‘by government 
but staffed by representative groups from the private sector could 
foster stable business conditions by publicising the results and recom­
mendations of its researches. In conjunction with reform of the anti­
trust laws, the council would seek to further industrial coordination 
and cooperation to achieve a 'balanced prosperity'.
This was the goal of the American Institute of Industrial Coord­
ination, brainchild of magazine editor, B.C. Forbes and Benjamin Javits.
The Institute sought to popularise the need for antitrust law reform 
and the creation of an Industrial Coordination Commission under federal
28. Ibid., 461-463.
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auspices. Manny Strauss, president of the Bankers’ Industrial
Corporation, was chosen as chairman of a Special Advisory Committee
which held its first meeting on 5 March, 1929, in Washington, D.C.
attended by a small but "representative" group of industrialists,
29labour leaders and economists. As chairman Strauss wrote to Hoover’s 
secretary in offering his help to organise a national Commission, the 
aim of such an agency would be to "stabilize prosperity" and "eliminate 
the high and low peaks in the employment situation". Javits seized 
the opportunity presented by the stock market Crash to request that 
Secretary Lamont summon a conference to create an organisation represen­
tative of all functional groups in industry and which would be devoted 
to "the gradual spreading of prosperity and the eventual elimination 
of poverty, ignorance and disease through industry". Hoover’s 
White House conferences gave encouragement that the President sympath­
ised with the method of industrial coordination and Javits advised 
him to consider antitrust revision to supplement "the forward movement 
of team-play" which had been inaugurated. While the Institute of 
Industrial Coordination became moribuad after 1929, Javits continued 
to urge Hoover to "mobilize" a "Congress of Industry". The failure 
of the White House conferences, he wrote in 1931, had been a "terrible 
blow" which the President had not deserved and was due to the "ignorance
29. 'Minutes of Conference of Special Advisory Committee on Industrial 
Coordination', 5 March, 1929. Benjamin A. Javits to George 
Akerson, 25 July, 1929. Pres., Box 334 File, Unemployment Corres­
pondence. H.H.L.
30. Manny Strauss to George Akerson, 9 July, 8 August, 1929. Ibid.
31. Benjamin A. Javits to Robert P. Lamont, 4 November, 1929. Ibid., 
Box 336 File, Unemployment Correspondence. 32*
32. Benjamin A. Javits to Herbert Hoover, 29 November, 1929. Ibid.,
Box 92 File, President's Business Conference.
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or selfishness" of business leaders who had not comprehended the needs 
of the time. Nevertheless, Javits was confident that subsequent exper­
ience had converted the business leadership to reason and any renewed
33effort by the President would meet with greater success.
The depression inspired numerous calls from business spokesmen 
for the establishment of economic councils. Nathan B. Williams, former 
counsel for the N.A.M., suggested that a series of economic councils 
be instituted to liaise between industries and government, while Paul 
Mazur preferred a unitary body which he hoped would evolve "to the
same position in the treatment of economic problems that the United
. 34States Supreme Court has attained in the treatment of legal matters .
Two prominent executives of trade associations in the steel industry,
Charles F. Abbott and Granville P. Rogers, gave their approval to the
establishment of a central economic agency in 1930. Abbott called for
an "impartial jury of competent men" drawn from business, labour and
professional economists which would make an intensive study of economic
trends and publicise its findings for industry - mobilised in trade
associations - to act upon. Rogers envisaged that an economic council
would rest at the apex of a tier system of business organisation, the
lower levels of which would comprise trade associations. The council
itself would be staffed by trade association executives and would work
33. Benjamin A. Javits to Herbert Hoover, 18 December, 1931. Benjamin 
A. Javits to Lawrence Richey, 31 December, 1931. Ibid., Box 336 
File, Unemployment Correspondence.
34. Nathan B. Williams, 'Advisory Councils to Government', The Annals 
147 (January 1930): 146-149. Paul Mazur, New Roads to Prosperity: 
The Crisis and Some Ways Out (New York, 1931): 138-143. 35
35. Iron Trade Review 86 (24 April, 1930): 58.
through these organisations to effectuate proposals aimed at remedying
business problems such as excess capacity and 'cutthroat' competition.
Specific proposals were advanced by two allies of the business 
community in politics and education, William Gibbs McAdoo and Wallace 
B. Donham. In an address before the Economic Conservation Committee 
of America at San Francisco on 4 June, 1931, McAdoo urged the creation 
of a "peace industries board" to stabilise conditions in industry and 
agriculture, prevent waste in industry and relieve unemployment. McAdoo' 
recommendations closely paralleled those of LaFollette's. The board 
would be representative in nature drawing its membership from business, 
industry and commerce, agriculture and labour, and would serve in a 
purely advisory capacity having no mandatory authority except the power 
to summon witnesses and investigate any industry it chose. McAdoo 
suggested specific and general objectives for the agency. In the first 
instance it would consider proposals to rectify imbalance that had 
occurred between production and consumption and second, would seek to 
discover a "new formula for human needs" in which industry would be 
"devoted primarily to supplying human needs, and secondarily, to 
profits". To secure the support of industry and facilitate implemen­
tation of the board's recommendations, Congress would provide relief
from the antitrust laws to facilitate cooperation through trade
. . 37associations.
McAdoo was reluctant to publicise his recommendations since he 
recognised that President Hoover had "gone to an extreme" in appointing 
ineffectual committees and boards. However, while appreciating that
36. Ibid., 86 (8 May, 1930): 64.
3 6
37. New York Times, 5 June, 1931.
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his proposal lacked substance and required elaboration, he was moved
to action by his conviction that serious consideration of "fundamental
changes in the existing order" were necessary and that his initiative
38might provoke meaningful discussion.
Dean Donham developed his proposals for the creation of an 
"Economic General Staff" during 1931 and 1932 in his two major works 
Business Adrift (1931) and Business Looks at the Unforeseen (1932). .
The Staff would constitute a "central thinking agency" which would 
anticipate the evolution of economic trends and suggest mechanisms 
to facilitate adaptation and insulate or compensate groups affected by 
economic change. Composed of representatives of government, business 
and labour, the Staff would make recommendations for the consideration 
of the Federal Government and a Business Congress chosen by and respon­
sible to leading industries and trade associations. Once the agency’s 
recommendations were approved by government and business they would be 
put into effect by trade associations which would ensure conformity 
within their particular industries. To facilitate effective trade
association activity, Donham recommended reconsideration of the 
39antitrust laws.
Donham's reluctance to vest his central agency with broad authority 
stemmed from his concern to preserve individualism and his convictions 
about the stultifying effects of bureaucracies. Successful planning 
depended upon "whether or not we can set up a group of really able 
men without power to enforce their views". Power would entail the
38. William Gibbs McAdoo to George W. Armstrong, 8 June, 1931.
William Gibbs McAdoo to Raphael Herman, 10 June, 1931. William 
Gibbs McAdoo to Bernard Baruch, 10 June, 1931. William Gibbs 
McAdoo MSS: Box 359. Library of Congress. 39*
39. Donham, Business Adrift, op.cit., 126-176. Idem, Business Looks
at the Unforeseen, op.cit., 49-50.
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creation of bureaucracies with their inherent conservatism and stifling 
effect on individual initiative. Hence, whatever influence was exerted 
necessarily should not be coercive, but "through the weight of 
conclusions".^
Bernard Baruch added his imprimatur to the cause of central planning 
in an address at a reunion dinner of W.I.B. staff-members in November 
1931. While Baruch rejected any resurrection of the wartime agency for 
peacetime purposes, he endorsed the central planning approach and recom­
mended the creation of two central agencies to promote it. An advisory 
economic council and a "high court of commerce" would work in tandem 
to stabilise business conditions. While the council would forecast 
and make recommendations for business to act upon, the court - which 
Baruch envisaged as a division of the F.T.C. - would specifically address 
itself to promoting stability in problem areas of the economy. Baruch 
advised that the court be empowered to grant licenses in sectors where 
overproduction or uneconomic competition was prevalent in order to 
enable firms to maintain an effective control over output through
.41cooperation.
This groundswell of business support for a national economic
council was reinforced by the report of the U*S. Chamber of Commerce#
Committee on the Continuity of Business and Employment, published in 
October 1931. In compiling its report, the Committee circularised a 
questionnaire to leading trade association executives to ascertain 
their opinions of a National Economic Planning Board. Of the small 
percentage replying (19%) the majority were favourable, but stipulated 
that while representative in character, the Board should be established
40. Wallace B. Donham, 'Can Planning be Effective without Control?',
The Annals 162 (July 1932): 5. 41
41. New York Times, 12 November, 1931.
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by business rather than government. Chamber members also insisted
that the Board should work in conjunction with trade associations and
that the antitrust laws be modified to facilitate the enactment of
42the Board's programmes. In the event, 81% of the Chamber's voting 
membership endorsed the creation of a central planning agency in the 
referendum on the Committee's recommendations, thereby determining 
official Chamber policy.
Business sympathy for an economic council did not extend to support 
of the proposals of the collectivists for central planning. Spokesmen 
objected that collectivists' schemes were too derivative from the Soviet 
experience and would jeopardise liberty, independent initiative and 
property rights if implemented. Also they claimed that the proposals 
were unsubstantiated, impracticable and threatened to diminish the 
credibility of all forms of industrial planning by association in the 
popular mind. Barron's decried the outbreak of "pink rash" that had 
emerged from the interest of some extremists in Russian economic planning, 
while Forbes believed that the Russian example acted as "a bogey man 
to stimulate action through fright". Individual plans were condemned 
for their thoughtless borrowing from the Soviet experience and their 
disregard for the threats to liberty that such copying posed. Of the 
Beard Plan Barron's reflected that "it borrows everything from Russia 
except the firing squad - and it will have to borrow that also to go 
over in a big way". The collectivists' appeal to the American planning 
tradition in the form of the War Industries Board was false, since the 
circumstances in peacetime were entirely different. "Only in the 
remotest figurative sense are we at war with anything or anybody now," 42*
42. 'Replies to Questionnaire on National Economic Planning Board', 
Memorandum from Julius H. Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 4 September,
1931. Pres., Box 95 File, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. H.H.L.
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Barron's contended. Even if national planning was desirable and accept­
able as an ideal, it would be unfortunate if it was considered on the 
"unsound, impractical and deadening" grounds provided by the collec­
tivists which promoted "political agitation" rather than disinterested 
deliberation. In sum, the collectivists' proposals were empty, poten­
tially dangerous and counter-productive in terms of effecting national
planning. "As rhetoric these calls to arms are excellent," Barron* s
A 3commented, "and pure rhetoric, unfortunately, gets us nowhere."
Business support for an economic council was conditional. The 
most significant qualification was that the role of government should 
be minimal. Collectivists were not alone in appreciating the likelihood 
of progressively greater governmental involvement in its proceedings. 
However, unlike the collectivists, businessmen regarded the prospect 
with distaste. In an essay of 1932, Alfred P. Sloan, president of 
General Motors, warned that the creation of a national economic council 
might lead to increased government intervention in the affairs of 
industry. While he conceded that the suggestion of economic planning 
through a central agency was not "bootless", he was adamant that any 
organisation established be staffed by a small number of individuals, 
successful in their fields and who had a direct responsibility to 
industry. "I should like to see the problem approached from the stand­
point of industry in Government - not from the standpoint of Government 
in industry," Sloan asserted. If an economic council provided an 
"entering wedge'! for political control of industry, the organisation 
would become "a distinct liability".^ Business spokesmen insisted
43. Barron's 11 (26 January, 1931): 16; Ibid., 11 (29 June, 1931):
16; Ibid., 12 (30 May, 1932): 14. Forbes 28 (1 July, 1931): 9. 
Warren Bishop, 'The Rain of Plans', Nation's Business 19 (August, 
1931): 35-36; 102-103. 4*
44. Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., 'Common Sense and Common Nonsense', in
Crowther (ed.), A Basis for Stability, op.cit., 68-69.
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that any council should remain within the orbit of business and were 
reluctant to grant representation to other groups outside of the 
business community. A related concern was that the council should have 
no mandatory authority but rather be advisory in character. The prospect 
of a council with coercive power which was vulnerable to government 
expropriation was threatening to the business community.
Although the LaFollette bill made no explicit provision for govern­
ment representation on the Council and provided it with no mandatory 
authority, business spokesmen were sensitive to long-term tendencies.
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle questioned the prospective role 
of government and suggested that its power would increase with time 
until the advisory body became transformed into a legal entity with 
the authority to enforce its opinions. If the advisory body proved 
ineffectual "the great danger is that there shall soon come a demand 
that 'teeth' be put into the 'Council'," the journal editorialised, 
at which point the agency would "tear and rend" the economic fabric.4"* 
Barron^ warned that although the bill appeared "innocent" by limiting 
the Council to advisory functions, businessmen's experience with other 
commissions, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, invited circum­
spection. Past experience demonstrated how such agencies could 
acquire authority and pose threats to private property interests, and 
businessmen should exercise caution towards the LaFollette proposal 
in case it was "another plot to steal away the little liberty still 
left" . 46
Business spokesmen stipulated also that any economic council 
should work in conjunction with trade associations which would effectuate
45. Commercial and Financial Chronicle 133 (24 October, 1931):
2652-2654.
46. Barronb 11 (28 December, 1931): 14
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the recommendations of the central body and would remain under the 
jurisdiction of businessmen themselves. As such, this enjoining of 
trade associationism and central planning had practical and political 
connotations. It was both a means of providing a mechanism to effect 
planning programmes and to ensure that the planning process remained 
in the control of the business community. Electrical World, for example, 
believed that the LaFollette bill was flawed because the economic council 
could state principles only and had not the means to apply and enforce 
them. "Stabilization is not only a matter of theory or principle," 
the journal advised, "it requires direct and competent business action 
by business men." To rectify this shortcoming legislators should 
consider incorporating the Swope Plan into the economic council bill, 
staff the council with trade association executives and use their 
organisations to advance a practicable programme of business 
stabilisation.^
These reservations about the role of government, the powers of 
the council and the role of trade associations were advanced repeatedly 
by business witnesses before the Manufactures subcommittee. LaFollette 
encountered no chorus of approbation for his bill from the business 
community, despite the expressed sympathy of many spokesmen for a 
similar agency. Clearly, the reservations of businessmen weighed more 
heavily than their enthusiasm,and instead of using the hearings to 
further the cause of central planning through an economic council, they 
seized the opportunity to promote a planning approach which they con­
sidered more congenial - trade associationism.
Few representatives of business gave their unqualified approval 
to the LaFollette proposal. Paul Mazur, George J. Anderson and Charles 
F. Abbott were amongst the most sympathetic witnesses. Mazur reiterated
47. Electrical World 98 (7 November, 1931): 814.
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his support for a national planning agency revealed in his published 
works. Anderson, president of the Consolidated Coal Co., was convinced 
by his experiences in the coal industry that there was an urgent need 
to educate and form public opinion on economic issues and that an 
economic council could perform such a function. Abbott believed that 
an economic council would be "invaluable" in formulating programmes 
to apply to sectors which suffered from excess capacity such as steel 
construction. These witnesses displayed an impatience with the ongoing 
depression and the inability of business and political leadership to
. , 48discover solutions.
At the other extreme, a minority of witnesses confessed outright 
opposition to the LaFollette bill. The Washington Daily News noted 
that bankers were particularly "cold to the national economic council 
idea".^ Bankers' opposition proceeded from a respect for 'classical' 
economics and a concern that planning would interfere with natural 
economic forces and inhibit revival. Charles E. Mitchell, chairman 
of the National City Bank argued that the experience of depressions 
since the Civil War and the inevitable outcome of revival warranted 
no departure from established economic principles during the current 
crisis. Moreover, major depressions had their sources in war rather 
than in any defects of the business structure and Mitchell suggested 
with irony that the most valuable function an economic council could 
perform was to abolish war and its deleterious economic consequences. 
Previous efforts at regulating the economy had been phyrric. "Time and 
again," Mitchell asserted, "it has been proved that well-intentioned 
efforts to stay the pressure of economic readjustment have only made
48. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit.,
. 424; 476; 693-696. 49
49. Washington Daily News, 2 November, 1931.
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matters worse." Planning threatened to handicap the exercise of init­
iative and enterprise in industry, the central dynamic of American economic 
progress and the surest hope for revival from the depression. At best, 
planning could purchase stability but only at the expense of progress 
and an advancing standard of living. "This is the dilemma of any system 
of central planning," Mitchell reflected. Melvin Traylor, president of 
the First National Bank, Chicago, shared the same fears for individual 
enterprise under a system of central planning and had similar reservations 
about the consequences of government intervention. Traylor pointed to 
the failure of the Federal Farm Board to stabilise agricultural output 
by crop yield forecasting and was "frankly skeptical" that a national 
economic council could succeed for the wider economy if it employed the 
same methods. W.W. Stewart, chairman of Case, Pomeroy and Co. was unhappy 
about previous efforts by government to "tinker" with the economy through 
the planning initiatives of individual agencies. Chairman LaFollette 
enquired sardonically whether "the cure for the results of this tinkering 
is tinkering on a larger scale". "I should hope not," the banker replied. 
"I should rather see abandonment." The pessimism of the bankers about 
the value of an economic council was captured by Albert C. Wiggin, chairman 
of the Chase National Bank. Asked if anything could be done to prevent 
serious fluctuations of business activity, Wiggin replied:
I do not think so. A man only lives so many years and his 
experience lasts with him so many years. New generations 
succeed and they will make the same blunders in the next 
generation and succeeding generations as were made in the 
first.
LaFollette branded Wiggins' testimony as "a counsel of despair".^
Between the extremes of approval and hostility to the LaFollette 
proposal were the bulk of the business witnesses whose support for the
50. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit., 
372-373; 424; 476; 693-696.
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bill was qualified by a concern about the ultimate extent of government 
involvement or by a preference for the trade association approach to 
planning.
Concern about government encroachment on the functions of an economic
council was not unanimous among business witnesses. Ralph Flanders
welcomed a prominent role for government out of his conviction that
public works were crucial to any successful planning which the council
might contemplate, while Benjamin Javits regarded government participation
as indispensable for the expertise that could be utilised through the
various governmental agencies and the prestige that the council would
acquire through the government's very association with it."*' However,
this was a minority opinion. Even sympathetic witnesses such as Henry
Harriman and the textile manufacturer Henry P. Kendall had reservations
about government's role. Kendall insisted that government's activities
be restricted to collecting, collating and publishing national economic
statistics. Any regulation of business by the council was undesirable.
Harriman preferred a council independent of government, appointed and
financed by business and dependent for its effect on the prestige of its 
52members. Alfred Sloan warned that any agency created should not promote
"government getting into business". "I think that industry has got
brains enough to solve its own problems, when it appreciates them,"
Sloan continued. "I think when the Government gets into business it
53is a dangerous thing."
Business witnesses expressed their reservations about government's 
role in three ways. First, they stressed that any council must be 
advisory in nature; second, they warned of the proliferation of 5123
51. Ibid., 243-244; 544-549.
52. Ibid., 172-173; 412-413.
53. Ibid., 380-381.
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bureaucracy if government assumed a leading role and third, they haggled 
over representation on the economic council, expressing a preference 
for a business-dominated body.
Business spokesmen were adamantly opposed to any form of control 
that might be exercised through the economic council. Henry Harriman 
reiterated the Chamber's official position that the council have no 
executive authority, Benjamin Javits conditioned his support for the 
bill in that "there is nothing mandatory about it in any sense" and 
Wallace Donham, while convinced of the need for national planning, 
resented any implication of control as "the next step to sovietism" 
Regulation or control would result in a proliferation of bureaucracy, 
with inevitable increases in taxation and government inefficiency, the 
stultification of entrepreneurial initiative and violations of property 
rights. Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
was "indifferent" to the LaFollette proposal and its utility to industry, 
but sensed inherent dangers in the bill. Even if modestly confined in 
its functions to fact-finding, there were too many government departments 
already providing economic information. One more would merely add to 
bureaucratic confusion and burdens on the public treasury. Furthermore, 
close and compulsory scrutiny of private records by a national economic 
council was an unwarranted invasion of property rights and a symptom 
of "big Government". For his part, Henry Kendall feared the perpetuation 
of bureaucracy if the council was invested with regulatory power. His 
fear was that while the agency might be responsibly and ably staffed 
during the economic emergency, once revival was underway the council 
would attract individuals of lesser calibre who would retain considerable 54
54. Ibid., 172: 273; 547.
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power over private enterprise.^ Commenting editorially on the hearings,
The New York Times was unconvinced that a national economic council would
contribute anything more than those agencies already in existence and
would constitute merely "another advisory commission which could not
possibly know as much about the problems of different industries as the
56men who actually manage them".
Witnesses who favoured the establishment of a council emphasised
that it should have close links with business. Unease was expressed
at the suggestion proposed by collectivists and organised labour that
the council should be genuinely representative in character, drawing
on expertise outside of business. Henry Harriman and John Fahey advanced
the Chamber's view that the council should be organised and financed
by business. Gerard Swope felt that the council's members should be
nominated by trade associations, while Alfred Sloan believed that the
council's fortunes would depend on the industrial experience of its
members and he recommended the appointment of individuals who had
"responsibility of big industrial organizations".'*^ Even those witnesses
who granted representation to other groups, such as Wallace Donham or
Henry Kendall, provided for industrial organisations to work in tandem
58with the central body.
The overall attitude of business witnesses before the LaFollette
59committee was "interested but skeptical" The New York Times reported.
For many businessmen who appeared before the committee, it would appear
55. Ibid., 394-400; 407. See also the testimony of W.W. Stewart, 
452-453.
56. New York Times, 2 November, 1931.
57. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit.,
165; 312; 382; 486.
58. Ibid., 279-280; 414-415.
59. New York Times, 2 November, 1931.
239
that their primary aim was to use the hearings as a forum to promote 
liberalisation of the antitrust laws to facilitate the activities of 
trade associations. Witnesses such as Charles Abbott, Roscoe Edlund,
Henry Harriman and Gerard Swope, while sympathetic to an economic 
council, stressed the role of trade associations in economic planning. 
Abbott favoured changes in the antitrust laws to enable compulsory 
membership of trade associations and a system of federal licensing to 
ensure compliance to the organisation's directives. Swope, Harriman and 
Edlund regarded trade associations as providing the foundations on which 
the economic council would be based and a "two-way bridge" between the 
central planning agency and the various industries. Harriman was clear 
that successful planning could not be accomplished without resort to 
industrial cooperation through trade associations and suggested that 
modification of the antitrust laws would do "more to put business on 
a sound basis than any other thing that could happen t o d a y " . J a m e s  
A. Farrell, president of U.S. Steel and Clarence Woolley, chairman of 
the American Radiator Co., although cool to a national economic council, 
believed that antitrust revision would result in advantages for industrial 
stabilisation.^ ^
The lack of enthusiasm displayed by businessmen for the LaFollette
bill provoked the scorn of collectivists. The Nation was disappointed
that, apart from experimentation with the antitrust laws, businessmen
had presented no tangible proposals to achieve economic recovery. "Their
attitude was that business should be allowed to take care of itself,"
the journal editorialised, "which, of course, is what business has been
62doing for many years with the results we see all about us." Writing
60. Hearings, Establishment of a National Economic Council, op.cit.,
167; 170; 308-309; 312-313; 473; 702.
61. Ibid., 346; 351; 599.
62. Nation 133 (11 November, 1931): 502.
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for the same magazine, Robert S. Allen regretted that businessmen had 
displayed an unregenerate conservatism since their "outcry ... against 
government-controlled economic planning was practically unanimous". 
Isador Lubin, LaFollette's research assistant, expressed dismay at 
the ignorance of the business and financial leaders who appeared before 
the committee. "By and large," Lubin wrote, "they knew almost nothing 
about what was happening." Lubin explicitly condemned James Farrell, 
Albert Wiggin and Charles Mitchell, attributing their success to "luck 
and pull" and regarding himself as "a pretty smarty guy as compared 
with some of those dumbells". As long as men of such a stripe remained 
important in economic decision-making, Lubin doubted that innovatory 
ideas had any chance of a d o p t i o n . A s  for representatives of the 
Chamber of Commerce, Lubin confessed that he had little faith in the 
sincerity of their conversion to 'planning'. He was sceptical of the 
Chamber's willingness to establish an economic council on its own init­
iative despite the mandate from its members. One major consideration 
was that the Chamber did not have the resources to finance a project 
which required highly-qualified personnel with appropriate salaries. 
Lubin suspected that, at best, a "paper organization" would be estab­
lished or "some board which will drop in on the Chamber every now and 
then and add its signature to such things as may be gotten together by 
the staff of the Chamber".^
Although LaFollette reintroduced his bill after the conclusion of 
the hearings and other attempts were made by advocates in 1932 to revive 
enthusiasm for an economic council, no specific proposal was debated in
63. Robert S. Allen, 'Business Talks', Nation 133 (25 November, 1931):
565.
64. Isador. Lubin to Professor Joseph Willits, 23 March, 1932. Isador
Lubin to Mrs. Joseph Gilbert, 12 March, 1932. Lubin MSS: Box 6
File, Personal Correspondence 1924-1933.
65. Isador Lubin to Roscoe Edlund, 2 February, 1932. Ibid.
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Congress. The reluctance of the business community to give wholehearted 
support to LaFollette's measure appears to have been critical to its 
fortunes given the unwillingness of the Hoover administration to endorse 
the bill. Hoover indicated an interest in establishing a national 
planning organisation during his address to the Chamber of Commerce on 
1 May, 1930, when he suggested the creation of an agency representative 
of business, labour, agriculture and professional economists which would 
investigate means of achieving economic recovery and ensuring long-term 
economic growth.^ However, Hoover seems to have withdrawn from this 
position during 1931 and 1932 with the result that no encouragement for 
LaFollette was forthcoming from the administration.
P.E.C.E. officials noted the publicity generated by the advocates 
of a national economic council during the summer of 1931 but disapproved 
of the idea. The organisation's secretary, E.E. Hunt felt that such 
schemes were based on false assumptions. In the.first place, the economy 
was not homogeneous but so intricate and variegated that it would not 
be possible for a single agency to comprehend all of its detail and 
ramifications. Secondly, central planners assumed that the "intermediate 
machinery" existed for putting into practice the recommendations of 
the planning agency throughout industry, when no organisations or 
agencies had been developed for such a purpose. There were practical 
difficulties also, such as the problem of providing adequate represen­
tation for the diverse interests in the economy without making the 
council "unwieldy". At most, Hunt could envisage economic councils 
established for specific regions or industries and accepted that for 
particular problems ad hoc commissions were "excellent" economic planning
66. State Papers, op.cit., 1: 295.
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vehicles. ^  W.J. Barrett of the Industrial Division echoed these 
sentiments to trade association executives in July 1931. It was unlikely 
that national planning would "spring forth full blare" because respon­
sible parties appreciated that any agency would be dependent for its 
success on the efforts of individual industries and trade groups to 
devise plans for their specific sectors. It was the administration’s 
priority to "stimulate plans within these groups towards taking care
of the long-range problem" rather than adopt a generalised and utopian
68national planning perspective.
Hoover's own attitude to the establishment of a central planning 
agency is illustrated by his reaction to the attempts of the American 
Legion to revive the Council of National Defense, a government agency 
created by act of Congress on 29 August, 1916 during Wilson's prepared­
ness drive, but moribund since 1921.^ During 1931, Howard E. Coffin 
of the First National Bank, Detroit,and an original Council member, 
sought to revive the agency for peacetime purposes. In July, he advised 
Hoover of the parallels between the depression and the Great War,
67. E.E. Hunt to Mr. Kerlin, 21 May, 1931. R.G.73 Series 1 File,
Edward E. Hunt, Chronological Files.
68. 'Report of Trade Association Executives' Meeting', 15 July, 1931. 
Ibid., Series 7 File, Trade Association Executives' Meeting.
69. The Council was composed of cabinet members and an advisory 
commission of representatives from industry, labour, science and 
medicine. It was charged with "the coordination of industries 
and resources for the national security and welfare" and each 
member was chairman of a subcommittee for some section of industry, 
finance or social work. The Council liaised with government depart­
ments and its subdivisions at State level and reported directly to 
the President. Once the United States had become involved in the 
war, the Council voted to establish the War Industries Board on
8 July, 1917, in which Council members assumed prominent positions. 
The Act of Congress of 1916 could be reinvoked by proclamation of 
emergency and without further legislation. Soule, Prosperity 
Decade, op.cit., 10-12.
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describing the current situation as "even more fraught with potential 
disaster than was that emergency". Coffin urged Hoover to resurrect 
the Council of National Defense for which the enabling statute was still 
in effect. Its purpose would be to coordinate government agencies with 
private organisations in an effort to produce economic recovery.^
In September, Coffin's initiative was reinforced by the American Legion. 
During its annual national convention at Detroit a resolution was adopted 
by the organisation that the government resuscitate the Council and 
the Resolutions Committee petitioned the President to give the matter 
his "serious consideration".^ The issue was revived in May of the 
following year after an address by Hoover in which he called for a 
renewal of wartime purpose. The President's remarks moved Gen. Albert 
L. Cox, chairman of the defence committee of the American Legion, to 
draw up a petition containing 88 signatures of prominent figures from 
industry, finance, labour and the professions to request the reinstate­
ment of the wartime organisation. "A national emergency of the first
72magnitude exists," the petition stressed, "it needs emergency treatment." 
The name of the agency mattered less than that the "aggressive offensive
73against the spiritual slump" begin as soon as possible, Coffin asserted.
70. Howard E. Coffin to Herbert Hoover, 2, 3 July, 1931. P.P.F., Box 
18 File, Coffin, Howard. H.H.L.
71. Harry M. Arthur to Herbert Hoover, 26 September, 1931. James F. 
Barton to Herbert Hoover, 20 October, 1931. Pres., Box 350 File, 
U.S. Council of National Defense. H.H.L.
72. Albert L. Cox to Herbert Hoover, 10 June, 1932. Ibid. New York 
Times, 11 June, 1932. According to the Times "the most important 
businessmen in the country" signed the petition. This was an 
exaggeration, especially since some of the names were found to have 
been used without the individuals' consent. However, prominent 
figures did sign the petition: Howard Coffin, Edsel Ford, William 
Green, Virgil Jordan, Fred I. Kent and Matthew Woll included.
73. Howard E. Coffin to Herbert Hoover, 12 June, 1932. Pres., Box 350 
File, U.S. Council of National Defense, H.H.L.
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Hoover rejected any revival of the wartime agency for emergency 
peacetime purposes and was reinforced in his decision by the correspon­
dence of ex-Council members such as Daniel Willard who expressed no 
sympathy for the Legion's objectives.^ In defence of his decision,
Hoover cited arguments intrinsic to the Defense Council and others that 
questioned the necessity of adding a further agency to the federal bureau­
cracy. In the first place, the President denied that the law creating 
the Council allowed it the authority to have any influence on the current 
economic situation.^ It would be inappropriate, anyway. "Every problem 
requires its own organization to fit its own time and period," Hoover 
advised Howard Coffin, "and the Council of National Defense is in no 
wise fitted to this present e m e r g e n c y. A l s o,  since the Council was 
largely composed of Cabinet members, its reinstitution would place 
additional duties on government officials already overburdened with 
responsibility.^ The restoration of the agency might do more damage 
than good. Hoover warned of creating "a state of public alarm" which
would undermine the climate of confidence that the administration had
78attempted to cultivate.
Hoover also objected to any enlargement of a distended federal
bureaucracy. "I have never felt that our need is for more committees
79and commissions in Washington," he wrote in May 1932. The expertise
74. Daniel Willard to Herbert Hoover, 17 May, 1932. Copy of President's 
Press Release, 12 June, 1932. Ibid.
75. Herbert Hoover to James F. Barton, 23 October,1931. Herbert Hoover 
to General Albert L. Cox, 10 June, 1932. Ibid.
76. Herbert Hoover to Howard E. Coffin, 13 June, 1932. Ibid.
77. Herbert Hoover to Harry M. Arthur, 29 September, 1932. Ibid.
78. Herbert Hoover to Howard E. Coffin, 10 July, 1931. P.P.F., Box 4 
File, Coffin, Howard. H.H.L.
79. Herbert Hoover to F.N. Shepherd, 25 May, 1932. Pres., Box 350 
File, U.S. Council of National Defense. H.H.L.
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and organisation in existing government departments, agencies and
particularly, P.O.U.R., would be merely duplicated by any new agency.
Hoover charged Coffin with failing to appreciate the extent of the
organisation already functioning in Washington and throughout the country
in the administration's attempt to halt the depression, and emphasised
that the establishment of another agency "would add a fifth wheel to
81an already much taxed coach".
While Hoover never addressed himself directly to the LaFollette 
proposal for the creation of a national economic council, his attitude 
to the Defense Council leaves no doubt that he was satisfied that an 
additional planning organisation would be extraneous to the government 
agencies currently in operation and perhaps, would create more damage 
and confusion than it would serve a positive good. Denied executive 
support and handicapped by the reservations of the business community, 
the movement to establish a national economic council ebbed during 1932 
as the trade associationism alternative to planning began to occupy 
legislators' attention. Central planners could claim no consensus 
behind their proposals and rely on no support from the President and 
little from the business community. While Hoover was concerned about 
the strain that another agency would put on federal resources, the 
business community feared that it would become another vehicle for 
government intervention in private enterprise. Both President Hoover 
and the business community favoured alternative approaches to planning 
and efforts were made during 1932 to implement these successfully.
80
80. Herbert Hoover to Daniel Willard, 20 May, 1932. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 6: THE MOVEMENT TO REVISE THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 1931-1932:
TRADE ASSOCIATIONISM IN ABEYANCE
The revision of the antitrust laws had been a goal of business organisa­
tions during the 1920s and was pioneered by the National Civic Federation 
during the first sixteen months of the depression.* However, the 
revision movement reached its most energetic phase after October 1931, 
in the wake of the Swope Plan and the Chamber of Commerce's Report on 
the Continuity of Business and Employment, both of which drew widespread 
attention to antitrust law reform. During late October and early December, 
both New York and Columbia Universities hosted conferences on the relation 
between the antitrust statutes and business trends in which leading 
figures from business, education and law participated. Most significant, 
during the ensuing First Session of the 72nd Congress (7 December, 1931 
to 16 July, 1932), some thirty bills and resolutions were introduced on 
the subject. Revision received considerable coverage and comment in the 
daily and journal press. Even Collier's, a magazine whose emphasis was 
literary rather than economic, used its editorial space to condemn "the
Olaw that went wrong" and demanded its modification. The culmination 
of this broadly based movement was the passage of the N.I.R.A. in June 
1933, and particularly, the inclusion of Section 5, which temporarily 
suspended the antitrust laws to allow greater scope for organised 
business to pursue the goal of economic recovery.
Advocates of revision could marshal powerful arguments in support 
of their cause. Several suggested that legislation had failed to keep 
pace with economic change. The antitrust laws had been appropriate in 123
1. The definitive account of the role of the National Civic Federation 
in the revision movement is found in Himmelberg, Origins of the 
National Recovery Administration, op.cit., 81-85; 91-93; 110-116.
2. New York Times, 28 October, 2 December, 1931.
3. Collier1s 90 (5, 19 November, 1932): 50; 50.
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the late nineteenth century, since when a different order of industry 
had evolved, more complex and inter-related, and for which the laws were 
too crude a regulatory instrument.^ The Washington Herald regretted the 
perseverance of the "rough and tumble" Sherman Act, conceived in "the 
spirit of 1890" and pernicious in its effect on a modern, complex economy 
which depended upon "delicately adjusted social engineering" for its 
functioning efficiency.^ Owen D. Young also warned of the legislative 
lag which accompanied economic change. "Under the stimulus of research, 
invention and engineering, business is now moving into the unknown with 
unparalleled rapidity," he advised the American Bar Association in 1932. 
"Unless the processes of the law are correspondingly quickened, the 
distance between them will increase. I fear it is increasing."^ Even 
Hoover recognised in his second Annual Message to Congress that "changes 
in business" had made consideration of revision advisable.^
Critics claimed that the antitrust laws lacked sufficient flex­
ibility to permit the type of cooperation in industry which would 
facilitate stabilisation and ameliorate unemployment. Much of the 
difficulty lay in the fact that the courts assessed economic questions 
by legalistic criteria. Definitions of unfair practices were "narrow" 
and "antiquated", the economists, Edgar L. Heermance and Melvin T. 
Copeland believed. They were based on the concept of misrepresentation 
rather than on price competition, ignored the problems that currently
4. Business Week, 30 September, 1931: 44.
5. Washington Herald, 5 May, 1932. 67
6. New York Times, 16 October, 1932.
7. Second Annual Message to Congress, 2 December, 1930. State 
Papers, op.cit., 1: 437.
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beset industry, and prohibited potential cooperative solutions. Business­
men were given no incentive to experiment with cooperative practices 
to relieve economic problems due to the fear of criminal suits and triple 
damages resulting from action by the Department of Justice. Even the 
F.T.C.'s trade practice conferences were of limited usefulness since 
businessmen were uncertain of the legality of the rulings, especially 
after the Commission became more strict after 1930, in its definition 
of acceptable cooperative practices. Businessmen were not confident 
that the Attorney General would refrain from initiating prosecutions 
on the basis of rules agreed with the F.T.C., and the seeking of legal
sanction for agreements was a long and costly process. The laws, then,
• ftintroduced an unnecessary uncertainty into the conduct of business.
A related argument was that the antitrust laws were promoting evils 
they were designed to curb. The law was destroying the independent 
producer by prohibiting cooperation between autonomous units. Unable 
to compete or survive with large integrated competitors, mergers of 
small firms were the only alternative to liquidation. J. Harvey 
Williams, the Buffalo tool manufacturer, emphasised the disadvantages 
of the independent producer in the face of consolidated purchasing 
agents. Williams, an active proponent of revision in both the N.A.M. 
and the National Civic Federation, phrased his arguments in terms of the 
interests of small or independent business. The gist of Williams' 
complaint was that the statutes no longer protected the constituency 
they were designed to serve, for while the courts had permitted consol­
idation through mergers, they had interpreted combinations of independent
8. Edgar L. Heermance, 'Self Regulation and the Law', Harvard Business
Review 10 (July 1932): 420-429. Melvin T. Copeland, 'Revising the
Antitrust Laws', Ibid., 10 (April 1932): 292-301.
9. Forbes 25 (15 May, 1930): 4.
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producers to be "in restraint of trade". As a result the "philosophy" 
of the laws had become divorced from their effects. Inability to 
combine to determine price levels and production, and to apportion 
markets, had put the independent producer at a grave disadvantage 
during the depression. Not only had he to contend with 'cutthroat* 
competition in a constantly shrinking market, but he was increasingly 
selling to a consumer who was not an 'individual' but a monopolistic 
enterprise whose market control enabled it to take the determination 
of prices out of the independent producer's hands and into its own.
This monopoly buying power was a corollary of the selling monopoly which 
had been brought about through the merging of independent concerns into 
large corporations. Moreover, the merger movement was likely to continue 
to the detriment of the independent producer and the public alike unless 
legislative remedies were considered to protect competition. Ironically, 
the means by which this would be achieved was to give the independent 
producer the same advantages as the large corporation by permitting 
agreements on trade practices between independent firms.^
The plight of the independent manufacturer was also evident in 
the Senate hearings on Gerald P. Nye's bills to amend the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and establish a Federal Trade Court. Repeatedly witnesses 
testified that revision of the antitrust laws would benefit small business. 
Congressman A.F. Lamneck (Ohio) regarded revision as the only way to 
"save" small businessmen. Charles P. Garvin, a trade association repres­
entative, contended that the trade association constituted the "little 
fellows'" only chance to provide a common front against monopolistic 
enterprises, while both W.J. Parker, a trade association executive and
10. J. Harvey Williams, 'The Reign of Error', Atlantic Monthly 147 
(June 1931): 787-796. Idem, 'How the Anti-Trust Laws Should be 
Modified', The Annals 165 (January 1933): 72-83.
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the businessman, Otho M. Graves, contrasted the indifference of big 
business to revision with the enthusiasm of the independent producer." 
Businessmen expressed their dissatisfaction with the trade practice 
conferences as a means of facilitating cooperation. N.A. Emmertz, a 
Chicago businessman, felt that they were flawed because conference
rules did not have industry-wide application and the F.T.C. did not
. . 12have the authority to enforce them on that basis. Others were
concerned that businessmen were unsure of their rights under the trade
practice agreements and expressed annoyance at the inconsistency of
13the F.T.C. in applying its rules.
Further arguments in favour of revision were delivered by spokes­
men from industries suffering from excess capacity. Representatives of 
the natural resource industries - coal, oil and lumber - were particularly 
vocal, and were joined by elements in cotton textiles who demanded 
legislative change. All these industries had been prominent 'sick' 
industries of the 1920s and many spokesmen had come to identify antitrust 
restraints as the principal obstruction to their industries' rehabili­
tation. There were strident reasons for the adoption of planning in 
these sectors: to balance production with demand, increase prices, 
rationalise the industries and increase productivity, allow workers 
a fair day's pay for a fair day's work and preserve finite natural 
resources. Support for revision came also from industries - such as 
sections of the steel industry - whose profitability during the 1920s 
paled in comparison with the 'newer' industries such as light metals. 1
11. Hearings, Amendment of Federal Trade Commission Act, op.cit.,
17-18; 47-48; 117; 124-125; 152.
12. Ibid., 32.
13. Ibid., 34; 40; 48; 77; 83-84; 122-128; 184.
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Selective revision of the laws as they applied to these industries 
promised to have beneficial effects on the economy as a whole.
Business was not the only source of support for revision during 
Hoover's presidency. The gravity of the depression made antitrust law 
reform a practicable focus for all those despairing of self-generating 
recovery or impatient with the President's own recovery policies.
Moreover, it attracted the attention of 'planners' from business, 
labour and the collectivist intelligentsia who defended revision as a 
sine qua non of economic planning. In effect, antitrust law revision 
became the least common denominator which united planners of different 
persuasions given the palpable failure of President Hoover to initiate 
an effective form of planning and the inability of LaFollette to draw 
out sufficient support for his economic council proposal. While the 
primary impulse for revision lay in the business community, support was 
forthcoming from collectivists, labour, Congress, and even from President 
Hoover himself. This support was neither wholehearted nor uncritical. 
Collectivists had reservations about planning being conducted by business­
men rather than by disinterested experts; Hoover sanctioned selective 
revision only, as applied to natural resource industries. Also, revision 
was not regarded as a solution in itself for immediate recovery and 
long-term stability. However, there was widespread sympathy for some 
form of legislative change as a prelude to the implementation of planning 
in industry.
Antitrust revision was accepted in the plans formulated by Stuart 
Chase, George Soule and Charles Beard, as well as by the more conservative 
schemes of William McAdoo and Wallace Donham. Chase believed that 
"drastic" revision was a necessary prelude to an alliance between 
industry, organised into trade associations, and government, to counter 
overproduction and inaugurate a planned society. Congress should
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recognise that in certain economic sectors competition was neither 
an operative nor a useful doctrine, amend the antitrust laws "and 
the sooner the better".^ Rexford Tugwell felt that the antitrust 
laws had failed in their purpose because consolidation had continued 
despite their enforcement. The attempt to enforce competition had 
merely promoted "business confusion", thwarted cooperative impulses 
and obliged industry to circumvent the laws through mergers, informal 
agreements and the skill of corporation lawyers. Moreover, consoli­
dation was both a natural and desirable trend. Unfortunately, "what 
was sound and economically necessary was branded as wrong legally".
The tragedy was twofold. Social policy had attempted to restrain 
inevitable and desirable trends and had failed to recognise how scale 
in industry could ba utilised in the public interest. Rather than 
discourage associationism, Tugwell advised that it should be encouraged 
under government regulation.^ The Nation also sympathised with 
business demands for antitrust relaxation, disparaging the philosophy 
behind the Sherman Act as "incompetent" to achieve stable production 
at equitable prices. Legislative change would be a recognition of 
the imperatives which faced modern business, and would remove the 
artificial "strait-jacket" in which it was presently constrained. 
"Industry has got to be organized, will be organized, is being 
organized," the journal declared.'^ Also, so long as business remained 
hampered by anachronistic laws its potential for stable growth would 
not be realised. "Our laws commit us and condemn us to an uncoordinated,
14. Chase, 'The Enemy of Prosperity', op.cit., 650. idem, A New 
Deal, op.cit., 222.
15. Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline, op.cit., 121; 130-132; 218-219.
16. Nation 130 (5 March, 30 April, 28 May, 1930): 262; 570; 614.
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unplanned, disorderly individualism" wrote Walter Lippmann, "which 
inevitably produces alternating periods of boom and depression."'^ 
Despite the deepening disrespect within organised labour for 
economic leadership by business and a scepticism about the value of 
trade association planning, the A.F. of L. remained prepared to support 
antitrust law revision. At the organisation's convention of 1932 
revision became official A.F.of L. policy. However, beforehand, 
during August, the Federation had committed itself to revision by 
officially subscribing to the Advertising Clubs' Plan, a seven-point 
programme for recovery formulated by the Clubs' Board of Directors. 
Antitrust revision was the second point of a programme which included 
demands for the introduction of the thirty-hour week, a $4 billion 
government public works programme, abolition of prohibition and a 
balanced budget. The programme was supposed to serve as a basis for 
a congress of representatives from industry, agriculture and labour 
scheduled for October, but which never convened. Nevertheless, Matthew 
Woll was explicit in his call for revision in his supporting statement 
on behalf of the Club's programme. "We want no statutes that tell 
us to stop working together," he declared. "We want merely statutes 
that clear the way for cooperation and that induce and encourage 
cooperation's helpful, democratic processes." Woll accurately 
reflected the sentiments of the A.F. of L.'s Executive Council on 
the issue. The Council declared for revision during 1932, and presented 
a proposal to this effect at the Cincinnati convention which was 
considered by the Committee on Resolutions. The Committee's conclusion
17. New York Herald Tribune, 18 September, 1931.
18. New York Times, 25 August, 1932.
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was that industry's right to organise was analogous to labour's own 
rights in this respect and that organisation by economic units repre­
sented a realistic response to modem economic conditions:
It must be clear to every trade unionist that modification 
of our outworn anti-trust legislation is imperative ....
The American trade union movement requires the right to 
organize in conformity with the development of modern 
industry and unless the hands of the clock are to be turned 
backward entirely there must be a like right running through­
out the whole industrial field.
The Committee continued in this corporatist tenor by emphasising the 
value of consolidation in industry to the extension of union participation 
in the economic decision-making process. Rationalisation in industry 
would abet union organisation and participation in industrial planning, 
and achieve "an extension of democratic practice in industry comparable 
to our democratic practice in our political life". So urgent was the 
issue that the Committee was prepared to support repeal, rather than 
modification of the statutes if necessary - a policy position which was 
in advance of most of the business planners. The Committee's recommend­
ation that legislation be formulated on the subject was adopted
19unanimously by the convention.
Organised labour's consideration of the antitrust question had 
been dominated by the problems of the bituminous coal industry since 
the 1920s when excess capacity began to have an adverse effect on 
miners' wages, working conditions and employment security. An early 
legislative attempt to stabilise the industry was the bill introduced 
by Sen. James E. Watson (Indiana) in 1928, which would have permitted 
consolidations and cooperative marketing between producers under the 
surveillance of a bituminous coal commission. The United Mineworkers'
19. Proceedings, 52nd Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1932, op.cit.,
72; 370-371.
255
Union (U.M.W.)» supported the measure because it provided for union-
20isation and collective bargaining in the industry.
Interest in the Watson formula revived after the onset of the 
depression and bills were introduced along similar lines in 1932.
The most significant of these were the companion bills of Sen. James 
J. Davis and Rep. Clyde Kelly of the State of Pennsylvania. The bills 
were construed by their sponsors as a response to the disorganisation 
and "jungle conditions" which prevailed in the bituminous coal industry 
and which stemmed from excessive competition. In the face of unprofit­
able enterprise, subsistence wages and the wastage of valuable resources, 
they rejected a "do-nothing" policy, and sought a solution to the
industry's blight through the principle of "mutuality" - the promotion
. 2 1of the rights of labour, capital and the public. Essentially, Davis 
and Kelly resurrected the Watson bill by providing for the creation of 
a federal commission, the licensing of mining operations involved in 
interstate commerce, and the formation of producers' marketing assoc­
iations to be supervised by the central agency. They also followed 
the precedent of reciprocal concessions established in 1928 by granting 
to labour the right of collective bargaining.
The bill was supported by both the U.M.W. and the A.F. of L.
The Federation's Executive decried the "sordid performance" of the 
coal industry since the war and recognised that the depression had 
resulted in "profitless operation for coal companies and pauperization 
of the mining communities". At the A.F. of L.'s annual convention of 
1931, the Executive Council supported the U.M.W.'s demand for federal 
regulation of the industry through the creation of a Federal Coal
20. S. 4490.
21. S. 2935 and H.R. 7536. Congressional Record 75, 72nd Congress, 
First Session, 1932: 2907; 2912-2913.
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Commission. The Council reiterated its position in 1932 with explicit
22support for the Davis-Kelly proposals.
The Davis-Kelly 'bill' had at least one advocate within the
Hoover administration. William N. Doak, the Secretary of Labor,
welcomed the bill as an answer to the deadlock that had developed on
23policy to solve the coal industry's problems. However, the reaction 
of the operators was hostile. Coal Age castigated the bill's "vicious 
basic principles". Unionisation by "fiat" was unacceptable, and the 
undefined supervision of a new federal agency would "destroy completely 
industrial self-government". While the journal welcomed antitrust 
relief, it preferred that the industry be given "a fighting chance to 
accomplish its own rehabilitation" without extensive government inter­
ference. Although operators were interested in stabilisation proposals,
Coal Age advised: "not at the price named in the Davis-Kelly bill,
.* i m 24 thank you .
Opposition to Davis-Kelly did not imply any employer disinterest
in stabilisation programmes or antitrust law reform. Before the onset
of the depression Coal Age had championed cooperative activity in the
industry through the trade practice conferences of the F.T.C., and had
condemned antitrust restrictions for debilitating the cooperative 
25movement. Noting "the clash between antiquated law and living, 
modern economics", the journal claimed in April 1929 that: "No 
industry has a greater stake in the movement for modification of
22. Proceedings. 51st Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1931, op.cit., 
134-135; 450-452. Proceedings. 52nd Annual Convention, A.F. of 
L., 1932, op.cit., 103; 372-373.
23. William N. Doak to Herbert Hoover, 17 February, 1932. Pres.
Box 104 File, Coal. H.H.L.
24. Coal Age 37 (February, March, May, June, July, 1932): 43; 91 and 
110; 200; 221-222; 258.
25. Ibid., 34 (January, February, 1929): 1 and 6-7; 73.
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oppressive regulation such as lurks in the Sherman Act than the coal
industry". Twice during the early years of the depression, the
journal supported a call for the appointment by the President of a
commission to consider the operation of the antitrust laws, and in
September 1931, advanced its own stabilisation programme, the central
feature of which was antitrust reform. The plan’s preamble reflected
the journal’s disillusionment with unregulated competition and its
conviction that stabilised and regulated operations with a minimum
of risk and a reasonable profit were preferable to the vagaries of
competition, with its high risks but opportunities for great profits:
Even were it possible to anticipate a return of the conditions 
which formerly brought about brief periods of flush earnings, 
such a return would be unhealthy. A gambling basis of profit 
for an industry so important to the industrial welfare of the 
nation ... is neither condusive to stability nor safe for the 
nation or for the industry itself. The time is ripe for the 
consideration of a program of rehabilitation and stabilization 
that will rest firmly upon a strong economic foundation.
Coal Age contended that current government policy confounded stabilis­
ation. Enforced competition promoted overproduction and excess 
capacity and penalised responsible firms who attempted to fulfil their 
obligations to their workforces and to their industry. "While the law 
of the jungle is driving out some of the inefficient, it also is drain­
ing the resources of many producers who richly deserve to survive," 
the journal reflected.' "Under the law of the jungle, the lion is little 
more secure than the jackal."
However grave was the crisis faced by the coal industry, its 
solution lay with the operators themselves and not with government. 
Stabilisation was "not a job for George". Government action was 
necessary only in as far as it was essential to revise the antitrust
26. Ibid., 34 (April, 1929): 201.
27. Ibid., 34 (December, 1929): 768; 35 (December, 1930): 705;
36 (January, 1931): 20.
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laws to permit self-regulation and control in the industry. This 
hostility to government intervention conditioned the journal’s reception 
of the Davis-Kelly proposals. Furthermore, a less objectionable 
vehicle for stabilisation emerged during 1931, in the form of the 
district selling agency. The Supreme Court's declaration of the 
constitutionality of the pilot agency, Appalachian Coals Inc. on 
13 March, 1933, was greeted by Coal Age as a decision which brought 
the Sherman Act "into step with present-day economic conditions" and
29which offered industry an opportunity to vindicate its own leadership. 
Labour spokesmen, however, disapproved of the district selling agency 
approach to stabilisation since it abandoned the formula of reciprocal 
concessions and government involvement. Deprived of these, stabilis­
ation became merely "a northwest passage around the antitrust laws",
30according to Harry Warrum, the labour lawyer.
While organised labour and operators mutually identified the 
contours of the coal problem and agreed that inter-firm cooperation 
was essential, they diverged on the issues of government involvement 
and unionisation as prerequisites for stabilisation. Although this 
discord jeopardised the achievement of any common programme for the 
coal industry, their collective voice on the antitrust question did 
gain publicity for the broader revision movement.
In the oil industry the failure of voluntary reduction of output 
and the limited effect of State measures at proration led to demands 
by operators and collectivists for a modification of the antitrust 
laws to facilitate successful curtailment programmes. Support for
28. Ibid., 36 (September, October, 1931): 461 and 469-472; 517.
29. Ibid., 38 (April, 1933):110.
28
30. Ibid., 37 (January, 1932): 34; 38 (April, 1933): 109-110.
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revision amongst operators was widespread, and the case of the oil 
industry for antitrust relief was taken up by the Chamber of Commerce. 
Collectivists also regarded revision as essential to stabilisation.
The Nation sympathised with the efforts of large integrated concerns 
like Standard to limit output, and regretted that more did not follow 
their lead. Calls for antitrust law reform were made also by the 
north-western lumber industry and its political representatives. For 
example, the dire circumstances of the industry in 1932 compelled 
Governors Julius L. Meier (Oregon) and Roland H. Hartley (Washington) 
to request President Hoover’s support for legislative relief. The 
Governors complained of the "desperate" conditions faced by operators 
and their employees, and demanded "immediate and drastic action" to 
prevent the industry's "complete collapse". In particular, they urged
Hoover to sponsor a proposal which would prohibit producers from selling 
33below cost.
The revision movement was sustained also by industries which, 
while not in crisis, had earned only moderate profits in the expanding 
economy of the 1920s. Many of these specialised in producers' goods, 
such as the iron and steel industry, and they entered the depression
31. See, for example, Amos L. Beaty, 'Production and the Sherman Law', 
Nation's Business 20 (November, 1932): 31—32. Walter C. Teagle, 
'Oil' in, Crowther (ed.), A Basis for Stability, op.cit., 112-117. 
Charles B. Steele, 'The Anti-Trust Laws and the Oil Industry',
The Annals 147 (January, 1930): 78-83. Barron's 11 (17 August, 
1931): 14. Chamber of Commerce, Referendum No. 59: On the Report 
of the Department Committee on Natural Resource Industries, 30 
October, 1931 (Washington, D.C., 1931): 12; 14.
32. Nation 130 (5 March, 1930): 262.
33. Julius L. Meier and Roland H. Hartley to Herbert Hoover, 9 July, 
1932. Pres. Box 64 File, Antitrust Laws. H.H.L.
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with the experience of a decade of disadvantage with respect to the
highly-profitable 'new' industries which specialised in consumer 
3 4durables. The long-term experience of such industries with 'profit­
less prosperity' made them more willing to consider drastic solutions 
for the problems of their industries.
The iron and steel industry was conscious of the problems with 
which it was faced during the 1920s. According to The Iron Trade 
Review in its annual summary of 1928, the condition of the industry 
was not critical, but "in the background - subdued but none the less 
perceptible - are traces of somber color, symbolic of a doubt which 
pervades the industry". Excessive competition was the cause of this 
anxiety, and its solution was "the most urgent task" that the industry 
confronted. However, while many steelmakers were favourably disposed 
to trade association activity to instil order into the industry, anti­
trust revision was not generally approved. The Iron Trade Review, 
for example, dismissed the necessity for revision "or any other 
artificial means". Rather it looked to a change of attitudes in the 
industry, whereby "vindictiveness, recrimination and obstinacy" 
would be transcended by "a spirit of constructive cooperation and 
understanding".^
Such moderation was unable to survive the depression and its 
effects upon the iron and steel industry. The decline of orders from 
the automobile, building and railway industries reduced steel production 
from a record level in 1929 of 56 billion tons of steel ingots -
34. Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, 
op.cit., 115-146.
35. Iron Trade Review 84 (3 January, 1929): 1.
36. For the journal's pre-depression attitude to the questions of 
industrial cooperation and antitrust law revision, see Ibid., 84
(3 January, 21 February, 14 March, 1929): 1 and 16-18; 531; 750-751. 
Ibid., 85 (4 July, 1929): 6-7.
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estimated to be one-half of the world total - to 13| billion tons by 
1932. In 1931, only 38% of steelmaking capacity was utilised. 
Specialist sectors such as steel construction were particularly 
affected. Steel constructors' markets declined after the building 
boom of 1921-1926, and the depression exacerbated problems. Charles 
F. Abbott wrote in 1931 of how steel constructors were experiencing 
a "very distressing time" and that "in most cases, profits are entirely 
dissipated" . ^
As the depression deepened, the industry grew impatient with 
'predatory' competition and became more favourable to antitrust law 
reform. In 1931, Iron Age noted the emergence of a new class of "moral 
chameleons" who espoused business ethics at one moment and price-cut 
their fellows at the next. The journal regretted that "increasingly 
bitter competition is apt to bring in its train a lower standard of 
commercial ethics" and hoped that trade associations might be given 
the means to discipline non-conformers. Trade association presidents 
in the steel industry, such as Charles Abbott, C.H. Smith and Granville 
Rogers, demanded revision of the antitrust laws to facilitate inter­
firm agreements. The Sherman Act was "obsolete and a detriment to 
successful business operation", according to Abbott, and he urged
37. Meredith B. Givens, 'The Iron and Steel Industry', in George
B. Galloway, et al., Industrial Planning Under Codes (New York, 
1935): 146. C.E. Wright, 'Industry Experiences a Calamitous 
Year', Iron Age 129 (7 January, 1932): 13-14. Charles F.
Abbott to Herbert Hoover, 6 October, 1931. P.P.F. Box 3 File, 
American Institute of Steel Construction. H.H.L.
38. Iron Age 127 (22 April, 7 May, 1931): 1330-1331; 1499.
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president Hoover to sponsor "early consideration" of the law. By 
May 1933, the experience of unprecedented deficits in the industry 
had convinced Steel that the industry's problems could not be solved 
without government assistance. All efforts at "moral suasion" had 
failed since the industry remained "cursed with the practice of a 
minority" which had precipitated cycles of price-cutting. "Self- 
government in the steel industry has failed," the journal advised, 
and it was necessary that government make available the means for 
trade associations to insist that operators adhere to 'fair' practices 
in business conduct.^
Businessmen's organisations complemented the efforts of the 
'sick' and 'disadvantaged' industries to secure antitrust revision. 
Some were ad hoc bodies, such as the 122 industrialists who sponsored 
the "Truce Plan' in February 1932. The plan's originators were 
prominent trade association executives, including Warner S. Hays, 
Charles Abbott and Gordon C. Corbaley. Their purpose was to secure 
publicity for antitrust law relief by presenting President Hoover with 
a proposal which emerged from a well-attended conference of business 
executives. The Plan submitted to Hoover on 11 February, and endorsed 
by 122 "independent producers and distributors" and by Matthew Woll 
on behalf cf organised labour, called for a "truce" of two years in 
destructive competition, during which time Congress would investigate
39
39. For examples of this sentiment in the iron and steel industry
which was favourable to cooperative action and antitrust revision, 
see American Institute of Steel Construction to Herbert Hoover,
28 October, 1930. P.P.F. Box 3 File, American Institute of Steel 
Construction. Charles F. Abbott to Herbert Hoover, 2 December, 
1930. Ibid., Box 43 File, Congratulatory Correspondence, Annual 
Message to Congress. H.H.L. Iron Age 129 (10 March, 1932): 628. 
Iron Trade Review 86 (24 April, 8 May, 1930): 58; 64. Steel^  88
(19 February, 1931): 27-28.
40. Ibid., 92 (15 May, 1933): 20.
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the effects of the antitrust laws on industry. The "truce" would be 
supervised by a "National Economic Truce Board", containing represen­
tatives of economic groups and consumers, and which would liaise with 
government agencies to create an "atmosphere" which equated cooperation 
between firms with patriotic duty.^
Interest in antitrust change gained momentum after the announcement 
of the Swope Plan in September 1931, and with the publication of the 
report of the Chamber of Commerce's Committee on Continuity of Business 
and Employment in the following month. The affirmative vote of 89% 
for the Committee's recommendations for antitrust modification in the 
December referendum, committed the Chamber to revision as its official 
policy.
The Chamber maintained close contact with Herbert Hoover through
the President's personal friendship with Julius Barnes. Barnes kept
Hoover informed on developing sentiment within the business community
on antitrust issues and sought to convince the President of the need
for revision of the laws. "If you could meet and talk with men in
various lines of industry as I do," wrote Barnes in May 1931, "you
42would feel that it is a question of major importance." By September, 
the subject had become "the largest question in business today" and 
Barnes presumed to make suggestions about material on antitrust matters 
that Hoover might consider for inclusion in his annual message to 
Congress. Barnes urged that the President "take a lead" in promoting
41. Gordon C. Corbaley to Lawrence Richey, 22, 23, 27 January, 1932; 
Matthew Woll to Herbert Hoover, 11 February,1932; 'Statement 
Submitted to the President of the United States by 122 industrial­
ists following conference, Washington 10 and 11 February'; 'A 
Plea from Representatives of Independent Industrial Units and
of Labor for the Trial of a Two Years' Truce in Destructive 
Competition, 11 February, 1932'. Pres. Box 90 File, Business - 
Correspondence. H.H.L.
42. Julius H. Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 7 May, 1931. Ibid., Box 64 
File, Antitrust Laws.
264
cooperative activity in industry by suggesting a mean3 by which
consultative action could be achieved. He returned to the subject
in October, when he stressed that the question of revision "comes
up everywhere" and that there was "complete conviction" that only
legislative change could bring about the eradication of destructive
competition. "If, with your advisors, you could say something
reassuring in respect to your effort to obtain such revision," Barnes
suggested, "it would give ... new heart and courage to thousands of
discouraged businessmen."^ In November, Barnes advised the President
that it was beyond the scope of individual economic units to promote
revival in the current economic situation and that "the corrective
action must come by discussion and agreement among the units of an
industry before they destroy each other".^ Barnes’ appeals to Hoover
coincided with the Chamber Committee’s deliberations on antitrust
revision and he personally made the President aware of work-in- 
46progress. Clearly his efforts were an attempt to cultivate presi­
dential support for the Committee's published recommendations.
However, after a meeting with Barnes and Silas Strawn in April 
1932, the journalist, Raymond Clapper, confided in his diary that 
there was a general gloom about the business situation within the 
Chamber's leadership. Although both Barnes and Strawn had "worked
43. Julius H. Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 17 September, 1931. Ibid., 
Box 95 File, Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
44. Julius H. Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 10 October, 1931. Ibid.
45. Julius H. Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 30 November, 1931. Ibid.,
Box 96 File, Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
46. Julius H. Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 4 September, 5 October, 1931. 
Ibid., Box 95 File, Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
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on" President Hoover to secure his support for antitrust revision,
they were pessimistic about the prospects. ^  During 1932, pressure
on the President eased, and appeals to him were less frequent.
Barnes reminded Hoover in May that business opinion was still "solid"
on the issue, and in June, the Chamber's new president, Henry I.
Harriman, urged that the President support the resolution of Rep.
Hatton W. Sumners (Texas) for a congressional investigation of the
antitrust laws. The President's lack of enthusiasm for the ambitions
of the Chamber's revisionists did not diminish the organisation's
commitment to antitrust reform as Harriman made clear in the summer
of 1932, when he specified the Chamber's demands. These included
the establishment of a "commerce court" or the empowering of the
F.T.C. to give advance sanction to inter-firm agreements which would
49confer immunity from the antitrust laws.
The National Association of Manufacturers began to work for 
revision also in 1931. Previously it had been critical of the laws 
but had stressed the need for their clarification through the appoint­
ment of an administrative tribunal with authority to render advisory 
opinions on commercial contracts and agreements.^ In March 1931, 
the organisation sponsored a conference of industrial leaders in New 
York, the object of which, according to The New York Times, was to 
"crystallize" opinion on antitrust modification and to mount a campaign 
for a congressional enquiry into the operation of the statutes. The 
Association's president, John E. Edgerton, gave his blessing to
47. Raymond Clapper, 'Diary', Raymond Clapper MSS: Box 7 File,
Diaries, 1932. Library of Congress.
48. Julius H. Barnes to Herbert Hoover, 27 May, 1932. Pres. Box 429 
File, Barnes, Julius. Henry I. Harriman to Herbert Hoover, 13 
June, 1932. Ibid., Box 64 File, Antitrust Laws. H.H.L.
49. Harriman, Our Job for the Year Ahead, op.cit. Nation's Business 
20 (20 August, 1932): 55. 50
50. Memorandum from Walter H. Newton, 24 December, 1930 with enclosure 
by James G. Emery. Pres. Box 63, File, Antitrust Laws. H.H.L.
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revision, contending that "indirect price-fixing through such control
of production as is consistent with American institutions" was
necessary to solve the problem of overproduction.^' In June, Edgerton
suggested that Congress conduct an enquiry into the advisability of
establishing a federal agency which would give advance sanction to
commercial contracts and proposed consolidations, and grant immunity
52from prosecution under the antitrust laws to the parties concerned. 
However, it was not until the summer of 1932 that the Association 
felt confident that opinion had gelled sufficiently for it to adopt 
a positive, official stance on the revision question. In its 'Platform 
of American Industry', announced in May 1932, and submitted to both 
the Democratic and Republican presidential nominating conventions, 
the Association demanded a congressional investigation into the anti­
trust laws and legislation to permit cooperative agreements between 
sellers.^
The efforts of business organisations to ensure antitrust revision 
were paralleled by those of the American Bar Association. At the 
outset of his presidency, Hoover was requested to call for congressional 
hearings to consider revision of "economically oppressive laws", 
and the Association repeatedly endorsed revision at its annual conven­
tions between 1929-1932.^ The Association's Commerce Committee took 
testimony from witnesses and formulated its own revision proposal 
which had undergone four drafts by the end of 1932. It provided for
51. New York Times, 25, 29 March, 1931.
52. Ibid., 27 June, 1931.
53. Ibid., 16 May, 1932.
54. Rush C. Butler to George Akerson, 20 April, 1929. Pres. Box 63 
File, Antitrust Laws. H.H.L. American Bar Association Journal
15 (November, 1929): 788; Ibid., 16 (October, 1930): 684; Ibid., 
17 (November, 1931): 760; Ibid., 18 (November, 1932): 754-755.
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the conferring of additional jurisdiction upon the F.T.C. to sanction
in advance 'restraint of trade' contracts voluntarily submitted by
industry, and would have granted immunity in law to parties to approved 
55agreements.
Antitrust reform was sponsored by a broad spectrum of the business 
community; the 'sick' and 'disadvantaged' industries, individual 
spokesmen such as Gerard Swope, ad hoc and established businessmen's 
organisations, and the legal profession. Organised labour and collec­
tivist intellectuals lent support to the business community's claims, 
although they conceived of revision in distinctive terms by anticipating 
a greatly expanded economic role for government. Two approaches existed 
on the method by which revision would be achieved. Advocates of admin­
istrative amendment called for the establishment of a government agency 
which would vet and give opinions on trade association plans. Affirm­
ative decisions would make an association immune from criminal prosecution 
by the Justice Department. The approach was essentially an attempt 
to certify the trade practice conferences of the 1920s by legalising 
agreed rules. Supporters of 'substantive' amendment did not favour 
assisting businessmen within the law as much as they wished to change 
the law itself. This approach required a more liberal definition of 
'restraint of trade' in which restraints 'in the public interest' 
would be permitted. In particular, 'substantive' revisionists demanded 
the revision of the antitrust laws to permit agreements on production 
and prices. During the Hoover presidency it was rare for an organis­
ation or individual to hold a consistent line on the form that 
revision should take. For example, while the N.A.H. became more 5*
55. Reports of the American Bar Association 57, 1932; 406-407;
American Bar Association Journal 17 (May, 1931): 277. New York 
Times, 29 March, 6» 17, 19 September, 1931; 14 April, 12 October, 
1932.
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militant in 1932, the Chamber withdrew from its advanced 'substantive*
_ • 
revision position as had been outlined in its Committee's report of
1931. However, such oscillation was the result of political tactics
and expediency; attempts to tack antitrust reform demands according
to the prevailing political climate. By 1932, the general consensus
within the business community was in favour of a reappraisal of the
legal definition of 'fair' competition.^
Activity in Congress to accomplish revision began in earnest in
December 1930, following President Hoover's recommendation in his
annual message that Congress institute an enquiry into the operation
of the antitrust laws. On 3 December, Sen. George W. Norris (Nebraska)
introduced two bills to redefine the functions of the F.T.C. and by
April 1933, some fifty bills and resolutions had been introduced into
Congress on the subject. The nature of the legislative proposals
differed significantly. While the majority were intended to modify
the laws by regulating or minimising competition, some provided for
more rigorous enforcement to facilitate competition.^ Some proposals
sought to regulate competition by enumerating prohibited competitive
practices which were deemed to be 'unfair' and undesirable, while
others provided for cooperation in industry without any specific
prohibitions of undesirable practices. In this latter category, the
various bills made provision for either administrative or 'substantive'
amendment to the antitrust laws to facilitate cooperation in industry.
56. Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, 
op.cit., Chapter 7. 57
57. See, for example, H.R. 8930 and S. 4331; bills introduced by 
Harold C. McGugin (Kansas) and Huey P. Long (Louisiana) in 
February and April, 1932.
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Congressional activity to secure revision was most marked during 
the First Session of the 72nd Congress when some thirty bills and 
resolutions were introduced. A variety of approaches to antitrust 
law modification was advanced. Sen. Arthur Capper (Kansas) introduced 
a bill to legalise resale price maintenance, a practice which was 
forbidden by the antitrust laws. Critics of the prohibition argued 
that retailers and manufacturers alike were injured by the restriction. 
Retailers were forced into price competition to attract customers, 
which benefitted the chain-stores. Manufacturers suffered since if 
a firm's product was made a loss-leader by a retail outlet, others 
in the same district would cease to sell the item because they could 
no longer make a profit. The outcome would be a decline in overall 
sales for the producer.
Several bills sought to amplify and define with greater precision 
the legal concept of 'unfair' methods of competition. Essentially, 
this approach represented a continuation of the precedent established 
in general terms by the Sherman Act and furthered by subsequent anti­
trust legislation, of specifically proscribing certain 'unfair' business 
practices by law. Both Sen. Gerald P. Nye (North Dakota) and Sen.
David I. Walsh (Massachusetts) sought to expand prohibited competitive
59practices in their bills of 1932. Nye would have defined selling 
below cost, price discrimination, and violation of trade practice 
rules as 'unfair' methods of competition which the F.T.C. would have 
the jurisdiction to prevent. Walsh would have included other specific 
categories such as patent violations and selling inducements. Common
58. S. 97.
59. S. 2626, S. 2627, S. 2628, S. 3256. Nye's three companion bills 
introduced in the 72nd Congress were an elaboration of measures 
that he sponsored in the previous Congress.
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to both was an attempt to secure the old Progressive ideal of equity 
in business enterprise through legislative fiat.
Nye and Walsh also made provision for the complete legalisation 
of trade practice conferences and the rules adopted out of them.
Advocates of this approach to antitrust law reform believed that it 
was inadequate merely to specify forbidden competitive practices and 
that some means should be provided to facilitate cooperation in industry 
to secure stabilisation goals. While the existing trade practice 
conferences offered a potential framework through which cooperation 
could be achieved, some congressmen insisted that they needed to be 
refurbished in order to operate more successfully. Nye was dissatisfied 
with the operation and results of the conferences, particularly since 
their rules were uncertain in standing and their enforceability remained 
in doubt. "The uncertainty thus occasioned has all but destroyed the 
usefulness of the conferences," he contended, and he suggested that 
rules should be given a definite legal status which conferred immunity 
from antitrust prosecution so long as they were observed. One of Nye's 
bills provided that once trade practice rules were adopted by a majority 
of an industry and were approved by F.T.C. or the courts, they would 
become binding on all members of the industry. To eliminate uncertainty 
and allow for uniformity in interpretation and enforcement, Nye also 
provided for the creation of a Federal Trade Court which would have 
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising under the antitrust 
laws. Considerable benefits-were expected from a court which specialised 
in business law since it would be in a position, as Nye explained, "to 
interpret the law in the light of rapidly changing economic and business
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conditions, such as is net now possible".^ For his part, Walsh 
would have empowered the F.T.C. to give advance approval of cooperative 
contracts and grant exemption from antitrust prosecution to approved 
codes. Penalties were stipulated for noncompliance with agreed rules 
and provision was made for the revocation of approval if deviation 
from the contract occurred. Walsh was particularly concerned that 
the public interest was protected, and provided for government juris­
diction over the reasonableness of prices in industries where approved 
contracts applied. "The bill permits industry to stabilize itself 
through cooperative agreements," Walsh stated, "and at the same time 
protects the public against the extortionate practices of monopolies."^ 
A final category of legislation concerned the granting of permis­
sion to make cooperative agreements between firms organised into trade 
associations, or among competitors in general. Several of the bills 
introduced on this basis involved the granting of licenses to corpor­
ations and associations which permitted them flexibility in determining 
codes of conduct for their industries, subject to the supervision of 
a governmental authority. These bills were aimed at restricting 
competition and would permit practices which otherwise would constitute 
'restraints of trade'. For example, the coal bills of James Davis, 
Clyde Kelly and David J. Lewis (Maryland) entertained the idea of 
production and price controls, while a resolution introduced by Sen. 
Frederick Steiwer (Oregon) in January 1932, would have exempted natural 
resource industries from the antitrust laws and empowered the F.T.C.
60. Congressional Record 75, 72nd Congress, First Session, 1932: 
1287-1289. Hearings, Amendment of Federal Trade Commission Act, 
op.cit., 5-7.
61. Congressional Record 75, 72nd Congress, First Session, 1932: 
2601-2605.
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to endorse agreements contrary to the Sherman Act, pending revision
62of the laws by Congress.
Of the arguments employed by congressional advocates of revision,
protection of the small businessman was the most popular. A strain
of Brandeisian liberalism was evident in the drive for antitrust
revision. Senator Capper sought to legalise resale price maintenance
to prevent the small proprietor from being "wiped out" through 'unfair'
63price competition from large chain-store operations. Walsh argued 
that the antitrust laws were defeating the purpose they were designed 
to serve, since the inability of independent firms to cooperate 
promoted mergers to escape from excessive competition. "Competition 
is an inherent characteristic of human nature," Walsh reflected, but 
"natural" competition was being extinguished by "predatory" competition 
"obnoxious to the economic welfare of the public, because it tends 
to result in monopolistic practices".^ The independent producer 
loomed large in Senator Nye's priorities also. He argued the case 
for antitrust relief on the grounds that to prevent the inroads of 
monopolisation, the small entrepreneur should be allowed to achieve 
a countervailing, cooperative power against his corporate counterpart. 
Nye described his own efforts as stemming from an appreciation of the 
"dangers which are besetting the independent industrial units from the 
groceryman to the manufacturers".^ These appeals to the American 
tradition of independent proprietorship expressed a genuine concern
62. H.R. 7448 (Lewis); S. J. Res. 87 (Steiwer).
63. Congressional Record 75, 72nd Congress, First Session, 1932: 
14977.
64. Ibid., 173.
65. Ibid., 1287.
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about the nature of economic and social change and reflected the 
sensitivity of the sponsors of antitrust reform to charges that they 
were abetting the process of consolidation by advocating coordinated 
industrial planning.
Interest in revision was more muted in the Second Session of the 
72nd Congress, but revived during the first six weeks of the succeeding 
Congress. The culmination of this revival was the passage of the 
N.I.R.A. The inability of the revision movement to make any significant 
headway before 1933, particularly during the First Session of the 
72nd Congress, is not open to ready explanation given the widespread 
interest displayed in antitrust law reform. Revision met with no 
legislative success despite congressmen's appreciation of the deter­
iorating economic situation, the destructiveness of excessive competition, 
the plight of the natural resource industries, and the efforts of 
influential groups to secure antitrust law relief.
Undoubtedly, political considerations were influential in deter­
mining the 72nd Congress's inaction. The fact that 1932 was a presi­
dential year inhibited congressional conduct. Consideration of 
corporative proposals which smacked of iconoclasm towards cherished 
national ideals could have been a political liability for congressmen 
who wished to retain their seats as well as for presidential aspirants 
and the major political parties. The New York Times anticipated the 
avoidance of the antitrust question by the 72nd Congress and suggested 
that neither party would wish to associate itself with new legislation 
sponsored by "a definite industrial class" and identified with the 
"vested interests". Furthermore, it appreciated that other outstanding
issues would deflect the attention of Congress, such as unemployment
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relief, the veterans' bonus and prohibition, which would take
f i f t  *precedence in congressional priorities.
Gilbert Montague argued that there had been too many antitrust 
proposals before Congress and that revision had been blocked because 
rival proposals had deadlocked with each other.^ Also, a lingering 
respect for the competitive ideal and a caution about the radical 
aspects of some of the proposals must have worked against congressional 
action on antitrust reform, although there is no way of accurately 
gauging sentiment since no proposal was debated by Congress until 
the N.I.R.A. Certainly, specific features of some proposals must 
have been objectionable to congressmen such as the provision for 
price-fixing made in the Walsh bill - a feature which was conspicuously 
absent from the N.I.R.A. in 1933. Perhaps most significant, congress­
men must have been deterred by the attitudes of the Department of 
Justice and President Hoover towards revision. In November 1931, the 
Attorney General, William D. Mitchell, was reported as being "askance" 
at proposals to broaden the authority of the F.T.C., and he gave 
little encouragement to revisionists throughout his period of office.00 
As for Hoover, his attitude to the antitrust laws was complex and 
given his significance to the revision movement's fortunes, the 
President's role requires extended discussion.
66. New York Times, 4 October, 1931.
67. Ibid., 12 October, 1932.
68. Ibid., 29 November, 1931. Himmelberg, Origins of the National 
Recovery Administration, op.cit., 92-96.
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There was no simple and singular clarity to President Hoover’s 
attitude to revision. An ambiguity existed as to his position which 
frequently confused revisionists. Despite his strict enforcement 
policies, disparaging references against the cooperative 'planners' 
and intellectual discourses on the values of competition, Hoover 
appreciated the instability caused by excessive competition. In 
particular, he was concerned about its debilitating effects on the 
natural resource industries and was prepared to consider selective 
revision for appropriate sectors. Nevertheless, during his presidency 
Hoover did not champion the revision movement, even in the limited 
sense as it applied to natural resource industries. Three principal 
influences determined the President's position. Clearly, his under­
standing of the scope of the chief executive's functions did not 
include the sponsorship of legislation. Also, his conviction that 
legislative change should emerge from thorough preparation and 
consensus prohibited resort to emergency expedients to counter the 
depression. Most important, the President was not absolutely convinced 
about the desirability of change in the antitrust statutes. Certain 
proposals for revision that came to his attention he believed to be 
too drastic, having dangerous implications for American ideals and 
institutions.
The most advanced position adopted by Hoover was to advise Congress 
to consider selective revision of the antitrust laws. In his first 
Annual Message to Congress he recognised that certain industries had 
not shared the general prosperity of the decade. Hoover singled out 
for emphasis coal, lumber, leather and textiles, and later would extend 
his list to include oil. The President was aware that rehabilitation 
was necessary to restore owners' profitability, boost labour's wage 
scales and promote conservation. In each of his annual messages from
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1930 to 1932, he recommended a congressional enquiry into the effects 
of the antitrust laws on natural resource industries. Hoover first 
announced for selective revision at the A.F. of L.'s Boston Convention 
of 1930, where he disavowed the type of competition which nurtured 
instability:
It certainly is not the purpose of our competitive system that 
it should produce a competition which destroys stability in 
an industry and reduces to poverty all those within it. Its 
purpose is rather to maintain that degree of competition which 
induces progress and protects the consumer. If our regulatory 
laws be at fault they should be revised. *
The plight of the bituminous coal industry was most serious in 
Hoover's opinion. At Boston, Hoover identified excess capacity as the 
bane of the industry and the aggravant of destructive competition and 
sliding wage scales. The result had been the "demoralization of the 
industry and a depth of human misery in some sections which is wholly 
out of place in our American system".^ The U.M.W. directed Hoover's 
attention to the problems of bituminous coal in September 1929, when 
the President was urged to call a conference of operators, workers and 
railroad representatives to discuss methods of rehabilitating the 
industry.^* The Governors of Maryland and Ohio, Albert C. Ritchie 
and Myers Y. Cooper, supplemented the union's request for a national 
conference. In June 1931, the president of the U.M.W., John L. Lewis,
69. Address, 50th Annual Convention of the A.F. of L., Boston, Mass.,
6 October, 1930. State Papers, op.cit., 1 : 394.
70. Ibid.
71. Van A. Bittner to Herbert Hoover, 17 September, 1929. Pres. Box 
104 File, Coal. H.H.L.
72. Albert C. Ritchie to Herbert Hoover, 12 August, 1930. Ibid. Myers
Y. Cooper to Robert P. Lamont, 4 August, 1930. R.G.40, Papers of
Robert P. Lamont: File, Coal, 1929-1930.
277
renewed labour's efforts in an emotive telegram which stressed that 
the "cancerous nature" of the industry's ills combined with the 
"helplessness" of the operators had produced "chaotic conditions"
73against which the Federal Government could no longer remain impassive. 
Lewis's initiative was buttressed by Matthew Woll who reiterated to 
Secretary Lamont the interest of organised labour generally in arresting 
the "extremely dangerous situation" in the coal industry.^
The summoning of a coal conference presented Hoover with the 
opportunity to direct the discussions over stabilisation and particularly 
to frame opinion on selective revision. However, he displayed a 
cautious attitude. Although the administration was "bombarded" with 
requests for a conference to discuss the situation in bituminous coal, 
it was reluctant to accede to them without prior preparation by miners 
and operators. Without any "constructive programs" or a "definite 
and positive plan" to serve as a basis for discussion, the conference 
would serve only "oratorical purposes" and accomplish little. "It 
is useless to call such conferences unless there is a definite program 
and some probability of its acceptance," Hoover advised the Secretary 
of Labor, James J. Davis.^
The administration met John L. Lewis's initiative by circularising 
160 operators to gauge their willingness to attend a conference and
73. John L. Lewis to Herbert Hoover, 11 June, 1931. Pres. Box 104 
File, Coal. H.H.L.
74. Matthew Woll to Robert P. Lamont, 8, 15 July, 1931. R.G. 40,
Lamont Papers: File, Coal Conference, 1931.
75. Herbert Hoover to James J. Davis 21 July, 13 August, 1930;
Herbert Hoover to Eugene McAuliffe, 29 September, 1930; James 
J. Davis to P.T. Fagan, 21 July, 1930; James J. Davis to Van A. 
Bittner, 14 August, 1930. Pres. Box 104 File, Coal. H.H.L.
Robert P. Lamont to Myers Y. Cooper, 8 August, 1930. R.G. 40,
Lamont Papers: File, Coal, 1929-1930.
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to seek advice on how the government could contribute most effectively
to stabilisation. "A conference which has no prospect of success
could only do more harm than good," Hoover stressed.^ The response
of the operators was generally unfavourable. Of the 160 canvassed,
only 38 were unreservedly favourable, 21 questioned the value of the
proposal and 101 returned negative responses or did not reply. Since
those willing to attend represented only one-quarter of the daily
tonnage of those unwilling, Hoover declined to issue formal invitations.^
Lewis branded the administration's circularisation of operators as "a
feeble and futile gesture" which had permitted "selfish interests
opposed to a conference to organize sentiment in opposition". The
administration should have taken unilateral action and issued a definite
specific call for a conference. As it was, Hoover had consigned the
78industry to "a sea of idle conversation".
Hoover failed to seize the opportunity presented by the calls for
a coal conference to bring his administration to the forefront of
policy-making in the coal industry. His reluctance may be explained
by his unwillingness to respond to pressure by the U.M.W. which,
according to Lamont, was unrepresentative of mineworkers and whose
79leader had the reputation of being "high-handed and arbitrary".
Also, Hoover had reservations about holding a conference before any 
general consensus emerged between operators and workers on policy for 
the coal industry. This conformed to Hoover's long-standing convictions
76. Herbert Hoover to John L. Lewis, 29 June, 23 July, 1931. Pres.
Box 104, File, Coal. H.H.L.
77. W.N. Doak to John L. Lewis, 29 August, 1931; W.N. Doak to Herbert 
Hoover, 28, 31 August, 1931; 'Memorandum: Replies to Canvass',
27 August, 1931. Ibid.
78. John L. Lewis to Herbert Hoover, 23 July, 1931. Ibid.
79. Robert P. Lamont to Matthew Wo11, 9 July, 1931. R.G. 40, Lamont 
Papers: File, Coal, 1929-1930.
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about the publicity functions of conferences and the need for thorough 
preparation to ensure their success. Finally, Hoover's reliance on 
private initiative precluded any unilateral action by his administration, 
and perhaps, Hoover could not consider a prominent initiatory role 
since the administration itself had no specific policy. "We have felt 
here that the solution must come largely from industry itself," wrote
80Lamont. "I am frank to admit that I don't know what the solution is."
Despite expressions of sympathy by Hoover and his administration
about the inadequacy of existing laws to remedy the problems faced
by bituminous coal, no initiative was forthcoming from the executive.
Hoover seems to have been convinced that the proper sources for
stabilisation schemes lay within the private sector and in Congress
rather than in the executive branch of government. When Governors
Meier and Hartley called for Hoover's support for antitrust law
relief for the ailing lumber industry, the President's response was
to place the responsibility upon Congress, regretting that his own
81efforts to secure a congressional enquiry had brought no results.
Beyond his annual recommendations to Congress, Hoover would not commit 
himself to championing antitrust relief for the natural resource 
industries.
The same circumspection that Hoover displayed towards selective 
revision on behalf of the natural resource industries was apparent 
elsewhere. To trade association executives who requested that the
80. Robert P. Lamont to Dwight S. Harding, 4 September, 1931. Ibid.
81. Herbert Hoover to R.H. Hartley and J. Meier, 11 July, 1932;
Herbert Hoover to Julius Meier, 14 July, 1932. Pres. Box 64 
File, Antitrust Laws. H.H.L.
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President endorse their organisational activities, Hoover's response
was restrained. Rather than issue rallying cries for organisation,
Hoover's endorsements were positive but vague. He received the
Truce Plan of February 1932 with typical equivocation. While he
"greatly deplored" destructive competition and its consequences, he
was not prepared to comment on the plan until it was given tangible 
83legislative form.
Hoover's equivocation disappeared when he considered specific 
proposals for revision which intimated a transformation of American 
values and institutions. As he recounted in his Memoirs : "There was 
a multitude of gloomy prophets who depicted that the era of progress
was exhausted, that our way of life was nearing an end, that our
84social and political system was disappearing." Hoover regarded the 
Swope Plan and the report of the Chamber of Commerce's Committee on 
the Continuity of Business and Employment in these terms and was 
unrestrained in his condemnation of them.
Although he received a complimentary copy of Swope's address 
before its delivery, Hoover seems to have been aware of its contents 
as early as June or July, 1931. The President was critical of both 
the unemployment insurance and trade association features of Swope's 
plan. Government subsidisation of insurance schemes and the adminis­
tration of them by trade associations was undesirable and Hoover saw 
no reason to displace existing facilities for insurance by establishing
82. V.G. Iden to George Akerson, 18 September, 1929; Herbert Hoover 
to Charles F. Abbott, 11 November, 1929. P.P.F, Box 3 File, 
American Institute of Steel Construction. H.H.L. Leslie C. 
Smith to Herbert Hoover, 20 April, 1931; Herbert Hoover to 
Leslie C. Smith, 29 April, 1931. Ibid., Box 4 File, American 
Trade Association Executives.
83. Herbert Hoover to Malcolm D. Whitman, 11 February, 1932. Pres. 
Box 90 File, Business - Correspondence. H.H.L.
84. Herbert Hoover, The Hoover Memoirs, 1929-1941, 3 vols. (London, 
1953), 3: 32.
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new agencies. Swope's ambition to stabilise prices through trade
association activity was merely "price fixing" in veiled vocabulary.
In effect, the plan would repeal the antitrust laws and foster "the
organization of gigantic trusts such as have never been dreamed of
in the history of the world". The monopolisation of industry which
the plan portended would result in industrial degeneration as obsolete
85plants and inferior managements were to be protected under its terms.
The intrinsic flaws of the plan were not the only cause of 
Hoover's concern, since it was to be "launched under important 
Democratic auspices" with "tremendous publicity", and a large, stand­
ing organisation was to be created on its behalf. "I will probably 
have to meet it in Congress," Hoover advised the Solicitor General, 
Thomas D. Thatcher. To prepare for this contingency and to check any 
popular boom in its favour, Hoover invited the Department of Justice 
to confirm the impressions of his "amateur legal mind" that the 
proposals were "thoroughly unconstitutional", and the President used 
Sen. Felix Hebert (Rhode Island), a member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, as his intermediary with the press. Hebert was supplied 
with material by the White House to relay Hoover's criticisms to the 
national press and the President expressed interest in Hebert's efforts, 
regretting that one release "did not get the national distribution it 
deserved".®^
85. Gerard Swope to Herbert Hoover, 11 September, 1931. Pres. Box 86 
File, Swope, Gerard. H.H.L. In the chronological files for June- 
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andum is the basis for Hoover's recollections of his reaction to 
the Swope Plan which appears in his Memoirs. Ibid., Box 92 File, 
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Hoover regarded the Swope Plan as disturbing in terms of its 
economic and social implications, and threatening because of the like­
lihood of its consideration by Congress. It confirmed his belief that 
the distress which accompanied the depression would give rise to 
undesirable expedients which might have a lasting and deleterious 
impact on American life. "I have found that the same despair as to 
the future and the same desire to effect immediate and radical remedies 
have taken place in every depression in our history," Hoover reflected. 
"We always learn something from depressions and we always make some
gains, but I do not believe we make those gains until we have been
87able to see the full picture."
In his Memoirs Hoover recounted how the Chamber of Commerce
proposal "struck me at the time as a bit humorous, coming as it did
from that citadel of economic freedom". Having "fretted greatly" over
the antitrust laws, the Chamber devised a plan which "violated the
primary canons of liberty". The Committee on the Continuity of Business
and Employment's proposal was "sheer fascism", being modeled on the
corporatism of Mussolini's Italy and involving the monopolisation of
American industry. When the Chamber approached Hoover to endorse its
88programme, the President declined.
Much of Hoover's retrospective bile about the Chamber's planning
proposal was due to his conviction that spokesmen had exerted undue
pressure on him to support it, by linking his endorsement with business
89support for his presidential campaign of 1932. Relations between the 
Chamber and the Hoover administration were often strained during 1931
87. Herbert Hoover to John R. Freeman, 23 September, 1931. Ibid.
88. Hoover, Memoirs, op.cit., 3: 335; 420.
89. Ibid., 335.
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and 1932. Considerable tension stemmed from the critical comment by
the Chamber's organ, Nation's Business, about the utility of work
performed by bureaus of the Department of Commerce. The Assistant
Secretary, Julius Klein, regretted that the publication's hostility
had lessened the "collaborative enthusiasm" of the Department's experts
who had received criticism. Furthermore, the journal seemed to reflect
accurately the views of leading spokesmen within the Chamber who made
no effort to curb the "avalanche of misrepresentation" to which the
Department was subjected. Even the accession of Henry Harriman as
the Chamber's president did not stem "the unrestrained campaign waged
against the Department". While Harriman was personally amenable,
Klein contended that "the line-up within that organization still
leaves much to be desired before we can count on mutually helpful 
90cooperation".
The Committee on the Continuity of Business and Employment seems 
to have exacerbated tensions between Chamber and President. Hoover 
received the results of the referendum on the Committee proposals on 
18 December, 1931. It appears that Julius Barnes contacted Hoover 
to urge his support for the Report's recommendations and that the two 
men had some sort of argument. On 22 December, Hoover wrote of his 
"lost temper" and his "keen remorse" for treating Barnes so badly.
The reason for Hoover's indisposition seems to have been Barnes's 
attempts to push him to adopt positions for which he was unprepared.
"I lose my temper occasionally," Hoover confessed, "when I am at work 
with both hands on the bellows trying to get the iron hot while my 
friends, justifiably impatient with the progress of events, urge me
90. Dr. Klein to Secretary Lamont, 9 November, 1931; Dr. Klein to 
Feiker, 21 April, 1932; Julius Klein to Wesley 0. Ash, 19 July, 
1932. R.G. 40 File, 92001/2.
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to pull the iron before it is of the right temperature." For his
part, Barnes sympathised with "the strain" under which the President
worked, but desired only to be useful to him by transmitting information
of trends in business opinion. "I do have unusual contact with various
shades of business conviction, not only here [in New York] but across
the country as well," Barnes replied. "I desire sincerely to interpret
and convey that conviction in a single desire to be helpful." After
the incident between Barnes and Hoover, Chamber pressure on the
President eased. Henry Harriman made two attempts to secure his
support for antitrust revision in June and September 1932, but
93received no satisfactory response on either occasion.
Generally, while Hoover recognised that a reduction of destructive 
competition was desirable he insisted that it be made compatible with 
American ideals. He was opposed to any outright repeal of the antitrust 
laws which he felt that Swope and the Chamber were demanding. Repeal 
would create more problems than it solved, particularly by promoting 
monopoly and stultifying competition, which was the major incentive 
to economic progress. "There can be a degeneration of competition of 
such destructive order," Hoover advised a West Virginia audience in 
1932, "that it becomes of first importance in the maintenance of proper 
home life amongst our people." A satisfactory approach to the problem 
would ensure economic objectives without sacrificing national ideals,
91. Herbert Hoover to Julius H. Barnes, 22 December, 1931. P.P.F.
Box 6 File, Barnes, Julius. H.H.L.
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and eradicate evils without jettisoning the fundamental purpose cf 
95the laws. It was necessary to secure "a limited cooperation to 
prevent this destructive action" while remaining loyal to the compet­
itive ideal in general terms.^
The solution was not to come from Hoover himself. He did not 
advance any specific programme for selective revision and the subject 
was not part of his 'Twelve Point Non-Partisan Economic Program' of 
December 1931. Rather he felt that it was a matter for congressional 
action following a thorough investigation of the effects of the laws.
Hoover's stance may be condemned as passing responsibility to 
Congress and declining to pit the prestige of his office behind the 
revision movement. It may be noted also, that Hoover's approval of 
selective revision fell well short of the sentiment for wholesale 
revision developing in Congress and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the 
posture was typical of Hoover's cautious liberalism. While he fore­
swore to no static relationship between government and society, he 
was cautious about fundamental legislative change, and was adamant 
that change should not be imposed by the government upon the people. 
Change should occur only when "public understanding" had matured 
sufficiently to warrant it. In this sense, government responded to, 
or kept pace with public opinion and not the reverse. If change was 
foisted upon the people, and- the people were unprepared for change, 
the nation would suffer from the "deadening hand of centralization". 
Hoover clarified the application of these principles to the antitrust 
laws before the American Bar Association in October 1932. His particular 
concern was that the American businessman was not prepared for change
95. Campaign Speech, St. Louis, Missouri, 4 November, 1932. Ibid.,
438. 96
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286
and would use revision to benefit his immediate self-interest to the
detriment of the general welfare. Legislative change would have to
wait a transformation of attitudes on the part of the business community,
or as Hoover put it: "Fundamental advancement in the control of great
business and great enterprises lies in the growth of the social instinct
97and social responsibility of the men who direct these enterprises."
Only in isolated cases had businessmen learnt the virtues of cooperation 
and begun to understand the harmony between the public interest and 
private profit. Hence, at most, Hoover could only endorse selective 
revision of the antitrust statutes.
Hoover's reluctance to campaign for antitrust law reform seems 
to have been crucial to the fortunes of the revision movement during 
1931 and 1932. However, other factors contributed to its failure.
Even within industry itself no absolute consensus had been achieved 
as to the desirability of revision. Some businessmen in industries 
which suffered from excessive competition felt threatened by the 
prospect of having to conform to stipulated standards, and in the 
process, of losing their competitive advantages. These elements 
hampered the revision movement's efforts in the coal, oil and textile 
industries. Where business and labour concurred on the need to 
provide for cooperation between producers, differences arose concerning 
the role of the Federal Government in the stabilisation process and 
the desirability of unionisation. In the coal industry, disagreements 
on these issues were insurmountable and confounded the achievement of 
a united front of labour and management in support of antitrust
97. Address, Meeting of the American Bar Association, Washington,
D.C., 12 October, 1932. Ibid., 333-334.
revision. Political problems existed also, some of which were 
germane to Congress while others were associated with the President's 
attachment to the competitive ideal. Both Congress and the President 
expressed interest in revision but neither provided the necessary 
thrust to secure its accomplishment.
However, the movement for antitrust reform was unsuccessful 
despite many advantages in its favour, which gave the movement a 
continuing vitality and an ability to weather political setbacks. 
Advocates of reform marshalled an impressive battery of arguments to 
justify their cause and which could be used to appeal to either the 
idealistic or the technocratic imagination. They could also claim 
a broad base of support behind their proposals which was both ideo­
logically variegated and influential. Unlike the movement for a 
national economic council and its demise after the LaFollette hearing 
political failure did not discredit the revision movement. Rather 
it was to gain strength as economic conditions deteriorated during 
the presidential ’interregnum’ and as Hoover's doctrine of voluntary 
associationism was shown to be incapable of dealing with the economic 
crisis.
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CHAPTER 7: THE SHARE-THE-WORK MOVEMENT, 1932-1933: THE FAILURE 
OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION!SM
The depression and its effects upon employment reinforced the efforts 
made during the 1920s by organised labour and some employers to secure 
a shorter working-week.^ However, the emphasis of advocates' arguments 
changed with the advent of the depression. In a period of prosperity 
reduced working hours were defended in terms of the virtues of greater 
leisure for the workingman and the equitability of rewarding labour 
for its increased efficiency due to technological change in industry. 
During the early years of the depression the shorter working-week was 
regarded as a means of combatting the unemployment emergency. Shorter 
working hours involved the 'spreading' of work by sacrificing a portion 
of the working time of the fully employed to open employment opportun­
ities for the unemployed.
Work-sharing commanded persuasive arguments in its favour. In 
its most humanitarian form, the case for spreading-the-work stressed 
its positive role in relieving the distress which accompanied mass 
unemployment and in elevating the dignity and morale of the jobless.
At its most self-interested, work-sharing would ease the strain on 
private and public relief agencies and relieve the burden on taxpayers 
and donors to charity. Some- advocates claimed that work-sharing would 
have beneficial economic results by spreading purchasing power more 
evenly, increasing consumers' expenditures, and promoting economic 
recovery. Others revived the 1920s' positive prospect of increased 
leisure in their claims that the short-work-week was a necessary 1
1. For critical appraisals of the shorter hours movement in the 
1920s, see Marion Cotter Cahill, Shorter Hours: A Study of the 
Movement since the Civil War (New York, 1932): 221-259. David 
Brody, 'The Rise and Decline of Welfare Capitalism', in John 
Braeman et al. (eds.), Change and Continuity in C20 America:
The 1920s (Columbus, 1968): 147-148.
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long-term adjustment to technological change. The concern expressed 
about technological unemployment during the early years of the 
depression and the recognition of the dispensability of labour in 
a mechanised and automated industrial structure, inflated work-sharing 
from a short-term expedient into a long-term solution for the displace­
ment of manpower by machines. Sen. George W. Norris claimed in 1933 
that the pace of technological change had been increased by the 
depression and that even if industry could resume its production 
levels of 1929, between five and six million workers would remain 
unemployed. There was no alternative except to limit the hours of 
labour. "The very fundamental principles of our civilization must 
be changed," Norris asserted, "if we do not change peacefully, they 
will, in the end, be changed by revolution." This fear of social 
and political convulsion in the absence of ameliorative programmes 
was a central theme for many advocates of work-sharing.
Organised labour entered the depression with a commitment to a 
shorter working week. In its convention of 1929, the A.F. of L.'s 
Executive Council rested its case on the values of leisure "essential 
to the full measure of living" and made possible by the increasing 
mechanisation of industry. A resolution in favour of a five-day week, 
universally applied, was unanimously adopted by the convention. The 
depression made the issue more urgent. In his keynote address to the 
convention of 1930, William Green advised that it was the "inflexible" 
and "irrevocable" purpose of his organisation to secure the five-day 
week. The Executive Council made reduction of working hours the first
2. George W. Norris to Jud Pierce, 15 May, 1933. See also, George 
W. Norris to H.H. Harper, 19 June, 1933. George W. Norris MSS: 
Box 69 File 12. Library of Congress.
3. Proceedings, 49th Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1929, op.cit., 
46-47; 388-389.
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point in its unemployment programme, and the Committee on the Shorter 
Workday described hours limitation as an "industrial necessity".^
At the organisation's convention of 1931, Green demanded the immediate 
implementation of the five-day week and suggested consideration of 
further reduction if necessary to share work equitably. The Committee 
on the Shorter Workday claimed that reduced working hours would 
provide relief by fostering a greater diffusion of jobs amongst the 
employable, and would assist recovery by stimulating consuming power 
through increased leisure."* The gravity of the unemployment crisis 
during 1931 and 1932 prompted organised labour to make its demands 
for a shorter working week more precise. In his testimony before 
the LaFollette committee investigating the establishment of a national 
economic council in December 1931, Green declared that a thirty-five 
hour week would be sufficient to eliminate unemployment.^ However, 
the worsening unemployment situation of 1932 forced a reappraisal of 
the extent to which working time would have to be reduced. At the 
A.F. of L.'s convention of 1932, Green called for the thirty-hour week, 
characterising it as "the one great reform now needed in order to 
inspire hope and faith and confidence".^ By 1932, organised labour 
was no longer willing to rely on the goodwill of management to institute 
the shorter working week and demanded government legislation to
Q
"electrify" the situation.
A. Proceedings, 50th Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1930, op.cit.,
3; 60; 265.
5. Proceedings, 51st Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1931, op.cit.,
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8. Ibid., 6.
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Work-sharing was also supported by elements of the business 
community, since it allowed businessmen to reconcile community pressures 
that they should lead in providing solutions for the unemployment 
problem, with the practical advantages that hours limitation offered 
to them. Businessmen employed various arguments in favour of work­
sharing. The manufacturer, L.C. Walker, contended that the depression 
presented a "great clinical opportunity" for businessmen and sociol­
ogists to research into the potential of leisure and to give the
9"idleness" of cyclical unemployment a more positive connotation.
His Distributed Leisure (1931) was critical of the prevailing scale 
of values which placed priority on material considerations above 
leisure and Walker sought to persuade Americans of the need to reap­
praise the role of leisure in society.'^ Similarly, Ralph Flanders 
pointed to the irony that leisure enforced by the depression was 
regarded as "a curse instead of a blessing, bringing bodily and mental 
distress instead of refreshment and recreation". Flanders urged that 
the organisation of leisure and its transformation into useful forms 
should be made a social priority.'* The problem of leisure was often 
considered in the context of technological unemployment and the prospect 
of permanent under-employment in the American economy. Henry Harriman 
felt that a general shortening of working hours and greater leisure 
was the most positive response to technological unemployment. In 1930, 
he suggested that industry should adopt the goals of gradually reducing
9. L.C. Walker, 'The Share-the-Work Movement', The Annals 165 
(January, 1933): 17-19.
10. Idem. Distributed Leisure: An Approach to the Problem of Over­
production and Unemployment (New York, 1931): 7. 1
11. Flanders, 'Engineering, Economics and the Problem of Social Well- 
Being' , op.cit., 109.
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the working-week to thirty hours, and establishing a working life of
forty years for its employees which would begin at the age of twenty 
. 12and end at sixty.
Aside from social gains, work-sharing would have favourable 
ramifications for the economy. L.C. Walker understood that unemploy­
ment had an adverse effect upon the purchasing power not only of the 
unemployed worker, but the employed worker also, because job insecurity 
made him reluctant to spend his income. Although Walker admitted 
that distributed employment would not increase the total wage fund,
it would increase effective purchasing power by removing the fear
13of imminent redundancy. Paul Mazur strongly endorsed the forty-hour, 
five-day week through his conviction that an additional day of leisure 
would increase consumption and production and lead to "a business 
boom of gigantic proportions".^
Wallace B. Donham had no expectation that the short-work-week 
would result in economic recovery; its likely effect would be to 
reduce total purchasing power. Nevertheless, he perceived an indirect 
stimulus to industry in work-sharing because it would assuage business 
anxiety about government interference in the economy: "Its principal 
effect would be to obviate the necessity of doles and charity with 
their consequent disturbance to the social structure."^ Forbes 
magazine warned of the growing impatience of the working class with 
the unemployment situation and the threat that this posed to the
12. Henry I. Harriman, ’The Meaning of the Major Business Trend of 
the Day': An Address before the Wesleyan University. Wesleyan 
University Bulletin 24 (November, 1930): 9-15.
13. Walker, Distributed Leisure, op.cit., 198.
14. Mazur, New Roads to Prosperity, op.cit., 183-186.
15. Donham,' Twenty-Year Plans’, op.cit., 109. Idem, Business Adrift, 
op.cit., 131-132.
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stability of American society. "If work be not shared with the 
workers, the workers may cause us all to share something worse than 
depression," the journal advised.**’ Both arguments recommended the 
adoption of work-sharing by industry to preclude undesirable 
alternatives.
Work-sharing could serve employers' self-interest more directly. 
L.C. Walker warned of the dangers of unbalancing a firm's work force 
by reducing its complement rather than its working hours. The benefits 
of the division of labour as applied to a full and specialised work 
force had been demonstrated in the 1920s, when American industry was 
able to keep down its unit costs, sell at cheap prices, and achieve 
high volume. Resort to redundancies by employers during the depression 
was counter-productive, for as workers became less specialised, unit 
costs increased, quality declined and workers' morale suffered. Rather 
than lay-off unneeded workers and share tasks amongst the remainder, 
Walker urged that full forces be employed on a short-work-week basis, 
plants being in full operation for a short period and shut down for 
the rest. Only through this method would maximum productivity, low 
costs of production and the low prices necessary to stimulate volume 
be realised.*^ Myron C. Taylor confirmed that the effect of work­
sharing at U.S. Steel had been to increase man-hour productivity 
rather than costs. Taylor believed that "a new principle" had been 
discovered whereby in periods of economic recession, maximum plant 
efficiency could be achieved if industries remained in continuous 
operation for a shorter working week. "It may be," Taylor suggested, 
that in this direction leisure will be found - and the true relation
16. Forbes 30 (1 December, 1932): 4.
17. Walker, Distributed Leisure, op.cit., 174-198.
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between the man and the machine discovered." Other spokesmen for 
the steel industry perceived both advantages and disadvantages in 
work-sharing. On the one hand, Iron Age believed that part-time 
work increased the cost of such items as maintenance and power. On 
the other hand, Steel advised that work-sharing deserved the support 
of industry because the alternative was relief payments and higher 
taxation. This aspect of work-sharing was frequently noted by 
businessmen. James H. Rand, Jr. favoured an acceleration of work­
spreading as a means of lightening the tax burden on employers. 
"American industrial employers must foot seventy percent of the cost 
of relief through taxation, with nothing to show in return for our 
money," he reflected. L.C. Walker also found this argument per­
suasive. "All through the business world," he wrote, "it is beginning 
to be sensed that the cost of maintaining the army of unemployed is 
going to rest on the community, and that a large portion of this cost 
must fall directly upon industry itself, in the form of taxes or
charity assessments, which must ultimately be reflected to a very
21considerable extent in increased production costs."
Work-sharing was a specific application of President Hoover’s 
doctrine of voluntary associationism and was central to the efforts
18. Crowther (ed.), A Basis for Stability, op.cit., 55-56. See also, 
Myron C. Taylor, 'A Few Observations on Employment': Radio Talk 
from New York, 27 January, 1931; 'Annual Meeting of Stockholders 
of the United States Steel Corporation, Hoboken New Jersey, 17 
April, 1933. Impromptu Remarks by Myron C. Taylor and Percival 
Roberts, Jr.' Taylor MSS: Box 22 File, Speeches and Addresses.
19. Iron Age 130 (28 July, 1932): 157. Steel 91 (17 October, 1932): 
18.
20. James H. Rand, Jr. to Rexford G. Tugwell, 7 December, 1932. 
Tugwell MSS: Box 2.
21. Walker,'The Share-the-Work Movement?, op.cit., 14.
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of P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R. to ameliorate the effects of the depression 
upon employment. It was felt that by rationing available work amongst 
existing work forces, businesses could cushion the effects of unemploy­
ment for the workingman and assist economic recovery by spreading 
purchasing power. The emphasis of the Hoover agencies' efforts was 
on stimulating voluntary initiative by individual firms. This would 
be achieved by copious publicity which stressed the accomplishments 
of leading and influential companies which had adopted methods of 
work-sharing. Standard Oil of New Jersey, Kellogg Co., Goodyear Tire 
and Eastman-Kodak Co. were often cited for their exemplary adoption 
of work-sharing practices. Alternative methods of work-sharing were 
publicised such as the reduced weekly or daily schedule, shorter and
continuous shifts, rotation of days off, and transfer of workers to
22busy departments or to maintenance work.
Agency officials did not believe that work-sharing, in itself, 
was a complete response to the problems of industrial stabilisation. 
Nevertheless, they regarded the implementation of work-sharing pro­
grammes as a first positive step towards more comprehensive planning 
by management to achieve stabilisation goals. "By present experience 
many business leaders are becoming convinced that further employment
22. For examples of government publications which urged the general 
adoption of work-sharing and contained alternative methods of 
spreading the available work, see U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Emergency and Permanent Policies of Spreading Work in Industrial 
Employment (Washington, D.C., March, 1931). Idem, Spreading Work: 
Methods and Plans in Use by William J. Barrett of the President's" 
Organization on Unemployment Relief (Washington, D.C., 1932). 
P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R. periodically conducted surveys to gauge 
the extent of the practice of work-sharing. See, for example, 
'Methods of Spreading Employment': P.E.C.E. survey, early 1931. 
R.G. 73 Series 19, Office Files of Erving P. Hayes.
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crises may be minimized by advanced planning," Col. Arthur Woods,
the chairman of P.E.C.E. asserted in 1931. "Industry is now engaged
in a nation-wide experiment which, through its proven success in
spreading the burden of hard times, is leading toward an ultimate
stabilization, the benefits of which are beyond prediction." The
committee in P.O.U.R.'s Industrial Division to consider employment
plans, chaired by Harry A. Wheeler of Chicago, appreciated that the
use of work-sharing programmes by management was not a "fundamental
and permanent" factor in industrial stability, but was a short-term
expedient. However, it sensed that work-sharing initiatives might
lead to a new concept of work whereby available employment would be
distributed according to society's needs. The committee suggested
that employment should be provided not according to the productive
efficiency of the individual worker but with reference to his capacity
for self-help. "We have arrived at a phase of our industrial progress
. 2 5where it is necessary to adopt a new attitude toward work itself." 
Kendall K. Hoyt of P.O.U.R.'s Industrial Division defended shorter 
working hours in terms of the requirements of a mature industrial 
economy. Technological change had resulted in imbalances in the 
distribution of work and mass purchasing power as workers were dis­
placed by technological innovations. During the 1920s, the situation 
was compensated by the emergence of new industries, aggressive
23. 'Spreading the Work Becomes a Major Factor Toward Recovery', 
P.E.C.E. Press Release, 12 July, 1931. R.G. 73 Series 12, Office 
Files of Erving P. Hayes.
24. 'Statement and Resolutions of the Committee on Employment Plans 
and Suggestions, Chicago, Illinois, 28 and 29 September, 1931*. 
R.G. 73 Series 19, Employment Plans and Suggestions, Wheeler 
Committee.
25. U.S. President's Organization on Unemployment Relief, Introductory 
Statement and Recommendations of the Committee on Employment Plans 
and Suggestions, Chicago, Illinois, 26 and 27 October, 1931 
(Washington, D.C., 1931): 9-10.
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salesmanship and expanding markets, which maintained employment at 
acceptable levels. The abrupt decline of international markets after 
1929 and the poor prospects for improvement made the employment problem 
critical since technological change continued despite the depression 
and with serious implications for jobs. Hoyt rejected any "do-nothing" 
response to the depression and suggested that a forty-hour week, 
voluntarily instituted and supervised by industrial organisations, 
would absorb much of the current unemployment. The alternative to 
work-sharing was serious social dislocation: "Greater suffering among 
the unemployed, greater unrest and violence, a further breakdown of 
morale and more unsound legislation to meet a popular demand for 
panaceas." Hoyt defended work-sharing as essential "both as an 
immediate and permanent remedy against existing economic conditions".
In the short-term, it was necessary to cushion unemployment and restore 
an internal market for the products of industry, while in the long-run, 
it would serve as an effective response to technological change in a 
mature industrial economy.^
The Federal Government expended considerable effort to persuade 
employers to adopt work-sharing schemes. Periodically, both P.E.C.E. 
and P.O.U.R. conducted surveys of firms in industry which practised 
work-sharing, and made their findings available to the business commun­
ity through published material. The aim was to combine access to 
information with exhortation to encourage businessmen to voluntarily 
plan their work schedules to secure maximum employment. The surveys 
sometimes lacked adequate sampling. For instance, in May 1931, P.E.C.E. 
based its conclusions in a report on work-sharing on the replies of 
only fifty-five companies which represented just over one million
26. Kendall K. Hoyt, 'The Need for Shorter Working Hours', Confidential
Report, n.d. R.G. 73 Series 19, Five-Day Week.
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workers, and recognised, in its internal correspondence, the survey's 
"limited coverage". This did not deter the agency from claiming 
in its publicity that work-sharing had become "one of the most impor­
tant factors for business recovery" and that "several millions" of 
workers were employed part-time as a consequence. In practice, 
voluntary associationism required the government to persuade as well 
as inform to secure action in the private sector, and the Hoover
administration had few scruples about distorting facts to suit its 
29purposes.
Work-sharing was merely one aspect of the general programmes 
of P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R. to ameliorate unemployment and promote 
recovery by harnessing private cooperation. However, during the 
autumn of 1932, Hoover decided to focus specifically on the work­
sharing approach and to create an agency to fulfil its objectives. 
During 1932, the President received various requests that the adminis­
tration sponsor a work-sharing drive, which specified precise goals
30and pitted the prestige of the chief executive behind the movement.
27. 'Special Survey of Emergency Employment Measures in Large 
Industrial Firms, Preliminary Report of 15 May Returns': 
Confidential Memorandum, 10 July, 1931. R.G. 73 Series 12, 
Office Files of Erving P. Hayes.
28. 'Spreading of Work Becomes a Major Factor Toward Recovery': 
P.E.C.E. Press Release, op.cit.
29. Later surveys of P.O.U.R. were more comprehensive in coverage. 
See 'Spreading of Work': Memorandum from W.J. Barrett, n.d.
(c. October-December, 1931). 'Extent of Use of Work Spreading 
Practices': Agency Memorandum, n.d. (c. October-December, 1931). 
R.G. 73 Series 7, Office Files of Fred Croxton-Barrett.
30. See, for example, Kenneth E. Stuart to Herbert Hoover, 19 
April, 1932. Milton J. Florsheim to Herbert Hoover, 22 April, 
1932. Harold McGugin to Herbert Hoover, 27 May, 1932. Pres.
Box 122 File, Eight-Hour Law. H.H.L. Benjamin A. Javits to 
Herbert Hoover, 19 September, 1932. Ibid., Box 123 File, Eight 
Hour Law.
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Supplementing these individual appeals, national business organisations
expressed interest in instigating a shorter working week. In September
1932, the Chamber of Commerce established a Committee on Working
Periods, chaired by P.W. Litchfield of Goodyear, to investigate the
advisability and feasibility of work-spreading in the current emergency,
and to consider the long-term prospects for shorter working periods
in industry. The National Civic Federation declared for a shorter
working week in August 1932. The organisation's chairman, James W.
Gerard, endorsed a thirty-hour week on 1 August, and its executive
director, Ralph M. Easley, wrote to Hoover that the shorter working
week might seem like "taking coals to Newcastle" in the present
economic climate, but that it might "give a little aid" and received
32the support of the Federation accordingly.
Hoover responded cautiously to this upsurge of interest in a
shorter working week. The President feared that a boom might develop
for a legislative solution which would stipulate mandatory compliance.
Not only was this inimicable to voluntary associationism, but Hoover
33rejected any constitutional basis for legislative action. He sought 
to defend his presidential record as a sponsor of shorter working hours 
and claim success for the voluntary approach. "I have long sympathized 
with the idea of the shorter week," he wrote to Harold McGugin. "As 
a matter of fact under proposals I have made and in cooperation with
31. Nation's Business 20 (October, 1932): 32. The Litchfield committee 
report was issued to the press on 1 April, 1933. It recommended
a forty-hour maximum working week, voluntarily applied. New York 
Times, 2 April, 1933.
32. Extract from statement made by James W. Gerard, 1 August, 1932. 
Ralph M. Easley to Lawrence Richey, 2 August, 1932. Pres. Box 
123 File, Eight Hour Law. H.H.L. Ralph M. Easley to Lawrence 
Richey, 9 August, 1932. Ibid., Box 246 File, National Civic 
Federation Correspondence.
33. Herbert Hoover to Kenneth E. Stuart, 23 April, 1932. Herbert 
Hoover to Milton J. Florsheim, 25 April, 1932. Ibid., Box 122 
File, Eight Hour Law.
industry we have brought this very thing about in a large proportion
of employment today." However, Hoover was not sanguine about his
work-sharing efforts and in a press conference of 23 July, 1932, spoke
35of the possibility of "a new stage for action" on work-sharing.
This was provided in August 1932, when the President institutionalised 
the work-sharing movement in a separate and privately administered 
agency.
'The Share-the-Work Movement', as it was titled, was inaugurated 
by Hoover on 26 August, 1932, at a White House conference of national 
banking and industrial leaders. The organisation was officially 
established on 1 September, 1932, when a national headquarters was 
opened at the Federal Reserve Bank Building in New York City. Walter 
Teagle was appointed chairman of the organisation, securing leave of 
absence from Standard Oil, New Jersey, to devote his entire energies 
to the project.
Hoover believed that the Movement had considerable potential
to reinforce and enlarge the efforts of P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R. By
giving specific focus to work-sharing the Movement would inspire the
adoption of the shorter working week nationwide. It would do much
to ameliorate unemployment and create the purchasing power which would
36"speed" business recovery. "It is doubtful whether any action we 
could take at this time would so greatly accelerate our progress, 
serve the welfare of our unemployed millions, or so quickly give us 
as a nation the benefit of widespread spending power as further spread
34. Herbert Hoover to Harold McGugin, 1 June, 1932. Ibid.
35. State Papers, op.cit., 2: 241.
36. Herbert Hoover to Walter C. Teagle, 21 November, 1932. Pres.
Box 210 File, National Conference of Business and Industrial 
Committees. H.H.L.
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of equitable plans of sharing the available work," Hoover claimed.
The Movement's general objective was to put between one and two million
men back to work through a campaign of persuasion directed at employers.
To achieve this target employers were advised not to resort to further
redundancies; to create employment vacancies by reducing hours for
38those already employed, and to supplement their work forces. The 
Movement restricted itself to no one approach of hours limitation - 
such as the six-hour day, or five-day week - but merely sought to 
persuade employers to adopt any scheme of work-sharing that would 
increase employment. While the Teagle committee advised reductions 
in hours of work, it stipulated that wages should remain adequate 
to ensure the worker a reasonable standard of living. As The Survey 
Graphic later testified, the Movement "at no time advocated the
39reduction of compensation below the levels necessary for subsistence".
As a confidential memorandum explained it, The Share-the-Work 
Movement was anchored in the doctrine of voluntary associationism.
The Movement's practical purpose of increasing employment in periods 
when it was not possible to increase the volume of work, was accompanied 
by a "social aspect" which involved community self-help: "It involves 
cooperation on the part of all on the payroll, from the highest executive 
to the humblest worker, and entails sacrifices by each." The work­
sharing drive would involve established organisations: businessmen's
37. State Papers, op.cit., 2: 272.
38. Walter C. Teagle to Herbert Hoover, 19 August, 1932. Pres. Box 
210 File, National Conference of Banking and Industrial Committees. 
H.H.L. Walter C. Teagle to Julius Klein, 16 September, 1932.
Walter C. Teagle to James F. Bell, 23 September, 1932. R.G.40
File, 81560/8. Remarks at Luncheon arranged by Myron C. Taylor,
2 December, 1932: 'To Further the Share-the-Work Movement'.
Taylor MSS: Box 22.
39. Survey Graphic 22 (July, 1933): 355.
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associations at national, State and local levels, labour organisations, 
and citizens' and social associations. Aggressive publicity would 
be central to the securing of public support for work-sharing, although 
the Movement would be careful not to cultivate any false optimism:
"It is of the highest importance that all publicity should be of a 
conservative nature and such as not to create a public impression, 
particularly among the unemployed themselves, that a miracle is being 
wrought and that the whole unemployment problem is to be corrected 
overnight." Voluntary associationism could offer no categorical or 
facile solutions to current problems. "On the contrary," the memorandum 
continued, "we face a long and arduous task."^
Structurally the Movement was organised on a regional basis, 
conducted by banking and industrial committees established in the 
twelve Federal Reserve districts, whose activities were coordinated 
by the central office in New York. The central office was staffed by 
representatives from each district.^' Efforts were made by the national 
and district organisations to obtain the support and cooperation of 
major national, State and local organisations, such as the Chamber of 
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, whose influence 
was considered indispensable to the effort. Particular attention 
was paid to convincing influential industrialists of the Movement's 
value, and appeals were made for their support of the organisation's 
programme. Teagle emphasised the importance of business leaders'
40. 'Share the Work': Confidential Memorandum to the Banking and 
Industrial Committees, n.d. R.G. 40, File, 81560/8.
41. The first of these committees was established for the New York 
district during the spring of 1932 and was composed of six leading 
bankers and six prominent businessmen. It sought to encourage 
banks and businessmen to avail themselves of the credit oppor­
tunities made available by the Hoover recovery programme. In 
May, Hoover advised the formation of similar committees in the 
other districts. For background to the Banking and Industrial 
committees see the five files in Pres. Box 12 Files, Banking and 
Industrial Committees. H.H.L.
42. New York Times. 2 September, 1932.
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support during his remarks at an organised businessmen's lunch: "Your
leadership in cooperating with our movement will do more than anything
else to put this over in a way that no individual or organization we
 ^3
could create would be able to do it," [sic].
Share-the-Work was endorsed by influential figures in politics and
industry. David Sarnoff, the president of R.C.A., regarded it as "the
ii 44proper approach to some of the problems that confront us . Lamwont 
du Pont, president of E.I. du Pont Co., was "sold on the fundamental 
idea of work sharing", while Myron C. Taylor regarded the organisation's 
work as a "most important economic activity".^ In the State where 
the Movement had its headquarters, Governor Roosevelt endorsed its 
objectives as "an essential in the continuing emergency".^ Frances 
Perkins regarded both the Movement and its underlying principles as 
"important to the program of reconstruction". Perkins was in "hearty 
accord" with the plan which would serve to build up "increased purchas­
ing power in the community" . ^  Sen. Robert F. Wagner also gave his 
support to the Movement, suggesting that the increased productivity 
of labour would make the short-work-week a permanent as well as an 
emergency arrangement.^ Such endorsements by prestigious national 
figures from industry and politics were central to the Share-the-Work 
effort and integral to voluntary associationisra.
43. Remarks at Luncheon, op.cit.
44. New York Times, 13 January, 1933.
45. Remarks at Luncheon, op.cit.
46. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Walter C. Teagle, n.d. Pres. Box 210 
File, National Conference of Banking and Industrial Committees. 
H.H.L. See also, 'The Governor Endorses a Shorter Work Week as 
a Means of Relieving Unemployment ' - Letter to John Sullivan, 
president of the New York State Federation of Labor, 25 August, 
1932. P.P.A., op.cit., 1: 227.
47. New York Times, 24 January, 1933.
48. Robert F. Wagner, 'The Problem of 25,000,000', New Outlook 156 
(October, 1932): 35.
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The Movement continued to function until March 1933, when, with
the advent of a new administration in Washington, it was disbanded and
its work transferred to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. From its inception
in 1932 to its demise during the following spring, The Share-the-Work
Movement enjoyed expansion and claimed some considerable success.
Local and regional committees were established and special units were
formed such as the Women's Division, under the direction of Mary Rumsey.
Divisions were also established on trade association lines in food,
drugs and chemicals to ensure uniformity of hours limitation in 
49specific sectors. As well as expansion, the Movement could claim 
to have made significant accomplishments as outlined in the reports 
of its district committees. The New York committee claimed that 24,656 
jobs had been saved through the efforts of the Movement in that State, 
and that 4,082 additional workers had been employed by over three 
thousand New York City firms participating in the s c h e m e . N e w  Jersey 
claimed that 28,904 jobs had been retained and 6,214 created as a 
result of its own campaign."** In its final report, the national organ­
isation claimed that at least 57,000 employers, employing nearly five
million workers, had actively supported the Movement and saved
521,091,282 jobs by utilising spread-work schemes.
However, the evidence suggests that Share-the-Work was not the 
success hoped for by its sponsors. Rather, by the early months of 
1933, it was recognised within the Movement itself that the extent 
of its influence was limited and that even where it had support, there 
was resistance to putting into practice share-the-work principles.
Walter Teagle frankly discussed the difficulties in December 1932.
49. New York Times, 23 January, 1933. Remarks at Luncheon, op.cit.
50. New York Times, 19 January, 1933.
51. Ibid., 28 January, 1933.
52. Ibid., 19 March, 1933
305
While he recognised and appreciated the cooperation of large manu­
facturers and heavy industry, he prophesied that if the Movement 
could not reach beyond the manufacturing sector into transportation, 
services, mining and agriculture, it would not be successful in
"breaking this business deadlock" and would be unable to justify its
53existence after a further six weeks. Even in the manufacturing sector 
commitment was not total. Share-the-Work spokesmen understood that a 
number of factors dissuaded employers from adopting work-sharing, such 
as the necessity of employing workers with technical expertise on a 
full-time basis and the fear of losing specialist workers to a competitor 
who continued to operate a full working week."^ Furthermore, spokesmen 
admitted that the most dedicated employers in applying the work-sharing 
principle were least able to apply it effectively. The Movement's 
staunchest support was located in those industries such as steel and 
automobiles which were reducing working hours in general below accept­
able levels as demand and production declined.^ Elsewhere, low 
morale within the business community explained the reluctance of many 
employers to adopt work-sharing. "Hard times have been with us so 
long that even the good business man has become defensively self-centered,"
53. Remarks at Luncheon, op.cit. In a press release in January 1933, 
the Movement noted that heavy industry remained committed to the 
programme for manual labour, but white-collar occupations were 
reluctant to participate in work-sharing. New York Times, 22 
January, 1933.
54. Remarks at Luncheon, op.cit. In his testimony before a Senate 
committee of 1933, P.W. Litchfield noted that the larger companies 
which spread work and maintained wages were disadvantaged by 
smaller companies which seized the opportunity to lengthen hours 
and lower wages and hence, reduce their unit costs. Hearings, 
Investigation of Economic Problems, op.cit., 503. See also,
Thomas R. Taylor to W.J. Barrett, 6 January, 1933. R.G. 40 
File, 81560/8.
55 Remarks at Luncheon, op.cit.
306
Teagle explained to the Secretary of Commerce, Roy D. Chapin. "Instead
of helping a general situation of which he is a part, his energies
56have been concentrated on self-preservation." Internal problems 
existed also. Teagle confessed that the performance of certain district 
committees, such as that of Philadelphia, had been disappointing.5^
By the early months of 1933, then, despite the bravura of its official 
pronouncements, the Movement recognised the limits of its own influence. 
Secretary Chapin had been pessimistic about the prospects for The 
Share-the-Work Movement since November. As he wrote to Edward Eyre 
Hunt about Teagle's efforts: "These are trying times, and our emer­
gence from them is certainly an uncharted one - both as to when and 
how. " 58
As The Share-the-Work Movement faltered into 1933, the adminis­
tration considered supplementary action which employed the work-sharing 
principle. In particular, the so-called 'Rand Plan' occupied Roy 
Chapin's fleeting attention. James H. Rand of Remington Rand Inc. 
proposed a 'Back to Work Campaign' which sought to re-employ three 
million workers for a two to three month period for at least three 
days a week. To fund payrolls the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
would be authorised to loan $500,000,000 for a five-year period at a 
nominal rate of interest. The basis of the Rand Plan was that 
re-employment would generate purchasing power and hence a demand for
56. Walter C. Teagle to Roy D. Chapin, 5 December, 1932. R.G. 40 
File, 81560/8.
57. Ibid.
58. Roy D. Chapin to Edward E. Hunt, 20 November, 1932. Edward 
Eyre Hunt MSS: Box 1 File, 1932 Correspondence. H.H.L.
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the products of industry, which would assist recovery. Secretary 
Chapin informed Hoover of Rand's plan and advised Teagle that the 
administration wished "to keep all of our interested minds busy" on 
such suggestions since "some basic thought" might emerge which could 
become the basis of a non-partisan re-employment programme.^ However, 
the President was cool to the Rand proposal, believing that it was 
"useless" for the expiring administration to establish the elaborate 
machinery needed to administer it. 61 In the event, the autumn drive 
of the Hoover administration to share the available work was its last 
attempt to employ the principles of voluntary associationism to amel­
iorate unemployment and generate some economic recovery.
Testifying before the House Labor Committee in April 1933, Teagle 
implied the failure of the voluntary approach to hours limitation when 
he condoned federal legislation to establish maximum working hours. 
Although he had reservations about the pending thirty-hour measure 
of Hugo Black because of its inflexibility, he claimed to be "entirely 
in sympathy with the objective of the Black bill" and that, while he
59. 'A Re-employment Plan for Putting Three Million People Back to 
Work on 1 February, 1933'. Copy in Tugwell MSSi Box 2. James
H. Rand to Roy D. Chapin, n.d. Pres. Box 348, File, Unemployment - 
Share-the-Work. H.H.L.
60. Roy D. Chapin to Herbert Hoover, 2 December, 1932. Ibid. Roy 
D. Chapin to Walter C. Teagle, 5 January, 1933. R.G. 40 File, 
81560/8.
61. Herbert Hoover to Roy D. Chapin, 3 December, 1932. Pres. Box 
348 File, Unemployment - Share-the-Work. H.H.L. Numerous 
disadvantages were noted in a memorandum on the Rand Plan found 
in the Hoover papers. The most frequent criticism was that
it would either duplicate or detract from The Share-the-Work 
Movement. See Memorandum on the Rand Plan'. Ibid.
308
believed the country had not been "ready” for short-week legislation
62previously: "Now, I believe it is."
This recognition of the limitations of The Share-the-Work 
Movement was also an admission of the shortcomings of Hoover's 
voluntaristic doctrine. Indeed, there were distinct similarities 
between the Movement and P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R. which both embodied 
the 'Hoover approach" to the depression. Like the others, The Share- 
the-Work Movement was inadequately financed, which explains the impor­
tance of businessmen as directing agents with their capacity to raise 
funds for the cause. As Teagle himself remarked: "In our effort we 
have had no accountants or large funds, and have operated by getting 
a little money here and there from our friends." The Department of 
Commerce assisted the Movement by supplying information and surplus 
material on work-sharing published by various agencies, but would not 
circularise the Movement's literature under the Department's frank 
and requested clerical help from the Teagle organisation to assist 
with distribution.^ A second similarity was the Movement's reliance 
on voluntarism: on persuading employers to limit lay-offs and hire 
more personnel through a general reduction in hours. Like P.E.C.E. 
and P.O.U.R., the Teagle organisation relied on publicity and slogan­
eering to secure support for their objectives; the official slogan of 
The Share-the-Work Movement being 'Job security by job sharing'.^
62. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Labor. Hearings on S.158 and 
H.R. 4557 and Proposals offered by the Secretary of Labor, Thirty- 
Hour Week Bill, 73rd Congress First Session, 1933: 511.
63. Remarks at Luncheon, op.cit.
64. Julius Klein to James F. Hodgson, 28 November, 1932. Julius 
Klein to Walter C. Teagle, 13 September, 1932. Walter C. Teagle 
to Roy D. Chapin, 9 September, 1932. Roy D. Chapin to Walter C. 
Teagle, 13 September, 10 November, 1932. Roy D. Chapin to William 
Steuart, 10 November, 1932. R.G. 40 File, 81560/8.
65. New York Times, 2 September, 1932.
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Third, the Movement emphasised that it was purely an emergency organ­
isation. Teagle justified his movement in terms of the prevailing 
emergency conditions: "If there was a partial food famine the available 
supply would be rationed to the end that all might live, and no one 
would question the necessity of fairness of such action. Now that 
there is a partial famine of work the supply of that likewise should
be rationed and spread more widely so that the prediction of thirteen
66million unemployed ... will not be realised nor even approached."
Once the emergency was ended the Movement would dissolve, having ful­
filled its function. "As business picks up," Teagle assured, "and 
jobs again begin to seek the man, this movement will evaporate like 
gasoline in the open air."^
As such, The Share-the-Work Movement represented no shift from 
elements of the Hoover counter-depression programme that had preceded 
it. Indeed, its sponsors were quick to disclaim that it was in any 
way innovatory. Hoover commended the strategy as avoiding "artificial­
ities" inherent in other, more ambitious recovery schemes. He conceded 
that work-sharing marked no attempt to "settle here in a day great 
economic problems of the future" but was a call for action to confront 
"problems immediately before us". Work-sharing was no novel approach
66. Nation's Business, 20 (October, 1932): 35.
67. New York Times, 15 January, 1933. For other references to the 
emergency character of The Share-the-Work Movement, see M. Kerlin 
to George Faist, 17 September, 1932. Walter C. Teagle to Roy
D. Chapin and William N. Doak, 14 December, 1932. Open letter 
to employers from Roy D. Chapin and William N. Doak, 15 December, 
1932. R.G. 40 File, 81560/8. 68
68. Address to the Conference of the Federal Reserve District 
Banking and Industrial Committees, Washington, D.C., 26 August, 
1932. State Papers, op.cit., 2: 272.
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to the problems of the depression, since it had been established on
an ad hoc basis by individual firms and through the efforts of previous
government agencies. "It grew naturally," Teagle contended, "on
sheer merit as a logical means of protecting the best interests of
. 6 9employers and workers in a period of poor business."
Guided by the principles of humanitarianism and political exped­
iency and entertaining the hope that work-sharing might induce economic 
recovery, the Movement made no attempt to disguise its temporary 
nature. This stress on the immediate emergency precluded much consid­
eration of the place of shorter hours in long-term business stabilis­
ation schemes and industrial planning. These aspects of shorter working 
hours had been emphasised by P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R. and were central 
to the work of theorists such as L.C. Walker and Arthur 0. Dahlberg.^ 
However, The Share-the-Work Movement dwelt on the relief and recovery 
elements of the shorter working week, making few references to its 
long-range significance. Its well-intended boast that work-spreading 
was instrumental in saving five million jobs during the depression, 
points to its relevance as a short-term expedient.^*
69. New York Times, 15 January, 1933.
70. Arthur 0. Dahlberg was an economist and engineer who, in 1933, 
was research fellow for the Social Science Research Council. In 
his published works, Dahlberg argued for the shorter working day 
in terms of securing a balance between production and consumption 
and improving the quality of American life. Although his work 
has gone largely unnoticed by recent historians, Dahlberg was 
considered influential by his contemporaries. Arthur 0. Dahlberg, 
Utopia Through Capitalism: A Study of the Possibility and Desir­
ability of a Shorter Working Day (Madison, 1927). Idem, Jobs, 
Machines and Capitalism (New York, 1932). John Chamberlain, 
'Panaceas for the Depression: I, Solving it with a Thirty-Hour 
Week', New Republic 74 (29 March, 1933): 178-181. Ralph E. 
Flanders, 'Required Reading: Three Surveys of the Existing 
Economic Disorder', Mechanical Engineering 54 (May, 1932): 317-319.
71. New York Times, 22 January, 1933.
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The Movement drew criticism from collectivists and labour spokes­
men. Opinion in these quarters was not uniform as to the viability 
or desirability of work-sharing as an approach to either relief or 
recovery, although many conceded that it would be an essential component 
of a more broadly-based programme. Yet opinion was unanimous in 
condemning the perceived shortcomings of the Teagle organisation's 
efforts. Five lines of criticism may be noted: that the sacrifices 
which work-sharing entailed were borne by the working-class; that 
the Movement was cynically manipulated by business in pursuit of selfish 
interests; that its principles had not received broad and adequate 
application; that it was based on specious economic premises and 
finally, that it avoided rather than confronted problems posed by the 
depression.
Some collectivists and labour spokesmen argued that work-sharing 
placed the burdens of unemployment onto the shoulders of wage-earners 
who were least able to bear them. Since work-sharing, as its advocates 
freely admitted, involved no substantial increase in costs or loss of 
productivity, the only disadvantaged element would be those workers 
already employed who would be obliged to accept wage reductions to 
accommodate new workers on their firms' existing payrolls. As The 
Nation commented, the Movement made "simply another plea for saddling 
the costs of the depression on the workers". Although the A.F. of L. 
was committed to work-sharing, it was disappointed that hours reductions 
had been accompanied by wage reductions which defeated "the very purpose 
it ... proclaimed to serve" through diminishing labour's purchasing
72. Nation 135.(14 September, 1932): 222. See also New Republic 73
(14 December, 1932): 112-113. Rugg, The Great Technology, op.cit., 
144-145.
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power. "It becomes a movement ... not of sharing work, but sharing
73poverty," the organisation declared in 1932.
A second criticism was that the Movement was dominated by business
whose interest was either in relieving tax burdens by making more
employed eligible for taxation, or in lowering wages to a subsistence
74level so as to benefit industry once a revival got underway.
Collectivists were unconvinced of the progressive nature of The Share- 
the-Work Movement. The New Republic charged the Movement with hypocrisy 
and suggested that businessmen could afford to utter such "noble 
sentiments" when they did not involve increasing payrolls or costs.
Until Walter Teagle himself should share-the-work of Standard, New 
Jersey, with its independent competitors, the journal would be suspicious 
of his Movement's sincerity.More fundamentally, collectivists were 
sceptical about the value of organised business leadership which had 
failed palpably over three years to provide a solution for the depression. 
The Nation questioned the wisdom of Hoover's reliance on "blind leader­
ship". If the President was really committed to assisting the 
unemployed he should seek the advice of social workers and labour 
leaders instead of depending upon "discredited bankers and 
industrialists".^
73. Proceedings, 52nd Annual Convention, A.F. of L., 1932, op.cit■, 
. 184. See also, American Federationist 39 (October, 1932):
1102-1103.
74. Sumner H. Slichter, 'The Immediate Unemployment Problem', The 
Annals 165 (January, 1933): 11. Slichter had anticipated this 
criticism a year previously. See Idem, 'Unemployment Relief 
by Business', New Republic 69 (30 December, 1931): 183.
75. Ibid., 72 (12 October, 1932): 216-217.
76. Nation 135 (14 September, 1932): 222.
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A third line of criticism was that work-sharing had been ineffec­
tive and inequitable in operation. Although Sumner Slichter was not 
opposed to work-sharing as a principle, he was dissatisfied and 
impatient with its accomplishments. His major reservation was that 
the working week and average weekly earnings were already so low 
that it was unlikely that work could be spread thinner without unfavour­
able consequences for labour.^ He was concerned also that commitment 
to hours limitation in industry was variable. The effect of work-sharing 
on a firm's cost structure was frequently the decisive factor in 
determining whether or not the practice was adopted and in some sectors 
such as textiles, little attempt had been made to spread work. Slichter 
understood businessmen's fears that they would be disadvantaged in 
competition with other firms if work-sharing added to their costs.
Large companies which had tended to reduce wages less drastically than 
they cut hours were becoming handicapped in competition with the small 
entrepreneur who had seized the opportunity of a labour surplus to 
dispense with inefficient employees and to make sharp wage reductions. 
Slichter perceived that large corporations were becoming increasingly 
reluctant to work at this disadvantage and forecast a declining enthus­
iasm for work-sharing and an increasing resort to lay-offs, long hours 
and wage reductions. Work-sharing would become viable only when it was 
made nationwide and this necessitated having the Federal Government
77. Slichter, 'Immediate Unemployment Problem', op.cit., 4. An
illuminating insight into businessmen's attitudes to work-sharing 
is provided in an exchange which occurred between Rep. Glenn H. 
Griswold (Indiana) and Gerard Swope during the House Labor 
Committee hearings on the Thirty-Hour Week Bill. Representative 
Griswold: "They are spreading work so thin that instead of 
having half the world paupers out here, we have all the world 
paupers." Gerard Swope: "Maybe we have got all the world's 
paupers, but each one is supporting his family, sir." Hearings, 
Thirty-Hour Week Bill, op.cit., 100.
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"compel" firms to adopt the practice. The criterion of reasonable
hours which Slichter preferred was those that were necessary "not
78for the plants but for the men".
The A.F. of L. was similarly disappointed with industry's record
in applying work-sharing and became favourable to some legislative
solution to make the practice more widespread. In the summer of 1932,
the organisation's Executive Council regretted that while some companies
had established a five-day week for employees "such action by a few
79companies has no national effect". The situation had not improved 
by the early months of the following year. William Green charged that 
the number of firms which had undertaken to share-the-work had been 
"so infinitesimal that it has not affected the general situation". 
Ultimately, if work-sharing was to be successful, mandatory legislation 
was essential: "It is the old story all over again, that it is only 
through the application of pressure that men will do the thing that 
is needed to be done."®^
A fourth criticism was that work-sharing was based on fallacious 
premises in economic theory and could be positively damaging if 
pursued. Donald Richberg characterised it as "the most short-sighted 
and unjust" of all programmes to relieve unemployment; "unjust" 
in as far as labour bore the burdens of relieving unemployment, and 
"short-sighted" because the policy would be damaging to economic 
recovery. Such a "wholesale deflation of labor" would result in a
78. Sumner H. Slichter, 'Should We Deflate Labor?', New Republic 74 
(3 May, 1933): 330-331.
79. New York Times. 13 July, 1932.
80. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Labor. Hearings on H.R.14105, 
Six-Hour Day, Five-Day Week, 72nd Congress, Second Session, 1933: 
8-9. Hearings, Thirty-Hour Week Bill, op.cit., 78.
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substantial diminution of purchasing power and have adverse effects
on industry. Focus on work-sharing was evidence of "panicky thinking"
since it represented "a surrender" and "an acceptance of defeat".
The programme resigned the nation to a lower standard of living and
possible economic and political change as a result. Richberg warned
• 81that such programmes would bring about "national degeneration".
A final criticism of the share-the-work strategy was that it 
offered no really fundamental solution to the depression and served 
to distract attention from more worthwhile approaches. As early as 
April 1931, The New Republic disparaged the efforts of manufacturers 
who introduced work-sharing: "At best it is an expedient which is 
only a little better than throwing unemployed workers on the resources 
of charity. It is not in any sense an approach to real industrial 
stabilization." Rexford Tugwell discussed the share-the-work 
approach with Basil O’Connor, presumably with a viey to the issue’s 
utility for Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidential campaign. Tugwell 
regarded work-sharing as merely one of many current panaceas. "Every­
one," he wrote, "has some little formula which he thinks will solve 
the world's difficulties and does not hesitate to press it on anyone 
who has any public influence." Tugwell himself was not sympathetic 
to work-sharing. The movement to reduce hours was "essentially a 
philosophy of despair" and it was necessary, as the Brains Trust 
understood, to devise "a more fundamental policy which will make 
such suggestions as this unnecessary". Tugwell did not reject the
81. Memorandum: 'The Spread-Work Folly', 17 August, 1932. Donald 
R. Richberg MSS: Box 44 File 2. Library of Congress.
82. New Republic 65 (15 April, 1931): 218.
83. Basil O'Connor was a lawyer and speech-writer-cum-adviser to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. He is often referred to as a member of 
Roosevelt's 'Brains Trust' of 1932.
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share-the-work approach out of hand, but merely criticised its
emphasis to the exclusion of other approaches. Work-sharing could
be "a minor point in a larger program", but as a formula for recovery
and relief in itself, it was inadequate. "If I were you I should
84pay no attention to it," he advised O'Connor.
By the end of Herbert Hoover's presidency the voluntary associa- 
tionism approach to industrial planning had been discredited. The 
attempt to specify a particular planning goal in The Share-the-Work 
Movement had failed as a practical venture and could not command a 
solid consensus behind the work-sharing strategy itself. Furthermore, 
as expounded by the Teagle organisation, work-sharing lost much of 
its relevance to industrial planning since it was defended in terms 
of its utility as a relief expedient. The failure of voluntary 
associationism was confirmed by the introduction of a bill by Sen.
Hugo L. Black on 21 December, 1932, to establish a shorter working 
week. The bill would have prohibited the shipment of articles in 
interstate or foreign commerce which had been manufactured in*any 
establishment employing any worker more than five days in any week 
or more than six hours in any day. In the sense that the Black prop­
osal sought to establish a shorter working week it was the culmination 
of previous efforts during Hoover's presidency to spread work to 
ameliorate unemployment. However, like the contemporaneous Share- 
the-Work Movement it stressed the role of work-sharing as a relief 
measure in the unemployment crisis and ignored the long-term industrial 
planning aspects of the shorter working week that had been a feature 
of P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R.'s defences of hours limitation. Moreover,
84. Rexford G. Tugwell to Basil O'Connor, 9 July, 1932. Tugwell
MSS: Box 2.
85. S.5267. A parallel bill was introduced into the House by
William P. Connery (Massachusetts) on 6 January, 1933. H.R.14082.
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the Black bill made an even more emphatic break with voluntary assoc- 
iationism than the Teagle Movement by attempting to make hours limit­
ation mandatory.
Black's sponsorship of his 'thirty-hour bill' stemmed from his
developed interest in a shorter working week and a sympathy for the
plight of labour in the depression. His concern about shorter working
hours had been nurtured through his association with the cotton textile
operator, Donald Comer of Birmingham, Alabama, who had earlier urged
Black to introduce legislation to make a forty-hour week mandatory.
It was not until the depression deepened and unemployment increased
86that Black conceded that "such a bill was immediately advisable".
Black was prepared to give voluntary action on shorter hours a fair
trial but when, despite the efforts of President Hoover and "the
influence of his high office", voluntarism met with "signal failure"
he became disenchanted with the approach. "Business leaders have
failed," Black claimed. "For four years we have waited for that
88prosperity which was to come around the corner." The limited applic­
ation of voluntary hours limitation convinced Black that legislation 
was essential.
t
86. Hugo L. Black to J.H. Garrett, 4 May, 1933. Hugo L. Black MSS:
Box 161. Library of Congress. Black credited Comer as being
a source of inspiration for the 'thirty-hour bill': "As a 
matter of fact, the discussion between you and me on this 
problem of long hours, was very influential in causing me to 
offer this bill." Hugo L. Black to Donald Comer, 21 April,
1933. Ibid. Black maintained his correspondence with Comer 
up until 1937. See Ibid., Box 158.
87. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933: 
1126-1127.
88. Ibid., 76, 72nd Congress, Second Session, 1933: 4311.
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Black's sympathy for the plight of labour was deep. He was 
optimistic that the victory of Roosevelt in 1932 would reverse the 
social bias of successive Republican administrations and their dis­
regard for the interests and welfare of the working man. As he wrote 
to George C. Davis of the Commerce Department:
I, too, am hopeful that we shall be able to secure some real 
relief for the 'little man'. The recent Republican adminis­
trations which have been in control of the country since 
the World War, have leaned to the privileged and wealthy 
classes. Under the leadership of our Democratic President,
Mr. Roosevelt, I am convinced that attention is going to be 
given to the needs of the masses of our people rather than 
the privileged few.89
Black welcomed what he sensed to be a new sentiment, inspired by the
depression, which demanded equity and just rewards for all involved
in industry and which valued human rights above property rights. He
was determined to activate this new mood against the "crime" of
excessively long working hours for the employed while "desperate"
millions remained unemployed. "I am very proud indeed," Black wrote
to a constituent, "to be fighting for a measure, which will make life
easier for the millions of men, women and children who are compelled
90to work long hours at drudgery in order to get a bare living."
Black argued the case for his bill on three levels. Perhaps as
a gesture to secure business support, Black contended that the shorter
working week was the soundest alternative to continuing public relief.
"We are now unmistakeably at the crossroads," he noted in a radio
address, "where we must choose between the evils of a dole system
91and some method of supplying work for our people." Second, he
89. Hugo L. Black to George C. Davis, 25 March, 1933. Black MSS: Box 112.
90. Hugo L. Black to J.H. Garrett, op.cit.
91. Radio Address by Hugo L. Black, 9 January, 1933. Reprinted in 
Congressional Record 76, 72nd Congress, Second Session, 1933:
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claimed that his bill would be instrumental in promoting a degree of 
economic recovery. While he denied that it was any panacea for 
unemployment, Black contended that six and a half million people 
would be re-employed because of it and that the bill would play a 
"major part" in national readjustment and recovery. Not only would 
re-employment increase aggregate purchasing power, but such a positive 
initiative would create a climate of optimism and confidence in 
industry which was vital for recovery. Furthermore, the benefits 
of the bill would extend beyond the industrial sector and into agri­
culture, since industrial revival would enable "people who work in
93industry to buy the products of the farmer at a fair rate".
However, Black's most emphatic and persistent arguments were 
either humanitarian or based on political expediency. He stressed the 
desirability of providing some form of immediate relief for the destitute 
and helpless unemployed and exploited. Regarding himself as spokesman 
for "the twelve million who have lost their jobs", the "twenty-five 
million more who have partially lost their jobs" and "the whole forty- 
eight million who are walking the streets today not knowing whether 
they will have a job tomorrow or not", he appealed to the common decency 
and humanity of congressmen to support his bill. Alongside this 
emotional appeal Black stressed the advisability of the thirty-hour 
week in terms of maintaining political stability. He indicated latent 
and sinister forces which might surface if the government failed to 
act positively against unemployment. Black wondered whether the 
"long-suffering" people would tolerate such neglect and indifference
92. Ibid., 4305. Hugo L. Black to B.F. Courtwright, 1 February,
1933. Black MSS: Box 160.
93. Hugo L. Black to J.H. Garrett, op.cit. Congressional Record 76,
72nd Congress, Second Session, 1933: 1443; 4305. 94
94. Ibid., 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933: 1127.
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in their government for much longer without demanding some extreme
political change. If the government was seen to be impotent, it
provided strong arguments to those who attacked the American political 
95system. Finally, Black urged support for his bill because it 
represented a positive gesture in over three years barren of accomplish­
ment, and initiative. "There have been few matters proposed in this 
body, very few," he declared, "which strike at the fundamentals of 
the widespread distress which exists in America today.
Senate passed the Black bill on 6 April, 1933, after the 
Roosevelt administration had assumed office. The bill's passage was 
a reflection of senators' unease at the deepening unemployment crisis 
and the necessity for some response to ameliorate the problem. The 
work-sharing strategy employed in the Black bill had been popularised 
as a component of Hoover's response to the depression which pivoted 
on voluntary associationism. However, by 1933, work-sharing was 
advocated in different terms. The mounting rolls of the unemployed 
made many sceptical of the value of a voluntary approach to unemploy­
ment relief and the Black bill sought a legislative solution to secure 
compliance to hours limitation. Also, advocates of the thirty-hour 
week defended its implementation in terms of the current emergency, 
rather than as part of long-term industrial planning strategies. That 
the Black bill succeeded in passing Senate, despite strenuous objections 
from many quarters, was testimony to the impatience of senators with 
voluntary associationism. In the event, the bill's passage acted as 
a catalyst for consideration by the Roosevelt administration and
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., 76, 72nd Congress, Second Session, 1933; 2740.
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Congress of more comprehensive recovery and relief measures which 
would revive the prospect of industrial planning, but on a different 
basis than voluntary associationism.
CHAPTER 8: INDUSTRIAL PLANNING, POLITICS AND CRISIS, 1933: THE 
MAKING OF THE N.I.R.A.
The November elections of 1932 introduced new possibilities with
regard to industrial planning. Hoover's rejection by the electorate
removed from office the major obstruction to the translation into
public policy of approaches to planning which differed from voluntary
associationism. His successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was more
pragmatic in his attitudes to industrial planning and was not respect-
«
ful of traditional American credos to the same degree as Hoover. The 
political complexion of Congress also changed. Tenuous majorities 
for the Republicans in Senate and for the Democrats in the House were 
replaced by substantial Democratic majorities in both houses; the 
largest for either party since 1910. The composition of the 73rd 
Congress was not its only distinctive feature. Newly elected congress 
men were less inhibited than their counterparts of 1932 in considering 
controversial measures that might have adverse electoral consequences. 
Moreover, the size of the Democratic majorities and the number of 
'freshmen' they included made the 73rd Congress "tractable" in a way 
that neither of its two predecessors had been. The new Congress was 
amenable to the vigorous executive leadership which Roosevelt was 
willing to provide.*
The deteriorating economic situation, manifested in the banking 
collapse of the last months of Hoover's term of office, provided the
1. Hoover’s relations with Congress are examined in Jordan A. Schwarz 
The Interregnum of Despair; Hoover, Congress and the Depression 
(Urbana, 1970). For Roosevelt's * honeymoon' period with Congress 
see James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New 
Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 
1933-1939 (Lexington, 1967): chap.l, and E. Pendleton Herring, 
'First Session of the 73rd Congress', American Political Science 
Review 27 (February, 1934): 65-83.
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context for an atmosphere of crisis during the spring of 1933. George 
L. Berry, the president of the International Printing Pressmen's Union, 
conveyed this sense of urgency in March, when he called for forceful 
leadership from the new administration. "This is the hour for complete 
coordination," Berry declared. "I believe President Roosevelt repre­
sents the last fortification, and with his failure there will come in
2this country a situation which I shall not attempt to describe."
This sense of crisis pervaded both the White House and Capitol Hill 
after Roosevelt's inauguration. From the outset, the Roosevelt admin­
istration recognised that some measure of industrial recovery needed 
to be generated urgently. Two of the President's aides, Adolf Berle 
and James P. Warburg, were particularly concerned on 22 March that 
the banking situation might precipitate a serious "secondary" crisis 
in the industrial sector "if we do not get the motor started within 
the next few weeks". Industrial recovery was the immediate priority. 
"Everyone seems to agree," Warburg wrote to Raymond Moley on 4 April,
"that the most important problem we face today is the problem of
3restarting industry and stimulating the sources of employment."
This attitude of crisis was duplicated in Congress and was especially 
evident in Senate's urgency to pass Hugo Black's 'thirty-hour bill', 
and in the dispatch with which the administration's industrial 
recovery bill was passed by both houses in June. The exigencies of 
crisis overrode scruples about changes in the United States' political 
economy and facilitated the efforts of a reforming president to trans­
late his predilections for a planned economy into public policy.
2. Minutes of the Labor Conference to Consider Unemployment and 
Unemployment Relief at the Department of Labor, 31 March, 1933. 
Copy in Beyer MSS: Box 36 File, Unemployment, 1930-1933.
3. James P. Warburg, 'Reminiscences', Columbia University Oral 
History Project: 201; 378.
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There appears to have been a shift of emphasis in Roosevelt's
conception of industrial planning between 1930 and 1932. As Governor
of New York State, Roosevelt was sympathetic to Hoover's doctrine
of voluntary associationism. His appointment of the Commission on
the Stabilization of Employment and his endorsement of its conclusions
about the role that private initiative could play in alleviating the
depression resembled Hoover's own approach to planning. However, as
a presidential aspirant during 1932, and advised on economic policy
by his Brains Trust, Roosevelt departed from Hooverian planning prin-
4ciples and adopted a more distinctive stance.
By 1932, Roosevelt had become sceptical of the virtues and utility 
of the competitive ideal and boldly declared for policies which contra­
vened established national credos. Unlike Hoover, Roosevelt sensed 
that the economy had reached a stage of maturity in which expansion 
would give way to stabilisation and consolidation. Industrial develop­
ment had reached a point congruent to the nation's territorial develop­
ment. Since American technology had the capacity to satisfy more than 
national needs, industrial progress, like westward expansion, would 
have to be moderated. "Our industrial plant is built," Roosevelt 
stated in his Commonwealth Club address, "the problem just now is 
whether under existing conditions it is not overbuilt."^ In the future, 
industrial growth would be more restrained. "It seems to me probable
4. The Brains Trust and its influence on Roosevelt are examined in 
Elliot A. Rosen, Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brains Trust: From 
Depression to New Deal (New York, 1977). Idem, 'Roosevelt and 
the Brains Trust: An Historiographical Overview', Political 
Science Quarterly 87 (December, 1972): 531-557. Rexford G. 
Tugwell, The Brains Trust (New York, 1968).
5. Address, Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California, 23 
September, 1932. P.P.A., op.cit., 1 : 750.
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that our physical plant will not expand at the same rate at which
it has expanded in the past," he reflected at Oglethorpe University.^
Such circumstances required a "re-appraisal" of values:
Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of natural 
resources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the 
soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources 
and plants already in hand, of seeking to reestablish 
foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the 
problem of underconsumption, of adjusting production to 
consumption, of distributing wealth and products more 
equitably, of adapting existing economic organizations to 
the service of the people.^
Changed conditions necessitated the abandonment of anachronistic 
ideas. Roosevelt recognised that as the day of the great entrepreneur 
was over, so the doctrines that had been applicable to the rapid 
industrial development of the late nineteenth century were no longer 
appropriate in the modern economy of the twentieth century. Roosevelt 
was less attached to laissez faire ideals than Hoover and when he 
espoused economic planning, emphasised the desirability of change 
rather than of continuity in economic policy.
Roosevelt disassociated his planning vision from the panaceas 
and "illusions of economic magic" spawned by the depression. Many 
'planners' deluded themselves that through the temporary application 
of planning practices during an economic emergency successful recovery 
could be achieved without recourse to any transformation of the 
economic system. Roosevelt dissented on two counts. In the first 
place, successful planning would involve a rigorous appraisal and 
perhaps, a reorientation of the economic system. As he stated in 
his 'Forgotten Man' radio address: "A real economic cure must go to 
the killing of the bacteria in the system rather than to the treatment
6. Address, Oglethorpe University, Atlanta, Georgia, 22 May, 1932. 
Ibid., 645.
7. Address, Commonwealth Club. Ibid., 751-752.
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Qof external symptoms." Second, economic planning was a long-term 
proposition; the means of avoiding the extremes of the business 
cycle. In both his Jefferson Day Dinner and Oglethorpe University 
addresses of 1932, Roosevelt stressed the need for a long-term commit­
ment to economic planning. "I favor economic planning, not for this 
period alone but for our needs a long time to come," he said at St. 
Paul.^ In his Oglethorpe address, which was composed by the journalist, 
Ernest K. Lindley, Roosevelt expressed sentiments of which Hoover 
would have disapproved, particularly when he described the function 
of planning as the control of income and investment: "Most important 
to me in the long run is the problem of controlling by adequate planning 
the creation and distribution of those products which our vast economic 
machine is capable of wielding."^ Rexford Tugwell has described the 
Oglethorpe address as Roosevelt's "high tide of collectivism", while 
Harlow S. Person, president of the Taylor Society, characterised it 
as "an expression of economic as well as of political statesmanship".^ 
Roosevelt was careful to endow planning with the legitimacy of 
American experience and pointedly alluded to the War Industries Board 
in several addresses. At St. Paul he made planning integral to his
8. Radio Address, Albany, New York, 7 April, 1932. Ibid., 625.
9. Address, Jefferson Day Dinner, St. Paul, Minnesota, 18 April,
1932. Ibid., 632.
10. Address, Oglethorpe University. Ibid., 644.
11. Rexford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (Baltimore, 1969):
219. H.S. Persons to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 24 May, 1932. P.P.F., 
Box 136 F.D.R.L. It should be noted that Tugwell does not accept 
that the Commonwealth Club and Oglethorpe speeches were accurate 
representations of Roosevelt's economic thought. See Rexford G. 
Tugwell, 'The Commonwealth Club Address in the First Campaign',
in In Search of Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass., 1972): 172-173.
12. See Radio Address, 7 April, 1932 and Address, St. Paul. P.P.A., 
op.cit., 1: 624; 632.
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"concert of interests" theme. He did not envisage an economy 
"completely planned and regimented", but proposed only essential 
interferences on the basis of democratic participation, to achieve 
a genuine "community of interests" between the various geographic 
sections and economic groups.^
While Roosevelt sought to minimise any coercive elements in 
planning, he was emphatic that a prominent role for government be 
provided in the planning process. The problems of adjustment involved 
in the transition from an expanding to a mature economy required that 
the Federal Government assume responsibility for the national economic 
welfare. The economic power of industrial and financial groups was 
of particular concern to Roosevelt since their interests often did 
not coincide with the general welfare. Citing Berle and Means' 
discoveries of the extent of industrial concentration, Roosevelt 
warned in his Commonwealth Club address - which Berle himself largely 
wrote - that the United States was "steering a course toward economic 
oligarchy, if we are not there already".1^  A re-definition of the 
relationship between business and government was imperative. Business 
leaders had to assume the responsibilities which accompanied their 
power and "it must be the policy of the Government to see that they 
do it".^
Roosevelt's strictures about industrial concentration and 
business malpractices made him no foe of large enterprise. It was 
pointless to "abandon the principle of strong economic units ... merely 
because their power is susceptible of abuse". Society must "modify"
13. Address, St. Paul, Ibid.
14. Address, Commonwealth Club. Ibid., 751.
15. Radio Address to the Business and Professional Men's League,
6 October, 1932. Ibid., 785.
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and "control" these units to serve the general welfare. This would 
be accomplished through a partnership between "statesmen and business­
men" which would seek to create a new "economic constitutional order". 
Roosevelt's model businessman was of the progressive, planning type 
which had become prominent during the depression. Unlike Hoover, 
Roosevelt was impressed with the sincerity of industrial leaders who 
sought legislative change to facilitate trade association activity, 
and saw potential in their programmes. At San Francisco he complimented 
those industrialists who had recognised the mutuality of interests 
between capital, labour and consumers and expressed sympathy for their 
ambitions to achieve industrial stabilisation through cooperation and 
coordination. Those industries which had endeavoured to "limit the 
freedom of each man and business group within the industry in the 
common interest of all" were "enlightened" in Roosevelt's opinion. 
Moreover, he appeared prepared to grant them the ability to organise: 
"The responsible heads of finance and industry, instead of acting 
for himself, must work together to achieve the common end ... I am 
very clear that they must fearlessly and competently assume the respons­
ibility that goes with power."
Roosevelt was less confident that these responsible elements 
could organise their industries effectively while the forces of 
"private advantage" - "the lone wolf, the unethical competitor, the 
reckless promoter" - continued to undermine their efforts. Only 
governmental authority could restrain the activities of such unenlight­
ened interests "whose hand is against every man's" and who threatened 
"to drag industry back to a state of anarchy". However, while govern­
ment would facilitate associational activity it would practice 
surveillance of these industrial collectivities to ensure that
3 2 9
collective power was not used contrary to the public interest. Such 
a "social contract" between business and government was appropriate 
for the changed economic circumstances and consistent with American 
ideals. Yet the approach was innovatory as Roosevelt recognised at 
San Francisco: "As yet there has been no final failure, because there 
has been no attempt."^
Roosevelt's developing ideas about the nature of industrial 
planning were most approximate in form to those of the progressive 
business planners such as Gerard Swope who were prepared to concede 
a role for government in the planning process, if not to the degree 
that Roosevelt intimated in his speeches of 1932. Before his election 
in November, Roosevelt had endorsed trade associationism in general 
terms and had inferred his dissatisfaction with the operation of the 
antitrust statutes. The contrast with Hoover was marked.
Integral to Roosevelt's developing ideas was the concept of 
crisis and his appreciation that circumstances required changes in 
the political economy. The same sense of crisis was apparent in the 
73rd Congress, which allowed congressmen to support the kind of legis­
lation which predecessors had shunned. This sensitivity to crisis 
was evident in Senate's consideration of the Black 'thirty-hour week' 
bill which had been introduced in the 72nd Congress and was re­
introduced in its successor. The Black bill is significant to the 
history of industrial planning during the early years of the depression 
for several reasons. In the first place, the bill represented the 
failure of Herbert Hoover's doctrine of voluntary associationisra. 
Although Black's measure may be interpreted as an extension of Hoover's 
'Share-the-Work' drive of 1932, by stipulating a mandatory, federally- 
enforced thirty-hour week, it significantly changed the assumptions
16. Address, Commonwealth Club. Ibid., 752-755.
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behind work-sharing. The bill represented Black's conviction that 
voluntarism was an unsound basis for the implementation of counter­
depression policies and that some degree of compulsion was necessary 
to secure compliance to desirable programmes. Second, the dominant 
consideration for legislators who considered the bill was the context 
of crisis. Although profound reservations were expressed within 
Congress and elsewhere about the measure's feasibility and desirability, 
emergency considerations overrode doubts about its practicability and 
consequences. The bill was defended as a relief measure and the 
implications of work-sharing for long-term planning were largely 
ignored. This sensitivity to crisis and determination to take pos­
itive action was a feature of Congress throughout the 'Hundred Days' 
and made it more receptive to proposals whose consequences were not 
predictable. Finally, Senate's passage of the Black bill on 6 April 
provided the catalyst for the Roosevelt administration to promote the 
formulation of a more comprehensive recovery bill which would contain 
prominent industrial planning features. Out of the flotsam of voluntary 
associationism, as represented in the Black bill, trade associationism 
was to emerge in a legislative form, embedded in the N.I.R.A. of 
June.
The Black bill passed Senate despite widespread criticism of 
its provisions. Numerous objections were voiced within Senate itself. 
The doubtful constitutionality of the bill was of most concern to 
William E. Borah (Idaho) who insisted that the Federal Government did 
not have the powers to make such stringent regulations for interstate 
commerce. Borah feared that the Supreme Court might adopt a generous 
construction however, since the measure was of an 'emergency character' 
and due to expire after two years. This would set a dangerous 
precedent, for if the Court was able to "suspend the Constitution"
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with its own definition of emergency it could well make encroachments 
upon legislative powers.'^ While Borah favoured a thirty-hour week, 
he considered the constitutional implications of the bill as framed 
to be so grave that he felt obliged to withhold his support. Other 
senators objected to the bill's rigid provisions on hours limitation. 
Members representing agricultural and fishery regions, or states in 
which food-processing was a major industry, objected to the bill's 
lack of flexibility. It was argued that seasonal industries, or those 
in which flexibility of labour hours was essential, would be severely 
handicapped by the bill. A further reservation was that reduced 
hours would not serve workers' best interests. "What I think will 
happen," Thomas P. Gore (Oklahoma) remarked, "is that hours will 
decrease, wages will decrease, work will speed-up, and labor will 
be driven to perform as much work in six hours as in eight. The wage 
earners, threatened, frightened by the breadline, will attempt the 
task." Neither would the bill serve to advance economic recovery. 
According to David A. Reed (Pennsylvania) and Marvel M. Logan 
(Kentucky), the shorter working week would not increase purchasing 
power but merely spread it more evenly as employers reduced wages 
proportionately. Even if wages were not reduced, the increased costs
17. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933: 
1117-1118.
18. William E. Borah to George W. Hunt, 2 May, 1933. William E.
Borah to E.R. Guye, 6 May, 1933. William E. Borah MSS: Box 349. 
Library of Congress.
19. The principal critics of the bill on these grounds were Arthur
H. Vandenberg (Michigan), Clarence C. Dill (Washington), Phillips 
Lee Goldsborough (Maryland) and James H. Lewis (Illinois).
20. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933:
1296. Black rejected the inclusion of a minimum wage provision 
in his bill. Doubtful of the constitutionality of minimum wage 
legislation, he preferred to omit it rather than jeopardise the 
whole measure. Black hoped that the efforts of organised labour 
and the pressure of public opinion would prevent drastic reduc­
tions in wages after the implementation of the thirty-hour week. 
Ibid,, 1113. Hugo L. Black to Carolyn Heine, 15 February, 1933. 
Black MSS: Box 159.
332
for the manufacturer would be passed on to the consumer, and would 
disadvantage the agricultural population not covered by the bill 
whose purchasing power would be eroded further. Finally, many 
senators were concerned about the threat posed by foreign competition 
if the Black bill served to increase producers' costs. Henry D.
Hatfield (West Virginia) estimated that foreign firms would be able 
to sell their goods at between 30 and 60% of American costs of produc­
tion, and sponsored an amendment to the Black bill which would have 
prohibited the importation of goods produced by labour working longer
than thirty hours a week. The amendment was narrowly defeated by two
22votes, fifteen senators abstaining.
Despite these serious reservations, a majority of senators 
resisted attempts to modify the Black bill to allow for greater 
flexibility of working hours or to regulate.foreign imports. Senators 
were hostile to an administration attempt on 5 April to amend the bill 
to provide for a thirty-six hour week. Members were concerned to 
avoid more time-consuming debate in exploring the implications of the 
amendment and many argued for the thirty-hour week on the basis of 
expediency. "If nothing is done," George Norris declared, "we are 
headed for chaos and it is not far in the distance." Norris contended 
that there were definite limits to providing relief to so many unemployed 
and since the only alternative was to provide work for the jobless, 
the proposal which promised to create more jobs deserved more sympathetic 
consideration. Hiram Johnson (California), Arthur R. Robinson (Indiana) 
and Bennett C. Clark (Missouri) expressed similar sentiments. But it 
was David Walsh who reflected most accurately the feelings of his
21. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933:
1191; 1296.
22. Ibid., 1340-1341; 1461.
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fellow senators. While he supported the measure, he did have reser­
vations about it and was comforted that it was an emergency bill, 
limited to two years. "It is somewhat experimental, but everything 
we are doing today is more or less experimental," he suggested. "It 
may not be workable ... It may be necessary to make changes in the 
proposal if in practice it does not meet the desideratum sought."
However, in terms of providing jobs for the unemployed, he concluded:
23"Here at last is an honest attempt ... by this Congress." In the 
event, the amendment sponsored by the Majority Leader, Joseph T.
Robinson (Arkansas) was defeated by a vote of 48 to 41. The Black 
bill passed on 6 April by a vote of 53 - 30.
In passing the Black bill it would seem that Senate was motivated 
by a number of considerations for which some immediate action was 
imperative: a humanitarian regard for the interests of labour; a 
wish to promote economic recovery; fear that failure to act would 
result in social disintegration, and an awareness of the need to main­
tain the prestige of Congress. As such the bill, a product of emergency 
conditions, was considered in like terms and its enactment became a 
matter of utmost urgency despite reservations within Senate itself.
The mood of the 73rd Congress was distinctly more activist than its 
predecessor.
Organised labour provided the most positive support for the 
measure outside Senate. In testimony before congressional committees, 
labour representatives were adamant that emergency conditions demanded 
positive responses by government unless disaffection was to increase 
within the working class. John Frey castigated the Hoover adminis­
tration's lack of imagination in dealing with the unemployment problem
23. Ibid.,1292-1294; 1331; 1343.
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and warned: "We can not continue this way, with millions of
unemployed .... What they will do, I do not know." William Green
referred ominously to "a standing army of unemployed" which constituted
"a menace to domestic tranquillity", while Philip Hurray, vice-
president of the U.M.W. contended: "The shortened work week is
25essential .... To avoid this step is to invite disaster."
The Black bill was a positive response to the unemployment
26problem which had William Green's "personal and official approval".
Green congratulated Black on rendering a "great social and economic
service" in sponsoring a bill which promised to ameliorate unemployment,
generate economic recovery, and which had long-term implications as
a response to technological unemployment. So strongly did labour
support the bill that the A.F. of L. was prepared to use its "economic
force" to compel employers to observe the thirty-hour week if no
legislation was forthcoming. The Federation would sponsor a general
strike among its members if the Black bill was not enacted. "We
have been so 'good' that we have almost become no good," wrote John
Frey, "and unless we begin to insist upon being heard in the nation's
councils, and particularly in the industrial world, we might as well
fold up our tent and continue to receive with thanks what industry may
29be willing to give us."
24. Hearings, Six-Hour Day, Five-Day Week, op.cit., 162.
25. Ibid., 3; 183.
26. Ibid., 1.
27. William Green to Hugo L. Black, 4 April, 1933. Black MSS: Box 159.
28. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary. Hearings on S, 5267, Thirty-Hour Work Week, 72nd 
Congress, Second Session, 1933: 2.
29. John P. Frey to Lt. Col. C.B. Ross, 12 December, 1932. Frey MSS: 
Box 13 File 191.
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Liberal intellectuals were more critical of the bill. Stuart
Chase, however, was an exception. Chase was invited to testify before
a congressional committee investigating the bill but was unable to
attend. Had he done so, he informed Edward F. McGrady of the A.F. of
L., he would have endorsed shorter working hours as the "only permanent
solution" for technological unemployment. However, neither The
Nation nor The New Republic found themselves able to approve the
measure wholeheartedly. The Nation forecast that the bill would
result in "the gravest consequences for labor" and that it would
succeed only in stimulating re-employment at the expense of workers
currently employed. The measure's effectiveness would be limited also,
because so many firms were working reduced schedules already that the
amount of slack for creating more jobs was restricted. Furthermore,
wages would be reduced proportionately to hours and no overall increase
. 3 1in workers' incomes was likely. The New Republic echoed these
sentiments, concluding that "the thirty-hour week bill is an empty
32and possibly dangerous gesture".
The response of both the Roosevelt administration and the business 
community to the Black bill was generally unfavourable. In effect, 
Senate's consideration and passage of the thirty-hour measure prompted 
both to press for the formulation of a more comprehensive and satis­
factory recovery programme. Given their signal influence in the 
development of an industrial recovery strategy during the spring and 
early summer of 1933, which included prominent industrial planning
30. Stuart Chase to Edward G. McGrady, 11 January, 1933. Black MSS: 
Box 159.
31. Nation 136 (19 April, 1933): 432.
32. New Republic 74 (3 May, 1933): 324.
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features, the Black bill's influence in these two quarters warrants 
extended discussion.
On 6 April, when Senate passed the Black bill, the Roosevelt
administration did not possess an industrial recovery strategy despite
consideration of the issues involved since the November elections of
the preceding year. During the presidential 'interregnum' Roosevelt
used his Brains Trust to establish contact with individuals who had
given thought to the problems of industrial recovery. In December,
Rexford Tugwell wrote that he was anxious "to keep in touch just now
with some leading businessmen who are interested in measures for
stabilization" and consulted with James Rand and Henry Harriman.
Antitrust law reform was the subject of conversations between Tugwell
and Harriman, the two men agreeing that the "old anti-trust law
repressions" should be superceded by "control, of present trends and
scale". After Roosevelt's inauguration, Adolf Berle's canvasses
of businessmen revealed that the subject of revision was becoming
"red hot" and Berle sought conferences between the President and
leading advocates such as Walker D. Hines, J. Harvey Williams and 
35Gilbert Montague. The Roosevelt administration also showed interest 
in a number of specific plans designed to stimulate industrial activity. 
Shortly after Roosevelt's inauguration, Raymond Moley and James 
Warburg were assigned to investigate the numerous economic plans
33. Rexford G. Tugwell to James H. Rand, Jr., 17 December, 1932.
Tugwell MSS; Box 2.
34. Rexford G. Tugwell, 'Monetary Preliminaries and Diary, 20 
December, 1932 - 27 February, 1933', 69-70; 111. Ibid., Box 
19. Henry I. Harriman to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 14 January,
1933. P.P.F. 3572. F.D.R.L.
35. Memorandum for the President, 22 March, 1933. O.F. 277. Adolf 
Berle to Colonel McIntyre, 30 March, 1933. O.F. 105. F.D.R.L. 
Adolf Berle to John Dickinson, 1 May, 1933. R.G. 40, File 
94694.
337
in existence and being urged on the President. Most of those scrut­
inised, such as the plans of the banker, Fred I. Kent, manufacturer, 
John R. Oishei and Edgar Kaufmann of the Kauffmann Department Store, 
involved government loans to industry or government guarantees against 
losses in the private sector. On 4 April, Warburg submitted a memor­
andum to Moley summarising the re-employment plans he had discovered 
and recommending that the President summon a conference of interested 
parties to draft a "practical plan" to be submitted to Congress. 
However, Moley was not impressed by the memorandum and was convinced 
that "thinking in business and government circles on the subject had 
not yet crystallized sufficiently to justify any further moves at 
the time". According to Moley, during his meeting with the President 
after receiving Warburg's memorandum, Roosevelt "agreed that nothing
should be done as yet regarding national economic planning for 
37industry". Despite the administration's concern to be acquainted
with current thinking on the means of achieving economic recovery,
it was committed to no particular strategy before 6 April.
Senate's passage of the Black bill introduced a note of urgency
into the administration's consideration of industrial recovery. On
10 March, Black wrote to Roosevelt requesting that he announce his
support for the thirty-hour week and include it as an integral part
38of his legislative programme. However, Roosevelt was not in sympathy 
with Black's proposal. While the President admired Black's praise­
worthy objectives, his "one paragraph bill" attempted to accomplish
36. Warburg, Reminiscences, op.cit., 184; 209; 242-243; 252; 371-373; 
376-378.
37. Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York, 1966): 287.
38. Hugo L. Black to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 10 March, 1933. O.F. 
372. F.D.R.L.
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them by "fiat" and laid down "hard and definite terms ... without
‘ . 39knowing the effect of it or without considering the effect of it". 
Roosevelt contended that the stipulated length of the working week 
was too "inelastic", and according to Secretary Perkins, the President 
preferred a forty-hour maximum.^ He was concerned also about the 
attempts of congressmen to insert into the bill a prohibition on 
imports of goods produced by long-hour foreign labour. This would 
constitute a "straight out and out embargo on all imports" which 
denied him the "wide latitude" to conduct bilateral trade agreements.^* 
Finally, Roosevelt objected to the bill's lack of provision for a 
minimum wage. Although the great majority of employers would pay 
a fair wage without compulsion, Roosevelt believed that the rest 
would "sweat" their labour and undercut the prices of competitors 
who were paying fair wages. It would "spoil the entire idea" and
1 2defeat the bill's purpose of increasing workers' purchasing power. 
Roosevelts last objection was consistent with his championing of 
State-regulated minimum wages during his gubernatorial period and
/  Oin his first months as President.
39. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conferences of the President, 
Microfilms, 12 reels (Hyde Park, N.Y., 1956): reel 2, 5 July, 
1933, 7.
40. Ibid., reel 1, 12 April, 1933: 132. Hearings, Thirty-Hour 
Week Bill, op.cit., 4-5.
41. Press conferences, op.cit., reel 1, 12 April, 5 May, 1933: 
132-133; 225.
42. Ibid., 14 April, 1933: lU.
43. During April 1933, Roosevelt was active in persuading State 
Governors to follow New York State's example by enacting 'fair 
wage' laws. See Franklin D. Roosevelt to Herbert Lehman, 11 
April, 1933. 'Telegram to 13 Governors of States of industrial 
importance', 12 April, 1933. P.P.F. 512, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
to Henry H. Blood, 13 April, 1933. Ibid., 792. F.D.R.L.
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Roosevelt detected flaws in the bill apart from its intrinsic 
shortcomings. He was aware of the overall lack of consensus in 
favour of the measure, despite the support of Senate. The White 
House received letters from businessmen which prophesied "a calamity" 
and "an industrial setback" if the bill was e n a c t e d a n d  was advised 
that the bill would not find favour with agriculture. The Secretary 
of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace, warned that the food processing 
industry would be unable to provide a satisfactory service to farmers 
if the bill was passed, while Rep. Albert C. Willford (Iowa), referring 
to agriculture's exemption from the terms of the bill, reported that 
"our farmers are bitterly opposed to letting the town man work six 
hours and they have to work sixteen".^ Roosevelt's unwillingness 
to lend administration support on behalf of the Black bill may have 
been conditioned, in part, by the political dangers that such support 
might entail. Nevertheless, Senate passed the bill on 6 April, and 
the threat of its passage by the House galvanised the administration 
to consider alternative measures.
The Roosevelt administration had been alert to the dangers posed 
by the Black bill since the end of March. On 29 March, Perkins 
suggested to Black that he amend his bill to give the President the 
discretionary power to declare a flexible working week of between 
thirty and forty hours for specified industriesBlack's  refusal 
led to the administration's unsuccessful attempt to force the thirty- 
six hour week amendment on 5 April. Unable to persuade Congress to
44. For a sample of the business correspondence on the Black bill 
which reached Roosevelt, see H.M. Lofton to Louis M. Howe,
6 April, 1933. Gene Ackerman to Marvin McIntyre, 8 April, 1933. 
A.E. Macdonald to Homer S. Cummings, 11 April, 1933. D.H. Warner 
to Homer S. Cummings, 11 April, 1933; Frank L. Grant to Homer 
S. Cummings, 11 April, 1933. O.F. 372. F.D.R.L.
45. Henry A. Wallace to Marvin E. McIntyre, 11 April, 1933. A.C. 
Willford to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 8 April, 1933. Ibid.
46. 'Memorandum to Hugo L. Black from Frances Perkins', 29 March,
1933. Black MSS: Box 159.
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modify the measure, the aim of the administration became to formulate 
a recovery programme which did not rely on one strategy, as the Black 
bill did in its focus upon hours limitation, and which did not contain 
the same shortcomings. Both Frances Perkins and the New York banker, 
Meyer Jacobstein, were working on alternative means of promoting 
economic recovery and advised the House Labor Committee that more 
comprehensive measures than the thirty-hour week were necessary to 
stimulate economic activity. Perkins was doubtful about the value of 
exclusive focus on hours limitation. "I do not rely upon any one 
panacea as an approach to the purpose of a business revival," she 
testified. "It is being attacked in many ways and this is one of
the ways, as it seems to me, that is both reasonable and helpful."
Jacobstein suggested that the bill was too limited. "It is a good 
start," he advised, "but in this great national emergency we should 
go forward on a larger scale." Jacobstein urged that the President 
be given broad powers to regulate not only hours, but wages and prices 
also, through a national board. Only by extending the scope of the
recovery programme was it likely to become a viable and practicable
. 47proposition.
A major criticism levelled at the Black bill by both Roosevelt 
and Perkins was its lack of provision for a minimum wage. To remedy
this flaw, the Secretary of Labor devised a 'substitute' bill which
was the subject of hearings before the House Labor Committee beginning 
on 25 April. The Perkins 'substitute' proposed that minimum wages 
should be stipulated by a tripartite board of employers, employees 
and consumers where wages were found to be below acceptable levels.
47. Hearings, Thirty-Hour Week Bill, op.cit., 23; 26-28.
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The board would also decree maximum working hours in industry which 
would vary between thirty and forty hours according to the particular 
industry's circumstances. Finally, the board would be empowered to 
limit the total operating hours of any plant overproducing through 
unfair competitive advantages such as the lax labour laws in the 
southern states which permitted the cotton textile industry to operate 
night shifts for women. Perkins believed that provision for flexible 
hours limitation, a minimum wage and a modicum of production control 
would provide industry with the opportunity and technique to become 
"practically self regulating in the public interest".^
The Perkins 'substitute' drew criticism from within the adminis­
tration. John Dickinson, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, feared 
that it would be "economically and politically very unfortunate" if 
the proposal was enacted. Dickinson claimed that it would have no 
beneficial effect on purchasing power but would actually decrease 
production in many industries, and through undue interference with 
interstate commerce would drive industry back into the states.
Perkins' proposal was "far too rigid and extreme" and lacked "any 
considerable degree of flexibility" to be considered helpful in 
promoting economic recovery. The political implications were equally 
grave. Political dissatisfaction would result from a programme 
which was "hasty and ill-prepared", indulged in "over-regulation",
entailed the creation of a large bureaucracy, and favoured particular
49industries at the expense of others. Dickinson advised his 
superior, Daniel Roper, that the administration should "gradually
48. Ibid., 1-10. Frances Perkins to the Editor, Washington Post,
29 April, 1933. O.F. 15. F.D.R.L.
49. John Dickinson to Raymond Moley, 26 April, 1933. R.G. 40 
File 93124.
342
and unobtrusively" withdraw its support from the measure and "shift
its support to some other type of measure making in the same general
j* ii 50direction .
In effect, Dickinson anticipated Roosevelt's course of action.
Even before the hearings on the Perkins 'substitute' were completed,
the administration had effectively lost interest in sponsoring an
amended version of the Black bill. On 1 May, Sen. Joseph Robinson
announced that the bill was no longer "in the picture".^ Given the
opposition which the Perkins 'substitute' aroused both within the
administration and elsewhere, Roosevelt decided to jettison any idea
of sponsoring an amended thirty-hour week bill.
Aside from some sympathetic comment by individuals such as
Edward A. Filene, Gerard Swope and Walter Teagle, the business
community was generally hostile to the Black bill and Perkins'
amendments. The conservative press assailed Black's original measure.
The New York Times described it as "grotesque" and likely to result
in "chaotic conditions" in industry, while The Commercial and Financial
Chronicle charged that some of the bill's assumptions lay "outside
the domain of reason". Forbes detected "dynamite" and "industrial
havoc" in the Black bill which threatened to compromise the genuine
53progress accomplished by the hours-reduction movement. Collier's 
described the bill as "a clumsy experiment" which would exacerbate 
and not diminish unemployment."^
50. John Dickinson to Secretary Roper, 21 April, 1933. Ibid.
51. New York Times, 2 May, 1933.
52. Ibid., 30 November, 1932. Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
135 (3 December, 1932): 3731-3733; Ibid., 136 (15 April, 1933): 
2487-2488.
53. Forbes 31 (1 May, 1933): 4.
54. Collier's 91 (3 June, 1933): 50.
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Iron Age reported that opposition to the Black bill was 
"unanimous" among steel executives. Indeed, the affirmative Senate 
vote caught the journal by surprise since previously it had been 
confident that the issue would not be seriously considered. As it 
was, the bill would work "particular, if not impossible, hardships 
upon steel works".^ Steel advised that "steelmakers view the Black 
bill ... as the most radical and revolutionary measure ever proposed 
affecting their industry".^ The major grievances of the steel 
industry were that the bill would deprive it of skilled workmen 
vital to its continuous process requirements; labour costs would
increase and make steel uncompetitive with other products not covered
\
by the bill; the effects of the law would be inequitable in operation, 
being especially injurious to smaller plants, and the bill would grant 
undue power to government over business through a generous construction 
of its powers over interstate commerce. Furthermore, the industry 
regarded Black's measure as a slight at the efforts it had made to 
maintain employment and wages. The industry was not opposed to work­
sharing, Steel claimed, but: "It would seem possible to put teeth 
into an intelligent spread-work plan ... without involving such drastic 
regulatory powers as are contemplated."^
The textile and coal industries shared steelmakers' misgivings. 
Textile World dismissed the Black bill as being of no practical benefit
55. Iron Age 131 (13, 20 April, 1933): 596; 613.
56. Steel 92 (10 April, 1933): 16.
57. Steelmakers were particularly concerned about their competitiveness 
in the construction sector. Competitive products such as lumber, 
concrete and masonry were often fabricated on the site and, unlike 
steel, were not involved in interstate commerce. The 'thirty-hour 
law' would not apply to these competitors which would enable them 
to avoid cost increases. Iron Age 131 (13, 20, 27 April, 1933): 
596; 613-614; 638-639; 674. Steel 92 (17 April, 1933): 18.
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to industry, and a law which would require a vast federal inspectorate
to administer. Individual operators throughout the country considered
the bill's defeat to be so essential that, according to Black, they
coerced employees to write to congressmen urging them to vote against
the bill. On behalf of the coal industry, Coal Age castigated the
measure as "loosely, even ineptly drawn" and the product of "leisurely
academic discussion ... pitched incontinently into the political 
60arena .
Both the Chamber of Commerce and the N.A.M. opposed passage of 
the bill. While recognising "the fine public spirit" behind the 
proposal, the Chamber's president, Henry Harriman, deplored its 
"rigidity" and considered that the statutory method of limiting hours 
was inappropriate.^ The N.A.M.'s counsel, James Emery, suggested 
that the bill would result in the "disorganization" of industry, 
increase production costs, lead to a lowering of wages to subsistence 
level and necessitate expensive and irritating government enforcement 
measures. Furthermore, he was dubious of the constitutionality of 
the proposal and viewed with disquiet the nature of the political 
authority proposed. The N.A.M. was opposed to a measure which threat­
ened to cause confusion throughout the business structure at a time
62when it was most sensitive.
58. Textile World 83 (February, 1933): 38.
59. Hugo L. Black to Donald Comer, 21 April, 1933. Black MSS: Box 
161. For the views of a leading southern textile manufacturer 
on how Black's bill would disadvantage southern mills, see 
Donald Comer to Hugo L. Black, 15 April, 1933. Ibid.
6°. Coal Age 38 (May, 1933): 141.
61. Hearings, Thirty-Hour Week Bill, op.cit., 195-198. Henry I. 
Harriman, 'This Changing Business World': An Address of 3 May, 
1933 (Washington, D.C., May, 1933): 13. 62
62. Hearings, Thirty-Hour Work Week, op.cit., 1. Hearings, Six Hour 
Day, Five Day Week, op.cit., 127-151. Hearings, Thirty Hour 
Week Bill, op.cit., 713-735.
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The Perkins 'substitute' compounded businessmen's alarm. Iron
Age denounced the "sweeping dictatorship" involved in the Secretary's
proposals, while Steel anticipated "vigorous" protests from steelmakers
who would object to such a "dictatorship" of industry presided over
by "a woman". Barron*s believed that Perkins had metamorphised
the Black bill to provide for "thinly disguised governmental control"
Coal Age also perceived the threat of social control of industry
through governmental supervision. However, it was optimistic that industry
would respond to the challenge by taking action on its own initiative:
Raging against this philosophy as socialistic or communistic 
will get industry nowhere, except, possibly, into a federal 
straightjacket. If business is to preserve self-regulation 
of industry, it must present something more constructive for 
consideration than a parrot-like policy of negation - and do 
it quickly. ^
The business community responded to the challenge of the Black 
bill by using the debate it inspired to further their own cause of 
trade associationism and antitrust law reform. Iron Age agreed that 
industry needed regulation of the type that Perkins proposed but 
insisted that it stem from within industry itself. The most construc­
tive service which government could provide for business was to liberal­
ise the antitrust laws to allow trade bodies the necessary "teeth" 
to "purge their industries of the few unprincipled pirates who cause 
most of their troubles". Textile World also sympathised with 
Perkins' aims which corresponded to those of enlightened textile
63. Iron Age 131 (27 April, 1933): 677. Steel 92 (24 April, 1933):
12; Ibid., 92 (1 May, 1933): 20.
64. Barron's 13 (24 April, 1933): 12.
65. Coal Age 38 (May, 1933): 141-142.
66. Iron Age 131 (4 May, 1933): 717.
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spokesmen. However, it emphasised that "the job must be done by 
industry" with the proper legislative basis to facilitate assoc- 
iational activity. ^
Business organisations also utilised the opportunity provided by 
discussion of the Black bill to promote the trade association idea. 
Henry Harriman wrote to John Dickinson that "the Black bill offers 
opportunities for very fundamental legislation going far beyond its 
scope and without its rigidity". The legislation that he had in 
mind, as he informed Hugo Black, was along the lines of the report 
of the Chamber's committee of 1931.^ Rather than concentrate on 
hours limitation, a proposal was needed which would meet the require­
ments of the current economic situation comprehensively and provide 
for minimum wages and the balancing of production with demand. "The 
parties who are best equipped to solve the problems of industry are 
the trade associations of each industry," Harriman advised the House 
Labor Committee. ^
The N.A.M. also seized the opportunity to transform the recovery 
debate into a more fluid one by advancing the trade association idea. 
James Emery wrote to Daniel Roper that the time had come to recognise 
"the tendency" for manufacturers and employers to make agreements 
within industry with respect to hours, wages and working conditions 
in order to eliminate unfair competition. Modification of the anti­
trust laws would constitute an official and helpful recognition of 67890
67. Textile World 83 (May, 1933): 47-48.
68. H.I. Harriman to John Dickinson, 12 April, 1933. R.G. 40 File 
93124.
69. H.I. Harriman to Hugo L. Black, 4 April, 1933. Black MSS: Box 159.
70. Hearings, Thirty-Hour Week Bill, op.cit., 199.
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this trend. 71 J.H. Williams suggested that a provision be incorporated 
into the Black bill which established a Board "for the improvement 
of competitive conditions in industry", consisting of the Secretaries 
of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. The Board would be empowered to 
approve agreements in industry which were construed as "fair and open 
endeavours to aid such industry" but which would be otherwise contrary 
to the antitrust laws. This would add a new dimension to the Black
72bill and extend its benefits which were presently limited to labour. 
Before the House Labor Committee Emery seized the moment to plead 
for legislation to advance the trade association idea: "Give us the 
chance to govern ourselves. The experiment is worth trying, and if 
the experiment is not successful, put us in the shackles you think
73we ought to wear."
The aims of business spokesmen to broaden the Black bill into a 
more comprehensive measure found favour amongst labour spokesmen and 
liberals. William Green, while favouring the thirty-hour week, 
emphasised that it should be one part of a wider programme and linked 
to government loans to industry or to controlled production. However, 
Green demanded reciprocal concessions for labour in return for any 
advantages that industry received, and the Federation president went 
on record as favouring a government guarantee of workers' right to 
belong to unions and to bargain collectively through them.7  ^ The New 
Republic welcomed the trend suggested by the Perkins 'substitute',
71. James A. Emery to Daniel C. Roper, 10 April, 1933. R.G. 40 
File 94649.
72. J.H. Williams to John Dickinson, 20 April, 1933. Ibid., File 
93124.
73. Hearings, Thirty-Hour Week Bill, op.cit., 723.
74. Ibid., 63: 66.
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of broadening the scope of the Black bill. Perkins' modifications 
transformed an "empty" and "possibly dangerous" bill into a "major 
measure of industrial improvement, and one capable of being 
administered".^
However, the reaction to the Perkins 'substitute' was generally 
unfavourable and Roosevelt was prompted to focus his search for an 
industrial recovery strategy on the plans which Warburg and Moley 
had continued to investigate during April. Professor Himmelberg has 
made a meticulous survey of the evolution of the industrial recovery 
draft between late April, when Roosevelt decided to abandon the 
Perkins proposal, and 17 May, when the administration's recovery 
bill was sent to Congress, and only cursory treatment is required 
here. *
During April a consensus emerged on the advisability of some 
form of subsidisation for American industry. A planning group formed 
around Robert Wagner, which consisted of Meyer Jacobstein, the economist, 
Harold Moulton, Fred I. Kent, and Malcolm C. Rorty of the American 
Management Association. All favoured "starting up" the economy by 
direct government aid to industry whether in the form of loans, loss 
guarantees or bounties. Although, the "start up" concept provided the 
initial framework for the recovery legislation it was discarded early 
in May as the draft developed and other influences emerged in the 
drafting process. The case for public works expenditure had been 
firmly established by progressives in Congress since the onset of 
the depression and was represented in the drafting process by Wagner.
The establishment of minimum wages and maximum hours gained legitimacy 
through the publicity generated by the Black bill and its amendments,
75. New Republic 74 (3 May, 1933): 324.
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and both were favoured by the President and his Secretary of Labor.
These influences did not necessarily preclude the incorporation of 
a "start up" aspect in the recovery programme, however, during early 
May the subsidisation of industry was displaced by the associational 
approach as the main thrust of the recovery programme. The trans­
formation is associated with John Dickinson's introduction into the 
Wagner group, with his sympathy for antitrust revision and his influence 
in permitting "direct participation and remarkable degree of influence" 
to business groups - especially the N.A.M. - in subsequent discussions. 
By 4 May, the "start up" concept had been superceded by antitrust 
revision and associational action as the central pillar of the recovery 
measure. To provide the 'teeth' to enforce associational activity, 
provision for the President to license business enterprises if the 
need arose had been added to the draft by 13 May under instigation 
of Gen. Hugh Johnson. Of the major provisions contained in the 
ultimate recovery act, only labour's right to bargain collectively 
had not assumed a precise shape approaching its eventual form by 17 
May, when the recovery bill was sent to Congress.^
Himmelberg has minimised the role of Roosevelt in the development 
of the associational aspects of the N.I.R.A. and argues that they 
were not "willed" by the administration but "thrust upon it by 
circumstances".^ Such emphasis suggests that rather than utilise 
the crisis, the President was its passive captive, and was influenced 
by events, such as Senate's passage of the Black bill and the volatile 
drafting process of the recovery bill, over which he had little control.
76. Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, 
op.cit., 181-207.
77. Ibid., 181.
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There is a danger here of depreciating Roosevelt's role in 1933 by 
ignoring the context of industrial planning during the early depression, 
and particularly the contrast between Hoover and Roosevelt. A change 
in the presidency was a pre-condition for the achievement of antitrust 
reform, and Roosevelt, as he intimated in his campaign speeches, was 
more responsive than his predecessor to changes in the political 
economy. While Roosevelt may not have played an initiatory role in 
formulating the recovery legislation of 1933, and doubts may remain 
about his commitment to associational activity through antitrust 
liberalisation, his willingness to speak on behalf of the approach 
illustrates his adaptability to changing circumstances which is in 
stark contrast to Hoover's inflexibility. Before the annual meeting 
of the Chamber of Commerce on 4 May, the President indicated with 
approval the directions in which administration policy was evolving. 
Roosevelt made three requests of the Chamber's members. The broadest 
was that businessmen should view recovery in national rather than 
parochial terms and "lay aside special and selfish interests to think 
of an act for a well-rounded national recovery". More specifically, 
the President suggested that industry should refrain from making 
further reductions in wages and maintain wage rates in conformity 
with price increases. Most significant in terms of current policy 
developments, was Roosevelt's request for cooperation within industry 
and between industry and government, to solve the economic crisis.
There was a warning to destructive minorities in the President's speech. 
Roosevelt appreciated the contribution of unfair methods of competition 
to industrial "disorder" and "general chaos" and was determined to 
discipline the perpetrators: "I can assure you that you will have 
the cooperation of your government in bringing these minorities to
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understand that their unfair practices are contrary to a sound public 
policy." Such boldness had not been customary during the Hoover 
presidency. Henry Harriman, who had experience of Hoover's obdurate 
attitude, was enthusiastic about Roosevelt's "splendid" address,
which had left business leaders with the "firm conviction" that the
79new President was about to lead a successful recovery effort.
Himmelberg also makes the point that the N.I.R.A. was not solely 
a response to business pressure for antitrust law reform but was
the result of "an interplay" between advocates of various recovery
80strategies such as deficit spending and industrial subsidies.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of industrial planning features in the
recovery bill was accomplished by vigorous business lobbying during
the first months of the Roosevelt administration.
Business spokesmen used the debate inaugurated by the Black bill
to broaden the discussion of industrial recovery. On 28 April, a
conference of 400 delegates, representing 94 industrial associations,
convened in Washington under the auspices of the N.A.M. The purpose
of the conference was to publicise industry's objections to the Black
bill and present the case for congressional consideration of antitrust 
81law revision. Shortly after the conference dispersed a select group 
of manufacturers affiliated with the Association petitioned President 
Roosevelt to support a supplement to the Black bill which would permit
78. Address before United States Chamber of Commerce, 4 May, 1933, 
P.P.A., op.cit., 2: 156-157.
79. Henry I. Harriman to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 May, 1933. O.F.
105. F.D.R.L.
80. Himmelberg, Origins of the National Recovery Administration, 
op.cit., 181.
81. National Association of Manufacturers, 'Governmental Control of 
Industry - and Industry's Alternative', Press Release, 2 May, 
1933. Copy in R.G. 40 File 94649.
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cooperative agreements between producers, subject to government 
approval and pending a congressional investigation of the antitrust
O  Ostatutes. Henry Harriman sought to use the administration's 
interest in the Perkins 'substitute' to advance the case for govern­
ment permission of inter-firm agreements, and on 1 May, advised the 
President that trade associations provided the "ideal machinery" for 
regulating wages and hours as well as prices. As administration 
policy veered in this direction early in May, an encouraged Harriman 
reassured Roosevelt that "the psychology of the country is now ready 
for self-regulation of industry with government approval of agreements 
reached". Harriman's previous misgivings about governmental inter­
ference in the conduct of industry seems to have been subsumed as 
the prospects of antitrust revision became more promising. In fact 
he was more concerned that any legislation should be of a permanent 
nature and not expire with the end of the emergency. "When prosperity 
has returned," Harriman warned, "selfishness or self-interest ... may 
have again asserted itself to such a degree that a sound law cannot 
be passed."®^
The business press welcomed what Steel referred to as the "great
change" in government's attitude to industry during the first week of
May. "Threats of restrictions" had been replaced by "the olive branch
of assistance" as the administration jettisoned the Black bill and
85sought other means to accomplish recovery objectives. Iron Age 
reported that steelmakers generally favoured the direction in which
82. Wilson Compton et al. to M.H. McIntyre, 2 May, 1933. O.F. 98.
P.D.R.L.
83. Henry I. Harriman to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 May, 1933. O.F. 
105. F.D.R.L.
84. Henry I. Harriman to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 May, 1933. O.F. 
466. F.D.R.L.
85. Steel 92 (8 May, 1933): U.
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government policy seemed to be heading. The journal itself, excited
by the legislative possibilities, abandoned its previous moderation
on the issue of antitrust law revision and demanded repeal rather
than liberalisation: "Their outmoded structures have become merely
a breeding ground to protect and propagate the price cutting vermin
which gnaw away the foundations of wages and earnings and which the
great majority of our people of all classes would be glad to see 
86exterminated." Surveying the developments of May, Coal Age was
satisfied with the administration's bill and perceived its significance.
"Ragged survivors of the school of rugged individualism will find no
comfort in the National Industrial Recovery Bill," the journal 
, 87asserted.
The task of allaying fears within the business community about 
a 'partnership* with government was faced squarely by business spokes­
men. Steel argued that it was "the only recourse left" to eliminate 
"ruthless competition" through inter-firm agreements. Although the 
journal had reservations about government surveillance of agreements 
and the licensing powers to be granted to the President, such radical 
expedients represented positive action and a recognition that "industry 
itself has not been able to pull itself out of the rut". Charles 
M. Schwab, chairman of the American Iron and Steel Institute, charac­
terised the Roosevelt administration's response to the economic crisis 
as "more vigorous and more effective than any other we have witnessed
in modern times" and was confident that the President would use his
89powers "sanely and constructively". Nation's Business defended
86. Iron Age 131 (18 May, 1 June, 1933): 793-794; 871-874.
87. Coal Age 38 (June, 1933): 173.
88. Steel 92 (8 May, 1933): 20; Ibid. 92 (15 May, 1933): 11; 20.
89. Iron Age 131 (1 June, 1933): 853.
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administration policy as providing "a recognized working partnership 
with the people" which would liberate the "genius and character of 
organized business". The consequences of reluctance on the part of 
business to cooperate with government in its programme was a leading 
theme of the Chamber of Commerce's annual convention which was held in 
the first week of May. Speakers such as Gerard Swope and Paul W. 
Litchfield stressed that the alternative to a partnership with govern­
ment. was the domination of business by the state which would be 
compelled to expand its own powers to stabilise industry and employment. 
"If industry does not see its opportunity and embrace it, it will 
be done from without," Swope advised. "The alternative, therefore, 
is not shall it be done, but by whom it shall be done; shall it be 
done by the government with its necessarily more rigid procedure and 
therefore less efficiently, or shall it be done by industry itself, 
which knows its problems intimately, with the cooperation of the 
government to see that the public interest is protected?" Litchfield 
echoed Swope's comments: "If we are to save our traditional freedom 
for the future, it is probable that we must make substantial concessions 
to what we have in past classified as the more radical school of 
thought." Before dispersing, the convention adopted resolutions 
endorsing a partnership between business and government but which
stipulated that "those who are best equipped to solve the problems
91of industry, are those who themselves are engaged in industry".
Nation's Business captured the distinction between concessions and 
submission to government in its review of the convention proceedings.
The journal described the convention as the Chamber's "coming of age 90
90. Nation's Business 21 (June, 1933): 11.
91. New York Times, 4, 6 May, 1933.
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meeting": "But it was a step forward on a well-mapped road, not a
step to one side into new fields of governmental direction and control
92of industry and commerce."
Naturally, the business community's response to the industrial
recovery proposal was not one of wholehearted approval, and spokesmen
pressed for changes during the hearings conducted by both House and
Senate between 18 May and 1 June. The N.A.M. was particularly forthright
in its criticisms of the measure. On 13 May, a steering committee
of the Association, headed by the Manufacturers' president, Robert L.
Lund, conferred for three hours with the framers of the bill, and
according to The New York Times, approved of the principles contained
in it. 0. Max Gardner, the former Governor of North Carolina and one
of the manufacturers' representatives, described the bill as "the
93most far reaching piece of legislation in American history". By
17 May, however, the manufacturers had modified their position. Lund
revealed to the press that his organisation had significant reservations
about the proposal. The licensing features were too draconian; there
was need of provision for loans to industry and import controls, and
the labour aspects threatened harmonious relationships between employer
and employee. "No legislation has carried such possibilities of good
94or evil," Lund asserted. Lund's comments were reiterated by James
95Emery before the Senate Finance Committee on 29 May. The manufac­
turers felt unable to support the measure in the form proposed.
92. Nation's Business 21 (June, 1933): 13. 9345*
93. New York Times, 14 May, 1933.
94. Ibid., 18 May, 1933. See also Robert L. Lund to Daniel C.
Roper, 27 May, 1933. R.G. 40 File 94649.
95. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance. Hearings on S. 1712
and H.R. 5755, National Industrial Recovery, 73rd Congress,
First Session, 1933: 274-275; 277; 284-285; 288-289.
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Section 7 (a) was the major point of contention, especially since
William Green had secured changes from the House Ways and Means
Committee which incorporated into the text explicit prohibitions
of any requirement for a worker to join a company union and for an
employer to interfere with the organisation of unions or the selection
of representatives.^ Spokesmen for the steel industry, in particular,
protested vigorously before the Senate Finance Committee. C.L. Michael,
Charles Hook and Robert Lamont defended the company union and warned
of the likelihood of the closed shop if the bill were passed in the
form approved by the A.F. of L. According to Iron Age, the amendment
had "greased the skids" for industry's approval of the recovery bill
since businessmen would be unwilling to support a blatant attempt by
organised labour to "recruit its depleted exchequers" through a
98government-assisted union membership drive.
Such invective was merely tactical, however, and represented an 
attempt by business spokesmen to secure desired amendments to the 
recovery bill. Generally, industry supported the bill to receive 
permission to make inter-firm agreements without the fear of antitrust 
prosecution. Even the prospect of government approval and surveillance 
of the agreements did not deter the business community. In effect, 
it had been from this quarter that the industrial planning features 
of the industrial recovery bill had stemmed. Business groups had 
seized the opportunity presented by Hoover's electoral defeat and 
his replacement as chief executive by the more amenable Roosevelt, and 
the volatile political and economic circumstances of the spring months
96. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on
H.R. 5664, National Industrial Recovery, 73rd Congress, First 
Session, 1933: 117-118.
97. Hearings, National Industrial Recovery (Senate), op.cit.,
378-380; 389-390; 394-395. 98
98. Iron Age 131 (8 June, 1933): 917.
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of 1933, to gain serious legislative consideration for their assoc- 
iational ambitions. One barrier remained for the advocates of 
antitrust revision and the realisation of business planning goals: 
the attitude of Congress, which had been a stumbling block during 
the 72nd Congress.
Consideration of the recovery bill began in the House of 
Representatives on 25 May and ended with Senate's approval of the 
joint conference report on 13 June. The thrust of congressmen's 
remarks during the debates revealed a strong disposition to take 
decisive action against the depression despite serious reservations 
about the particular proposals sponsored by the administration.
Much of the discussion in the House focussed on the bill's 
taxation features and the powers which it conferred on the President. 
Roosevelt had failed to make any provision for the raising of the 
necessary revenue to finance the public works projects of Title II 
of the bill, and the responsibility devolved on the House Ways and 
Means Committee. The Committee's proposals, which included sales, 
gasoline and graduated income taxes, were described as inequitable 
and socially-biased by Republican congressmen, and the President was 
indicted with irresponsibility for avoiding the problem. Allen T. 
Treadway (Massachusetts) believed that the President had anticipated 
the "popular disfavor" that increased taxation would occasion and 
"passed the buck to us". Roosevelt's conduct made Republicans doubt­
ful about conferring such substantial powers on the President as were 
contained in the recovery bill. Republicans were concerned that 
Roosevelt would be empowered not only to establish agencies, appoint 
officers and delegate authority to execute the purposes of the bill, 9
99. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933: 4329.
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but to impose codes of fair competition upon industry and license 
business enterprises if the need arose. James H. Beck (Pennsylvania) 
believed that Congress would be "submitting a 'depotism' for a free 
nation" if it passed the measure, and by expanding the powers of the 
executive, would emasculate its own authority. "This Congress will 
be merely a debating society, and the Executive will be master of 
the destinies of the American people." Beck's position was well 
supported. James W. Wadsworth, Jr. (New York) warned that the bill's 
enactment would result in the end of individualism and liberty, and 
the substitution of "the hard, heavy, cold hand of bureaucracy".
Frank Crowther (New York) was more florid in his imagery. The power 
conferred on the President by the recovery measure would make "the 
distinguished dictator, Mussolini, look like an Egyptian mummy".
Another point of friction was the bill's temporary suspension 
of the antitrust laws, a subject about which Democrats ware especially 
sensitive. Well before the bill reached Congress a group of Democratic 
congressmen led by Joseph B. Shannon (Missouri), Wright Patman (Texas), 
William D. McFarlane (Texas) and Edgar Howard (Nebraska) attempted 
to commit their party to opposition to antitrust law reform. At the 
Democratic caucus of 10 May, McFarlane and Howard offered resolutions 
against any revision of the antitrust laws, but according to The New 
York Times, they were withdrawn "in the face of overwhelming defeat", 
and the caucus adopted a resolution supporting the President and his 
policies.^ In the event, those Democrats such as Emmanuel Celler 
(New York), Fred M. Vinson (Kentucky) and Herman P. Kopplemann 10
100. Ibid., 4212-4213; 4334; 4348.
101. New York Times, 10, 11 May, 1933.
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(Connecticut) who spoke to the bill's antitrust features, supported
change but were at pains to reassure their fellows that the bill did
not presage a cartelised economy. "The War Industries Board did not
injure the Constitution nor will the National Industrial Recovery Act," 
102Celler contended. However, many Democrats must have had deep 
reservations about supporting a bill which challenged their party's 
long-standing convictions.
Many Representatives set aside scruples and doubts to support the 
measure in the hope that it might stimulate recovery. This is best 
illustrated in the case of those Republicans who voted for the recovery 
bill despite making fundamental criticisms of it. They were motivated 
by a paramount consideration - that of affording relief to labour and 
industry. Thomas A. Jenkins (Ohio) was anxious about conferring such 
extensive power on the President but felt obliged to vote for the 
measure because of its potential in providing relief to industry and 
workmen. "I am lending my support to the measure," Jenkins explained, 
"from the purest motives and with the hope that we can again bring 
happiness to millions who are now distressed." Representative Treadway 
also supported the measure, despite his objections to the taxation 
proposals and presidential conduct. The bill presented the only avail­
able remedy for the depression:
A balloon has been sent up which may or may not aid industry 
and return people to work. We have tried various expediencies 
without success. Here is a new lotion. Try it. Try anything.
William E. Evans (California) voted for the bill "entirely on the
ground of the emergency with which we are confronted" and found comfort 102
102. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933: 4339.
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in only one of the bill's features: "And that is that it expires in 
two years". Apprehension pervaded the ranks of Republican congress­
men. Basically they felt unable to fathom the implications and 
consequences of the bill, but many were determined to support the 
proposal,for the want of anything better. In summing up his own 
position on the recovery legislation, Harold McGugin captured the 
bewilderment of congressmen, yet the determination that something 
be done:
On the bill itself no man knows whether the enactment of the 
measures means that it is merely a temporary program which 
leads us out of our present distress back to traditional 
Americanism, or leads us on to greater fields of communism.
At the same time, no man knows whether standing still now will 
save traditional Americanism or lead us on into still greater 
economic and social chaos. For my part, I choose to take the bill.104
As James Wadsworth remembered, the recovery bill was passed in a 
climate of crisis: "It was an atmosphere of hysteria and of 
desperation ... Something must be done to cure this depression!"^“* 
Senators paid more attention to the underlying associational 
nature of the recovery bill. Criticism was more searching and more 
effective in that critics successfully sponsored an amendment to the 
administration's bill which declared that codes of fair competition 
should not sanction "monopolistic practices". Dissent from the bill 
was also bi-partisan; the leading critics being Huey Long and William 
E. Borah.
For Long, the recovery bill was a denial of the Democratic Party 
platform and of the Black bill, which he believed the party platform 
favoured. The objectives of the new legislation and those of the 10345*
103. Ibid-* 4324; 4331; 4347.
104. Ibid., 4332.
105. James W. Wadsworth, Jr., 'Reminiscences', Columbia University Oral
History Project: 398.
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Black bill were the same, Long reasoned, but by waiving the antitrust 
laws the recovery bill had introduced a novel and undesirable element. 
"You might as well have told a turkey to hatch out a turkey, and had 
it hatch out a rattlesnake," he informed Senator Black, "as to bring 
this thing in here and say that it is the same thing as the Black 
bill." Long believed that the ends did not justify the means. The 
code-making process would create new elites and necessitate the 
employment of "hundreds of thousands of agents" who would dictate 
price and production schedules to the small entrepreneur. Long was 
convinced that the "little man" would not be adequately represented 
in code-making and would be unable to promote his own interests. Even 
if small businessmen did attend the conferences, Long argued, they 
would not know "any more about prescribing one of these codes than a 
hog does about a sidesaddle". The outcome would be the domination 
of the code-making process by a select group which would formulate 
provisions with complete disregard for the welfare of the "little 
man". Consequently, Long urged his fellow senators to refrain from 
"blind voting" in support of a bill whose results, at best, were 
unpredictable. "You have no more idea what you are voting for under 
this bill than what you are going to meet in the night-time a thousand 
miles away," Long challenged.
Borah was similarly concerned about the fate of the small entre­
preneur once the protection of the antitrust laws had been removed.
"The reigns are taken off monopoly, a restraint of trade all along 
the line," Borah wrote. "I can not believe these things are wise."*^
106. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933:
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The emergency repeal or modification of the antitrust statutes would
be irrevocable and would foster "an ultra-concentration Of wealth"
in the country. "We are to have combines as large as the industry
itself," Borah advised, "and any man in the industry who does not go
along ... may be put in jail." He believed that the industrial
recovery bill was not designed to assist the constituencies which
needed most help. Rather, it would damage the interests of the
consumer by raising industrial prices and jeopardise the integrity
of independent business through compliance to the dictates of the code 
109authorities. In a letter to the Western Pine Association, Borah 
gave a succinct summary of his attitude to the recovery bill: "I am 
opposed to the bill in any shape or form. It is wrong in principle.
It will be vicious in effect.
Spokesmen for the administration countered by arguing that the 
purposes of the bill were to stimulate re-employment and strengthen 
the competitive system. Robert Wagner set the trend in his testimony 
before the Senate Finance Committee. He described the bill as having 
"as its single objective the widespread and permanent re-employment 
of workers at wages sufficient to secure comfort and a decent living".
As for the bill's references to the organisation of American industry, 
Wagner argued that while it was innovatory in its conception of business- 
government relations, it did not intend to abolish competition, but 
make it "rational".*^  When he introduced the bill in Senate, Wagner
108. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933: 5162.
109. William E. Borah to Byrd Trego, 1 June, 1933. William E. Borah 
to William B. Ball, 2 June, 1933. William E. Borah to H.H.
Cummins, 9 June, 1933. Borah MSS: Box 348.
110. William E. Borah to Western Pine Association, 2 June, 1933. Ibid.
111. Hearings, National Industrial Recovery (Senate), op.cit., 1-2. 
Author's emphasis.
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characterised it as "an employment measure", and attempted to allay
fears about monopolisation by arguing that in the past the antitrust
laws had fostered monopolies by making it imperative that firms merge
to avoid excessive competition. The measure intended to promote the
integrity of the independent firm by giving it the legal right to make
agreements with other firms in order to stabilise its operations.
"Sooner or later," Wagner contended, "it will be understood by senators
that this is a bill to protect the small businessman against the
112predatory practices of large business." However, many senators 
remained sceptical, and under the instigation of William Borah, the 
bill was amended to provide that no code of fair competition should 
promote monopolies or monopolistic practices.
The Senate's consideration of the recovery bill replicated that 
of the House in that despite serious reservations, senators voted to 
pass the measure. Again, the context of crisis was instrumental in 
determining Senators' priorities. George W. Norris indicated the 
tensions experienced by senators, in appraising the recovery bill to 
a constituent on 5 June. Norris began by conceding that antitrust 
changes were undesirable unless they were imperatively necessary. He 
proceeded to argue that current economic conditions justified radical 
expedients. "We are confronted with conditions now, which have never 
before confronted civilized men," Norris asserted. "I am of the 
opinion that in some instances it will be necessary to modify our 
anti-trust laws, if we are to carry legislation that will improve 
conditions." He appreciated that the programme contained manifold 
dangers of an economic, social and legal nature: "I say this may not 12*
112. Congressional Record 77, 73rd Congress, First Session, 1933:
5152; 5238.
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work. But we must do something .... If we do not do something of this
kind, what will we do?" Norris's conclusion typified senators'
appreciation of the emergency conditions which dictated support for
measures that in normal circumstances would have been rejected:
It seems to me every fair-minded person must realize that to 
sit idly by and do nothing would mean that our entire civil­
ization would go down in chaotic failure. I do not think 
the future is all bright by any means; I realize that in 
trying any of these remedies, we must be careful to avoid 
dangers which lurk in the pathway, but I am convinced that 
these laws, harsh though they may seem to be, are nevertheless 
necessary if we are to save our government and our 
civilization.* ^
Senate passed the recovery bill on 13 June and the President added 
his signature three days later. To use the phrase of Robert Wagner, 
legislation had "swung the baton" by inaugurating "a controlled exper­
iment" in planned e c o n o m y . D a n i e l  Roper recognised that the measure 
represented "the first step in a radical change in public policy 
toward the conduct of private industry in the United States"."^ The 
President himself stressed the centrality of the business community 
to the success of the Act: "It is a challenge to industry which has 
long insisted that, given the right to act in unison, it could do much 
for the general good which has hithertoo been unlawful. From today 
it has that right."
Business spokesmen regarded the N.I.R.A. as a triumph for the 
forces of business self-government. Henry Harriman believed that the 
Act marked "the beginning of a new business dispensation" while Robert
113. George W. Norris to Clarence M. Westbrook, 5 June, 1933. Norris 
MSS: Box 42 File, Anti-Trust Laws.
114. Robert F. Wagner, 'Planning in Place of Restraint*, Survey 
Graphic 22 (August, 1933): 395.
115. Memorandum to the President from the Secretary of Commerce,
6 June, 1933. R.G. 40 File 94694. 16
116. P.P.A., op.cit., 2: 252.
365
Lund was gratified that industry had received the right to "police
itself against ruthless competition".^^ "The Act will very properly
encourage industrial planning by industry for the joint benefit of
itself and of its labor," Harriman contended. Textile World
described the Act as initiating "an experiment of the first magnitude":
"In our opinion, no piece of legislation passed within our memory
has been fraught with more significance, or has promised to make
119more history, than the National Industrial Recovery Act."
Organised labour welcomed the N.I.R.A. not only for the particular 
advantages which it conferred upon the trade union movement. Labour 
spokesmen were impressed by the underlying assumptions of the Act.
William Green referred approvingly to its recognition of the mutuality 
of interests between economic groups and the partnership envisaged
120between these interests and government to advance the general welfare.
The American Federationist greeted the Act's emphasis on economic
planning as a superior synthesis between traditional values and
innovation. "By providing for individual initiative disciplined by
group decision and concerted action, and guided by wider understanding
of the interdependence of all economic interests, we may enter this
new period of history hopeful of finding new levels," the journal 
121reflected.
117. New York Times, 14, 25 June, 1933.
118. Ilenry I. Harriman, Now It Can Be Told: Statement Regarding Recent 
Legislative Enactments (Washington, D.C., 1933): 13.
119. Textile World 83 (June, 1933): 47.
120. New York Times, 25 June, 1933.
121. American Federationist 40 (June, 1933): 567-568.
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Old progressives despaired of the Act. Borah believed that
it had dealt "the final blow" to the antitrust laws and that the
business community had achieved its long-standing ambition of a
cartelised economy. The Act might stimulate a temporary economic
revival, but it would be accomplished at the expense of the masses
for "the price fastened upon the great body of the people will amount
122to nothing less than a crime".
Collectivists were only partially satisfied with the measure.
The New Republic was disappointed that it did not advance a holistic 
conception of planning but relied upon planning by single industries. 
This involved the risk of "turning over the United States to the big 
corporations" and condoning production restriction and price mainten­
ance at a time when industrial prices were already too high. The 
Nation commended the administration's aims but was dubious about the 
consequences of business self-government given the abject record of 
businessmen in providing enlightened responses to the depression.
"Like the Bourbons, they have learned nothing and forgotten nothing," 
the journal contended. However, both journals viewed the Act as a 
milestone in the evolution of a planned society. For The Nation, the 
measure was "a promising first step .... But it is no more than that." 
The New Republic hoped that the Act would mark "the beginning not 
merely of recovery but of a collectivization of the economic system". 
The Act had acknowledged the bankruptcy of laissez-faire, the journal 
believed, and had committed the United States to national economic 
planning and control:
122. William E. Borah to George L. Record, 19 June, 1933. Borah MSS; 
Box 348.
Future struggles will not concern the question whether we 
are to have a system regulated automatically by 'economic 
laws' or a system consciously administered. They will 
concern the immensely important questions of what kind of 
planning we shall have, what objectives it shall seek, 
what instruments it shall use and what classes shall control 
it.123
Whatever the future prospects for industrial planning, all 
interested parties recognised that the N.I.R.A. was a victory for 
the business community and its concept of trade associationism. 
Assisted by the deteriorating economic circumstances, the political 
changes of November 1932, and the context of crisis which confronted 
the new administration and Congress in the spring of 1933, the 
business lobbies seized the opportunity to gain legislative sanction 
for their associational aspirations.
123. New Republic 74 CIO May. 1933): 350*351; Ibid., 75 (31 May.
1933): 57-58. Nation 136 (7 June, 28 June, 1933): 629-630; 
711. See also George Soule, 'The New Deal in Practice', New 
Republic 75 (5 July, 1933): 199.
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CONCLUSION
The National Industrial Recovery Act's immediate purpose was to stim­
ulate economic recovery and it was due to expire after two years, or 
upon a joint declaration by the President and Congress that the economic 
emergency had ended. However, according to Roosevelt, the Act had 
another important, if secondary, objective: "To plan for a better 
future for the longer pull." On signing the measure, Roosevelt charac­
terised it as "the most important and far-reaching" legislation ever 
enacted by Congress since it was intended to "stabilize for all time" 
business conditions in the United States. His supplementary statement 
on the N.I.R.A. reinforced the impression that the Act marked a turning 
point in the American political economy. The President twice evoked 
the powerful symbolism of the wartime experience to give effect to 
his remarks about cooperative, national planning and he concluded by 
posing a rhetorical question, the bias of which struck a discordant 
note with the tenets of competitive individualism. "Must we go on in 
many groping, disorganized units to defeat," Roosevelt declared, "or 
shall we move in one great team to victory?"'
The Act was the product of a reappraisal of the sources of American 
economic development and the conduct of public policy which took place 
during the early years of the depression. Its declaration of policy 
was preoccupied with similar concerns to those of business spokesmen 
and their organisations, the labour movement, intellectuals, and polit­
icians who had provided critical perspectives on the political economy 
throughout Herbert Hoover's presidency. Industry was to be rehabilitated 
by fostering cooperation between labour and management under government
1 . P.P.A., op.cit., 2: 246; 251-256.
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supervision; by curbing unfair competitive practices in industry and 
stabilising production; by reducing and relieving unemployment, 
increasing purchasing power and improving conditions of labour, and 
conserving natural resources.
The mechanisms which the Act employed to achieve these ambitious 
goals reflected a conviction that economic problems could be rectified 
only through the systematic application of management and planning 
principles to the economy at the national level. Title II provided 
for the expenditure of $3.3 billion of public funds on public works 
and construction projects; Title I, section 9 provided special rules 
for the regulation of the oil industry, while section 7 of the same 
Title granted labour the right of collective bargaining and established 
the principles of maximum hours and minimum rates of pay in industry.
However, the principal mechanism through which the Act's policy would 
be effected was contained in sections 3-6 of Title I. Business organ­
isations were given the opportunity to design codes to regulate compet­
ition within their industries and to submit them to the President for 
his scrutiny. If the codes received presidential approval they would 
be granted exemption from the antitrust laws and would become binding 
on all members of the industries concerned.
In certain respects the Act reflected the principles and the strategies 
of voluntary associationism. It conformed to Hoover's view of the importance 
of associations in achieving both the short-term goal of economic recovery 
and the long-term aim of industrial stabilisation. The principle of 
associationism underlay the Act's encouragement of both trade associations 
and labour unions, and in each case the right to initiate organisation was 
reserved to business and labour and not to government. While the Act fostered 
associationism it did not seek to stifle the competitive principle which was 
a central tenet of voluntary associationism. Instigated by Senator Borah,
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an amendment was incorporated into the measure - in Section 3a - which 
sought to prevent the development of either monopolies or monopolistic 
practices under the codes of fair competition. Finally, Hoover's emphasis 
on work-sharing as a counter-depression strategy found expression in 
Section 7 of Title I of the Act. All codes were obliged to incorporate 
the labour provisions of Section 7 and to stipulate maximum working hours 
for employees.
However, the N.I.R.A. diverged from the principles and the practice 
of voluntary associationism in several, crucial respects. Hoover had been 
unprepared to foster associationism in business and industry by making 
changes in the antitrust laws because of his fear that competition would 
be compromised. Section 5 of the N.I.R.A., however, temporarily suspended 
the antitrust laws for approved codes and agreements. The Act was based 
on the assumptions that excessive competition was detrimental to the public 
interest and that incentives had to be provided for the effective organ­
isation of industry. Also, the powers granted to the President to organise 
industry went beyond Herbert Hoover's conception of both the proper functions 
of the chief executive and the role of government in the economy. Section 3a 
provided for presidential authorisation of the codes of fair competition 
before they were effected and stipulated conditions that the codes would 
have to meet to secure approval. Beyond this supervisory role provided 
for the government by the Act, the President was given the authority, 
under Section 3d, to prescribe codes if any trade or industry failed to 
assume the initiative, while Section 4a enabled the President to sanction 
agreements between persons and groups which would supplement the codes and 
further the purposes of the act. The law's enforcement features elaborated 
presidential power. In particular, the licensing features of Section 4b 
gave the President the power to regulate the operations of business
enterprises. Such a mandatory emphasis was alien to voluntary 
associationism. However, by 1933, it had become clear to the Act's 
sponsors that any scheme lor industrial planning which did not 
involve a surrender of traditional liberties and a larger role for 
government, would be likely to be unsuccessful.
While the N.I.R.A. marked a departure from Herbert Hoover's 
doctrine of voluntary associationiam, it did not fully conform 
to the prescriptions of organised labour and the intellectuals for 
industrial planning. Throughout the first phase of the depression, 
those groups had stressed that the Federal Government should 
assume a prominent role in the planning process and their 
demands were partially satisfied by the N.I.R.A. The law granted 
the President the power both to establish agencies to further the 
purposes of the Act and to approve or stipulate codes of fair 
competition, and provision was made for ongoing surveillance by 
the Federal Government of the operation of the codes. Furthermore, 
the government's powers over industry were increased through the 
Act's enforcement provisions. Section 3b provided that codes 
approved by the President became legally binding and that 
violations were to be defined as 'unfair methods of competition' 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 4b authorised 
the President to license business enterprises if he deemed it 
necessary to make effective a code of fair competition or to 
prevent any destructive practices in industry which were contrary
to the spirit of the law.
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Despite the substantial role of government in industrial 
planning provided by the M.I.R.A., the Act eschewed central 
planning in favour of a decentralised, industry-based alternative 
which was to be conducted through trade associations under 
government supervison. The furthest that the Roosevelt 
administration was prepared to go in creating a central planning 
agency was to establish the Special Industrial Recovery Board 
in June 1933, which was superceded by the National Emergency 
Council on 17 November of the same year. However, these agencies 
did not initiate policy as much as they coordinated and facilitated 
the work of various government authorities such as the National 
Recovery Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. By giving 
permission to trade associations to make inter-firm agreements, 
with reasonable exemption from the antitrust laws, the industrial 
planning aspects of the Act resembled most closely the approach 
of trade associationism as advanced by the business community 
during Herbert Hoover's presidency.
The implementation of trade associationism as public 
policy in the N.I.R.A. was a result, in the short term, of 
the political and economic circumstances which surrounded 
Roosevelt's election and inauguration. The change of administration 
removed the major political barrier to the realisation of the 
business community’s ambitions since Hoover had resisted the 
efforts of reformers who sought to inaugurate a planned 
society by making changes in the Laws. In contrast to
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Hoover, the incoming president had expressed a readiness to experiment 
with economic policy, although at the outset, his administration was 
committed to no specific planning strategy. The economic crisis of 
the spring of 1933 provided the context in which business lobbies could 
operate effectively on behalf of antitrust reform and smoothed congres­
sional approval for the necessary changes in the laws. The success 
of trade associationism in 1933, then, was due to the removal of 
political obstructions which had previously handicapped the business 
community in its efforts to translate its planning ambitions into 
public policy.
From a longer-term perspective, trade associationism emerged out 
of a reappraisal of the political economy which was conducted by 
leadership groups during the early years of the depression and the 
interaction that occurred between various approaches to industrial 
planning and the political process. By 1933 the issue of whether or 
not a planned economy was desirable was less in doubt than the most 
appropriate form that planning should take, and the new administration's 
options were largely influenced by Americans' consideration of, and 
experimentation with, industrial planning during the previous four 
years.
The Hoover approach of voluntary associationism was the only 
national industrial planning strategy to achieve the status of public 
policy before June 1933. Implemented through public agencies such 
as P.E.C.E. and P.O.U.R., and private organisations such as the 
National Business Survey Conference and The Share-the-Work Movement, 
Hoover's favoured approach relied upon voluntary initiative in the 
private sector to promote recovery and stabilise business conditions.
The role of government was limited to providing information and 
exhortation, and coordinating these decentralised initiatives.
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Dissatisfaction with Hoover's strategy had been evident since 1930 
and grew as the depression intensified. The dismal failure of Walter 
Teagle's organisation during the last months of Hoover's administration 
confirmed the doubts of many critics about the effectiveness of 
voluntary associationism. By 1933, even the business community had 
come to accept a modicum of government regulation, and welcomed 
government sanctions to ensure observance of rules of fair competition 
throughout industry.
While experience had demonstrated the weaknesses of voluntary 
associationism, it suggested also that central planning of the type 
favoured by intellectuals and organised labour was not politically 
viable. The LaFollette hearings of 1931 had revealed the limited 
constituency which supported the establishment of a national economic 
council. Although LaFollette's bill was moderate in tone because it 
stressed the advisory nature of the proposed council, the proposal 
had radical connotations. The business community, in particular, 
was reluctant to support the bill because spokesmen feared that an 
economic council might serve as an entering wedge for government to 
assume a commanding role in the economy. During 1932 the movement 
to establish a central council began to dissipate after the LaFollette 
hearings indicated that this strategy was unable to achieve the 
necessary consensus in its favour which was vital to its political 
success. One further factor militated against the adoption of a 
central planning strategy by the Roosevelt administration. Neither 
the agencies nor the expertise existed to inspire much confidence in 
this approach given the context of the emergency conditions of 1933. 
Central planning of the type advocated by collectivists such as Stuart 
Chase and George Soule remained, as some academic economists termed 
it, utopian.
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The case for experimentation with trade associationism as public 
policy, however, was relatively persuasive. Proponents of this 
approach had an advantage over the central planners in that they could 
claim that the mechanisms for planning were already developed and 
that businessmen were well-versed in their practices, Unlike voluntary 
associationism, trade associationism had not been tried as public 
policy and was not tainted with the stigma of failure. Also, a powerful 
lobby supported revision of the antitrust laws to facilitate trade 
association activities, and the case for trade associationism had 
been buttressed by the development of a battery of cogent arguments 
in its favour and by the copious publicity which they had received 
during previous years. By 1933, the ground had been well prepared 
for the public and political acceptance of trade associationism.
Finally, trade associationism claimed a broad range of support. While 
the voice of business was dominant in the movement for revision of 
the antitrust laws, the approach was favoured by both organised labour 
and the intellectuals and had even been endorsed, in limited form, 
by Herbert Hoover. Trade associationism, then, was able to meet the 
criterion of consensus, and by 1933 it had become the least common 
denominator which united planners of diverse persuasions.
Professor D.K. Adams has questioned the validity of applying
"isms" to the New Deal and suggests that the essence of New Deal
ideology lies in the way in which it tempered and synthesised diverse,
2and often conflicting, ideas and credos. Indeed, while trade 
associationism was central to the industrial planning strategy employed 
by the N.I.R.A., the Act did not slavishly affect the demands of the
2. D.K. Adams, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (Saffron 
Walden, 1979): 24
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business planners. The measure's scope was broader than that of
trade associationism and included features, such as the labour and
public works provisions, which were unacceptable to many business
spokesmen. Furthermore, the Act provided a major role for
government in the industrial planning process. In doing so, it reflected
both the concern, shared by Hoover, that unsupervised trade associations,
freed from the restraints of the antitrust laws, would develop practices
which were inimical to the public interest, and the collectivists'
conviction that the Federal Government should ensure that economic
development accomplish stipulated social goals. These modifications
typify both the New Deal's flexibility and adaptability, and the
intention of the Roosevelt administration to commit the Federal
Government to responsibility for economic development and social
progress. They typify, also, the New Deal's ambivalence to the
'monopoly' issue, since the role that the N.I.R.A. assigned to
government could be interpreted either as guardian of competition
or as agent of concentration and control. The tension was never resolved,
as Ellis Hawley has noted, and the National Recovery Administration was
to be hampered by inconsistencies in the Interpretation of government's
3role until the agency's eventual demise in 1935.
Professor Adams has noted how the New Deal's concern with 
policy was paralleled by an acknowledgement of political realities, 
and that while the Roosevelt administration was prepared to challenge 
entrenched ideas and interest groups it was ever sensitive to the
3. Hawley, The New Deal and Monopoly, op. cit., 72-110.
374a
power and functions of established interests. In the N.I.R.A 
the criteria of policy and politics coincided. Its aims of 
promoting both short-term economic recovery and the long-term 
stabilisation of industry through national planning reflected 
the consensus that had developed amongst leadership groups in 
the United States, during Hoover's presidency, which was critical 
of the nature of the contemporary political economy and which 
sought to adapt private and public institutions to manage American 
economic development. The trade association strategy, which was 
central to the achievement of the Act's goals, also met the 
criterion of political acceptability. The limitations of alter­
native approaches to national industrial planning had been revealed 
during the first four years of the depression, and the trade 
association strategy commended influential support. With the 
modifications to that strategy effected by the Roosevelt 
administration and Congress which were designed to provide a 
prominent role for government in the planning process and to 
protect competition, the strategy of trade associationism could 
command the same strength of support as did the ideal of national 
industrial planning. In this sense, the N.I.R.A. represented a 
resolution of the divisions which had occurred between 1929 and 
1933 on the most effective means of implementing national 
industrial planning.
4
4. Adams, Roosevelt, op. cit,, 23.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSALS AND RESULTS OF REFERENDUM NO.58, ON THE REPORT OF THE 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS
AND EMPLOYMENT
1. The anti-trust laws should be modified so as 
to make clear that the laws permit agreements 
increasing the possibilities of keeping 
production related to consumption
2. Modification of the anti-trust laws should 
include provision for government supervision 
in order that agreements which are not in 
the public interest in stabilization of 
business operation and employment may be 
nullified.
3. Businesses desiring to combine should have 
the opportunity to ascertain from a suitable 
government authority whether or not the 
proposed combination will be in violation
of the anti-trust laws.
4. The principles of a national economic 
council should be placed into effect.
5. For each field of business a representative 
trade association should perform the 
functions of an economic council
6. Aided by increased opportunity for stability 
of operations, each employer should so plan 
operations as to assure the greatest poss­
ible number of employees there will be work 
for the greatest possible number of weeks
in the year.
7. Aided by increased opportunity for stabil­
ization, employers individually and collec­
tively should provide adequate reserves for 
unemployment and other benefits for their 
employees.
8. Through trade associations employers should 
make such reserves and benefits uniform 
throughout each field of business, in all 
states.
For: 2,446$
Against: 307$
Total : 2,754
% Favourable: ~ 89%
For: 2,092
Against: 627
Total: 2,719
% Favourable: 77%
For: 2,433
Against: 299
Total : 2,732
% Favourable: 90%
For: 2,178
Against: 494$
Total: 2,672$
% Favourable: 81%
For: 2,401$
Against: 278$
Total: 2,680
% Favourable: 90%
For: 2,593
Against: 126
Total: 2,719
% Favourable: 95%
For: 2 , 1 1 0
Against: 493$
Total: 2,603$
% Favourable: 81%
For: 1,995
Against: 575
Total: 2,570
% Favourable: 171
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9. Unemployment which now exists and may
presently occur should be dealt with upon 
an individual basis, locally, through 
organisations to that end.
For: 2,586$ 
Against: 115 
Total: 2,701 $ 
% Favourable: 95%
10. Needed relief should be provided through
private contributions supplemented by state 
and local governments, and without any 
federal appropriations for such purposes.
For: 2,479$ 
Against:' 194$ 
Total: 2,674 
% Favourable: 93%
Source: Silas H. Strawn to Herbert Hoover, 18 December, 1931.
Pres. Box 96 File, Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States, 1931. H.H.L.
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